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Abstract
This thesis is the first full account of Trotsky's writings penned between 
August 1914 and March 1917. The source material used is almost 
exclusively primary, both published and archival, some of which is 
examined here for the first time. Each of Trotsky's concerns as a 
thinker and publicist is illustrated, and each debate followed to its 
conclusion.
The main findings of this thesis are as follows. Trotsky's analysis of 
the causes of the war and his programmatic response to it were logical 
and consistent. Second, although he hoped to unite all internationalists 
around his war programme, differences of opinion with the Bolsheviks 
and the Mensheviks meant that his plans on this issue remained 
unfulfilled. Third, Trotsky's major concern of the First World War period 
was to combat social-patriotism, i.e., socialists who argued that it was 
the proletariat's duty to defend its respective homelands.
Finally, several areas for further investigation which arise out of this 
thesis are suggested.
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CHAPTER ONE
Switzerland
1-1 From Vienna to Switzerland
On the 19th of July 1914 Germany declared war on Russia. Trotsky 
was in Vienna and on the following day he went to the Wienzeille in 
order to question socialist deputies on the likely position of Russian 
emigres. There he met Fritz Adler who informed him that the Austrian 
government had just issued on order to its citizens to be on the look-out 
for suspicious foreigners who should then be reported to the police. 
Trotsky then travelled with Fritz's father, Victor, to the head of the 
Austrian political police to ask for his advice. He was informed that an 
order for the arrest and internment of all Serbs and Russians living in 
Austria would possibly be issued on the next day:
It follows then that you recommend departure?
Certainly, and the quicker the better.
Alright...tomorrow I’ll go to Switzerland with my family.
Well, it would be better to do this today.1
The above conversation took place at three o'clock in the afternoon. 
At 6.10 p.m. Trotsky and his family were on a train bound for 
Switzerland, that 'temporary political watch-tower from which several 
Russian Marxists reviewed the development of those unprecedented 
events.'2
1.2 The Diary in Zurich
Safe in Zurich Trotsky noted his first reactions to the events occurring 
immediately after the outbreak of the First World War in his dairy; a 
literary form he often employed when in difficult circumstances: 
after two to three weeks, when the French and German 
newspapers in Zurich gave a complete picture of the total political 
and moral catastrophe of official socialism, the diary was a 
substitute for a critical and political pamphlet.3
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In the 1914 diary Trotsky did not concern himself with elaborating an 
explanation of the causes for the outbreak of the war. At this point he 
focussed on the collapse of the Second International.
Referring to the ’collapse1 of internationalism Trotsky stressed that 
this did not spring out of a vacuum. In the entry for the 10th of August 
he noted that the question of the danger of war was raised in the 
Second International every three years. During the discussions of this 
issue disagreements had only arisen around the problems of how to 
hinder war efforts and, if war actually started, how to prevent 
’backward' elements from obeying mobilisation orders and how to 
break the war 'with the heads of the ruling classes.’ However, when war 
looked likely the German Social-Democrat Party had entered into 
secret negotiations with its government; the French establishment had 
convinced its Socialist Party of its peace loving nature; and Austrian 
Social-Democrats had announced Austro-Hungary’s ultimatum to 
Serbia to be justified. When the hostilities began German socialists in 
the Reichstag voted for an extra five million in war credits and Austro- 
Hungarian comrades became intoxicated with nationalism. For 
T rotsky,
It is absolutely clear that what happened was not simply 
mistakes, or isolated opportunistic steps, or ’awkward’ 
declarations from the floors of parliaments, or the votes of the 
Grand-Duchy Social-Democrats for the budget, or the 
experiments of French ministerism, or the degeneracy of several 
leaders - what happened was the collapse of the International in 
the most crucial epoch, in relation to which ail the foregoing work 
was only a preparation.4
Elaborating upon this theme on the 12th of August Trotsky 
highlighted Austrian Social-Democracy to illustrate his general point 
that national contradictions were long ago evident in the Second 
International. He cited Victor Adler as describing the International 
Department in Brussels as ’decorative’, and remembered an earlier 
article against the chauvinistic tendencies of the Austrian Social- 
Democratic newspaper Arbeiter Zeitung, which he had felt compelled 
to write and publish in the Neue Zeitung. He labelled Adler's statement 
’short-sighted' in that in a multi-national country such as Austria, the
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external policy of the Austro-German Social-Democrats would always 
have internal repercussions:
One cannot separate the ’German idea1 and the 'German spirit' 
from the 'Slav' idea as the Arbeiter Zeitung did everywhere and 
at the same time unite the German workers with the Slavs. One 
cannot day-in day-out slight the Serbs as 'horsethieves' and 
expect to unite the German workers with the Austrian South- 
Slavs.5
It was the above form of nationalistic spirit which, for Trotsky, had 
directly led to socialists backing the war efforts of their home 
governments:
The Social-Democratic deputy Ellenbogen said at a mass 
meeting in Vienna: 'We are faithful to the German nation in good 
times and bad, in peace and in war'...As a result of this policy the 
party split onto different national groupings, and at the moment of 
war the German Social-Democrats of Austria appeared as a 
subsidiary detachment of the monarchy.6
For Trotsky, what was true of Austrian Social-Democracy was also 
true of its equivalent across Western Europe. Thus, for instance, Bebel 
of the German Social-Democratic Party, ’ at some point promised to put 
a gun on his shoulder for the defence of the fatherland against 
tsarism.'7 And, according to Trotsky, the only distinguishing feature of 
German Social-Democracy was that it kept its formal affiliation to 
internationalism hidden better than any other Western Social- 
Democratic party.8
However, forever the revolutionary optimist, Trotsky did not fall into 
a a mood of absolute despair. Indeed, he viewed the generally positive 
reactions to the outbreak of war and the collapse of the Second 
International as temporary phenomenon.
Trotsky explained initial feelings of joy by reference to the fact that, 
for the workers, war arrives as a break from a routine of life which is 
one of insufferable hell. Moreover, war brings with it promises of 
change for the better. However, for Trotsky, the feelings of the masses 
would go through the following general pattern of rise and fall: the first 
months of the war are a period of hope; this stage is soon concluded 
and followed by worry as the material hardships imposed by war begin
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to be felt; then news of the first 'blessed victories' renews hopes and 
spirits; this tide of joy is then dissipated by a return of the hardships of 
war. The accumulative effect of dashed hopes and privitations can 
then create a situation which leads to a revolution:
War often brings about revolution. This is not so much because 
the war was unsuccessful in a state sense, as because the war 
did not satisfy all expectations.9 
Furthermore, Trotsky noted several developments which put the 
prospects for socialist revolution into a healthy light.
First, with reference to Germany, in the entry for the 15th August, 
Trotsky reacted to the unconfirmed news that Liebknecht had been 
killed in an anti-war demonstration in Berlin be writing that Liebknecht 
had saved the honour and pride of German Social-Democracy. Them 
on 17 August, Mol'kenbur told Trotsky that in the discussions on tactics 
to be adopted in the Reichstag during the vote on the war credits, 36, 
one-third of those present, had voted for a rejection and 15 had 
abstained. Hence, the decision to go to the Reichstag and support the 
government had been passed by a few votes only. For Trotsky, the 
'shameful character' of the German SPD's war vote of 4 August had not 
been removed by the objections of the 36. But, he said,
the figures for the groups inside the fraction are in themselves 
very suggestive for the future: what upset could the vote [for war 
credits] have brought forth among the masses if, even within the 
fraction, the most opportunistic part of the party, almost half of 
the members were against it.10 
Furthermore, according to Trotsky, the war would break the link 
between the German proletariat on the one side, and its Social- 
Democratic organisations on the other. This was a positive 
development since the latter had become influenced by bourgeois 
opinion. According to the diarist, bourgeois influence had stemmed 
from the nature of German Social-Democratic parliamentarianism, i.e., 
the creation of a bureaucracy which had daily contact with the leading 
representatives of bourgeois society. This, in turn, had created an 
atmosphere of compromise which had inevitably reflected on the 
consciousness of the workers' representatives, making them 
susceptible to bourgeois suggestions. For Trotsky, the consequence of
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this process was that in the epoch leading-up to the First World War the 
German masses had received neither an international perspective, nor 
a revolutionary temper, from their representatives. However, 
mobilisation
mechanically and moreover at one blow rips the workers from 
productive and organisational cages: from foremen, trade 
unions, political organisations and so on...putting and uniting 
them in the new fiery and iron cages of regiments, brigades, 
divisions...11
Second, in a discussion of his homeland's prospects Trotsky 
predicted that Russia would not withstand the pressures of war for long. 
Dismissing the notion that the Russian army had put itself to rights after 
the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, Trotsky turned to an evaluation of 
the current condition of the constituent parts of Russia's armed forces. 
To begin with he noted that the Russian peasant had broken with 
patriarchal passivism. The events of the 1905 revolution had, he said, 
awakened a new personality in the Russian peasant: a personality 
which, given continual economic growth in the countryside could have 
taken an individualistic bent, thus providing a support for a bourgeois 
order; but, under the reality of economic uncertainty and ’shocks', was 
still far from bourgeois norms and, as such, not a reliable ally. Then the 
growing numbers of workers and national minority groups as a 
percentage of the army provided a further force for instability. In 
particular, Trotsky pointed to the strikes in St. Petersburg on the eve of 
the war, mentioning their ’revolutionary character, and argued that the 
workers would carry their hatred of the Russian ruling classes into the 
army. And, once there, he predicted that the proletariat would 
recognise its class enemy in the officer corps; a group which, he said, 
had become an integral part of Russia's ruling elite, distinguished for its 
'embezzlement, nepotism and terrible indifference.' For Trotsky, this 
had all the makings of an explosive situation:
From all of this there flows an inevitable, awful disintegration 
which, in its turn, unleashes the revolutionary energy of the 
people. Hence one cannot exclude the possibility that we will be 
returning to the homeland before the year is out.12
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Third, Trotsky thought that socialist planning would grow out of the 
economic dislocation caused by the war. He reached this conclusion 
through an analysis of a debate taking place in Switzerland over how to 
guarantee the supply of essential foodstuffs for the duration of the 
hostilities. Switzerland was not self-sufficient, supplying only one 
quarter of its domestic consumer market. On the 12th August 1914 the 
Zurich Social-Democratic newspaper Volksrecht proposed the 
requisition of all grain and potatoes. These would then be distributed 
through canton and communal organs. Finance was to come from the 
state bank, which would act as a mediator between the state and the 
agricultural sector. Describing this as only one step towards the 
distribution of essentials Trotsky continued,
The more war introduces chaos into international economic 
relations, the more it disorganises production and the means of 
communication, the more one has to distribute the available 
staple foodstuffs ahead of time and wisely. But one can only 
produce and distribute in a wise and economic manner on 
socialist beginnings...Humanity will not be destroyed under the 
smoke of the militarism's wreckage. It scrambles out of this and 
enters on to the real road. Beginning with a concern about the 
planned distribution of potatoes, it moves toward a socialist 
organisation of production.13
Finally, Trotsky retained his revolutionary optimism, derived from his 
belief in Marxism and the proletariat. This is best illustrated by the 
following spirited, polemical entry of 11th August 1914:
One cannot doubt that even in the course of the next few months 
the European proletariat will raise its head and show that the 
European revolution lives under European militarism. Only the 
awakening of the revolutionary socialist movement, which should 
immediately take-on a very energetic form, can lay the basis for a 
new International. One should not doubt that it will be created 
through profound internal struggles, which will not only throw off 
many old elements from socialism but will also widen its base, 
recasting its political appearance. In any case, socialism will not 
be forced to begin from the beginning. The Third International 
will, in a principled sense, mark a return to the First International,
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but from the springboard of the organisational-educational 
conquests of the Second International.
The coming years will be an epoch of socialist revolution. Only the 
revolutionary awakening of the proletariat can stop this war, 
otherwise it...will last until the total exhaustion of the world, 
throwing our civilisation back by several decades...14
1.3 The War and the International
The diary in Zurich also served as a notebook for the writing of 
Trotsky’s first pamphlet of the war - The War and the International. 
Despite some overlap between the two texts, the latter is distinguished 
from the former in that one finds less talk of the death of the Second 
International and more material relating to the war-aims of the Great 
Powers. Indeed, for Trotsky,
The exposure of diplomatic trickery, cheating and knavery is one 
of the most important functions of socialist political agitation.15 
In a discussion of perceptions of the war as one of 'liberation' or 
'defence', Trotsky argued that each of the belligerents viewed the 
hostilities from the standpoint of the power interests of the state. Thus, 
for example, for Austria-Hungary the war was necessary as a way of 
holding a multi-national state intact in the face of ethnic nationalism: 
Austria-Hungary [as] a state organisation...is identical with the 
Hapsburg monarchy...Since Austria-Hungary is surrounded on all 
sides by states composed of the same races as within its 
borders...[it] is compelled to extinguish the hearthfire that kindles 
their political leanings - the independent kingdom of Serbia.16 
In turn, Austrian action was sanctioned by Germany which, for 
several reasons, needed to preserve the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. 
Most notably, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy provided an ideological 
support to a German society dominated by the Junker class. Added to 
this, the Austro-Hungarian army acted as a reserve military contingent 
to Germany's disputes with the Entente.
Trotsky highlighted Germany’s anti-democratic political structures to 
ridicule the notion of Germany waging a war of liberation against 
Russian despotism. This argument was used as a justification for
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involvement in the war by German Social-Democracy but Trotsky 
countered that Russia's autocracy would be preserved by a German 
victory. This was because Russia was necessary to the Junkers in 
much the same way as Austria-Hungary, i.e., tsarism, as a form of 
government, was essentially the same as that of Germany's:
the existence of tsarism strengthens the Hohenzollern monarchy 
and the Junker oligarchy since, if there were no tsarism, German 
absolutism would face Europe as the last mainstay of feudal 
barbarism.17
German imperialists also had one more reason for propping-up 
Nicholas II: since tsarism was inefficient in carrying-out its 
administrative and governmental tasks, Russia was prevented from 
developing into a real rival to German expansion. Thus, reasoned 
Trotsky, in swallowing the ’liberation myth' German Social-Democracy 
had been totally fooled into accepting the claims of German war 
propaganda. It was, he stated, Germany's intention to retain tsarism as 
a political structure after German economic hegemony had been 
established through victory in battle. The real targets of German 
aggression were the more developed and dangerous competitors - 
France and Britain. A successful conclusion to the war for the Central 
Powers would, according to Trotsky, pave the way for an alliance of the 
anti-democratic forces of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia; an 
alliance which would 'mean a period of the darkest reaction in Europe 
and the whole world.'18
Revealing the real reasons for the causes of World War One in 
terms of state-power interests followed from Trotsky's general analysis 
why hostilities had broken out. He traced the origins of the war to ’the 
imperialist antagonisms between the capitalist states.’19 By ’imperialist 
antagonisms’ Trotsky meant a situation in which colonies were 
necessary for the further capitalist development of the advanced 
nations, but there were no more areas remaining ’free’ for colonisation. 
Thus, 'there was nothing left for these states except to grab colonies 
from each other.’19 He cited from the recently published works of Arthur 
Dix and George Irmer as evidence of Germany's imperialist ambition to 
become the dominant world state power. In order to achieve this 
Germany had to destroy the British economy. In turn, Britain had
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entered the war not so much as a point of principle over Belgium 
neutrality, as a German victory there would threaten British domination 
of the sea.21
Trotsky presented his most theoretical exposition of the 
underpinnings of imperialist rivalry in the Preface to War and the 
International. This was Trotsky's first formulation of the causes of the 
war in terms of 'a revolt of the forces of production against the political 
form of nation and state.'22 According to Trotsky, capitalism had 
transformed the world economy into 'one economic workshop1.23 This, 
in turn, demanded international political structures to reflect the nature 
of the economic base. One can see how this approach is in harmony 
with the base/superstructure model of society, outlined by Marx in his 
Preface to A Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy.24 But, 
Trotsky objected, it was not in the nature of capitalism for this task to 
be solved by peaceful, organised cooperation across national 
boundaries. Rather, the capitalist response was to fight for hegemony 
on the world market. Hence, the current imperialist rivalry in which the 
question on the order of the day was: 'which country is by this war to be 
transformed from a Great Power into the World Power [?]'25 However, 
for Trotsky, it was already impossible for a single capitalist country to 
establish a hegemonic position over the world's productive forces. In 
short, the war was a last gamble on behalf of a system which could not 
resolve its own internal contradictions which had developed to the 
full.26 The destruction and chaos introduced by the war would, he 
predicted, lead to economic collapse:
The economic rivalry under the banner of militarism is 
accompanied by robbery and destruction which violate the 
elementary principles of human economy. World production 
revolts not only against the confusion produced by national and 
state divisions but also against the capitalist economic 
organisations, which has now turned into barbarous 
disorganisation and chaos.27
For Trotsky, the only solution to the current crisis was proletarian 
revolution and socialism. The tasks for socialism were to overcome the 
nature of imperialism and the make good the inadequacies of 
capitalism. To begin with, there had to be a socialist organisation of the
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world economy. In order to attain this the international proletariat would 
have to establish what the national capitalist state could not; namely, a 
harmonisation of political forms with productive forces, i.e., an 
international political order. To this end, Trotsky advanced the idea of a 
'republican United States of Europe, as the foundation of the United 
States of the World.'28 At this point Trotsky did not say why Europe 
should be the foundation rather than Africa, America or Australia and 
so on, but he did stress that the Russian revolution would be 'an 
integral part' of the European revolution. Of course, Trotsky had 
emphasised that the Russian revolution could only survive if a wider 
European revolution came to its aid in Results and Prospects. 
However, in this earlier work of 1906 this point was made through an 
argument based on necessity, i.e., the contradictions facing a workers’ 
government in a predominantly peasant country could only be 
overcome if help was received from the victorious proletariat of the 
advanced West. Now Trotsky related this link between revolution in 
Russia and in France, Britain and Germany to the creation of a 
republican United States of Europe, the urgency of which flowed out of 
the revolt of the productive forces against the limitations of national 
boundaries.
A final point of note in the War and the International is that 
imperialism is viewed as a source both of working-class support for the 
imperialist state and of eventual working-class rebellion. Initially the 
workers back their home government in its imperialist designs as this 
meets the immediate needs of their economic position: the more 
successful the imperialist ambitions of the capitalist state, the more 
wealth in that society; some of which would go to the workers. When the 
imperialist state engages in war, however, the chance arises that the 
workers will revolt because of the hardships imposed by the military 
situation. Most notably, the violent behaviour of the imperialist 
competitors acts as lesson to the working-class. Any former allegiance 
to bourgeois legality would, Trotsky stated, by smashed:
Is it not clear that all these circumstances must bring about a 
profound change in the mental attitude of the working class, 
curing them radically of the hypnosis of legality in which a period 
of political stagnation expresses itself?...the terrible poverty that
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prevails during this War and will continue after its close, will be of 
a sort to force the masses to violate many a bourgeois law.29 
For socialists to win over the workers to their side during the then 
current hostilities Trotsky recommended them to adopt the slogan of 
Peace.30
1.4 Conclusion
Trotsky's stay in Switzerland was brought to a close by an invitation he 
received from the Ukrainian newspaper Kievskaya Mysl' to work as its 
war correspondent in France. Although he spent less than three 
months in neutral Switzerland he could leave for Paris feeling that he 
had made several accomplishments. He had formulated his response 
to three very important questions: Why had the Second International 
collapsed?; What had caused the war?; and, finally, What slogans 
should socialists advance to reunite the proletariat around a 
revolutionary programme of action? Most importantly, he had arranged 
for his pamphlet War and the International to be translated and 
published in German.31 Trotsky thought this to be of supreme 
importance, especially given that the German Social-Democratic 
movement had been the most powerful section of the Second 
International. In later years Trotsky remained proud of the fact that he 
had been sentenced by a German court for the contents of his Zurich 
pamphlet.32 The ideas expressed in it will also feature in subsequent 
chapters, which examine the articles penned by Trotsky while a 
resident of Paris during World War One.
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CHAPTER TWO
Trotsky & Kievskaya Mysl'
2.1 From Switzerland to Paris
On the 19th of November 1914 Trotsky crossed the French border as 
war correspondent for the newspaper Kievskaya Mysl'. He 
subsequently summarised his initial impressions of the situation he 
found in Paris in several texts: first, in 1917 in a series of articles taken 
'from a notebook' and published in the Russian emigre newspaper 
Novyi Mir'. These articles were then reprinted by Trotsky, with some 
additions, in War and the Revolution, issued in 1922. Finally, Trotsky 
included a brief account of his arrival in Paris in his autobiography of 
the late 1920s, My Life. These sources are interesting when 
juxtaposed, as Trotsky took some sections from the 1917 and 1922 
texts and placed them unaltered in his autobiography. Other parts were 
changed or omitted altogether. One can illustrate this process with the 
example of Trotsky's explanations of why he accepted the job offer 
from Kievskaya Mysl'. In War and Revolution he wrote that 'I accepted 
Kievskaya Myslus offer the more willingly as it gave me the possibility to 
become better acquainted with France's political life in that critical 
epoch.'1 Later, in My Life, Trotsky changed the account of his 
motivation to a 'chance to get closer to war.'2
Whatever the real reason for his acceptance, Trotsky, according to 
his reminiscences, discovered a subdued Paris:
Paris was sad. The hotels stood empty...There were many 
women in black everywhere...Children played at war and many of 
them had been dressed in military uniforms by their mothers. 
Wounded convalescents with fresh crosses on their chests 
walked the streets. Old men...talked respectfully and ingratiatingly 
with them. There were many of those uncompromising 
supporters of 'war to the finish' who walked the streets then: too 
young for military service in 1870 and now too old...3 
Trotsky describes the mood in his hotel during a Zeppelin attack. 
Arriving there after walking through the streets during a black-out, in
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which he had witnessed a searchlight pointing to the sky from the Eifel 
Tower, he found the guests sitting by candles reading, talking, or 
playing cards. Later the alarm bells rang to signal that the raid was 
over. Those who had bothered to go to the cellars returned to their 
floor. Trotsky laconically recounts that, 'on the next day the 
newspapers said on which part of the town the bombs had fallen and 
how many people had died.’4
However, even when painting such a sombre picture Trotsky did not 
permit the possibility of workers' unrest to slip totally from view: 
the cafes closed towards eight o'clock on an evening. 'What 
explains the last measure,' I asked people in the know, - 'It's very 
simple: General Gallieni, the Governor of Paris, does not want the 
public to gather there. In such an epoch as ours cafes, for the 
working class who are occupied during the day, can easily 
become centres for the expression of criticism and 
dissatisfaction.5
Trotsky was, though, particularly pessimistic about the state of 
French politics. He spoke of the possibility of a Bonapartist coup d'etat 
when Joffre's authority stood on the highest possible level after the 
German attack had been repulsed at Marne. However, for a 
Bonapartist uprising one needs a Bonapart and, according to Trotsky, 
'never had mediocrity reigned so brightly in the Third Republic as at 
that tragic time.'6 For Trotsky, the most prominent politician was 
Aristide Briand, an 'instigator of bribery and corruption, the clearest 
mockery of a "great", "national", "liberating war".'7 Among the Russian 
emigres Trotsky met the light of patriotism shining brightly. The 
Russian workers in Paris were 'disorientated and confused.'8 In his 
summary of these impressions we find Trotsky at his bleakest:
Individual opposition elements were scattered about here and 
there, but they showed almost no signs of life. It seemed as if 
there were no gleams of a better future.9
2.2 Trotsky as War Correspondent for Kievskaya Mvsl'.
Trotsky had previously worked as a war correspondent for Kievskaya 
Mysl1 during the Balkan Wars:
Trotsky & Kievskaya Mysl'
At the time of the Balkan Wars, when the imperialist mood had 
still not captured wide petty-bourgeois circles, including the 
intelligentsia, I was able on the pages of Kievskaya Mysl1 to 
conduct an open struggle against the raids and crimes of the 
union of diplomats in the Balkans and against that neo-Slav 
imperialism on the soil of which the Kadet opposition signed an 
agreement with the third of June monarchy.10 
In The Prophet Armed Isaac Deutscher pointed out that Trotsky’s 
writings have either been ignored or given attention depending upon 
the extent to which they were bound up with his political fortunes.11 He 
further claimed that if this situation had not been so, then Trotsky would 
have been given a place in literature on the basis of his contributions 
for the newspaper Kievskaya Mysl1 during the First World War.12 
However, although Deutscher was right to draw attention to the 
Kievskaya Mysl1 articles, he provided only a brief exposition of these 
writings.13 Moreover, Deutscher’s evaluation of the nature of these 
texts is at variance with that given by Trotsky himself. This difference of 
opinion has, not surprisingly, been ignored by subsequent Trotsky 
biographers. After all, Deutscher himself did not realise that his own 
interpretation was at variance with Trotsky’s.14 This has meant that 
Trotsky's own view of his writings for the newspaper Kievskaya Mysl1 
during World War One has been overlooked in scholarly accounts of 
his life; Deutscher’s version standing alone as ’orthodoxy’. The rest of 
this chapter has two aims. First, to fill the lacuna left by Deutscher’s 
exposition. Second, to evaluate the conflicting interpretations of author 
and biographer.
2.3 Trotsky, Deutscher and Kievskaya Mysl1
In the 1922 introduction to War and Revolution Trotsky explained why a 
non-Marxist publication such as Kievskaya Mysl1 should have hired a 
Marxist. This he did with reference to the social, political and economic 
structure of Kiev.15 According to Trotsky, Kiev had a weak industry and 
this meant that the class struggle did not take on such an open form 
there as in places like Petrograd. This, in turn, resulted in a gentry- 
intelligentsia led democratic opposition movement. This movement
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acquired a radical element in response to Tsarist political oppression 
which, in the Kievan context, had the additional burden of measures 
directed against nationalities:
This explains the general policy of the editors, who associated 
themselves neither with Social-Democracy nor with the working 
class, to set aside a very wide space for Marxist contributors and 
allow them to explain events, especially foreign, even from a 
social-revolutionary point of view.16
From November 1914 to December 1916 Trotsky wrote a total of 
sixteen articles for Kievskaya Mysl'. By the end of this period the 
newspaper had, according to Trotsky, 'under the pressure of bourgeois 
social opinion and the prods of social-patriotic contributors gone over 
to patriotism, aspiring only to preserve "allusions of the great 
homeland."'17
One thus learns that Trotsky was able to continue to work for the 
newspaper, which had previously hired him at the time of the Balkan 
Wars, until it changed its character.
Isaac Deutscher, however, makes no such distinction in the nature 
of the newspaper as it developed over time. Deutscher highlights two 
particular constraints which Trotsky had placed upon his reportage by 
becoming an employee of Kievskaya Mysl'. First, the newspaper 
supported the war and this meant that,
Trotsky could tell his readers in Russia only half the truth as he 
saw it, that half which somehow fitted in with official Russian 
policy. He tried on occasion to tell it in such a manner that the 
shrewd reader should guess the suppressed half of the story.18 
This view could be used to explain Trotsky's later reluctance to 
elaborate on his contributions for Kievskaya Mysl' in his 
autobiography, My Life. In My Life Trotsky focused exclusively upon his 
work for the political newspapers Golos and Nashe S/ovo.19 If 
Deutscher's view is correct then Trotsky's omission would be 
understandable. After all, why bother with a series of articles, written for 
a newspaper over which one had no editorial control, which did not 
reflect the full range of one's views?20
However, Deutscher's commentary is true of only a tiny proportion 
of Trotsky's articles. For example, 'The Bosnian Volunteer'
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(14.12.1914) does end on an enigmatic note: ’You say that the war has 
deeper reasons? Certainly, one does not doubt this.'21 But on other 
occasions there is no room for doubt on the author's exact intended 
meaning. Thus, for example, in 'The Seventh Infantry Regiment in the 
Belgium Epic' (4&6.3.1915) it is argued that the positions of the pro- 
and anti-German sections of the Belgian bourgeoisie had nothing to do 
with the rights of nations, but everything to do with the rights of 
property:
Could one allow the Germans through Belgium? Nobody 
permitted this, apart from small commercial and industrial circles 
who were directly dependent upon German capital. For the 
peasantry and for the petty-bourgeoisie the issue was absolutely 
clear: one could not allow the Germans. Certainly this was not 
because it was contrary to international law but because a 
German army entering Belgium would not want to leave it. 
Moreover, an army on the march grabs and ruins everything that 
it comes across. One had to fight.22
The economic interests underpinning military action were further 
illustrated in 'Two Armies' (4.12.1914). Here Trotsky argued that, 
initially, Germany did not want to attack France and Belgium. These 
countries posed no economic threat to Germany and Germans could 
even admire certain aspects of the French 'character1. However, 'sad 
necessity' dictated the military defeat of France and Belgium in the 
struggle against 'the deadly enemy of German imperialism, 
England...one had to defeat France to get to England, and the shortest 
path to the heart of France was through Belgium.'23
Moreover, if Trotsky did not always engage in explicit Marxist 
analysis, he was still able to bring Marxist conclusions to the attention 
of the reader. For example, in 'From whence it came' (22.3.1915) he 
highlighted the futility of individual terrorism in the struggle to liberate a 
nation.24 The division between mental and manual labour under 
capitalism was criticised in 'War and Technology' (21,12.1915). Trotsky 
pointed out that the development of the machinery of war takes place in 
the intellectual atmosphere of laboratories and this deprives research 
of the actual and real physical test of action, something which happens 
comparatively rarely:
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If the exclusiveness of the division between mental and manual 
labour shows itself to be strongly negative in all contemporary 
production, then it shows itself to be directly fatal in the military 
sphere where arms are applied only in the comparatively short 
period of war.26
According to Trotsky, one thus enters a situation in which the beginning 
of a campaign is characterised by the failure of technology going 
through its first real test. In the course of the war technical problems are 
continually solved until a full success rate has been achieved by its 
conclusion. A new period of peace then condemns military 
inventiveness to return to the laboratory where it is once again subject 
to the limitations of the division between mental and manual labour. 
The smooth operation of the best developed technology by the end of 
one war is totally outdated by the time of the next. Indeed, the article 
ends by suggesting that the nature of modern technology would like 
wars to occur more frequently: 'Is one not brought to the conclusion 
that war happens too rarely for present-day technology?'26
'All Roads Lead to Rome' (20.1.1915) serves to illustrate the futility 
of religious belief. The article outlines the desires of Catholics of various 
countries to receive the Pope's blessing for their campaign of national 
defence. However, the Pope's response is shown to be a series of 
political manoeuvres with two basic 'unholy' intentions. First, to secure 
the role of broker in any future peace negotiations for the Pope. 
Second, to attain maximum advantage in such negotiations for the 
papacy: 'in such a way universal neutrality is turned into a tool of 
political bargaining.'27
The primacy of social conflict was the subject of Trotsky's first 
article of 20 November 1914. Here he discussed the war as a political 
moratorium; a temporary suspension of national contradictions which 
would once again resurface. He presented this thought through an 
analysis of Austria-Hungary, although his underlying idea could easily 
be generalised as true for many countries. He begins by describing a 
patriotic demonstration outside the War Ministry in Vienna on 2nd 
August and asking what made people behave in this way. After all, 
Austria-Hungary, unlike Switzerland and the United States, had not 
successfully solved the problem of nationality in a multi-national state.
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The Swiss population might be split in loyalty towards France and 
Germany, but if either country attacked Switzerland then all cantons 
would rush to its defence. For Trotsky, this was due to the fact that life 
in Switzerland offered so many advantages. The same could not be 
said of Austria-Hungary. Formed as a central-European defence 
against Turkey, the Austro-Hungarian state had not yet fallen prey to 
the centrifugal tendencies that had destroyed Turkey for two negative 
reasons: the weaknesses of the various nationalities and the strength 
of reactionary forces. Furthermore, this situation also prevented 
Austria-Hungary from becoming another Switzerland:
It is true that capitalism brings about a meeting of tendencies to 
economic unification. But the capitalist development of Austria, 
exhausted by landowners and militarism, developed very slowly.
A real exit for the Danube peoples onto the great historical road 
would be the reconstruction of their state structure on the Swiss 
model: not only would this make Austria-Hungary invulnerable, it 
would also turn it into a focus of overwhelming attraction for all 
those national fragments spread along its periphery. But the 
cultural backwardness of a large part of the population and 
especially those reactionary historical forces which today are still 
the bearers of the Austro-Hungarian state stand as obstacles to 
the path of regeneration. Hence the national chaos which forms 
the internal life of the Danube monarchy.28
In the absence of positive feelings towards the state Trotsky focused 
on two factors in explaining the rise of patriotic feelings. First, war 
breaks the normal routines of life. In such a worrying situation the state 
- armed from head to foot - seems to be the most stable institution to 
which one can turn for comfort. Second, in the immense changes which 
war causes people hope for the better, the state becomes the 
repository of these hopes. However, Trotsky made it clear that this 
harmony between the population and the state would only be 
temporary. His warning to patriots and to any supporters of the existing 
order was clear; national and social contradictions would return:
In relation to the first epoch of the war placing one's hopes on 
radical, national and social movements...was, at root, unfounded 
when the government, even while shaking completely from
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centrifugal forces which it had only managed to suppress 
mechanically, immediately became master of the 
situation...Mobilisation and the declaration of war appear to wipe 
all national and social contradictions in the country from the face 
of the earth. But this is only an historical adjournment, a political 
moratorium. The promissory note has been rewritten for a new 
time, but they will still have to pay for it...29
In the biographical essay ’Jean Jaures’ (12.7.1915) Trotsky clearly 
delineated reformist and revolutionary approaches to the solution of 
social conflict. Reformism is shown to be a compromise with the 
bourgeoisie which had not been able to prevent neither the exploitation 
of the workers nor the outbreak of war. However, according to Trotsky, 
the war amounted to a break with the previous era of conservatism and 
reform. The future belonged to revolution:
The working classes, in the last decades grasping the idea of 
socialism, are only now in the terrible ordeals of war acquiring a 
revolutionary temper. We are entering a period of unprecedented 
revolutionary tremors. From out of its ranks new organisations 
will be advanced by the masses and new leaders will stand at its 
head...When the European revolution turns to the liquidation of 
the war it, along the way, will also open the secret of Jaures’ 
death to us.30
Even in seemingly neutral, factual accounts Trotsky managed to 
include something related to Marxism. For instance, the problem of 
class is raised in the short biography of the commander-in-chief of the 
British forces, Sir John French. Ireland, French's place of birth, is 
referred to as that place where ’landlords rule over an emaciated 
country like demi-gods, where in the ruling strata there reigns a most 
conducive atmosphere for raising military leaders of the old ’’heroic’’ 
type/31
In ’Two Armies' Trotsky compared the economic and social origins 
of the German and French armies and how this affected their 
respective strategies. For Trotsky, the German army possessed the 
mightier technology, a reflection of Germany's higher level of capitalist 
development:'...in the last analysis war techniques are dependent upon 
a country's general technical-industrial development.’32 However,
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militarism is not only technology, but also the skill of humans who 
control the machinery. According to Trotsky, Germany also had an 
advantage in the field of human resources. This was in two senses. 
First, again as a result of its industrial development, Germany had a 
greater quantity of workers who, as a class, were 'not only more 
intelligent and more able to adapt to conditions than peasants, but had 
greater powers of endurance.'33 A second, and more important factor, 
was the German officer class; a united group whose whole lives and 
thoughts were dedicated to the practice of war. German social 
development had, for Trotsky, been characterised by a lack of 
revolutionary traditions and the late development of a strong and 
independent bourgeoisie. The tasks of capitalist development had 
therefore been handed to the Junkers:
The liberal bourgeoisie did not go beyond the boundaries of a 
'loyal opposition', forever commissioning the Junkers to bring 
order into the capitalist society and spreading its military might. 
Finally, when capitalist development placed new tasks of a world 
character before the German bourgeoisie it, as before, 
commissioned the Junkers united around the monarchy to lead 
the military nation.34
This, in turn, led to the development of an offensive strategy:
All German strategy was built on attack. This corresponds to the 
basic conditions of Germany's social development: to the rapid 
growth of the population and richness on the one hand and to the 
backward state structure on the other. The German Junkers have 
a "will to power" and in directing this will the nation provides the 
highest technology and qualified human material.35 
France, according to Trotsky, had a totally different tradition and 
had thus developed a different strategy. Formed through a series of 
revolutionary periods France's petty-bourgeois republican regime did 
not consider itself to be compatible with the foundation of a standing 
army. However, the petty-bourgeois radicals thought one needed 
some type of army to guarantee order. So, an army was retained but in 
conditions of disputes over which exact form its military organisation 
should take and without the status of the German army. Thus, there 
arose a situation which Jaures called 'the bastard regime', in which old
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and new forms collided and neutralised each other. The former French 
major Drian is cited as comparing a German army united in the spirit of 
attack and a French army whose officers were split in a struggle 
between monarchists and masons. Furthermore, Drian declared that 
the masons had separated the state and the church and had thus 
deprived the French army of the psychological cement of religion. For 
Trotsky, all of this had the consequence that France developed a 
defensive strategy which corresponded to its social structure:
The country's petty-bourgeois and strongly conservative 
economic structure did not permit imperialist desires on a world 
scale. A halting population growth demanded caution in relation 
to human material.36
The second constraint which Deutscher pinpoints follows on from 
the first. As Kievskaya Myslf supported official Russian policy Trotsky 
was forced to focus upon a critique of Germany:
in his articles he had to tack about cautiously to avoid a breach 
with the paper. The Kievan editor was only too glad to publish the 
Paris correspondent's denunciations of German imperialism, but 
his criticisms of the Entente were unwelcome.37 
However, Trotsky did write about the problems of the Entente and in 
such a way that could not have been particularly reassuring for those 
who supported it. Moreover, the newspaper did publish these 
contributions. For instance, the 'Japanese Question' (6.1.1915) 
portrays a desperate France in dispute over whether it should enlist 
Japanese help in the immense task of forcing German troops from its 
territory. The problems facing the French government were not only 
related to how much compensation they would have to give to Japan 
and if they could afford it, but also concerned the fact that they did not 
have total control over this issue. Apart from inability to meet any 
demands that Japan might set, there existed only two paths for any 
Japanese forces travelling to Europe: by land across Russia and by sea 
under British protection. However, 'Japan has formal ties only with 
Britain and...it is precisely Britain who is less than others interested in 
quickening the pace of military operations.'38 Moreover, if Trotsky did 
have a bias, then he also gave an explicit warning to his readers to be 
wary of war reports for this very reason:
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The correspondent himself is not objective. He is a passionate 
agent in this drama: a national wire between the battle and 
society. He aims to cheer up his own people and to terrorise the 
enemy. Correspondents paint their judgements, conclusions and 
factual accounts in certain colours.39 
Furthermore, if the role of the First World War correspondents was to 
boost national morale then Trotsky certainly did not fulfil his duties. 
Morale could hardly have been increased by the following description 
of a war-weary Europe after 12 months of hostilities:
I remembered clearly that cold autumn morning when I arrived in 
France from Switzerland. Then the war was still new...people 
were a lot more generous than they are now. In the past months 
everybody has become poorer in money, enthusiasm and hopes 
- the rich mourn. Then, in that autumn...everyone spoke anxiously 
about the winter campaign and of hopes for a great spring 
offensive...Winter and spring came and now summer is already 
rushing towards autumn. Once again people in wagons and in 
families talk anxiously about the coming winter.40 
In several articles Trotsky wrote moving accounts of the horrors of 
war, both for civilians and for soldiers. In, for example, The Seventh 
Infantry Regiment in the Belgium Epic' the military career of a Belgian 
law student, De Baer, provides the background against which Trotsky 
presents a brilliant exposition of human lives thrown into turmoil by the 
fall of Belgium. The article begins by portraying the university town of 
Leuven - small, quiet, provincial. There the happy, moderately hard 
working De Baer studied law. The war caught him totally unawares; at 
that time procrastinating over whether to join the ruling clerics or the 
liberal opposition. However, at this stage confidence was high that, 
together with the French, the Belgians would reach Berlin in several 
weeks. These illusions were soon shattered in the face of rapid 
German victories. In depicting De Baer's first taste of battle and a 
defeated army on the retreat, Trotsky vividly illustrates the cruelties of 
war. During the hostilities around the town of Aerskot De Baer stumbles 
across a dead woman: 'both breasts were cut off, below the stomach 
was a gaping wound.'41 Over the next months the regiment retreated, 
engaged on several occasions with the enemy, was promised rest and
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then immediately recalled to battle, and was even once victorious. In 
retreat the army was in confusion, feeling shame for what they were 
leaving behind:
A stream of retreating army mixed with a whirlpool of people full of 
desperation...Women roamed the town carrying children...An old 
woman, loudly wailing, pushed an armchair with an old paralysed man 
in it...Children ran between the soldiers ranks, crying and searching for 
their parents..."Colonel!", cried a grey clean-shaven old man...,"you are 
leaving us to the tyranny of the Germans!" The colonel...silently moved 
ahead.42
For De Baer his personal fate had fallen along with that of his 
country. What use would a knowledge of Belgian law be in a country 
dominated by Germany? However, this mood was soon to be replaced 
by one of self-preservation. Surviving while his comrades fell De Baer 
was tortured by the thought of whether he would be one part of that 
group of people who survived war without a scratch: his life was ruled 
by this 'law of statistics.1 This turned out to be the case but, in the 
meantime, he was a witness to the dehumanising experience of war. As 
a law-student De Baer was twice called-upon to defend soldiers 
accused of a breach of discipline. One of those he defended (Ekkhaut) 
was acquitted and later befriended De Baer in the trenches. At night it 
was cold and while the soldiers slept, anxiously awaiting a German 
attack, Ekkhaut would carefully cover De Baer with half of his clothes. 
On the dawn of their last day in the trenches in Izer, De Baer was 
suddenly awoken by the familiar sound of attack. He sensed a 
movement to his right and he recoiled in horror: 'under the shared 
clothes lay Ekkhaut's motionless body: the bullet had entered right 
between his eyes leaving a small accurate hole.'43 The craters left by 
enemy shells would be modified into graves by the same shovels that 
had dug the trenches. When the Germans attacked De Baer shot 
mechanically at a seemingly mechanic procession of bodies moving 
towards him: 'it did not have anything tragic in itself because there was 
already nothing human in it.'44 After losing his glasses in battle De Baer 
was sent to a military hospital. There it was discovered that he was too 
short-sighted for military service and he was discharged. The dead 
bodies, danger and filth of the trenches were behind him. Trotsky
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stressed the futility of war in reporting the final reward that De Baer 
received for his courage: 'A new life started for De Baer. He roamed 
without connections, almost dishevelled and always hungry...'45
Trench warfare was a new phenomenon and Trotsky devoted 
several (negative) articles to this subject. In 'Fortresses or Trenches?' 
(1.10.1915) he addressed the question of whether the trenches had 
replaced the medieval fortresses of old. Reviewing opinions both for 
and against, Trotsky argued that modern warfare had rendered 
fortresses anachronistic in two ways. First, as witnessed in Northern 
France and Belgium, it was able to reduce them to rubble. Second, one 
needed large stocks of shells to protect a fortress. Trenches also 
demanded huge quantities of shells, but from the attacking side only. 
Trotsky painted a picture of future wars in which underground defences 
would play an even greater role: 'a refuge, warehouses, workshops, 
electrical stations...spread along a wide space...not open to heavy 
enemy artillery fire.'46 In the meantime, the triumph of the trenches was 
so dear that both militarists and pacifists worshipped them:
One [pacifist], apparently Swiss, arrived at the happy thought that 
one could abolish war if one strengthened the state borders with 
trenches protected by mighty electrical currents. The poor golden 
pacifist who seeks refuge in the trenches!47 
In 'The Trenches’ (20.9.1915) Trotsky moved from a macro-analysis 
of the general role of trenches in war to a micro-view of the everyday 
life of the soldiers in them. This experience is portrayed as one of 
physical and mental monstrosity. The trenches are described as 
'decisive boundaries, the smallest crossing of which by either side is 
paid for with numerous victims.'48 Constructed from whatever material 
at hand ('tree trunks...haversacks filled with earth, greatcoats of dead 
Germans'49) the trenches become an underground 'temporary 
sanctuary.'50 Trotsky answered the cries of the French press that the 
Germans had forced the French into 'disgusting dumps' by stressing 
that soldiers from all nations shared a similar experience: 'the originality 
of the national genius is still safeguarded by one field: the French sit in 
the trenches like the Germans, like the Russians, like the Italians.'51 
Arriving at the trenches the soldier enters the zone of military danger,
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his closest contact with the enemy. This in itself induces order into the 
ranks; all thoughts are of self-preservation:
Here, in the trenches, there is very little thought about the general 
tasks of the war and, although this may seem paradoxical, even 
less about the enemy. Certainly the enemy trenches which send 
death...are always at the centre of the soldier's attention. But here 
he thinks not about Germany, not about the Emperors’s plans, 
not of German exports, not of the historical enemy - he thinks of 
the pieces of lead or metal from which one has to save oneself 
and return the compliment to the enemy trenches...The enemy 
lives the same life, experiences common events with the same 
feelings...In incessant struggle they imitate one another: raising 
periscope against periscope, grenade against grenade...Equally 
uncertain whom destiny promises to blow-up first.52 
The trenches and the war become so intertwined that the removal of 
the former leads to the cessation of the latter. For example, Trotsky 
quotes from a Russian volunteer's letter - written at the time of the July 
floods - which reports how all soldiers, as if in silent agreement, did not 
fire at each other. It was only after the common task of pumping out the 
water and returning to the trenches had been completed that the war 
resumed.
The trenches are also the means by which the soldier orientates 
himself. After a period of time and increasing familiarity the soldier 
looks upon the trench 'not only as a defence, but also as a flat.’53 If 
enemy fire is not too heavy then one company can occupy the same 
trench for a long period and life becomes regulated. For each soldier 
this underground life induces feelings of isolation. According to Trotsky, 
these feelings are expressed in two ways. First, a process already 
observed in barracks, prisons and boarding-houses. The soldiers 
develop their own language to describe old and new phenomena as 
they appear to them from the point of view of their own trench. Fresh 
soldiers from the latest levy are called ’Marie-Louise’; the biggest 
enemy shells are labelled 'pots’ and so on. Second, the soldiers 
become self-centred and feel themselves to be cut-off from civilian life. 
Letters from home awaken half-forgotten thoughts and anxieties. 
However, the trenches soon recapture their thoughts and domestic
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concerns are blotted out. Trotsky follows a group of soldiers home on 
leave to illustrate the extent of the psychological effects of trench 
warfare on the soldier to the reader:
In the family, in the home village...despite all joy at not meeting 
danger they do not feel right. There is no longer that former 
equanimity between them and home. Psychological contact is not 
immediately renewed...The four days soon pass...the returning 
soldiers meet their comrades. They chatter about leave but the 
trenches have already captured their thoughts. They talk about 
them, remember and foresee. Isolation absorbs them more 
psychologically than they are physically entrapped in it.54 
Trotsky often focussed upon the psychological effects of war. His 
article entitled The Psychological Mysteries of the War' (11.9.1915) is 
perhaps his strongest attack on the futility of the then current events. 
He argues that individuals had had no control over the origins of the 
war. Indeed, people had struggled to come to terms with a reality thrust 
upon them:
...great events do not arise from the springs of consciousness but, 
on the contrary, events arise from the combinations, mutual 
actions and intersections of great objective historical forces, only 
later forcing our inert, lazy psychology...to accommodate itself to 
them. All the united voices of guns and rifles cry out this fact in the 
fate of contemporary culture and nations in general...The war 
came without their knowledge and against their consciousness: it 
revealed itself to them and subordinated to itself not only the 
whole material-social life in all of its complexity but also the 
nation’s spirit of survival, separate social groups, small collectives 
and individuals, the feelings and thoughts of the rulers and the 
ruled...workers' organisations and universities, mothers and 
lovers.55
According to Trotsky, all of this amounted to nothing less than the 
waste of a whole generation of creative talent:
Current events have...placed the question of those 
degenerations, which have occurred and are occurring in the 
psychological light of the European nations, its most lively and 
artistic generation which is presently entrapped in...divisions...and
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through barracks, depots, camps, and trenches go through all 
the stages which bring them closer to the focus of contemporary 
events: to physical clashes with the enemy, attacks, defence, 
retreat, so that part of one's cadres can be crossed-out from the 
books of the living and the other part, through medical textbooks, 
field hospitals and homes for convalescents again return to 
society blinded, armless and legless...56
2.4 Conclusion
Trotsky's articles for Kievskaya Mysl' not only covered a wide range of 
topics - war and technology, religion, psychology, biography, the 
origins of history etc. * they were also rich in anti-war sentiment. 
Moreover, he was able to write from a Marxist perspective. It is true that 
Trotsky published his more overtly political and polemical writings on, 
for example, social-patriotism among ’Left' groupings in Golos and 
Nashe Slovo; but then such articles were more suited to the nature of 
those newspapers. A survey of his contributions published in Kievskaya 
Mysl' support Trotsky's own claim that he was able to write freely for 
the newspaper until it went totally over to the side of patriotism, rather 
than Deutscher's account of a Trotsky continually forced into half- 
truths. The next chapter will examine what effect, if any, the censor in 
Paris had upon Trotsky's writings for the Russian internationalist press 
published in the French capital.
However, before moving on, it is worth noting that Trotsky's work as 
war reporter for Kievskaya Mysl' was also significant for his future 
career as military commander. It is true the Trotsky's first stint as war 
correspondent for the Ukrainian newspaper of 1912-13 afforded him 
better opportunities to become acquainted with war; in 1914 Kievskaya 
Mysl' did not demand that he accompany the army to the front, nor 
were war correspondents permitted to do so by the authorities. 
However, he was able to visit Marseilles, Menton, Boulogne and Calais 
where he spoke with British and Belgian soldiers about their 
experiences of battle.57 It was this knowledge of war and its participants 
which was later used by the founder and leader of the Red Army in the 
Russian Civil War.
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CHAPTER THREE
Trotsky and the Censor in Paris 
during World War One
3.1 Introduction
On the 12th of November 1914 Leon Trotsky crossed the French 
border as war correspondent for the newspaper Kievskaya Mysl'. 
However, the vast majority of his journalistic writings of his stay in Paris 
during World War One did not appear in the Ukrainian publication, but 
in Golos and its successors, Nashe Slovo and Nachaicr, socialist 
newspapers produced by Russian emigres residing in the French 
capital. Nashe Slovo contains the richest store of Trotsky's writings of 
this period: it survived longer than its predecessor and successor, and 
its production coincided with Trotsky's time in Paris.
In The Prophet Armed Trotsky’s most famous and most influential 
biographer gave the following account of Nashe Slovo:
Nashe Slovo began to appear on 29 January 1915. This was a 
modest sheet of two, rarely four, pages abundantly strewn with 
white spaces marking the censor's deletions, and yet packed with 
news and comment. The paper was constantly in danger of being 
killed off by the censor and by its own poverty.1 
Deutscher's emphasis upon the censor's far from helpful interference 
followed Trotsky's own interpretation. In the introduction to War and 
Revolution, for example, Trotsky mentioned two particular difficulties in 
the production of a radical Russian newspaper in war time France; first 
fiscal and second the censor:
The newspaper was published with great material and technical 
difficulties. Before the issue of the first number there were 
approximately 30 francs in Antonov's and Manuil'skii's 'cash 
register1. It goes without saying that not one so-called common 
sensical man could have believed that one could have published 
a daily revolutionary newspaper with this basic 'capital'; especially 
in conditions of war, chauvinist fury and the censor's brutality.2
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In turn, when Trotsky came to write his autobiography at the end of the 
1920s he said of Nashe Slovo, 'under the blows of deficit and the 
censor, disappearing and soon appearing under a new name, the 
newspaper survived in the course of 2 years, i.e., until the 1917 
February Revolution.^ And thus the matter has stood until this day; 
Deutscher's and Trotsky's claims about the censor have not be en 
examined.
However, some of the articles which were completely or partly 
censored when they were sent for approval were later published in 
fuller form when the two volume War and Revolution was issued in 
Moscow and Petrograd between 1922-1924. When Trotsky gathered 
his writings of the First World War period he obviously checked their 
contents for suitability of publication. It was most likely during this task 
that he seized the opportunity of filling in some of the gaps left by the 
censor's white marks. This was probably a hit and miss process. 
Trotsky was proud of his excellent memory,4 but even he could not 
reconstruct all of the censored articles as exact reproductions of their 
original. When one compares the versions published in War and 
Revolution against Nashe Slovo one can see that the text 
subsequently inserted by Trotsky is not equal to that removed by the 
censor.
However, despite the fact that Trotsky's reconstructions are not as 
accurate as one would like, his efforts do enable us to do several 
things. First, we learn what Trotsky wanted to say to his readership at 
the time but was prevented from doing so. Second, we can check 
whether the censor cut certain themes consistently. We thus enter the 
mind of the censor and discover what he consider ed to be 'sensitive1 
subjects. Third, because Trotsky left some articles in their cut versions, 
we can see if we can make any sense of what remains. This should 
lead us to draw some conclusions about the overall effectiveness of the 
censor, and thus test Deutscher's and Trotsky's 'orthodoxy'.
3.2 Trotsky and the Censor
The governments of warring nations not surprisingly like to ensure that 
only the most optimistic reports of military operations reach the civilian
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population and soldiers in combat. The fact that this consideration 
ranked high on the censor's list of sensitive subjects can be deduced 
from the alterations made to several of Trotsky's pessimistic 
evaluations of the state of the war.
In, 'The Key to the Position', for example, the censor cut the 
statement that the Russian assault on the Galician front would not alter 
the general stalemate.5 Moreover, the censor was so keen to avoid any 
recognition that Europe had fallen into a hopeless situation that he 
deleted sentences expressing this thought, even when their absence 
did not prevent the essential point from being made. Thus, in the same 
contribution, Trotsky discussed the possibility of American intervention 
as the deciding factor, guaranteeing the victory of one side over the 
other. At the outset of this section the censor cut the thought that the 
European powers were turning to America in self-recognition of their 
own powerlessness:
[In consciousness of that terrible dead-end into which the war has 
gone], in the past few months the ruling groups and parties of 
Europe have again concentrated their gaze on America.6 
Trotsky then explained why America would not involve itself in the war 
by reference to the profits American capital was making: 'Europe is 
breaking-up and America is enriching itself.'7 However when, in the 
concluding sentences, he summarised this argument by linking it to a 
Europe floundering in a hopeless blood bath, the censor once again 
reached for his eraser:
[while the American bourgeoisie has the opportunity of warming 
its hands on Europe's bones it will not alter its attitude. 'The key to 
the position' in America? But in the meanwhile it thinks that the 
most advantageous position for it is supporting the bloody 
European dead-end.]8
In other instances the censor seemed more perturbed by the 
strength of the language employed than by the message Trotsky was 
attempting to express. In 'A Year of War' the censor revealed his 
sensitiveness to harsh critiques of capitalism's responsibility for 
Europe's hopeless military situation. It was the use of the word dead­
end {tupik) that the censor most objected to:
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On the Gallipili peninsula, as on the new Austro-ltalian front, the 
line of the trenches was immediately designated [as a line of 
military hopelessness]...In this picture [brought about by the blind 
automanism of capita list forces and the conscious 
dishonourableness of the ruling classes]...[The European 
strategic situation gives a mechanical expression of that historical 
dead-end into which the capitalist forces have driven 
themselves].9
Nevertheless, despite these cuts, Trotsky was still able to put across 
his less than optimistic appraisal of the state of the war and his moral 
condemnation of the ruling class:
In this picture...there are no decisive points of support which, from 
the military point of view, would permit one to connect any plans 
and hopes for a decisive victory for one of the sides. Even if the 
European ruling forces had as much historical good will as they 
do evil, then even then they would be powerless to resolve by 
their means those problems which brought about the war.10 
If the censor was unreceptive to overtly harsh condemnations of the 
war situation, he was also careful to avoid allowing discussion of the 
likely spoils of the war to appear in print. This applied at a general as 
well as at a specific level. Thus, in an appraisal of the group centred 
around Nasha Zarya, the censor cut Trotsky's sarcastic response to 
the claim that the Entente was fighting for the most worthy aims:
One has to find that group of powers whose victory would be 
more beneficial for world development. So judge the authors of 
the document analysed by us. [Such a group of powers turns out, 
by a fortuitous concurrence of circumstances, to be the 'Western 
democracies' in struggle with the 'Junker monarchies.' Tsarism?
It acts as a subsidiary force of democracy]...This...is the official 
French point of view...Theoretically and politically this is a return 
to the most banal ideological democratism - without social flesh, 
without historical perspectives, and without a trace of the 
materialist dialectic.11 
A reader of the above passage would not have known what view 
Trotsky was criticising. In a report of Milyukov's visit to Paris of May 
1916 Trotsky was prevented from referring to negotiations between the
Trotsky and the Censor 40
Entente powers concerning Russia's claims to Constantinople, the 
Bosporus and the Dardanelles:
[April 1915 remains as a memorable date in Russian history, for 
in this month our relations with the allies about the Straits were 
precisely regulated: in the world struggle the East was put aside 
to our advantage (nous a ete assign comme domaine)]12 
The fact that France was allied to Russia and Great Britain also had 
consequences for what the censor would look for when he checked an 
article for publication. The French censor was keen to expunge any 
remarks which may have caused embarrassment to people engaged in 
the leading posts of the Allied governments. In .'Wonders the Wise did 
not dream of1 an accusation that the Russian ambassador in Paris had 
had a hand in the appearance of an announcement in Intransigent 
attacking Nashe Slovo was appropriately cut.13 On other occasions the 
censor removed references to the ’[ungovernable appetite of Tsarist 
diplomacy]’;14 and while the censor was happy to see Trotsky criticise 
the imperialism of the Central Powers, he did not permit similar 
remarks about Russia: ’If Austro-Germany seizes Poland, this is 
imperialism by them; [if Russia seizes Galicia or Armenia, this is 
national liberation of the oppressed.]’15
The censor's alterations did not protect only Russia. On two 
occasions Trotsky's remarks concerning Lloyd-George did not appear 
in print. The first time Trotsky was discussing accusations that the 
Russian socialists in Paris were panGermanists: '[But see w e are not 
for Syria and we are not for Constantinople. But see we are not with 
Lloyd-George and we are not with Plekhanov.]'16 On the second 
occasion Trotsky's prognosis of the overthrow of Lloyd-George in the 
wake of the Dublin Uprising was deleted:
The historical role of the Irish proletariat is only beginning...[This 
rebellion from now on will not fade away. On the contrary, it finds 
a response across the whole of Great Britain...Lloyd-George's 
executions will be severely revenged by those same workers who 
Henderson now attempts to chain to the bloody wheels of 
imperialism.]17
This, of course, left France itself and the censor's patriotism was an 
undoubted criterion for resolving what to erase. The censor twice
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deleted uncomplimentary references to 'bourgeois France' helping 
tsarism to crush the 1905 Russian revolution.18 However, the censor 
objected most of all to any critique of the French government during the 
war. Thus, for instance, in 'A Convent of Confusion and Hopelessness' 
the censor removed the following appraisal of the sorry state of French 
democracy:
[However, the historical development of the last decades has 
finally undermined the social foundation of democracy. 
Imperialism is not compatible with it. And because it is stronger 
than it, it has ravaged it. The formal universal general rights give 
us a parliament, parliament gives us a ministry; but the ministry 
has now fallen into the mess of secret diplomatic obligations, the 
bank's influence and the will of finance capital, which showed its 
political face at the elections, reigns. Clemenceau is not happy 
with the powerless parliament.]19 
But in the light of Clemenceau's then opposition to the French 
government for its poor conduct of war policy, Trotsky's portrayal of 
Clemenceau as an opportunist was allowed to appear in Nashe Slovo: 
The utopian thought that capitalist imperialism should 
subordinate itself to the democratic regime is, however, 
completely alien to the 'Jacobin' Clemenceau. He wants to 
preserve only a democratic shell, the rejection of which would be 
too risky an experiment for the French bourgeoisie, and at the 
same time he attempts to use the parliamentary mechanism for a 
struggle with the excesses or deficiencies of militarism.20 
The censor's desire to protect the French government's image of a 
government of national unity impinged upon Trotsky's account of 
Longuetism. The Longuetists derived their name from Jean Longue 
(1876-1938), son of Charles Longue and Jenny Marx, editor of Le 
Populaire and leader of the pacifist minority of the French Socialist 
Party. The censor was quite content for Trotsky's critique of 
Longuetism to see the light of day, but the Longuetist s1 demand for 
French Socialist Party leaders to resign from their ministerial portfolios 
was kept in the dark:
Hence the necessity for the Longuetists to advance a new 
programme. [Now they insist - with that indecisiveness that
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composes their nature - on the exit of socialists from the 
composition of the French government. However] undoubtedly 
logic and thoroughness is not on the side of the Longuetists; a 
party which supports the war and participates in the union sacree 
has no principled foundations to refuse to serve in the 
government.21
In making the above alteration the censor managed to publicise the 
view of the French Socialist Party leadership without affording a similar 
service to the Longuetists; work he must have been proud of.
During the First World War contact between citizens of the warring 
nations was outlawed. This meant that any socialist in Paris who 
wanted to report efforts to retain links with comrades in the Central 
Powers would most likely collide with restrictions to be imposed by the 
censor. This was certainly behind the prohibition placed upon any 
immediate reference to the Zimmerwald Conference of September 
1915, while one of Trotsky's reports on the proceedings of the Second 
Zimmerwald Conference was also censored.22 Although it was possible 
to mention Zimmerwald by name by October 1915, in the summer of 
1916 the censor was still attempting to ensure that only negative 
accounts of Zimmerwald appeared in Nashe Slovo. He did this by 
cutting any specific piece of information Trotsky might want to pass on 
to the reader while leaving Trotsky's general position intact. Thus, 
Trotsky's use of Karl Liebknecht's campaign against social-patriotism 
on both sides of the Rhine was cut from his rejoinder of August 1916 to 
representations of Zimmerwald as ‘Pan-German intrigue'.23 This did 
not discourage Trotsky from submitting further articles in which he 
continued to struggle against patriotic misrepresentations of 
Zimmerwald, but the censor once again deleted direct reference to 
Liebknecht as supporting evidence:
As soon as Liebknecht was locked-up...the servile spirits of the 
established Entente socialists decided that the hour had come to 
use Liebknecht's name for a struggle against his ideas on the soil 
of the Entente itself....[How they lie about the restrained as about 
the dead...Is this really not clear? Liebknecht himself struggles 
with the enemy above all in his own country. Liebknecht is ours 
and not yours.]24
Trotsky and the Censor 43
Thus the censor consistently cut several themes from Trotsky's 
writings. Their list contains no real surprises: the Entente in a hopeless 
military situation, negotiations between Entente diplomats on what they 
expected from a successful conclusion to the war, unflattering 
accounts of high politics in the Entente countries, and the activities of a 
united international Marxist leadership. However, the fact that the 
censor often deleted only the most outspoken of Trotsky's statements, 
while overlooking others which expressed the same thought in a more 
restrained language, suggests that the censor's regime was not as 
harsh as it could have been. Moreover, the censor's alterations were 
probably made less effective by the fact that the readership knew that 
he checked the paper. On several occasions Trotsky wrote accounts of 
his battles with the censor.
For instance, in an article of August 1915 Trotsky began by 
declaring that now Russian setbacks in Galicia, Poland and the Baltic 
had become general knowledge, perhaps the censor would permit him 
to explain why the Russians had not been so successful. After all, he 
pointed out that he had predicted this outcome but had been silenced 
by the censor: 'the privilege of free judgement is utilised only by those 
who foresaw nothing and understood nothing.'25
In an (admittedly censored) contribution of October 1915, Trotsky 
argued that the censor's work could not blot-out the significance of the 
Zimmerwald Conference.26 In any case, Trotsky's reports from 
Zimmerwald had already appeared in Nashe Slovo under the cloaked 
heading of 'From a Notebook'.27 In January 1916 the censor kept only 
his protection of the French Socialist Party from Trotsky's pen secret 
when Trotsky listed his grievances against the censor's deletions:
We have been prevented from distressing not only French 
ministers but also Russian governors. [Moreover: the censor took 
the French Socialist Party under his protection], and only recently 
we were not allowed to speak of the ideological banality of that 
socialism which Pierre Renaudel heads. We are nearly always 
not able to print the Social-Democratic deputies' speeches in the 
Duma, in the course of several weeks we could not mention the 
name Zimmerwald, and now we are not able to publish the 
resolutions of the Foreign Section of our party...In all of those
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cases when the censor may have had doubts he decided against 
us: what is the sense of standing on
ceremony with an emigre newspaper published in the Russian 
language!28
At least the reader could become very well acquainted with most of the 
topics he was not supposed to know of!
Furthermore, Trotsky twice published articles under the rubric of 
censorship. In 'There is still a censor in Paris!' he reported that the 
French government liked to profess that there was no censorship in 
Paris, only a 'special regime' for the press. He conceded that there may 
have been some justification for this view. After all, pieces had been 
published which contained such revelations as Russian bureaucrats 
taking bribes, the fact that Russian Jews were not living in heaven on 
earth, that Alexander III was not a republican and so on. However, the 
censor had only just rejected two large articles and this should serve as 
warning to all that, 'under a special regime things are just the same as 
under a censor.'29 Trotsky enjoyed the freedom not only to complain of 
his lack of freedom, he was also permitted to write a critical account of 
the arbitrariness of the censor's judgement. In an article of September 
1916 the censor was teased with the following questions:
Can one say that the All-General Conference of Labour is feeling 
the 'dizziness of nationalism'? We have written this dozens of 
times. Now we are suddenly stopped from speaking of this. What 
happened? The Temps which, it seems, should be sufficiently 
loyal writes of the necessity to renew the political struggle - in 
particular the struggle against royalism, conducting at the time of 
war tireless agitation 'for the phantom of the past'. Can one in 
view of this say that the struggle of Bonnet Rouge against Action 
Francaise is the forerunner to the battle of a new republican 
'concentration' against a royalist reaction? It appears that one 
can. But yesterday we were not allowed to say this. What does 
this mean? What happened, Mr Censor!30
Trotsky was quite right to point out that the censor sometimes 
objected to material which he had previously passed. Occasionally the 
censor's apparent arbitrariness could be explained by the wider 
context in which Trotsky submitted his articles. In the light of hightened
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attention on the working class during the 1 May celebrations, for 
example, the censor became more sensitive to revolutionary appeals 
to the masses. Thus, Trotsky's article '1st May 1916' is full of white 
spaces inserted by the censor, with Zimmerwald again falling victim to 
the censor's prejudices:
[In this time there occurred the conference in Zimmerwald which 
was possible only thanks to the awakening of revolutionary 
indignation on the left-wing of the official parties and which gave 
this process banners and a first organisational form...The 
publicists and theoreticians of the International applied all of their 
efforts to lower socialist thought to the level of its political role.] 
The previous May 1st [was the lowest point in this process of 
decline, fall and betrayal...bourgeois society was able to take the 
class organisations of the proletariat captive. This was revealed 
in such a scale and form that nobody expected...For part of the 
socialist leaders frightened by events pacifism means self- 
imposed exile and a wait and see passiveness. For the masses 
pacifism means a moments reflection, a stage on the path from 
slave patriotism to international action...We have become 
stronger. In the coming year we will be stronger than we are now. 
Nothing and nobody can delay the growth of our strength].31 
Perhaps the most telling evidence for evaluating the effect the 
censor had on distorting the meaning of Trotsky's writings is an 
examination of the articles censored in Nashe Slovo, which appeared 
in their censored form when they were reprinted in later publications. 
Can one make any sense of these articles? Are they devoid of any 
material which might have hurt the sensibilities of a patriot supporting 
the war? The answer to the first question is 'yes' and to the second 'no'.
In several censored pieces Trotsky's critique of the ruling classes as 
cynical and hypocritical manages to reach the reader. In 'On the 
beginnings of Reciprocity' Trotsky began by recounting Wilhelm ll's 
offer to Nicholas II: Russian prisoners held in German camps would be 
allowed to celebrate their monarch's name-day if a reciprocal right 
were bestowed upon German prisoners in Russian camps. The censor 
deleted Trotsky's concluding sentences, but the Russian
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revolutionary's disgust at the niceties of the monarchical dub while 
their respective subjects suffered remained:
On the beginnings of reciprocality! The German and Russian 
human meat is blown up and destroyed by shells, frozen in cold 
filth and falling to pieces; but the holy flame of monarchical 
enthusiasm, despite everything, is carefully upheld in the hearts 
of the armoured
priests in Berlin and in Petrograd 32
The censor removed twenty lines of text from 'A Law of 
Mechanics'.33 However, it would be hard to claim that the missing 
sentences would have made any radical difference to the article's 
meaning. In the context of a relatively small contribution, Trotsky 
makes his point. At the outset he reminds the reader that press 
censorship during the Balkan War had led many to doubt the apparent 
war aim of 'peasant democracy'. Clemenceau is then presented as a 
man who objected to press censorship - he changed the name of his 
newspaper from L'Homme libre to L'Homme enchame as a protest 
against censorship - while remaining silent when Golos was closed. 
Clemenceau's apparent hypocrisy is explained by his position as a 
politician: eventually he wants to gain power to silence others so cannot 
afford the luxury of general principles. However, even when acting 
under dubious political motivations Clemanceau could still be 
perspicacious. Thus, in a recent article he had raised the issue of the 
likely reaction of returning soldiers, discovering what the state of affairs 
had been at home while they had been fighting for freedom. 
Clemenceau warned of the law of mechanics which states that 
resistance grows as applied pressure increases. Trotsky pointed out 
that Clemenceau was hoping that this 'law of mechanics' would one 
day transfer power into his hands; but he had provided a useful service 
in foreseeing a 'catastrophic upheaval in the mood of the people'34 
The implication was clear; the prerequisites for revolution were in the 
offing.
Twenty sentences were also cut from 'Stages', published in Nashe 
Slovo of 6 July 1916, but Trotsky was still able to express his views on a 
number of sensitive issues; including, the hopelessness of the present 
war and of the incompatibility of social-patriotism with the interests of
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the working class. The rest of the article was devoted to a review of the 
growing successes gained by the revolutionary section of the 
international proletarian movement; from the first to the second 
Zimmerwald Conferences and onwards to the establishment of a Third 
International.35
In 'On what the French Press is silent about' Trotsky discussed 
Stunner's programme for Poland.36 Although the censor cut over thirty- 
five sentences from this two-column article, Trotsky's rejection of the 
Russian Foreign Minister's plans for a united Poland under Russian 
protection is clear.
Finally, despite censorship in 'Wager on the Strong' this article 
stands as an open assault on notions of the First World War as a war of 
liberation. The fate of small nations (Belgium, Serbia, Turkey, Bulgaria, 
Roumania, Greece and Portugal) is likened to the fate of small 
businesses crushed in the competition between large trusts:
In the field of international relations capitalism carries-over those 
methods by which it 'regulates' the internal economic life of a 
separate nation. The path of competition is the systematic 
destruction of small and middle enterprises and the domination of 
large capital. The world competition of capitalist forces means the 
systematic subordination of small, middle and backward nations 
to the large and largest capitalist powers....The 'liberation' of 
Belgium does not stand as an independent aim. In the further 
course of the war, as after it, Belgium will enter as an integral and 
subordinate part of the great play of the capitalist giants 37 
Hardly an inspiring picture for those engaged in a war to free Belgium.
3.3 Conclusion
Although Trotsky's Paris writings for Golos and its successors did not 
always appear in the exact form that he may have wished, one cannot 
say that the censor was particularly 'brutal' when he doctored Trotsky's 
work. Out of a plethora of articles submitted for approval between 
November 1914 and December 1916 only three were rejected 
outright38 One can read the partially censored articles without feeling 
that Trotsky's revolutionary socialism was being too heavily repressed
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or, even worse, being turned into reactionary social-patriotism. From a 
comparison of partially censored contributions against their fuller 
versions one discovers that Trotsky managed to say most of what he 
wanted to say, if not always in the language he wanted to employ. 
Trotsky himself was even able to reprint one of his partially censored 
articles in its censored form as an illustration of the theory of 
permanent revolution as he conceived of it during the First World War 
when the book Results and Prospects was issued in Moscow in 
1919.39 As the following several chapters will show, his contributions to 
the radical Russian emigre press in Paris during World War One are a 
rich source for discovering his views on a whole range of issues as the 
'war to end all wars' was being fought.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Trotsky, Lenin & the Bolsheviks, 
August 1914-March 1917
4.1 Introduction
In The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte1 Karl Marx wrote that 
the 'tradition of the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the 
minds of the living'.1 Marx's view is particularly pertinent to the political 
biography of Leon Trotsky (1879-1940). Trotsky's pre-1917 relations 
with Lenin and the Bolshevik fraction of the RSDLP were to haunt him 
after he joined the Bolsheviks in 1917. This was especially true during 
the disputes which surrounded the struggle to be Lenin's successor. 
For the overriding consideration of the protagonists was to present 
themselves as closer to Lenin than anyone else. In these 
circumstances the nature of an individual's history with Lenin was a 
factor of supreme importance. It was in the interests of each to 
construct a picture of harmony between themselves and Lenin, and to 
accentuate disharmony between others and Lenin.
Those Bolsheviks who wished to oppose Trotsky had a rich store of 
material from which they could draw upon: starting with the spilt 
between Lenin and Trotsky at the Second Congress of the RSDLP of 
1903, and ending with disagreements between the two during the 
years of Bolshevik rule. Stalin and his supporters did not waste this 
opportunity and attacked Trotsky for his anti-Leninism and non- 
Bolshevism. In turn, Trotsky responded by defending his Leninist 
pedigree.
The use of Leninism as a criterion of correctness also left its mark on 
subsequent writings by historians of this period. In Trotsky's case this 
has resulted in some historians writing accounts of a strong line of 
demarcation between Lenin and Trotsky.2 Others interpret relations 
between the two as those of a gradual convergence. Disputes are 
explained away or softened by references to circumstances which 
were made irrelevant by the 1917 Revolution.3 The suspicion remains, 
however, that whatever the interpretation, an honest evaluation of
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documents has not been the overriding consideration in reaching 
conclusions. This is for several reasons. First, until recently, Soviet 
historians were limited either in access to documents or to what they 
could publish openly.4 Second, Trotsky is a figure who arouses political 
passions and many Western interpreters have written their accounts 
more from a political point of view than from any other.5 Third, 
translations of many of Trotsky's writings have been long available and 
this has permitted several non-Russian reading researchers to 
produce biographies of Trotsky, but without the ability to incorporate 
obscure, untranslated and often crucial documents into their versions.6
Of course these remarks do not apply to all historians who have 
addressed this topic in the recent period. Brian Pearce, for example, 
has written an excellent piece on one aspect of the subject-matter of 
this chapter.7 However, this chapter differs from Pearce's contribution 
in two respects. To begin with, its focus is wider than the issue of 
'revolutionary defeatism in Lenin and Trotsky'. Indeed, the current work 
will present the first full account of relations between Trotsky, Lenin and 
the Bolsheviks from the outbreak of war in August 1914 to the March 
Revolution of 1917 in Russia. Furthermore, although Pearce noted 
Trotsky's difficulties post-1924 in presenting his pre-October relations 
with Lenin, he gave no account of how this sensitive topic was 
approached in the very first years of Bolshevik rule. In contrast, this 
chapter will illustrate how the actual content of the polemics which 
raged between Trotsky and Lenin and the Bolsheviks during World War 
One became obscured first by the Bolsheviks in collaboration and then 
in dispute, and how, in turn, these distorted positions entered the 
accounts of historians writing on the 1914-1917 period. It is therefore 
both a history and a historiographical analysis of its topic.
4.2 Trotsky, Lenin and the Bolsheviks, August 1914-March 
1917
During the war the main forums for communication between Russian 
Social-Democrats continued to be the publication and distribution of 
newspapers, journals and pamphlets. This form of intercourse was 
obviously complicated by conditions of war. However, apart from
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circulation and financial problems, Russian socialists enjoyed a 
relatively free environment for the pursual of debates. The Bolsheviks 
pub lished Sotsial'Demokrat\ Kommunist' a n d  Sbomik 
Sotsial'Demokrata in neutral Switzerland; Novyi Mir was produced in 
America; and even in Paris, where Trotsky wrote for Goios, Nashe 
Slovo and Nachalo, the censor was not particularly concerned by the 
appearance of articles contributing to polemics raging between various 
fractions of Russian Social-Democracy; especially as they were of 
interest to a minority audience and written in a foreign language.8
Russian Social-Democrats were already split along fractional lines 
at the outbreak of World War One. In the months prior to August 1914 
Trotsky had continued his campaign for unity, most notably in the 
journal Bor'ba.9 Events of such magnitude as war can interrupt a 
settled pattern of debate and throw people and groups into alliances 
which, up until that point, they would not have seriously considered. 
Thus, an opportunity arose for a realliance of Russian Social- 
Democratic fractions around a common programme on the war.
Trotsky outlined his political response to the war in a series of four 
articles of January and February 1915, published in Golos and Nashe 
Slovo. Here he continued his analysis of the war as a revolt of the 
productive forces against the narrow confines of state boundaries, 
which he had first argued in the Preface to War and the International. 
According to Trotsky, one had to have a clear understanding of the 
causes and nature of the then world conflict in order to construct a 
viable political programme. It was of no use to merely call for peace; 
one had to have real solutions which could act as a rallying call for 
revolutionary action for a just peace:
It is absolutely naive to say that we should not complicate our 
struggle for peace with slogans of a wider character. We would 
not want a peace in which Belgium, Northern France...etc went to 
the victorious country and thus becoming a source of new 
catastrophe. We are not intending to remove the questions of 
Poland, Alsace-Lorraine and Serbia from the order of the day - 
we want to resolve them. We do not believe these solutions can 
come through the forces of militarism, and we express this 
disbelief in our demands for a cessation of the war. To call for
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peace while sweeping its programme aside would be a call for a 
step back, in to the blind alley. Precisely therefore such a political 
posture is powerless to win over to its side that enthusiasm, that 
heroism, that ability to self- sacrifice which is now being exploited 
by militarism.10
For Trotsky, the war was being fought across two geographical 
centres which were situated at different stages of historical 
development. In South-Eastern Europe - Russia, Austria and the 
Balkans - the main issue was the creation of nationally independent, 
stable states as a prerequisite for capitalism. This area was thus beset 
by problems of the first stage of bourgeois development. In Western 
Europe - Britain, France and Germany - the nation state had been 
created over the previous three centuries. These countries were 
grappling with the major problem of the final stage of imperialist 
development: the need to abolish artificial state boundaries. The 
productive forces demanded the extension of the economic base. In 
terms of the policies of the Great Powers of the day this me ant one of 
two things: either victory and domination by Britain or by Germany. 
Trotsky realised that Britain was allied to France, but he asserted that 
the antagonism between Britain and Germany was 'the basic moving 
force of the present war.'11 He argued that Britain and France had been 
united by the 'German danger', but he also claimed that perceptions of 
this danger were rooted in different concerns. France's main worry, 
due to its 'halting population growth and extreme slow-down in the 
tempo of economic development',12 was to preserve its existing 
position on the world market and as a world power. Britain's interest 
was to ensure that no continental power, France or Germany, became 
so powerful in Europe so as to be able to launch an attack on British 
expansion, which was to be achieved on the basis of its colonial 
acquisitions. According to Trotsky, Germany pursued the most 
aggressive foreign policy at that time as this corresponded to the 
condition of its industry, the most quickly developing in Europe. In this 
way the expansionary plans of Britain and Germany lay at the heart of 
the world conflict:
capitalism saturated in the framework of the national state and 
the rebellion of the productive forces against this framework,
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aspiring to a greater and greater widening of the economic base 
to the inclusion of backward peoples into the sphere of economic 
activity of the national mother country, is the essence of the 
imperialist policy of the great powers. The collision of national 
imperialists brought about the present war.13 
For Trotsky, the combination of tasks of different historical origin 
gave the then present war its peculiar character. Specifically, this 
situation gave rise to the possibility of illusions being held about the 
war. The struggles of the advanced countries could be seen as part of 
the ostensibly liberating struggle for national independence taking 
place in the backward countries. However, Trotsky argued that the 
dominating factor was the concerns of the Great Powers. He 
recognised the importance of the national pretensions of, for example, 
Serbia and Belgium as playing an important part in the conflict, but he 
also perceived them as secondary issues. Thus, Serbia and Belgium 
had become involved in the war only because they were geographically 
situated on the map of the expansionary plans of the Great Powers. 
Moreover, the peoples struggling for national independence could not 
follow the route taken by the advanced nations when they faced tasks 
of a similar nature. The nation state was already an anachronism. For 
example, Trotsky claimed that each Balkan nation had too narrow a 
base for economic development. Even an enlarged Serbia would mean 
that other nationalities would fall into dependence upon Germany, 
Russia or even Serbia itself, and this could only give rise to a prospect 
of further 'liberation' conflicts. For Trotsky, the only answer to the 
peculiar combination of tasks of a pre-capitalist nature in an 
environment dominated by the needs of the final imperialist stage of 
capitalism was the enlarged state form of a Federative Balkan 
Republic.
According to Trotsky, the establishment of a Federative Balkan 
Republic would have several significant advantages. First, it would 
answer the need of a wide territorial base for economic development. 
Second, it would be a democratic state structure in which various 
nationalities would be able to express their individuality without 
threatening the cultural requirements of others. Trotsky combined 
these two points thus: 'It neutralises nationalism in the economic sense,
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freeing economic development from dependence up on the distribution 
of separate ethnic groups on the map of Europe.'14 Finally, the 
Federative Balkan Republic would be better equip ped to defend the 
interests of the Balkan peoples from possible aggression from Russia 
or Germany.
Trotsky also argued for the establishment of a transnational state 
structure, specifically a Republican United States of Europe, for 
Western Europe. In this area the interests of further economic 
development demanded an integrated economy organised under a 
single European state. Obviously, Trotsky did not see national 
problems as particularly pressing in West Europe as in South-Eastern 
Europe; his case fora United States of Europe remained at the level of 
economic considerations. For Trotsky, this urgent task could be 
realised in one of two ways. First, German imperialists had planned the 
forceful unification of Europe under their domination. Trotsky 
acknowledged that this represented a genuine attempt to resolve an 
issue that had to be resolved; it was a 'progressive historical need 
refracted, however, through the junker-militaristic, reactionary-caste 
state apparatus of Germany.'15 However, this attempt was bound to 
fail. One could not bring about the cohabitation and cooperation of 
peoples through militarism. Furthermore, what chance had plans for a 
Europe under the tutelage of the Central Empire when this Empire itself 
was disintegrating?: The wonderful professor-junker-stock-market 
utopia is the plan to turn the whole of Europe into a new Austria- 
Hungary at the same time as the old Austria-Hungary is being ripped to 
pieces.'16 Second, the European proletariat could arise and create an 
all-European dictatorship of the proletariat in the form of a Republican 
United States of Europe. For Trotsky, not only was this the only way to 
achieve the desired goal, but the preconditions for it had been 
prepared by the very process which demanded the formation of a 
United States of Europe:
Destroying the framework of the national state as too narrow for 
the development of productive forces, the war also destroys them 
as a base for social revolution...In our time the problem of social 
revolution stands before us if not as a world problem in the direct 
and immediate sense of the word, then in any case as a
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European problem. In present circumstances all proletarian 
movements in their very first steps will inevitably aspire to expand 
the framework of their national limitness and in the parallel 
movements of the proletariat of other countries seek to find a 
guarantee of their own success.17
Thus, Trotsky's analysis and prognosis envisaged a struggle for 
peace under the slogans of the creation of two federative republican 
state structures; the first in the Balkans and the second across Europe. 
In his concluding remarks in the final article he did add however that the 
responsibility for the further economic development of backward 
regions would rest upon the United States of Europe.18
While Trotsky was expounding his views Lenin and the Bolsheviks 
were publishing their reaction to the war in their newspaper 
Sotsial'Demokrat', issuing their first manifesto of the war in number 33 
of 1 November 1914.
This manifesto shared several assumptions of Trotsky's writings of 
the time. First, the war was characterised as a struggle of the advanced 
imperialist nations for markets in which the dynastic interests of the 
backward nations were also involved. Second, and probably most 
important from Trotsky's point of view, the manifesto called for the 
formation of a Republican United States of Europe as the 'immediate 
political slogan of European Social-Democracy.’19 Like Trotsky, the 
manifesto distinguished between ’proletarian' and 'bourgeois' versions 
of a United States of Europe, declaring that:
the formation of a Republican United States of Europe, distinct 
from the bourgeoisie which is prepared to 'promise' whatever is 
demanded if only to include the proletariat in the general 
chauvinist group. Social-Democracy will explain the falsehood 
and the foolishness of this slogan without the revolutionary 
overthrow of the German, Austrian and Russian monarchies.20 
However, the manifesto also departed from Trotsky's analysis in 
several ways. First, it expanded the basic aims of the war from pure 
imperialist antagonisms to a desire to 'distract the attention of the 
working masses from the internal political crises of Russia, Germany, 
Britain and other countries.'21 Second, although Sotsial’Demokrat1 
viewed the battle as one of the British and French bourgeoisie against
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their German counterparts, no distinction was made between British 
and French interests. For Sotsial'Demokrat' both countries wished to 
'seize German colonies and ruin the competition of a nation 
distinguished by more rapid economic development.'22 Third, and here 
begins what were to be the most significant differences, the manifesto 
made no mention of a struggle for peace with a defined peace 
programme. Instead, Sotsial'Demokrat' called for 'turning the 
imperialist war into a civil war',23 and referred to a resolution of the 
1912 Basel Conference as authority for the correctness of this stance. 
Fourth, the manifesto considered the defeat of one of the two warring 
camps from the perspective of whose defeat would be the most useful 
for socialism. The conclusion reached was that,
for us, Russian Social-Democrats, there can be no doubt that 
from the point of view of the working class and the labouring 
masses of all peoples of Russia the least evil would be the defeat 
of the tsarist monarchy, the most reactionary and barbaric 
government, oppressing the highest quantity of nations and the 
greatest mass of population of Europe and Asia 24 
Finally, Sotsial'Demokrat' did not call for the establishment of a 
Republican United States in the Balkans as well as in Europe. For 
Sotsial'Demokrat', the main cleavage was between advanced and 
backward countries. Socialists in backward countries were told to 
struggle for the defeat of their governments in order to introduce 
democratic changes: 'democratic republics (with full equal rights and 
self-determination of all nations), the confiscation of landowners' land 
and the eight-hour working day.'25 It would be the task of socialists in 
the advanced countries to bring about the defeat of their country so as 
to stage a socialist revolution:
in all advanced countries the war places as the first slogan a 
socialist revolution, which becomes more urgent the more the 
difficulties of the war are put upon the shoulders of the proletariat, 
and the more active its role should become in the rebuilding of 
Europe after the horrors of modern 'patriotic' barbarism in 
conditions of massive technical successes of large capital.26 
The Bolsheviks were to return to the issue of their programmatic 
response to the war at the Conference of the Foreign Section of the
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RSDLP, held in Bern between 14-19 February 1915. The resolutions of 
this Conference widened the differences between the Bolsheviks and 
Trotsky; most notably, the notion of a ’United States of Europe' was 
omitted. The only idea advanced under the resolution 'Slogans of 
Revolutionary Social-Democracy’ was that of ’turning the imperialist 
war into a civil war1, and five points of action were listed as the first 
steps needed to attain this goal.27 Moreover, Nashe Slovo was not very 
favourably reviewed in the resolution ’Relations to other Parties and 
Groups':
elements grouping around Nashe Slovo vacillate between 
platonic empathy to internationalism and aspirations of unity at 
any cost with Nasha Zarya and the Organisational Committee.28 
At this stage, i.e., between November 1914 and the end of February 
1915, both Trotsky and Lenin and the Bolsheviks developed their 
programmes knowing the stances adopted by the other. In early 
November 1914 Eintracht, a section of the Swiss Social-Democratic 
Party, held a meeting in a large hall in Zurich. Trotsky attended and 
delivered a speech, although when he subsequently made reference 
to this meeting in two of his published writings he did not expound upon 
its contents.29 However, Lenin was also present and his notes made at 
the conference were published in volume 14 of Leninskii sbomik 
(1930). These notes enable us to reconstruct some of the themes 
addressed by Trotsky’s speech. First, he declared his solidarity with 
Eintracht's resolution, which called for a struggle to end the war with the 
aim of implementing a 'peace programme' - i.e., no forced annexations, 
no war indemnities, the right of nations to self-determination and a 
United States of Europe free of standing armies, secret diplomacy and 
feudal castes.30 He then considered the relationship between his 
insistence on the necessity of a struggle for peace and the resolution of 
the 1912 Basel Conference. For Trotsky, there was no contradiction 
between the two:
in order to begin the war of the German proletariat against the 
German bourgeoisie one has first to end the war of the German 
proletariat with the French proletariat. The first slogan for a civil 
war is an end to the imperialist war.31
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Lenin highlighted this section of his notes with a square bracket down 
the left-hand side and labelled Trotsky's argument 'sophistic .'32 
Further in his notes he commented, 'Let the speaker declare his 
opposition to the Basel Conference.'33 Later, when writing of S. 
Vainshtein's view that little separated the positions of Lenin and 
Trotsky, Lenin registered his contempt by writing of 'rebellious 
anarchism' (Trotsky) and 'scientific socialism’ (Lenin).34
However, Trotsky also made somewhat of a favourable impression 
on Lenin. Thus, for example, when Trotsky announced his 
disagreements with Kautsky Lenin wrote of a 'firmer tone and more 
profound considerations.'35 Moreover, when M. Ratner declared his 
intention to argue against Trotsky Lenin found his tone to be 
'demagogic and very distasteful.'36
Indeed, at the beginning of 1915 the idea of cooperation between 
Trotsky and Nashe Slovo on the one side and Lenin and 
Sotsial,Demokrat, on the other was broached. The cause was the 
decision to call a conference of socialist parties of the Entente 
countries, to be held in London in February 1915 and organised by the 
Belgian social-patriot Vandervelde.37
The initiator of the correspondence was the editorial board of Nashe 
Slovo, who approached the Bolshevik Central Committee and the 
Menshevik Organisational Committee, among others, in an attempt to 
forge an anti-social-patriotic bloc. The full text of this approach was not 
published in the newspaper, and the editors of volume 17 of Leninskii 
sbornik (1931) claim that the Institute of Marxism-Leninism does not 
possess a copy of Nashe Slovo's letter38 We are thus forced to rely 
upon references made to the letter to learn of its contents. From 
Lenin's reply, written in Bern on 9th February 1915, we discover its 
date and basic intentions:
In your letter of 6th February you propose a plan of struggle with 
'official social-patriotism' to us regarding the London Conference 
of socialists of the 'allied countries' of the Entente.39 
Lenin responded favourably, declaring that he accepted the offer of joint 
action 'with pleasure.'40 He then stressed the necessity of utilising all 
opportunities of conducting this struggle and outlined a draft declaration 
on the London Conference, to be signed by Sotsial’Demokrat' and
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Nashe Slovo. The draft declaration announced the present war to be an 
imperialist war, a product of an age in which the bourgeois state in 
national boundaries had outlived its time. Lenin listed an eight-point 
programme of action, which was intended to fulfil the Basel resolution: 1) 
the break-up of national blocs in all countries; 2) a call to workers of all 
countries to use political and economic means to struggle against their 
own bourgeois governments; 3) a harsh condemnation of all voting for 
war credits; 4) socialists should leave the governments of Belgium and 
France, and it should be recognised that joining governments and voting 
for war credits is as big a betrayal of socialism as that perpetrated by 
German and Austrian Social-Democracy at the outbreak of war; 5) the 
formation of an international committee for agitation of the idea of 
revolutionary mass action against one's own government; 6) all attempts 
at the establishment of fraternal relations between the soldiers of 
warring countries should be supported; 7) women socialists of warring 
countries should strengthen their efforts to propagandise the 
aforementioned points; and 8) Russian Social-Democracy should be 
supported in its struggle against tsarism. The letter from Nashe Slovo 
must also have mentioned the possibility of teaming-up with the Bund 
and the Organisational Committee, as Lenin felt it necessary to warn that 
they stood for 'official social-patriotism.1 However, he also asked to be 
kept informed of how these organisations responded to Nashe Slovo's 
suggestions.
Thus, the overall tone of Lenin's reply was positive, and he even 
went so far as to make concrete suggestions for continuing along the 
path of cooperation. However, this positive tone was at odds with the 
pessimism he expressed on the likelihood of the success of the Nashe 
Slovo project in a letter to A. Shlyapnikov of 11 February 1915:
We answered Nashe Slovo that we are happy with its suggestion 
and we sent our draft declaration. Hopes for agreement with 
them are small, for Aksel'rod, it is said, is in Paris and Aksel'rod is 
a social-chauvinist, hoping to reconcile Germanofiles and 
Francofiles on the soil of social-chauvinism. We will see which is 
dearer to Nashe Slovo - anti-chauvinism or Aksel'rod's 
friendship.41
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In the meantime, Nashe Slovo published three separate 
declarations on the London Conference. The first was signed by 
Martov on behalf of the Organisational Committee and Lapinski 
representing the Polish Socialist Party.42 This statement criticised the 
calling of the London Conference for several reasons. First, it was a 
mistake to invite socialists on the basis of their nationality, a criteria 
underpined by imperialist assumptions: ’We refuse to recognise the 
principle of grouping the proletariat along the lines of the temporary 
coincidence of the interests of their class enemies.'43 Second, by 
limiting invitations to a select group the organisers were accepting and 
strengthening the splits in the Second International which had occurred 
at the outbreak of the war. Third, only an internationalist stance, 
considering the views of socialists of all countries, could restore the 
International. For Martov and Lapinski, socialists had to avoid aligning 
themselves with any of the warring nations in order to pursue a socialist 
policy of exposing the imperialist roots of the war, and to struggle for 
peace. It was only in this way, the authors were convinced, that 
socialists could guarantee for themselves an influence on determining 
the conditions of a future peace. They requested that delegates at the 
London Conference should refrain from passing any resolutions which 
could only play into the hands of the class enemy. In a footnote to the 
declaration, which appeared after the Conference had ended, Martov 
and Lapinski announced that they would have voted against the 
resolutions eventually adopted by the meeting.
The second declaration to be published was that elaborated by 
Nashe Slovo itself, in the form of a mandate accepted at a meeting of 
the editorial board of 13 February 1915. This seven-point programme 
was censored when it appeared in the newspaper; half of point two and 
all of point six were lost.44 However, Lenin and other socialists had 
access to the full text which was published in Berner Tagwacht of 20 
February 1915, and later translated into Russian from the German in 
Volume 17 of Leninskii sbomik,45 Nashe Slovo also declared the 
London Conference a betrayal of the principles of socialist 
internationalism, and called for socialists to attend the Conference so 
as to call for a conference of socialists of all countries. Then, using the 
contents of Lenin’s letter to the editorial board, a programme of action
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was listed not in order to turn the imperialist war into a civil war but as 
part of a struggle to end the war.46
Third, in Nashe Slovo of 4 March 1915, the declaration of the 
Bolshevik Central Committee was published. This text was also 
censored; points 2-4 and the concluding sentences were blank. The 
declaration began by pointing out that the London Conference was 
supposed to be for socialists from Belgium, Britain, France and Russia, 
but Russian Social-Democrats had not been invited to attend. The 
hope was then expressed that Russian Social-Democracy's hostility to 
the Conference had been made clear to delegates gathering in 
London; otherwise 'we would have grounds for accusing you of a 
misrepresentation of the truth.’47 The Central Committee made 
demands similar to those outlined in their letter to Nashe Slovo which 
had then been used by Nashe Slovo itself: the immediate withdrawal of 
socialists from governments; a condemnation of voting for war credits; 
and, finally, the recognition that Austrian and German Social- 
Democracy had committed terrible crimes against socialism and the 
International, and that Belgian and French socialists had hardly acted 
any better.
Nashe Slovo followed the publication of these declarations with an 
article enlightening readers on the steps it had taken to coordinate the 
actions of Russian socialists on the London Conference.48 An editorial 
outlined its intentions in approaching the Bolshevik Central Committee 
and the Menshevik Organisational Committee thus:
Not long before the Conference the editorial board of our 
newspaper sent to representatives of our party in the 
International Socialist Bureau, Aksel’rod and Lenin, letters in 
which it was proposed to them that in the interest of struggle with 
’official sociai-patriotism’ steps should be taken to ensure that no 
accidental invitations could be sent to a social-patriot to speak on 
behalf of Russian Social-Democracy not expressing the views of 
the RSDLP, and that any invitation to the Conference should go 
through official representatives of our party in the Internationalist 
Socialist Bureau. Our offer, obviously, also proposed a 
coordination of action of internationalist elements of Russian 
Social-Democratic delegates.49
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Readers were then informed that both Aksel'rod and Lenin had agreed 
to coordinate activities, and that the basic points of Comrade Lenin's 
draft declaration had been incorporated into Nashe Slovo's mandate. 
The editorial concluded with a confident statement of the success of 
the Nashe Slovo initiative to date:
In this way we see that maintaining an internationalist socialist 
position, unifying Social-Democratic internationalists of all 
fractions - a stable base for joint revolutionary action is created 
and we express our deep belief that the coordination of action of 
all revolutionary internationalist elements of Russian Social- 
Democracy is not only possible and desired but also strongly 
necessary.50
This optimistic mood was also reflected in an article of 18 March 1915, 
’Where is the majority?'51 This editorial took issue with Plekhanov's 
assertion that a majority of Russian workers and socialists supported 
his patriotic stance on the war. Nashe Slovo reported that Plekhanov 
had spoken of two pieces of evidence which he thought confirmed his 
belief. First, Martov had declared that his own supporters did not share 
his views on the war. Second, Lenin had published a worker's letter 
which stated that the Russian proletariat did not wish to hear talk of 
Russia's defeat. These two points were then dismissed as insufficient 
grounds for drawing such a conclusion. First, it was pointed out that 
Martov was speaking of the editorial board of Nasha Zarya\ a group 
which did not represent a majority of Russian workers and which had 
no organisational base. Second, it was argued that just because 
workers did not wish to support Russia's defeat they wanted instead to 
support a victory of the Entente. It was claimed that Russian socialists 
could disagree over the correctness of the call for Russia's defeat and 
all the same unite around the issue of opposing social-patriotism; a 
possibility which was in fact occurring. The editorial listed the party 
groups (including the Bolshevik Central Committee, the Menshevik 
Organisational Committee and the Bund) which occupied a position 
hostile to Plekhanov; while a footnote highlighted the fact that different 
tendencies had united around Nashe Slovo's initiative at the London 
Conference. Two further processes of unification around points of view 
opposed to Plekhanov's were mentioned: first in Petersburg and
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second among Social-Democratic deputies in the State Duma. The 
editorial concluded that the only way in which Russian Social- 
Democracy could prevent one single voice from claiming to represent 
the movement as a whole was for fractional groups to unite around a 
stand against social-patriotism.
It was this article, combined with Nashe Slovo’s evaluation of the 
negotiations surrounding the London Conference, that Lenin found 
objectionable. In his reply to Nashe Slovo Lenin had stated that he 
considered the Organisational Committee to be social-patriots. Now 
Nashe Slovo was claiming that he was agreeing to join a coalition of 
which arch social-patriot Aksel'rod was to be a member. Moreover, he 
was probably annoyed that Nashe Slovo, with its claim of having 
incorporated the fundamental points of his draft declaration into its 
programme, appeared to be pulling the ground for his party's own 
individual stance from under its feet. Indeed, to be fair to Nashe Slovo, 
its mandate and Lenin's draft project were very similar in content and in 
the language employed to express that content. However, afraid of 
being steamrollered into an alliance of which he wanted no 
participation in, Lenin went onto the offensive.
On 23 March 1915 Lenin sent a letter to the editorial board of Nashe 
Slovo.52 He began by expressing support for the idea of the unification 
of all Social-Democratic internationalists. However, he also pointed out 
that there had to be sufficient ideological agreement to make 
unification possible. In order to discover whether this condition existed 
Lenin asked for clarification of Nashe Slovo’s position on several points. 
First, he stated that one had to struggle against Plekhanov and 
Aleksinskii not through declarations, but through real work in which one 
clearly understood that, in order to qualify as an organisation, one 
needed to have had years of contact with the masses and not simply 
issue a newspaper. Second, Lenin questioned why Nashe Slovo had 
included the Bund in its list of internationalists. After all, he argued, their 
newspaper the Informatsionnyi Listok! undoubtedly stands on the point 
of view of German chauvinism.'53 Third, he claimed that one could not 
consider any supporter of an 'amnesty', i.e., that socialists should 
regroup after the war without accusations of guilt against one another, 
an internationalist:
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No concessions, no agreements with Kautsky and the 
Organisational Committee are absolutely not permissible. The 
most decisive struggle against the theory of 'amnesty' is the 
conditio sine qua non of internationalism...And here we ask - is 
there agreement between us on this crucial question?54 
Why, Lenin continued, did Nashe Slovo think that the Organisational 
Committee was internationalist? Was it not obvious from its most 
prominent representative Aksel'rod, for example, that it was full of 
chauvinists? Lenin did not rule out further cooperation with Nashe 
Slovo, but he emphasised that, 'We will be very glad to receive a full 
and clear answer on all of these questions from you. Then it will be 
possible to think of the future.'55
These sentiments were expressed in a slightly harsher tone in the 
article 'On the topic of the London Conference', published in 
Sotsial’Demokrat' of 29 March 1915.56 Here Lenin emphasised the fact 
that he had labelled the Bund and the Organisational Committee 
social-patriots in his letter of 9 February 1915 to Nashe Slovo: ’Why 
does Nashe Slovo lie to itself and to others, keeping silent on this in its 
editorial of issue 32?'57 Furthermore, in an attempt to take control of 
the negotiations and to preserve his party's distinctive stance, Lenin 
stressed differences between his draft project and Nashe Slovo’s 
declaration:
Why keep quiet on the fact that in our draft project we also spoke 
of the betrayal of German Social-Democrats? Nashe Slovo's 
declaration left out this important 'fundamental' point; neither we 
nor Comrade Maksimovich accepted this declaration nor are we 
able to agree to it. Therefore, united action between us and the 
Organisational Committee did not happen. Why then does Nashe 
Slovo fool itself and others, believing that there is a base for 
united action?58
In this (public) article Lenin made it absolutely clear that if there was to 
be joint action, then it would be a case of Nashe Slovo coming to share 
Sotsial'Demokraf’s position and not vice versa: 'It remains only to 
express the desire that from vacillations between 'platonic empathy 
with internationalism' and reconciliation with social-chauvinism Nashe 
Slovo moves to a more determined position.'59
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In reply to Lenin's letter of 21 March 1915, the editorial board of 
Nashe Slovo defended its inclusion of the Organisational Committee 
and the Bund in the ranks of internationalists.60 For Nashe Slovo, all of 
the groups to which it had appealed were united in their opposition to 
the war and it was this fact that, in its opinion, enabled joint action. 
Moreover, Nashe Slovo argued that it was possible to exaggerate 
differences and in this way fall into the trap of condemning 
internationalists as social-patriots. So, for example, it would be correct 
to say that the Organisational Committee was wrong in its view of the 
newspaper Nasha Zarya\ but, at the same time, it would be incorrect to 
conclude from this that the Organisational Committee supported 
social-chauvinism. According to Nashe Slovo, Sotsial'Demokrat' had 
also made this mistake in its evaluation of the Duma fraction as social- 
chauvinist: '[the Duma fraction] did not balk at excluding Man'kov from 
its ranks because of his militaristic speech.'61 Furthermore, Nashe 
Slovo continued, it was possible for undoubted internationalists to be 
unsure about crucial matters: 'witness (including Sotsial'Demokrat) the 
uncertain position in relation to the slogan of struggle for peace, under 
the banner of which all activity of internationalists is now taking place.'62 
Finally, on the issue of an amnesty, Nashe Slovo stated that it was 
against the reformation of the International based on the principle of 
mutual forgiveness for nationalist positions occupied during the war. 
However, at the same time, Nashe Slovo argued that it did not want to 
exclude cooperation with any group at too early a stage:
....it would have been a mistake, in the beginning of the war when 
both Liebknecht and Ruhle were one with the rest of the majority 
of German Social-Democracy, to have called for an abyss 
between them and us and to have built our party tactics on this 
call...we find that the fraction of the revolutionary minority which 
we, the internationalists, now constitute should resolve questions 
of the preservation of party unity or its converse, sacrificing it, 
from the point of view of expediency, i.e., depending upon what 
type of organisational form will guarantee us the most influence 
over the course of the class movement in each separate case.63 
Nashe Slovo concluded by expressing the hope that its letter would 
remove any doubts which the Central Committee had had on the
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viability of further cooperation. However, we have no record of a 
response from the Central Committee to Nashe Slovo. Indeed, we 
cannot even say for certain when Nashe Slovo replied to Lenin's letter 
of 23 March 1915; the editors to Volume 17 of Leninskii sbornik dated 
Nashe Slovo's letter 'after 25 March.'64 What we can say is that Trotsky 
blamed Lenin for the breakdown of the negotiations and for harming 
the cause of internationalism. The following is from his letter to Radek 
of 8 June 1915:
The meeting which Nashe Slovo proposed (Ts.K, O.K. and NS) 
could have played an important role now. The internationalists 
would have been the decisive force and the vacillating O.K. would 
have been forced to subordinate itself...Lenin destroyed this 
meeting. Why? From pure fractional considerations, not allowing 
collective authority into that place which he reserved for his own 
personal authority, seeing in himself, in the last analysis, the axis 
of world history. This is a terribly egocentric person...and this 
terrible egocentricism causes us no less difficulties than the 
Menshevik's vacillations.65
The next development of note was an offer from the Central 
Committee to Trotsky of cooperation on its new journal Kommunist' , 
the first (double) issue of which appeared in August 1915. No copy of 
this offer has ever been published so we have to guess the time of its 
composition and reconstruct its contents from Trotsky's response 
which appeared in Nashe Slovo of 4 June 1915.66 The Central 
Committee's offer was probably made sometime towards the end of 
May 1915. This date is the most likely as the Central Committee 
included a copy of its introduction for the new journal, which was dated 
20 May 1915 when it was published later that year.67 Assuming that 
Trotsky would not leave this letter without a reply for a long time, such a 
dating would also fall nicely into the timescale of Trotsky's printed reply 
of early June 1915.
In the 'Open Letter to the editorial board of the journal Kommunist1 
Trotsky declined the offer of participation for several reasons. First, he 
highlighted serious programmatic differences between himself and the 
Bolsheviks: the Central Committees's rejection of the slogan struggle 
for peace; the Bolshevik's espousal of the defeat of Russia as the
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’lesser evil' which, for Trotsky, shared the same methodological 
grounds as social-patriotism; and, finally, Trotsky did not agree with the 
way in which the Bolsheviks delineated social-patriotism in 
organisational terms. Second, Trotsky claimed that these differences in 
themselves would not be an obstacle to cooperation if the Bolsheviks 
were establishing an open discussion journal. However, for Trotsky, 
Kommunist1 was 'sad evidence of the fact that you subordinate your 
struggle against social-patriotism to considerations and aims for which 
I in any circumstances do not consider myself to have the right to take 
responsibility for.’68 Most annoying for Trotsky was the fact that in its 
introduction to Kommunist1 the editorial board had included a list of 
those people and groups which it considered to share a stance of 
opposition to social-patriotism; a list which included the five deputies 
who had been sent to prison in Russia but which excluded Trotsky and 
Nashe Slovo. According to Trotsky, this list represented ’a decisive 
distortion of the real state of affairs from the point of view of fractional 
perspectives.’69 After all, he pointed out, the views of the five 
condemned Social-Democratic deputies were the same as the Social- 
Democrats remaining in the Duma. If there was any lack of 
revolutionary clarity in the first statements issued by Social-Democratic 
deputies then, for Trotsky, this was the responsibility of all deputies - 
both in and out of prison. Moreover, recent speeches by Social- 
Democratic representatives in the Duma were a ’rebuff to all attempts 
to introduce social-patriotic depravity into the ranks of the masses.’70 
The fact that the Bolsheviks could ignore the Social-Democrats in the 
Duma while welcoming Monat and the Independent British Socialists 
into their ranks merely testified to the fact that their conclusions were 
drawn ’neither by the demands of political clarity nor in the interests of 
the International [but] in those interests which they call forth and which I 
cannot support.’71 Trotsky concluded by stating that in actual fact 
Nashe Slovo was closer to the Bolsheviks than any of the groups 
named in Kom m unistFor Trotsky, one could conclude one of two 
things from this: ’you keep silent about [Nashe Slovo] because of 
considerations of a non-principled character; and if not then it looks as 
though you have no allies in the International.’72
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Trotsky's unequivocal reply, based upon the differences which 
clearly separated him from the Bolsheviks at that time, raises the 
question 'Why did the Central Committee appeal to Trotsky?' There are 
several possible reasons for this.
First, there had long existed the suspicion in the Bolshevik camp that 
Trotsky's calls for unity were a form of ’non-fractional fractionalism', i.e., 
a device to strengthen Trotsky's own influence in Russian Social- 
Democracy. This could be demonstrated if Trotsky were to turn down 
an offer of cooperation from the Central Committee. Second, some 
Bolsheviks may have looked upon Trotsky as occupying the most 
internationalist stance of all in the Nashe Slovo editorial board. They 
had no doubt followed his dispute with Larin concerning Trotsky's 
relation to the Organisational Committee,73 and they may have desired 
to push Trotsky, through participation in the production of Kommunist', 
further into the Bolshevik camp. Third, if Trotsky was perceived as 
being closer to the Bolsheviks than to anyone else in his views and as 
being the main figure behind Nashe Slovo, then coopting Trotsky could 
have been seen as a way of increasing Bolshevik influence over a daily 
newspaper - something the Bolsheviks were not producing but clearly 
wanted to produce.74 Thus, there might have been tensions among 
Bolsheviks - between those supportive and dismissive of Trotsky. 
Trotsky's response to a letter sent directly to him could provide 
evidence for the validity of the views of one side or the other, and in this 
way end what might have been (or threatened to be) a long running 
dispute. Certainly this was the claim made in Kommunist' itself when it 
was issued in August 1915. In a footnote to his article 'Russian Social- 
Democracy and Russian Social Chauvinism'75 Zinoviev described the 
events surrounding the offer to Trotsky as a successful and amusing 
'experiment':
Regarding the letter Trotsky involuntarily gave the editorial board 
of Kommunist' several minutes of real mirth. Part of our editorial 
board had predicted Trotsky's pompous vacuously-phrased 
answer to other editorial colleagues word for word. (Trotsky, like 
Turgenev's well-known hero, is even silent in vacuous 
phrases)...The result of the 'demonstration' was supremely 
transparent. After Trotsky's open letter it became clear to all that
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it was more important to him to be allied to the liquidationist 
Organisational Committee than to Russian internationalists.7® 
Whatever the reason, or combination of reasons, for the Central 
Committee's approach Trotsky was certainly annoyed. On the day 
following the publication of his 'Open Letter' he further attacked the 
views of Sotsial'Demokrat' in the third instalment of a series of articles 
published between 15 May and 24 July 1915 under the heading of 'Our 
Position.'77 In earlier contributions to this series Trotsky had criticised 
Sotsial'Demokrat' for its opposition to the slogan struggle for peace: 
Parliamentary declarations of various socialists of various 
countries, international women's conferences and so on testifies 
to the huge role of the slogan 'struggle for peace1 in mobilising the 
left and what a huge political mistake was made, and to a 
significant degree continues to be made, by Sotsial'Demokrat' 
attempting to put this slogan in the camp of pacifists and 
papists.78
Now Trotsky turned his attention to the problems of splits and unity 
among Russian Social-Democrats. In particular, he answered 
Sotsial'Demokrat"s accusation that Nashe Slovo was not drawing the 
necessary conclusions from a struggle against social-patriotism, i.e., a 
split with the Organisational Committee. For Trotsky, internationalists 
should remain within organisational structures, even if they were in the 
minority, in order to win people over to the side of internationalism: 
'Split is not our slogan but the winning of organisations as such.'79 He 
highlighted the cases of Liebknecht, Monat and the Independent 
Labour Party as examples of people and organisations who had 
remained within old groupings to win them over to their aims. However, 
at the same time as rejecting the 'artificial splits' proposed by 
Sotsial'Demokrat', Trotsky stated that splits were permissible in certain 
circumstances. For instance, he wrote that splits should arise from the 
process of struggle for internationalism itself. However, in such cases 
'the proletariat should realise the necessity of split as a political 
conclusion and the responsibility for it on those who now use discipline 
in service of the class enemy.'80
In the fourth, and final, instalment of 'Our Position' Trotsky applied 
his general arguments on unity and splits to the specific case of
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Russian Social-Democracy.81 He began by distinguishing Russian 
Social-Democracy from its Western European equivalent. For instance, 
he pointed out that Russian socialists had split into organisational 
fractions long before the war during disagreements over specifically 
Russian issues (most notably the nature of any forthcoming Russian 
revolution), whereas German socialists coexisted within one broad 
organisation. According to Trotsky, stances adopted on the war had led 
to a regrouping in Russian socialism which, as elsewhere, had cut 
across old allegiances. However, so strong was the tradition of 
ideological and organisational fracture that, among Russian socialists, 
three groups had survived into the war: Sotsial'Demokrat', the August 
Bloc, and Nashe Slovo82 For Trotsky, several dire consequences for 
the cause of internationalism in Russia followed from this situation. 
First, the proletariat had been thrown into confusion by the outbreak of 
the war and organisational disunity only added to this confusion. 
Second, although internationalists were objectively closer in their 
outlook to one another than to anyone else, various organisational 
interests mitigated against a general coming together in order to speak 
with one voice, i.e., negotiations for unity tended to be swamped by a 
struggle for the dominance of one’s own organisation. For Trotsky, the 
urgent task was to unite all internationalists (here Trotsky mentioned 
the Organisational Committee, the Central Committee and Nashe 
Slovo) so that henceforth there would be two identifiable groups in 
Russian socialism: Social-Democrats and social-patriots. He illustrated 
how this could be achieved through a scenario of the possible 
unification of three proletarian organisations in Petrograd: the 
Petrograd Committee, the Unification Group, and the Initiative Group. 
Those people who supported the merger of the three organisations 
into one were urged to remain within their current organisation and 
argue their case. If this was done Trotsky hoped that the Initiative and 
Unification groups would become more decisive in their campaign 
against social-patriotism and the Petrograd Committee would free itself 
of fractional arrogance. In this way the three groups would converge 
politically and this would provide the prerequisite for their reformation 
into one organisational structure. By not calling for the formation of a 
fourth ’progressive’ fraction Trotsky claimed that he was refuting the
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accusations of 'organisational platform' and 'non-fractional 
fractionalism' made by Sotsial'Demokrat1 and the August Bloc. Despite 
a lack of success to date Trotsky saw the future as belonging to his 
position:
We have taken upon ourselves the initiative to call, appealing to 
the 'leaders', for the joint elaboration of a common effective 
platform of the internationalist majority of Russian Social- 
Democracy. So far there have been no practical results from our 
efforts. But we do not intend to despair. The ideological logic of 
this attempt penetrates a lot deeper than the official leaders. In 
the same direction there acts the far mightier logic of the situation 
itself. We shall repeat our attempt and no doubt more than once. 
Tomorrow we shall meet face to face at an international 
gathering of internationalists. We hope that it will....bring us 
together and make easier our further coming together in the 
framework of Russian Social-Democracy. Working in this 
direction we do not doubt of the vitality of this position - far both 
from ideological-political formlessness and from organisational- 
fractional absolutism.83
However, Trotsky's arguments cut no ice with with the Bolsheviks. 
For Zinoviev, for example, Trotsky's plans for unity were doomed to 
failure because his political platform was the most,
idealess and unprincipled ever to have existed in Russian Social- 
Democracy. Taking a piece from the liquidationists and a piece 
from the Pravdists, 'to worm oneself' between the Central 
Committee and the Organisational Committee - in this consists 
the simple philosophy of 'Trotskyism'. It is absolutely clear that 
no-one can look at this system with respect.84 
Zinoviev argued that one had to avoid eclecticism if one wanted to 
remain a socialist. Thus, Russian Social-Democracy had passed the 
test of the outbreak of war because the Bolshevik Central Committee 
had pursued a policy of splitting from revisionists over the course of 
many years. The retention of ideological purity in the past had enabled 
the Central Committee to occupy a principled position against social- 
chauvinism. Trotsky's policy of reconciliation of all tendencies within 
Russian Social-Democracy could only lead to the burying of Russian
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socialism, in the same way as socialism had been buried with the 
triumph of opportunism in Western Europe:
Opportunists reduced Social-Democracy to the level of a national 
liberal workers' party. Now the question is should we assimilate 
the social-chauvinists, can one somehow cohabitate with social- 
chauvinists in one party; or is our feeling of socialist self- 
preservation still so alive in us that we can muster enough 
strength to split with bourgeois corrupters of socialism and walk 
along our own path? The issue is should there or should there not 
be socialism.85
Zinoviev cited several facts which illustrated Trotsky's support of 
opportunism and social-chauvinism. First, Trotsky located the collapse 
of the Second International solely to the peculiarity of the previous 
epoch.86 For Zinoviev, this was a one-sided and confused formulation 
of the issue. After all, Trotsky had said nothing of the nature of 
opportunism as such. Why should Trotsky omit any reference of the 
ideological side of the matter? Because, Zinoviev answered, his call for 
the formation of a single party from various tendencies was a cover for 
the pursual of his political intention of reconciliation with social- 
chauvinism. Second, despite his espousal of the permissibility of split 
when political expediency demanded, after a year of war Trotsky had 
still not split from Russian social-chauvinists. Third, Trotsky insisted 
that there were no differences which separated the five sentenced 
Social-Democratic deputies from the rest of the Duma fraction. How 
could this be, asked Zinoviev, when Chkheidze and others rejected 
everything that the five stood for? Did Trotsky not know that Chkheidze 
supported the line of the social-chauvinist publication Nasha Zarya? 
Was Trotsky unaware of Chkheidze's participation in meetings at which 
the question of how best to supply the army was discussed? Was 
Trotsky blind to the fact that Man'kov had been expelled because his 
open avowal of social-chauvinism was harmful to a cause which 
needed to hide its true intentions so as not to alienate workers? Had 
Trotsky not read Plekhanov's patriotic justification of Chkheidze's 
refusal to vote for war credits: that one could not give money to a 
government unfit to ensure the defence of the homeland? Did Trotsky 
really not know why tsarism itself had distinguished the five for 'special'
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treatment? According to Zinoviev, Trotsky knew all of this but he lied 
because he was 'chained to the Organisational Committee and to 
social-chauvinism like a convict to a wheelbarrow.'87 The attack on 
Trotsky concluded with a prediction of the subsumption of Trotsky's 
brand of eclecticism under full-blown social-chauvinism:
At the present moment, under the influence of an optical illusion, 
it is possible that Trotsky's newspaper appears to be an organ of 
a particular, independent direction. In order to create a 
newspaper of Nashe Slovo’s type in Paris one need not have any 
connections with the Russian workers' movement. When the 
matter comes to a serious struggle before the masses in Russia 
then it will once aga in become clear that we have only two 
serious independent platforms: our party and the party which 
forms Nasha Zarya, behind which Trotskyism will always be 
forced to keep up with.88
Lenin also went on to the offensive against Trotsky at this time, most 
notably in two articles which appeared in Sotsial'Demokrat' of 26 July 
1915. In 'On the defeat of one's own government in the Imperialist War’ 
Lenin declared defeatism to be the axiom o f a revolutionary class 
during a reactionary war.89 Trotsky was labelled a 'hopeless servant of 
the social-chauvinists' for his claim that defeatism shared the same 
methodological grounds as social-patriotism.90 Lenin argued that the 
Bern Resolution had made the issue absolutely clear, even for people 
like Trotsky who lacked the ability to think: 'the proletariat should desire 
the defeat of their own government in all imperialist countries.'91 For 
Lenin, Trotsky's views were expressed in the same 'puffed-up phrases 
by which [he] always justifies opportunism.'92 This analysis of Trotsky 
as social-chauvinist was pursued by Lenin in 'On the state of affairs in 
Russian Social-Democracy.'93 Here Lenin listed three groups which 
coexisted in Nashe Slovo: first, two editors who were close to 
Sotsial'Demokratsecond, Martov and the okisty and, finally, Trotsky 
who 'as always does not agree with the social-chauvinists but is in all 
practicalities at one with them (thanks, by the way, to 'lucky mediator1 - 
it seems as though this is how to call it in diplomatic language? - 
Chkheidze's fraction).'94
Trotsky, Lenin & the Bolsheviks,
August 1914-M archl917 77
Trotsky did not respond directly to either of Lenin’s articles. 
However, in early September 1915 he published what was his fullest 
case against defeatism to date.95 He acknowledged that Russian 
Social-Democrats had agreed even before the hostilities that Russian 
engagement in a war would fatally weaken its state order. However, he 
also pointed out that none of the Russian socialists had called for war 
as a means to further the cause of revolution. According to Trotsky, 
they had not done so for several very good reasons. First, war 
becomes a substitute path to revolution only when there is no class 
able to act as a revolutionary force; a condition not met in the Russian 
context. Second, war is too uncertain a factor to place at the centre of 
one's strategy; it could give the necessary push to revolution but one 
had no guarantees that one could then stop the war. Third, the 
consequences of war and defeat are a disrupted and often ruined 
economy; not the best starting-point for a new revolutionary order. 
Fourth, the defeat of one country presupposes the victory and 
strengthening of another, and ’we do not not know of such a European 
social and state organism in the strengthening of which the European 
proletariat would be interested; and, at the same time, we in no way 
assign Russia the role of an elected state whose interests should be 
subordinated to the interests of the development of other European 
peoples.’96 Finally, military defeat, as well as stirring a population to 
action, can also paralyse a nation and ’perhaps in first place the 
revolutionary movement of the proletariat.’97
So, relations between Trotsky and the Bolsheviks were far from the 
state of harmony which Trotsky hoped would be achieved at a meeting 
of internationalists to take place in Zimmerwald, starting on 5 
September 1915. In his first reports from Zimmerwald which, because 
of restrictions imposed by the censor, appeared in Nashe Slovo of 
early October 1915 Trotsky devoted several articles to an evaluation of 
the activities of Lenin and the Bolsheviks.
In ’Our Groupings' Trotsky reported how the Bolsheviks, together 
with the Polish Opposition, held a pre-conference meeting to decide on 
a joint programme.98 The article began with the claim that Lenin was 
isolated in his views from the others in attendance . According to 
Trotsky, Lenin had argued that the slogan struggle for peace had no
Trotsky, Lenin & the Bolsheviks,
August 1914-Marchl917 78
revolutionary content. However, he 'did not succeed in attracting the 
support of any of the participants.'99 The reader was then informed that 
the 'Leninist tendency' put forward two documents in draft form: a 
tactical resolution and an appeal to the masses. The tactical resolution 
consisted of a denunciation of the war as an imperialist war; a 
condemnation of Kautsky and of the notion of 'civil peace'; the demand 
for a struggle for peace and for a break with legalism. Trotsky 
welcomed this resolution, viewing it as 'whole number of "retreats” from 
the point of view of Sotsial’Demokrat*; arguing that to the extent that 
this represented a move towards Nashe Slovo's position there was now 
an absence o f 'all that demarcates the position of Sotsial'Demokrat' 
from the positions of Golos and Nashe S/ovo.'100 He also emphasised 
the fac t, in block letters, that if Sotsial’Demokrat' was to continue to 
adopt a more internationalist stance then it would be forced to abandon 
its fractionalist position:
We can only a hundred times note with satisfaction that IN SO 
FAR AS THE GROUP SOTSJALDEMOKRAT ENTERS ONTO 
THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA I T WILL BE FORCED TO A 
GREATER OR LESSER EXTENT TO THROW TO ONE SIDE 
THAT SECTIONALIST LANGUAGE UNDER THE HELP OF 
WHICH IT HAS ATTEMP TED TO ARTIFICIALLY SPLIT 
RUSSIAN INTERNATIONALISTS.101 
After expressing regret that the tactical resolution was defeated when it 
was put to the vote, Trotsky expressed a cautionary note: the slogan of 
struggle for peace had not been written into the resolution in a 
sufficiently decisive and principled manner. For Trotsky, 'the social 
revolutionary political perspectives were formulated with too confused 
and superficial features and so on.'102
Three days later Trotsky published an article which painted a far 
more pessimistic picture of Lenin's machinations. Events occurring on 
the eve of the conference illustrated just how far a mood of hostility had 
set in between the two. In 'The Russian Section of the Internationalists' 
Trotsky recounted how Lenin had tried to prevent Nashe Slovo from 
having its own representative at the conference.103 According to 
Trotsky's report Lenin had argued that since half of the editorial board 
of Nashe Slovo belonged to the Organisational Committee there was
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no need for a separate place to be set aside for Nashe Slovo. Lenin 
also claimed that this had already been agreed with the Organisational 
Committee. The Organisational Committee objected and stated that 
they had never concluded such an 'agreement'; while Trotsky attacked 
Lenin's assertion of the links between Nashe Slovo and the 
Organisational Committee - had not Sotsial'Demokrat1 itself written 
that the Organisational Committee had decided to boycott Nashe 
Slovo? Lenin dropped his proposal amid all of this wrangling, but there 
was obviously no love lost between Lenin and Trotsky; the latter 
claiming that the proposal would have been rejected if it had been put 
to the vote.
In this and in other articles written from the Zimmerwald Conference 
Trotsky proudly defended the achievements and 'non-fractional' 
stance of Nashe Slovo. Thus, for example, he emphasised that it was 
now entering its second year of existence, continuing to play a crucial 
role as an organ used by revolutionary internationalists struggling in 
the Balkans, Russia, Italy and especially in Germany where the fact 
that Nashe Slovo (unlike other socialist publications produced in 
neutral countries) was produced in Entente-aligned France had special 
significance.104
In 'Basic Theses' Trotsky reported the steps taken which led to the 
adoption of the Zimmerwald Manifesto.105 Lenin put forward a 
resolution which called for the adoption of a programme of struggle to 
launch a civil war against imperialist governments. Trotsky criticised 
this plan as ignoring the need first of all to unite the proletariat against a 
war which was exhausting vital human and technical resources: 'So 
that the German proletariat should want to turn their cannons 42 
against the class enemy they should first of all desire not to turn them 
on their class brothers.'106 He acknowledged that Lenin considered 
Trotsky's espousal of a struggle for peace as a half-retreat to pacifism 
but, for Trotsky, it was exactly this that made Lenin's position 
'sectionalism Furthermore, Trotsky argued that the Leninists were 
inconsistent in their evaluation of pacifism; sometimes correctly 
identifying it as a desire to ensure that war would not occur again while 
retaining capitalism and, at others, calling pacifism part of the 
'revolutionary-class struggle for peace as a central task of the
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moment.'107 However, Lenin's proposal was rejected. A Commission of 
the Conference asked Grimm and the 'representative from Nashe 
Slovo' to elaborate a programme acceptable to all. This was done and 
passed unanimously. The Leninists attempted to attach an amendment 
to the Manifesto, criticising Kautsky's position and approving 
Liebknecht's. This was also rejected as a personification of views taken 
by various German socialists and thus deemed inappropriate for a 
document bearing a general appeal. Trotsky made it clear that he was 
not satisfied with the Manifesto. For him, it did not outline a full 
programme of peace and its relation to a revolutionary struggle. From 
this he concluded that the Manifesto had a pacifist tone which, given 
the critical and not creative mood which existed among parties 
dominated by social-patriotic leaderships, he accepted as an inevitable 
compromise. Nevertheless, Trotsky viewed the Manifesto as a step 
forward in the right direction at a time when many socialist parties were 
still in a state of crisis after their recent capitulations.
Lenin also produced his own version of what had happened at 
Zimmerwald. He seized this opportunity to continue his struggle against 
Trotsky. Sotsial'Demokrat' No 45-46 of 11 October 1915 carried the 
Zimmerwald resolution in full on its front page, with Lenin's signature of 
approval on behalf of the Russian delegation.108 However, in several 
articles in the same issue Lenin and his comrades stressed that the first 
'internationalist' conference of the war had not issued a true 
internationalist manifesto. Zimmerwald was evaluated in a manner 
similar to Trotsky's: it was a necessary compromise which would 
eventually lead to the victory of a real revolutionary Marxist appraisal of 
the then current events.109 However, Trotsky and the Bolsheviks 
differed over the meaning of a real Marxist approach. In a back-page 
report of the activities of the falso-internationalists' at Zimmerwald 
Trotsky was criticised for his opposition to Radek's theses of a struggle 
against opportunism and the centre and for mass revolutionary 
activity.110 The report claimed that French and German delegates were 
the first to object to Radek's views. Trotsky then supported them, 
declaring that he did not know what Radek meant by 'mass 
revolutionary activity.' Sotsial'Demokrat' retorted by saying that 
Trotsky's 'revolutionary activity' never went beyond the idea of voting
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on war credits. Although it was admitted that Trotsky had voted for 
Lenin's resolutions to be submitted to the commission which would 
elaborate a common statement, the Nashe Slovo correspondent was 
described as having 'struggled with all his might against a revolutionary 
Marxist appraisal of issues.'111
The same issue of Sotsial'Demokrat' contained one further assault 
on Trotsky's views. In 'The War and the Revolutionary Crisis in Russia' 
Zinoviev criticised Trotsky's evaluation of the nature of the coming 
revolution in Russia.112 In a series of articles entitled 'Military 
Catastrophe and Political Perspectives' Trotsky had argued that recent 
changes in Russian society meant that the proletariat was the only 
class willing and able to carry out a revolution.113 The peasantry had 
become even more stratified and conservative, and the proletariat 
could hope to attract only proletarian and semi-proletarian elements 
from peasant ranks. For Trotsky, the revolution would not only be 
proletarian in content but also in form, i.e., it would be a socialist 
revolution. According to Zinoviev, Trotsky's schema ignored the 
importance of Russia's bourgeois-democratic movements as well as 
underestimating the peasant's potential to play a revolutionary role. 
Furthermore, he argued that Trotsky was wrong to call for a socialist 
revolution in Russia. Zinoviev repeated the view outlined in 
SotsialVemokrat"s manifesto of November 1914: in backward 
countries, including Russia, there should be a democratic revolution; 
socialist revolution was possible only in the advanced countries of 
Western Europe.
Trotsky responded to only one of the above articles. He summarised 
the criticisms of his actions at Zimmerwald in an article in Nashe Slovo 
of 5 November 1915.114 Sotsial'Demokraf’s version of events was 
objected to as a distortion of what had really happened. After all, 
Trotsky had stated that he considered the Manifesto to be deficient 
from a revolutionary Marxist point of view. More over, elaborating the 
Manifesto in conjunction with Grimm hardly amounted to a full-blown 
struggle against Marxism. Trotsky also responded to an 'extremist' 
critique of Zimmerwald advanced by the Dutch tribunists.115 He wrote 
that it was easy to preserve one's purity when one had the support of 
five hundred people in a country that was not involved in the war and
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which would not become a centre of revolutionary activity. The point 
was, however, that if one remained in the confines of one's own fraction 
one lost a sense of perspective of what could possibly be achieved at 
any particular moment. Trotsky added that one could have written of 
Zimmerwald as a capitulation to social-chauvinism in Paris. He used 
this thought as a background against which he ridiculed Zinoviev:
In mood it would be in the same tone by which Zinoviev writes his 
articles (Zinoviev, as is well-known always writes one and the 
same article) and would not have been distinguished from 
Zinoviev's article - well, apart from a better literary style!116 
By the end of November 1915 both Lenin and Trotsky were levelling 
criticisms at the other but over different issues. Lenin chose to 
concentrate on the differing perceptions of what type of revolution 
would occur in Russia. Trotsky had once again stated his case for the 
establishment of a socialist workers' government in a polemical article 
directed against Aksel'rod and the Organisational Committee.117 Lenin 
seized the opportunity to express his view on the debate and went on to 
the offensive against Trotsky.118 His main criticism was that Trotsky 
was blind to the crucial role of the peasantry in a revolution which would 
lead to a 'revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and 
the peasantry.'119 For Lenin, Trotsky's arguments could only help the 
cause of liberal politics in Russia which 'by "denying" the role of the 
peasantry understand a disinclination to urge the peasantry to 
revolution !'
Trotsky, however, was still focussing his attention on how the 
Zimmerwald Manifesto was produced, in two articles in which the 
author polemicised with Martov.120 The dispute centred around 
Martov's evaluation of Trotsky's reportage of the Zimmerwald 
Conference. For Martov, Trotsky had been wrong to identify three 
groups at the conference: the extremists (Lenin) who called for a civil 
war; the right (Ledebur) who demanded peace but without any clear 
plan of how to achieve it and who refused to condemn social 
nationalism; and the centre (Nashe Slovo) who put forward the slogan 
struggle for peace which would act as a rallying call for the 
revolutionary mobilisation of the proletariat. Trotsky defended his
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classification of the various political tendencies at the conference and 
included a damning characterisation of Lenin and the Bolsheviks: 
misunderstanding of the significance of the slogan struggle for 
peace as a slogan of mass proletarian struggle; subordinating 
questions of political action to questions of organisational 
splitting; hostile relations to those who do not share the basic 
principles of their political programme and to those who do not 
bow down before all points of their sectionalist programme. If this 
group was the more organisationally formed then this would fully 
correspond to its tendency of exclusion.121 
However, as well as presenting the Bolsheviks as a closely knit 
sectionalist group Trotsky also pinpointed friction within the Bolshevik 
camp. In particular, he (once again) claimed that Lenin was out of step 
with his supporters. Thus, he pointed out that Lenin had initially refused 
to sign the Zimmerwald Manifesto unless it was amended. Then Lenin 
backtracked and signed. For Trotsky, the message was obvious: 'even 
[Lenin's] closest friends were not prepared to go that far down the path 
of sectionalism.'122
Trotsky's insistence of the sectional nature of Lenin's politics was 
not only based upon his experiences at Zimmerwald. At some point in 
1915 Trotsky resigned from his membership of the Internationalist Club 
in Paris because he thought it run by Lenin's extremist sectionalists. In 
1921 Tanya Lyudvinskaya, the secretary of the Paris section of the 
Bolshevik fraction during the First World War, sent a copy of Trotsky's 
letter of resignation to Istpart. In her covering letter she informed the 
Party historians that the Club was established by the Paris section of 
the RSDLP(b) with the intention of 'uniting all groups occupying an 
internationalist position on the war.'123 She dates Trotsky's letter at 
May or June 1915, but it was clearly written after Zimmerwald. Thus, 
Louis Sinclair's dating of December 1915 is probably the more 
accurate.124
In the letter Trotsky claimed that the Paris Club could not fulfil its aim 
of uniting internationalists since it clearly was a sectionalist 
organisation. After all, he pointed out, the Club's practice of passing 
resolutions would inevitably alienate some comrades. Thus, the 
resolutions which were passed, 'receiving a completely accidental
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majority1, supported the Zimmerwald extremists and this meant that 
Trotsky had to resign:
Since I did not agree with the behaviour of the Leninist delegation 
at the Zimmerwald Conference; since I supported the Leninist 
delegation at the conference only in so far as its basic line 
corresponded in general with the line of revolutionary 
internationalism and with all my energy struggled against it in so 
far as it attempted - true, unsuccessfully - to place its sectionalist, 
fractionalist, extremist stamp on the conference, even 
threatening not to sign the conference manifesto - then naturally, 
not uniting with the Leninists in Zimmerwald, I am even less able 
to unite with them through the auspices of the Paris Club.125 
For Trotsky, the fact that the majority of the Club's members supported 
Lenin's resolutions at Zimmerwald without even considering those of 
other groups1 ’even more illustrates the fractional character of the 
Club's decisions.'126 In his concluding remarks Trotsky stressed that 
the reasons for his resignation were principled, and not sour grapes.
In November and December 1915 Lenin and Trotsky made 
conflicting claims about which of their programmes was receiving most 
support among the Petrograd workers. They were given this 
opportunity by the tsarist government which, in the summer of 1915, 
decided to allow the workers to elect their representatives to the War- 
Industries Committees. The elections were held in September 1915.127 
In Sotsial'Demokrat' of 20 November 1915 Zinoviev reported that the 
Bolsheviks had gained a majority of ten votes, i.e., ninety against the 
social-chauvinists1 eighty. He informed the reader that, in the election 
campaign, Nashe Slovo and Trotsky had whitewashed the social- 
chauvinists, labelling their publication Utro 'internationalist.' However, 
according to Zinoviev, Trotsky had paid the consequent price. With no 
clear policy of his own Trotsky
again turned out to be a dead-end. There is simply no place for 
him among the workers' movement in Russia. Either you are with 
Chkheidze and this means with Plekhanov and Guchkov or you 
are with the RSDLP and this means against Chkheidze. Life itself 
places the question in this way.128
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In his rejoinder to Zinoviev Trotsky did not claim the ninety 
internationalists for himself. He said that nobody had exact information 
regarding the ideological-fractional breakdown of the internationalist 
majority. However, it was clear the Mensheviks and the internationalist 
minority of the narodniks had been counted in the ninety. Trotsky 
admitted that the Bolsheviks were a significant group among the 
worker deputies, but even they had not supported specific slogans 
advanced by Sotsial'Demokrat'. On the contrary,
There was a repetition only on a much larger scale, and not at the 
start but in the fifteenth month of the war, of that which occurred 
at the trial of the five S-D deputies: the defeatist slogan, i.e., 
nationalism turned inside out, was rejected not by 'chauvinists' 
and 'government lackeys', as Sotsial'Demokrat' labels all its 
opponents, but by the whole revolutionary-internationalist 
vanguard of the Russian proletariat. We hope therefore that 
Sotsial'Demokrat' will not force us to return to this sad ideological 
and political confusion.123
Whatever misgivings Trotsky had about the compromise which lay 
at the centre of the Zimmerwald Manifesto, he clearly viewed it as more 
of a success for his position than for the Leninists. In a series of articles 
published in Nashe Slovo between 29 January and 13 April 1916 
Trotsky attempted to fill what he saw as the main lacuna left by 
Zimmerwald: the absence of a detailed programme of peace. In the first 
instalment Trotsky repeated his view that the Leninists had been forced 
to give ground at Zimmerwald:
Opponents of the struggle for peace (Leninists) capitulated at the 
Conference without a struggle: they could not but see that the 
movement arises everywhere under the slogan struggle for 
peace.130
Lenin's alternative to struggle for peace of turning the war into a civil 
war was then dismissed as 'putting the question abstractly-extremly 
and not revolutionary politically.'131
A central component of Trotsky's peace programme was the need 
to establish a United States of Europe. In their first Manifesto of the war 
the Central Committee had also expressed support for this idea. Lenin 
had then divided the United States of Europe into a political and an
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economic aspect. He accepted the term politically but he also said that 
the it must be evaluated more fully from the point of view of economics. 
He then came out against the slogan both politically and economically. 
Trotsky discussed the developments in Lenin's position in the fourth 
and fifth contributions to ’A Programme of Peace.'
First, he examined the arguments expounded in a footnote to 
Zinoviev's and Lenin's brochure Socialism and the War; published in 
the Summer of 1915. Here Zinoviev and Lenin stated that:
In No. 44 of the central organ of our party, Sotsial'Demokrat', 
there appeared an editorial article in which the economic 
incorrectness of the slogan 'United States of Europe' was 
illustrated. Either this is a demand which is unrealisable under 
capitalism, proposing the establishment of a regulated world 
economy with the division of colonies, spheres of influence and 
so on between separate states. Or this slogan is reactionary, 
signifying a temporary alliance of the great powers of Europe for 
the more successful exploitation of the colonies and for robbing 
the more quickly developing Japan and America.132 
Trotsky dismissed these arguments as an 'administrative dispatch' 
written in a 'telegraph style.’133 He used the example of industrial trusts 
to illustrate how the two Bolsheviks had concentrated on only one 
(reactionary) side of the issue. He pointed out that trusts were also a 
means to more exploitation. However, to stop one’s analysis at this 
point could be done 'only by a Chelyabinsk narodnik.'134 Marxists also 
viewed trusts as a progressive measure in that they would be utilised 
as part of a future socialist organisation of production. Trotsky hoped 
that, 'the authors of the aforementioned brochure themselves make 
from this analogy the necessary conclusions in applying them to the 
United States of Europe.'135
Trotsky devoted a whole article to a consideration of Lenin's 
arguments which he had expounded against the slogan of a United 
States of Europe in Sotsial'Demokrat'of 23 August 1915.136 Here Lenin 
rejected the United States of Europe for two reasons: 'first because it 
combines with socialism; and second, because it can lead to the 
incorrect thought of the impossibility of the victory o f socialism in one 
country and of the relation of this country to the rest.'137 Trotsky
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criticised Lenin’s objections on four grounds: logical, logistical, 
methodological and empirical.138
Trotsky likened Lenin's view that the United States of Europe would 
be combined with socialism and therefore any talk of it in the present 
could only give rise to the aforementioned illusions to the reason why 
the Dutch tribunists rejected the slogan of the rights of nations to self- 
determination, i.e., that this problem would be resolved under socialism 
and any mention of it now could only create the impression that it could 
be resolved under capitalism.139 He also pointed out that Lenin did 
think that the nationality problem was a task for the then present epoch. 
According to Trotsky, Lenin was left in the contradictory position of 
assigning the national democratic demarcation of states to imperialism 
while denying that imperialism could bring about the democratic 
unification of states, i.e., a United States. For Trotsky, 'such a picture is 
absurd whether one takes it politically, economically or synthetically.'140
Trotsky's second objection to Lenin’s critique of a United States of 
Europe was that Lenin had ignored an important logistical 
consideration, i.e., he had leaped over the bridge which linked the 
present (capitalism) to the future (socialism). In assigning the United 
States of Europe to the future Lenin, according to Trotsky, had omitted 
social revolution. And, for Trotsky, 'the European Republican 
Federation is the state instrument of social revolution and outside this it 
turns into a democratic abstraction.'141 In other words, the formation of 
a United States of Europe was the means by which the coming 
revolution would realise itself, so to ignore the slogan of a United States 
of Europe meant that one was out of step with reality and left with an 
empty and meaningless analysis.
Trotsky linked Lenin's logistical error to his methodological 
shortcomings. Thus, for instance, he characterised Lenin as a thinker 
in whom 'revolutionary democratism and socialist dogma live side by 
side without ever having been amalgamated into a living Marxist 
whole.'142 On the issue of Lenin's thoughts on the issue of the rights of 
nations to self-determination, Trotsky saw the victory of the 
revolutionary democrat over the socialist doctrinaire; the latter 'did not 
have time to express his doubts regarding the realisation of self- 
determination on a capitalist basis.'143
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Trotsky's final assault on Lenin went right to the heart of their 
differing perceptions of the nature of the epoch and of the coming 
revolution. Lenin had stated that the time when socialism was only a 
European problem had disappeared into the past, never to return. For 
Lenin, uneven political and economic development meant that a 
socialist revolution would occur first in one or in several states. There 
would then follow a whole epoch of struggle in which the remaining 
capitalist states would be conquered until the establishment of a United 
States of the World. Lenin did not predict where or when this process 
would begin, but he emphasised that one could not separate out 
Europe as a special entity in itself.144 In response, Trotsky outlined a 
diametrically opposed scenario. While he accepted Lenin's assertion of 
a law of uneven development under capitalism which 'it is useful and 
necessary to repeat'; he also insisted that 'in comparison with Africa or 
Asia, all of these countries are a capitalist 'Europe' ripe for socialist 
revolution.'145 Ultimately, Trotsky viewed Lenin's worry of the 
impermissibility of a successful revolution taking place in one country 
under Trotsky’s outlook as sharing the same theoretical ground as 
social-patriotism:
To look at the perspective of social revolution in the framework of 
the nation state would be to fall victim to the same national 
limitness which is the essence of social-patriotism....One should 
not forget that in social-patriotism there is that vulgar reformism 
and national revolutionary messanism which thinks that its 
state....is the one to lead humanity into socialism. If the victory of 
socialism was possible in the limits of one more prepared nation 
this messanism, connected with the idea of national defence, 
would have its relative historical justification. But in actual fact it 
does not have this. Struggling for the preservation of the national 
base of the social revolution by such methods which undermine 
the international ties of the proletariat means to undermine the 
revolution which has to start on a national basis, but which cannot 
stop on it under the present economic and military political 
interdependency of the European states, never before revealed 
with such force as precisely in this war. This interdependency, 
which will immediately and directly condition the coordination of
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action of the European proletariat in revolution, is given 
expression by the slogan of a United States of Europe.146 
In the midst of all this wrangling one further attempt was made to 
bring Trotsky and Lenin together. The mediator was Henrietta Roland 
Holst who wanted Lenin and Trotsky to contribute to the journal 
Vorbote, two issues of which were published in January and April of 
1916. Trotsky replied to Holst's offer after he had received the first 
number of the journal.147 He refused to be in any way connected with 
the journal as it stood. Trotsky's main objection was that Holst wanted 
the journal to be a coalition journal, whereas in reality it was firmly in the 
hands of the Leninists. As such the journal was notable mainly for its 
paucity of content, for 'Russian extremism is the product of an 
amorphous and uncultured social environment where the first historical 
movement of the proletariat naturally demands a simplification and 
vulgarisation of theory and politics.'148 Furthermore, Trotsky excluded 
the possibility of bringing the Leninists over to the side of cooperation. 
After all, he pointed out, had they not criticised Holst's (the coeditor's) 
contribution for its opposition to the Dutch extremists? According to 
Trotsky, he 'knew this public too well to be surprised by anything.'149 
For Trotsky, the journal's base was far too narrow for it to be able to 
attract wide support and to be successful:
I do not think that such a journal can group around itself serious 
forces in the sphere of the German and French workers' 
movements. I know too well with what contempt they referred to 
the leaflet of the Zimmerwald Left here in order not to have any 
doubts about this. In the last analysis you should not forget that 
the Leninists do not have - and in my view cannot have - any 
supporters either in Germany or in France or in Britain. The 
Russian and Dutch extremists together cannot found the 
International.150
Trotsky was to refer to his disagreements with Lenin and the Central 
Committee one more time on the pages of Nashe Slovo before the 
newspaper was closed by the French police on 15 September 1916. 
This concerned Lenin's assertion in Sotsial'Demokrat' No. 50 that 
there were no differences separating Chkheidze from the social- 
patriotic newspaper Prizyv.
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Trotsky can rant against our factionalism, hiding by these 
rantings (the old recipe of Turgenev's...hero!) of his supposed 
non-fractional 'appearance' that some so and so from 
Chkheidze's fraction 'agrees' with Trotsky and swears his leftism 
and internationalism and so on. But fact remains fact. There is no 
hint of serious political differences not only between the O.K. and 
Chkheidze's fraction but also between both these institutions 
and.. .Prizyv.i51
In the first instalment of 'Our Duma Fraction', which appeared in 
March 1916, Trotsky criticised Chkheidze for not making it clear that 
imperialists and social-patriots were guilty of propagating a 'defencist' 
ideology.152 However, at the same time he praised the deputy for 
disrobing social-patriotism, and he cited the following extract from 
Chkheidze’s speech: 'what for them [the social-patriots] is holy is lying 
and deceitful.'153 In view of this Trotsky claimed that it was simply 
nonsense to equate the two. One month later Trotsky was far more 
critical of the Social-Democratic fraction, claiming that the deputies 
were 'passive internationalists.'154 This more damning appraisal was 
further developed in September 1916. Here Trotsky labelled 
Chkheidze's call for the setting up of mutual aid organisations as a 
response to high prices as 'deplorable.'155 However, Lenin was not 
overly impressed with Trotsky's critique of Chkheidze:
Nashe Slovo and Trotsky....have more and more been forced by 
the pressure of facts to struggle against the Organisational] 
C[ommittee] and Chkheidze....but to this day they have not yet 
uttered the decisive words. Unity or split with Chkheidze's faction. 
They are still afraid to think of this!156
After being deported from France to Spain at the end of October 
1916 Trotsky's circumstances were not conducive to the steady 
production of polemical articles. He was to regain contact with a readily 
available forum for the expression of his views only after he landed in 
New York on 13 January 1917. There he quickly became involved with 
the publication of the Russian emigre journal Novyi Mir; edited by 
Bukharin, Kollontai and Volodarsky. His attention was soon to be 
absorbed by the news of the outbreak of the March Revolution in
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Russia and he wrote no articles in which he directly polemicised with 
Lenin and the Central Committee.
However, this does not mean that hostility between the two had in 
any way receded. Thus, for example, in a letter of 17 February 1917 to 
Kollontai we learn of Lenin’s continuing contempt for Trotsky. Kollantai 
must have informed Lenin that Trotsky had attempted to forge an 
alliance against Bukharin:
It was just as wonderful to learn from you of N. I. Bukharin's and 
Pavlov’s victory in Novyi Mir...as it was sad news of Trotsky's bloc 
with the right for a struggle against N. I. Bukharin...- left phrases 
and a bloc with the right against the whole left!! One has to 
unmask him (by you) although with a short letter in S-D!157 
So, despite attempts at the establishment of cooperation relations 
between Trotsky and Lenin and the Bolsheviks from the August of 1914 
to the March of 1917 remained fraught with suspicion and hostility. This 
mood seems to have continued right up to the time of Trotsky joining 
the Bolshevik Party. After all, during the negotiations between the 
Bolsheviks and the Inter-Districters Trotsky stipulated that, 'I cannot 
call myself a Bolshevik.'158
The subsequent problem for Trotsky was how to represent these 
war time relations when he came to compose his collected works 
around the beginning of the 1920s, i.e., when he was a member of the 
Bolshevik government.
4.3 Conclusion: Trotsky, the Bolsheviks and post­
revolutionary historiography
The first post-revolutionary reference made by Trotsky to his First 
World War disputes with Lenin was in the Introduction, first written in 
1919 and then revised in 1922, to the first volume of War and 
Revolution,159 Here Trotsky did two things. First, he acknowledged that 
Nashe Slovo and Sotsial'Demokrat' had adopted different stances 
during the war. However, he limited these disagreements to three: 
Nashe Slovo rejected defeatism; Sotsial'Demokrat' rejected the 
slogan of struggle for peace and supported the notion of civil war; and, 
finally, Nashe Slovo declared that the coming revolution would be a
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socialist revolution whereas Sotsial'Demokrat' insisted that it would be 
a ’democratic’ dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry.160 Thus, he 
made no mention of the disputes concerning the United States of 
Europe and those centring around accusations of factionalism. 
Second, Trotsky claimed that Nashe Slovo and Sotsial'Demokrat' 
were poles apart at the outset of the war and then gradually moved 
closer together. Credit for this convergence was given to 
Sotsial'Demokrat', whose criticism:
was...undoubtedly correct and helped the left-wing of the editorial 
board to oust Martov and in this way give the newspaper, after 
the Zimmerwald Conference, a more defined and irreconcilable 
character.161
Of course, the pattern of relations between Trotsky and the Bolshevik 
Central Committee had not followed the curve which Trotsky drew in 
the above scenario. In fact, there had been initial agreement on the 
need to establish a United States of Europe; then negotiations of joint 
action during the London Conference; and after this the onset of a 
stable course of opposition and occasional acrimonious outbursts. 
However, in War and Revolution Trotsky constructed a picture of 
increasing harmonisation in two ways.
First, as Bukharin pointed out in the mid-1920s, he simply left out 
most of the articles in which he had polemicised with Lenin and the 
Bolsheviks.162
Second, Trotsky falsified other articles to make them conform to his 
convergence thesis. For example, in Volume 2 of War and Revolution 
one finds an article entitled ’Conclusions’, ending a section devoted to 
the Zimmerwald Conference and claiming to be from Nashe Slovo of 3 
and 6 October 1915.163 The impression is given that ’Conclusions’ is a 
coherent article spread over two issues of the newspaper. It begins by 
talking of a pre-conference Bolshevik meeting and throughout the 
piece one reads ’meeting’ as signifying that reference is still being 
made to this gathering of Bolsheviks. The evaluation of the meeting is 
very favourable and it is claimed that the differences between Nashe 
Slovo and Sotsial'Demokrat' had been eliminated. However, 
’Conclusions’ was in fact made-up from two separate and unconnected 
reports; one (discussed above) in which Trotsky noted that
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Sotsial'Demokrat' was moving closer to Nashe Slovo but significant 
differences remained, and another in which Trotsky presented a 
glowing account of the success of Zimmerwald in general.164 Trotsky 
also changed the whole thrust of his original analysis of some 
convergence between Nashe Slovo and Sotsial'Demokrat' by omitting 
crucial sentences when he merged the two articles to form 
'Conclusions.' The first paragraph of 'Conclusions' ends with the claim 
that Lenin had 'showed that the slogan of struggle for peace was 
deprived of revolutionary content.'165 The subsequent sentence in the 
original that Lenin had not attracted any support was simply cut; as was 
the text in block capitals in which Trotsky had emphasised that 
Sotsial'Demokrat' would have to abandon its fractionalism if it were to 
adopt an even more internationalist position, together with the footnote 
which stated that the Bolsheviks had not formulated the slogan struggle 
for peace in a sufficiently decisive way. Thus, from the 1924 text one 
would think that Trotsky had recognised Lenin's persuasiveness in 
October 1915!
When Trotsky falsified his writings of the First World War his 
sensitivity extended beyond Lenin. Thus, for instance, in a piece 
entitled 'Dutch Extremists' he dropped the paragraph where he had 
ridiculed Zinoviev for his vacuousness and poor prose style.166
At this stage Trotsky's endeavours to present past disputes in a 
more favourable light received some backing from his Bolshevik 
colleagues. When Zinoviev gathered his war time writings for 
publication in the fifth volume of his collected works he cut his more 
taunting references to Trotsky. For example, the claim that the 
Bolsheviks had written to Trotsky offering cooperation on Kommunist' 
as part of an 'experiment' did not appear in the reprint of 'Russian 
Social-Democracy and Russian Social-Chauvinism.'167 Zinoviev did 
retain the part of this article which was very critical of Trotsky, but he 
added an explanatory footnote which stated that:
During the war L. D. Trotsky attempted to occupy an intermediary 
position and 'reconcile' the Central Committee and the social- 
chauvinists, advancing his usual view on the necessity of 
patience in relations towards each other. The events of the war 
pushed him more and more to the left. None the less the
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characterisation of his position during the war remains true and
factual.168
This equilibrium was upset by Trotsky's publication of his essay 
'Lessons of October', used as an introduction to volume 3 o f his 
collected works.169 This essay became a contentious issue as it was 
interpreted as part of a Trotsky campaign to become the new leader of 
the party and state.170 Trotsky had not referred to the First World War 
in this essay, but this did not prevent this period from being brought into 
the remit of the debate. Many leading figures in the party wrote 
rejoinders to Trotsky's 'Lessons of October'. In their contributions to the 
debate Kamenev and Bukharin gave expositions of the disputes which 
raged between Trotsky and the Central Committee during the war.171 
These accounts highlighted the issues of civil war or struggle for peace, 
defeatism, unity with Chkheidze, the Zimmerwald Left and the role of 
the peasantry in the Russian Revolution; and this approach was to 
become the standard version of Stalinist historiography.
Trotsky returned to the positions taken by Russian socialists during 
the First World War in My Life , History of the Russian Revolution and 
in The Stalin School of Falsification, all of which stressed the gradual 
convergence of Lenin's and Trotsky's views. In his autobiography, for 
example, Trotsky claimed that the 'secondary, in essence, 
disagreements which still separated myself from Lenin in Zimmerwald 
disappeared into nothing in the coming months.'172 Both My Life and 
the History state that, by April 1917, only Lenin and Trotsky shared the 
same evaluation of the future development of the Russian Revolution - 
the former expounding his view in his famous April Theses and the 
latter in his articles of March 1917 in Novyi Mir.178
In this way the ground was laid for the approaches subsequently 
adopted by historians of this period. Deutscher followed Trotsky's 
interpretation and his willingness to do so must be set against a 
generally accepted view of the falsity of Stalinist historiography. Indeed, 
given the nature of Stalinist oppression one can well understand 
Deutscher's inclination to believe Trotsky; as one can well understand 
Soviet historians repeating the views taken by Trotsky's protagonists 
following the publication of 'Lessons of October1. Now, in the aftermath 
of the most full-blown process of deStalinization to have occurred in the
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former Soviet Union, one can witness a further twist of the tale. For now 
some Russian historians accept Trotsky's version of events. Thus, for 
example, Pantsov argues that the analyses produced by Trotsky and 
Lenin in March/April 1917 are 'obviously identical.'174 However, an 
examination of the documents written during the First World War 
reveals a story of almost continuous opposition between Trotsky and 
Lenin and the Bolsheviks.
The next chapter will examine whether Trotsky was able to establish 
and maintain better relations with the Menshevik section of the RSDLP.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Trotsky and the Mensheviks
At the outbreak of World War One the leading Mensheviks found 
themselves on various sides of the new military frontiers, and did not 
have a central organ through which they could inform each other of 
their respective responses to the war. They could, however, 
communicate by mail, not all of which was confiscated by the military 
censorship.1 In 1924 the Russian Revolutionary Archive in Berlin 
published Aksel'rod's and Martov's letters. This correspondence 
enables us to trace Martov's efforts to orientate himself in the new 
environment of war.
He first of all worried about the fate of comrades spread across 
Europe, mentioning Uritskii, Semkovskii and Trotsky,2 and was not 
himself happy at being trapped in Paris. First of all he was devoid of any 
means of support and, furthermore, he felt there was nothing for him to 
do there. Above all, he wanted to go to Zurich and discuss matters with 
Aksel'rod. Vorwarts, the newspaper of the German Social-Democratic 
Party, continued to reach Paris, but reading of its support of the vote for 
the war credits only convinced him that German comrades had 
'brought shame upon the banner of Marxism and in a scandalous 
manner ended their hegemony in international socialism.'2 For Martov, 
only the Mensheviks possessed the personel versed in Marxism to 
save the honour of revolutionary socialism. In letters to Aksel'rod he 
soon raised the issue of how and with whose participation a journal 
could be established. The possibility of working with Plekhanov and 
Lenin was broached and dismissed, Martov declaring that 'I would 
prefer if we, the Mensheviks, spoke for ourselves.'4 He insisted that 
only a combative publication could answer the needs of the moment: 
'we have to try to exert a moral influence on the Russian public abroad, 
in order to prevent it from falling into despair and disappointment with 
social-democracy, under the impression of the sinful fall of the latter. 
For this, we need to seize a harsh tone of struggle against illusions and 
opportunism of both a German and Slavonic origin.'5 Indeed, Martov 
had the chance to fulfil this aim when he was asked to take overall
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control of the recently formed Russian internationalist newspaper 
Golos but, as he himself admitted, he let this opportunity slip through 
his hands:
Golos, it seems, is everywhere considered as my organ. This is 
not altogether comfortable, since a fair amount of stupidity 
appears in it. In actual fact I lost the opportunity of taking it under 
my control. It was founded by unemployed printers and they 
asked me to lead it. At that time I was convinced that with the 
censorship it would be impossible to say anything and I declined. 
Then the printers called for a first meeting and matters 
progressed little by little. Now we have to consider the 'rights 
acquired' by the vperedist Ivan Bezrabotnii, one 'party-bolshevik' 
and not one of the best liquidationists. Therefore one cannot rule 
out the possibility that, for example, Lenin will not be called upon 
to cooperate and so on.6 
Martov also considered Golos to be 'amateurish', and this low opinion 
of Golos's 'professionalism' not doubt played its role in his refusal to 
become editor in chief. At the same time, however, it did not prevent 
him from submitting several articles.
In contributions to Golos in September, October and November 
1914 Martov consistently pursued an anti-war stance. He derided 
attempts to present the war as a 'war to end all wars', or as a 'just war' 
on behalf of any of the belligerents, as ideological justifications of the 
bourgeoisie's aggressive intentions. Wars, he made clear, would occur 
as long as capitalism existed. In one piece he highlighted a declaration 
of a group of Russian industrialists, published in Promyshlennosti i 
Torgovli, that a clash of Russian and German economic interests had 
brought forth the current world conflict, as evidence of imperialism's 
guilt for the war. Martov was particularly appalled by 'comrades' who 
argued that the war was, for some, a ’war of defence' which could be 
condoned on socialist principles, or that it was necessary to declare a 
'civil peace' for the duration of the hostilities. It was in this connection 
that he on several occasions polemicised with Plekhanov, rejecting the 
'Father of Russian Marxism’s’ case that an analysis guided by 
economic determinism should lead one to support Russia's war effort, 
and wrote an obituary notice on Vorwarts, which had renounced class
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struggle while the war lasted. Contrary to the German newspaper, 
Martov insisted that class struggle on an international basis in order to 
wrest power from the bourgeoisie was the only way to resolve the 
problems which had led to war; the first slogan of this struggle, he 
thought, should be 'peace*. Finally, he publicised the activities of the 
Mensheviks in the Duma and one Serbian socialist who had voted 
against the war credits, welcomed the first signs of anti-war sentiment 
voiced by Liebknecht in Germany, the Italian party's resolutions to keep 
Italy neutral, and the attempts of the Dutch and Swiss parties to restore 
ties between socialists situated on both sides of the war zones, to 
stress that not all Marxists had capitulated before the 'social-chauvinist' 
fury.7
These writings earned Martov Lenin's guarded praise; the latter 
declaring that 'Martov, if one judges by the Parisian Golos, is holding- 
up very well..rebuffing German and French chauvinism...but he is afraid 
to declare open war against all international opportunism and its 
"mighty" defender, the "centre" of German Social Democracy.'8 
Although Martov did not mention all of the arguments that Trotsky was 
employing in the first months of the war, the United States of Europe 
being one notable absence for example, Trotsky himself could not but 
have been impressed by Martov's 'internationalism'. Indeed, Deutscher 
claims that Trotsky 'rejoiced' at the prospect of a bloc with Martov and 
Lenin around a common response to the war.9 Be that as it may, only 
one month passed after Trotsky's arrival in Paris in mid-November 
1914 before his relations with Martov became strained.
The cause of the breakdown in relations was Martov's response to 
several chauvinist announcements made by his Menshevik colleagues. 
To begin with the Menshevik-liquidationist broadsheet Nasha Zarya 
published contributions which backed Russia in the war. One of its 
correspondents, G. Cherevanin, for example, held German militarism 
to account for causing the war and urged Germany's 'defeat'.10 Then 
Sotsial'Demokrat' of 5 December 1914 published the reply sent to 
Vandervelde by a Menshevik-liquidationist group in St. Petersburg. In 
August 1914 the Belgian socialist minister had appealed to Russian 
comrades not to hinder their country's war efforts which were of vital 
importance, he said, to the Entente's cause.11 The St. Petersburg
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Menshevik-liquidationists assured Vandervelde that they viewed him 
and Belgian's workers as conducting a 'just cause of self-defence 
against those dangers from the aggressive policy of the Prussian 
Junkers which threaten democratic freedom and the proletariat's 
liberating mission.'12 They hoped that German Social-Democracy, the 
'mighty vanguard of the international proletariat', would participate in 
the fight against Prussian militarism, and regretted that ’Russian 
conditions' deprived them of the chance to join a war ministry. Despite 
this, and despite the fact that they had to guarantee that tsarism did not 
become the centre of European reaction, the Menshevik-liquidationists 
said that, in their work, they would comply with Vandervelde's request. 
In return, they asked the Belgian minister to oppose the war if it ever 
became transformed into a means for territorial expansion from the 
side of the Entente. In an editorial supplement to this document 
SotsiarDemokrat1 commented that the Menshevik-liquidationists, as a 
tendency, had declared itself to be social-chauvinist: 'Martov's voice 
against chauvinism,' it claimed,'now stands alone among the 
liquidationists.'13 Finally, there appeared in Golos itself a summary of 
Aksel'rod’s stance on the war, compiled from an interview he had given 
to Bremer Burger-Zeitung, a German left-radical publication, and a 
conversation with Golos's (Menshevik) correspondent R. Grigor'ev.14 
Aksel'rod expressed his amazement that some socialists had rejected 
the defensive/aggressive war distinction under a condemnation of the 
current conflict as 'imperialist1 on both sides. He accepted that not one 
of the warring fractions represented 'progress' which, he maintained, 
was vested in the international proletariat struggling for peace. 
Furthermore, he did not doubt that each imperialist country had had an 
interest in attack. But, he said, this did not mean that in the concrete 
conditions of the events that had led to war one could not distinguish 
'relative guilt'. And, viewed from this perspective, Germany had acted 
first and therefore was the aggressor. Aksel'rod urged the application 
of relativism in two more instances. First, he explained the various 
national Social-Democratic positive responses to mobilisation orders 
as a reflection of a level of social development in which each separate 
proletariat was still infected with fears for 'its' homeland. Hence, he 
argued, one could not condemn the German proletariat any more than
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one could blame the Belgian workers for taking up arms in their 
country's defence. After pointing out that 'explanation does not equal 
justification', he highlighted the tactics which each section of the 
International should have adopted after war had been declared, taking 
into account relative guilt for causing the war and the existence of 
national feelings among the workers. German socialists should have 
admitted that the war was 'adventurism' on behalf of its ruling classes 
and abstained during the vote on war credits. The French party, on the 
other hand, had a duty to vote for the war budget but should have 
added that while supporting France in its hour of need, the French 
Socialist Party did not want its country used as a bulwark to Russian 
absolutism. Finally, judging the most desirable outcome to the war, 
Aksel'rod argued that one had to distinguish one type of defeat from 
another. The total destruction of one country would be disastrous since 
it would obstruct economic progress and result in new conflicts. A mild 
defeat for Russia would not, contrary to Plekhanov, mean total 
enslavement by Germany, but the establishment of a democratic 
order.
Martov was certainly placed in an awkward situation by these 
developments. On the one hand he did not want to admit that, three 
months after the hostilities had begun, he was isolated among a 
fraction to which he had belonged since 1903. To do so would, he felt, 
play into the hands of the Bolsheviks, a fraction with whom he had 
disagreements over the war and other issues. Why then break from a 
group on an issue which would most likely disappear along with the war 
itself when there were other points at issue? On the other hand, Martov 
could not deny that there existed real differences between his own 
recent writings and those of the St. Petersburg liquidationists and his 
old friend Aksel'rod. A whole range of questions now confronted 
Martov, most notably, could unity in Menshevik ranks be maintained 
despite opposing views on the war or would the fraction split into hostile 
camps?; if a split was to occur who would be left in control of the fraction 
- himself or the Petersburg group?; finally how would this affect his 
standing in Golos? After all, the Mensheviks had still not organised their 
own publication and Martov did not want to be left without any means of 
propagating his thoughts. In the end he decided to pursue a dual
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strategy: on the one hand, to play down the extent of disagreement 
among the Mensheviks, in this way trying to counter Lenin’s efforts to 
force him to split from his friends, and, on the other, to stress the 
internationalist element in Menshevik thinking, in this way attempting to 
placate his colleagues on Golos.
In a letter to Golos entitled 'On my supposed isolation' Martov 
claimed that Sotsial'Demokrat1 was in cynical fashion trying to make 
fractional gain out of the tragedy of the current world conflict.15 The 
Bolshevik publication knew, he said, that it was lying when it wrote of 
Martov's isolation. After all, had not Aksel'rod and two (unnamed) 
Menshevik collaborators on Golos spoken out against chauvinism? As 
far as the 'Petersburg statement' was concerned Martov also thought it 
contradictory and confused but, he wondered, what else could one 
expect from people both isolated from emigre leaders and confronted 
with the pro-war announcements of such authorities as Plekhanov, 
Guesde and Vandervelde? Moreover, Martov argued that one had to 
focus upon all aspects of the Petersburg document. If one did this, one 
would discover not only points to criticise but some statements to 
praise as well. For Martov, the Petersburg liquidationists had given at 
least three indications of their non-chauvinism: (1) they had not 
connected 'Prussian militarism' to a demand for Germany's defeat but 
to the activities of the German proletariat; (2) social-chauvinists would 
not call German Social-Democracy 'mighty'; and (3) they were clearly 
anti-tsarist and this was not a trait associated with chauvinism. Martov 
corrected Sotsial'Demokrat' for stating that the Petersburg group 
constituted a Menshevik tendency; the reply to Vandervelde had not 
been sanctioned by the Duma fraction or by the Organisational 
Committee. Finally, although he admitted that he had no exact 
information about the situation in Russia, Martov said that he was 
convinced that one would be able to find comrades there who shared 
his views.
Martov's rejoinder probably satisfied his immediate demands as 
leader of the Mensheviks. Indeed, he could even claim some success. 
He continued to be closely involved in the production of Golos, and P. B. 
Aksel’rod's name was not removed from the list of participants which 
appeared on the front page of each issue of Golos from 25 November
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1914 onwards.16 However, he did not escape from this incident 
unscathed. In an editorial comment on Martov's letter to 
Sotsial'Demokrat' his colleagues denied that his defence had saved 
the Petersburg liquidationists from the charge of social-chauvinism. 
They argued that the call 'not to oppose the war' was the logical 
outcome of the views expounded by the social-chauvinists Plekhanov, 
Guesde and Vandervelde and not by internationalists of the Golos 
mould. Yes, the liquidationists had warned of tsarism becoming a 
centre of reaction but, asked Golos, would not calling a halt to 
revolutionary activity at a time when the state was armed to the teeth 
only bring this possibility closer to realisation? Golos agreed with 
Martov that 'fractional obsessions' should not cloud one's view of 
contemporary standpoints, but was not Martov himself guilty of this 
when he evaluated his own group's statements? In conclusion, Golos 
stated that the times demanded that people apply the clearest critical 
acumen and, in this particular case, this meant issuing a rejection of the 
liquidationist's chauvinism.
Martov's attempt to find a compromise solution to his difficulties not 
only earned him a public rebuff from Golos, it also soured his personal 
relations with Trotsky. During December 1914 Martov fulfilled his desire 
to travel to Switzerland to converse with Mensheviks in permanent 
residence there. He returned to Paris at the beginning of January 1915 
armed with propositions that Aksel'rod and other Mensheviks in Zurich 
should join Golos's editorial board, and that Trotsky should contribute 
to a planned Menshevik publication. From a letter to Aksel'rod of 9 
January 1915 we learn that Martov encountered Trotsky's hostility on 
two issues. Trotsky felt Martov was not splitting from Nasha Zarya out 
of 'fractional considerations' and that his Zurich colleagues wanted to 
turn Golos into an exclusively Menshevik broadsheet. Then, on a more 
personal matter, he was convinced that Martov had conspired to 
arrange a less than desirable reviewer for his pamphlet War and the 
International:
I have even not reached agreement with any of the proposed 
contributors to our sbornik because upon my return I 
encountered opposition from Trotsky on another point - the 
supposed pretensions of the people in Zurich to make Golos a
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'fractional organ'. He drew this conclusion out of Zurich's 
proposition for an agreement between the group and the editorial 
board and the corresponding inclusion of the former into the 
latter During the first conversation with him on this matter he 
made me lose all patience and I said a few harsh things to him. I 
therefore decided to delay talk of the sbornik until our relations 
have softened a little. This happens from time to time. In 
conversation he reproached me for not breaking with Nasha 
Zarya out of fractional bias, even though it now stands on a 
Plekhanovite position. But this is only the half of it. Even worse, he 
thinks I engaged in some kind of intrigue, that I encouraged Zolov 
to write an article about his book in Grimm's newspaper. I thought 
that I had rendered him a service but it turns out that he was 
offended that Grimm himself did not pen the re view...and with a 
sincerity that almost touched me, convinced me that I had hit 
upon Zolov so that a committed liquidationist and not some 
Leninist would write about his brochure and, in this way, out of 
fractional considerations, any initiative on Grimm's behalf would 
be forestalled. I see that you are shaking your shoulders, reading 
this rubbish. To be fair to Trotsky it has got to be said that I myself 
put this idea into his head, for in a fit of temper I said to him: if 
Zolov had not written the review, Grimm would not have written it 
but, in all likelihood, Grisha Zinov’ev who would have sworn at 
you for the slogan of peace and so on. This was an argument 
about whether Zolov had done Trotsky a good turn and Trotsky 
decided that I had let my machiavellian thoughts slip out. In a 
word, once again I will have to walk around him like one walks 
around a table with a china ornament on it.17 
Trotsky's differences with Martov were not kept within the confines 
of personal meetings, they also spilled over into Golos's editorial board 
meetings. The fact that Trotsky and Martov did not see eye to eye at 
these gatherings has long been recognised.18 Less well-known, 
however, are the articles over which the two clashed. Some examples 
of these disputed texts can be gathered from Martov's 
correspondence. Further in the letter of 9 January quoted above, for 
instance, we find the following account of the threats and compromises
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which accompanied the penning of Golos's editorial on the 
Copenhagen Conference, attended by Dutch and Scandinavian 
socialists on 16-17 January 1915:
In number 100 of Golos you can read an address, sent in name 
of ’editors and coworkers' to Copenhagen. The censored spots 
revealed Russia's annexionist policy and explained the slogan of 
peace. This text which was first of all worked out by a vpredist 
and myself was, under the pretext of a 'supplement', radically 
changed from top to bottom with Trotsky's support against other 
members of the commission...! had to come face to face with a 
completely simple and simple-minded understanding of the crisis 
which we are living through and break a lance over every word. 
Finally I had to threaten not to give my signature after they had 
wasted all my efforts, putting in place of an explanation of the 
confusion in the proletariat by the psychology of the previous 
period hackneyed phrases about the reformism in which the 
workers were raised. My 'ultimatum' led to a toning down of this 
section.19
Even when the two agreed over something, joint action proved to be 
impossible. When news of the intention to hold a conference of 
socialists of the Entente countries in London became known, for 
example, Martov drew-up a three point programme which he intended 
to take to this gathering.20 In a letter to Aksel'rod of 21 January 1915, 
Martov recounted how he had asked Larin to obtain official invitations 
for the proposed event in London so that three representatives of the 
Menshevik Organisational Committee could attend: himself, Aksel'rod 
and Trotsky. He then went on to say that despite the fact that he 
approved Martov's programme, Trotsky refused to go to London as 
part of a delegation of the Organisational Committee. The extent to 
which 'fractional considerations' played a crucial role in this instance is 
clear from Martov's commentary upon this affair:
In the finish he [Trotsky] said that, in an emergency, he could be 
the representative of the group Bor'ba as part of the OC 
delegation, as was the case in Brussels, with the right to conduct 
a separate line...I answered that on a joint mandate I could not 
accept these reservations for Trotsky and that therefore I would
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ensure that a mandate was issued to us without Trotsky. I think 
that no other outcome was possible, although his presence might 
have been useful; but, on second thoughts, even this is under 
doubt if he, for example, took it into his head there, if only to 
emphasise his independence and 'reconciliationess', to reach 
agreement with Lenin.21
The next opportunity for Trotsky to cooperate with Martov came 
during the negotiations to start a new newspaper after Golos was 
closed by the French authorities on 18 January 1915. At this time 
Martov was still trying to include the Zurich Mensheviks on the 
projected editorial board and Trotsky, worried that he would find 
himself in a minority among the Mensheviks and bound to them by the 
formal rules of editorial unity, at first refused to join Golos's 
replacement, Nashe Slovo. As is clear from Martov's letter to Aksel'rod 
of 1 February 1915, this did not prevent Trotsky from attempting to limit 
the Mensheviks’ influence in Nashe Slovo from the 'outside':
Instead of Golos Nashe Slovo has begun to appear. I agreed to 
join its editorial board, whence I was invited to go along with 
Trotsky; the latter refused on the grounds that he was busy at the 
moment, but, in actual fact, he does not want to tie-up his hands. I 
am convinced of this at the moment, seeing how he influences 
the non-Menshevik part of the editorial board...terrorising them 
with the prospect of being swallowed-up by our threesome...He 
acts so that if we are not able to manoeuvre he, with the best 
intentions, will achieve a split in the editorial board and the 
newspaper will loose any 'unification' significance.22 
The ground for Trotsky's eventual cooption onto Nashe Slovo's 
editorial board was most probably laid by Martov's renunciation of 
Nasha Zarya's chauvinist line, published in the very first issue of Nashe 
Slovo23 After all, Trotsky would be unlikely to join a publication that 
associated itself with chauvinism, even if it did so negatively by not 
printing a critique of Nasha Zarya. The appearance of Martov's 
'announcement' at this time can probably be explained by the following 
factors. First, Martov had resisted making a public statement against 
Nasha Zarya while he had no backing from Menshevik colleagues. To 
do this alone would be to admit that Lenin was right. However, by 29
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January 1915 Martov had received a letter from fellow Menshevik Dan 
in which the latter also expressed his opposition to Nasha Zarya. 
Martov published Dan's letter alongside his statement in Nashe Slovo, 
and he did so to stress Menshevik unity on this point. Second, Martov's 
colleagues on Nashe Slovo were most likely pushing him to make an 
anti-Nasha Zarya announcement in Nashe Slovo. This would hopefully 
stop Lenin from accusing Nashe Slovo of harbouring closet- 
chauvinists, and ease relations with Trotsky who, as Martov himself 
recognised, had friends on Nashe Slovo's editorial board. Forced into 
action by various pressures, Martov admitted that he was torn with 
anguish when he made his an\\-Nasha Zarya statement. On the one 
hand, he wanted to make his opposition to something he did not 
believe in clear; on the other, he did not want to damage the standing of 
the Menshevik fraction. Not least, would his public remarks not be used 
by Trotsky?:
I made this 'splitting' with a great 'anguish' in my soul, for I 
foresee that, as a result, from one side the group which has been 
most united in spirit up to this point will split and, from another, I 
am aware that on each step all of these symptoms of 
disintegration are exploited and will be exploited to an even 
greater degree by the specialists in disrobing 'factionalism' who, 
in actual fact, slyly use even a great world tragedy and 
catastrophe to tiny fractional advantages. Now Antid Oto 
[Trotsky] engages in this. With him (he is here) I should 
(preserving, as far as possible, good personal relations) keep 
myself constantly on guard.24 
If Martov hoped that he could limit the amount of antagonism between 
sections of Nashe Slovo and parts of the Menshevik fraction from 
appearing on the pages of the former, in part by keeping on good terms 
with Trotsky, he was to be sorely disappointed. Although he could claim 
the occasional victory, in the coming months it was Trotsky's views 
which more and more came to dominate in Nashe Slovo.
On 13 February 1915 Trotsky distanced himself from the 
Organisational Committee by issuing a statement in which he denied 
that he bore any more responsibility for the policies of the 
Organisational Committee than for any other section of the party.25
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Then, at the beginning of March, Trotsky published a two-part critical 
evaluation of Nasha Zarya's commentary upon the Copenhagen 
Conference, which appeared in the first issue of the Organisational 
Committee's newly established Izvestiya. In the first part of this critique 
Trotsky focussed upon Nasha Zarya's claim that, since the proletariat 
had proved itself unable to prevent the current war, socialists had to 
support the side whose victory would bring most benefit to economic 
and political progress, i.e., the Entente. For Trotsky, this view was 
based upon a misunderstanding of the conditions in which the workers 
would engage in revolutionary activity. He reconstructed the logic of the 
Nasha Zarya group thus: the Second International overestimated the 
strength of the working class as a factor in international relations. 
Therefore the masses would have to throw their weight behind one of 
the great power blocs as a supplementary force. Contrary to this, 
Trotsky argued that the proletariat had underestimated its strength in 
the pre-war epoch. This, he thought, was quite natural for what was a 
time of 'm ighty world reaction' for, 'revolutionary self- 
sufficiency...awakens and is strengthened during epoches of instability 
which put the oppressed class in such a situation out of which there is 
no other exit apart from the path of revolution.'26 And, according to 
Trotsky, the war was creating conditions ripe for violent class struggle. 
This explained why the revolutionary internationalists, unlike Nasha 
Zarya, urged the proletariat to free itself of national-state 
consciousness and to pursue its own, social-revolutionary policy. In the 
second instalment Trotsky took issue with Nasha Zarya's perception of 
the Entente forces as most embodying progress out of the warring 
coalitions. He made it clear that the war was not a clash of political 
forms, democratic (Entente) versus feudal (Central Powers), but a 
battle for colonies between capitalist nations. In thinking otherwise 
Nasha Zarya had simply accepted imperialist propaganda:
One of the most important ideological means for putting the 
whole democratic state organisation at the service of imperialist 
aims is the idea, the myth, the legend that the war is conducted 
'for democracy against militarism'. Adopting this legend the 
group of Petersburg liquidationists, like Nasha Zarya's editorial
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board, can only blank out minds, easing the work of social forces 
deadly hostile to socialism and democracy.27 
During April 1915 Martov was able to claim limited success in his 
battles on Nashe Slovo. On the negative side, Trotsky gained a majority 
to delay the publication of Martov's reply to Radek's censure of the 
Menshevik I. Izvol'skaya for belonging to a fraction which did not 
conduct a decisive struggle with social-patriotism in its own ranks.28 
After this dispute Martov, in a letter to Semkovskii, wrote that it was 
once again 'impossible to approach Trotsky.'29 On a more positive 
note, he did ensure that, in a declaration on fractions within Russian 
Social-Democracy, Nashe Slovo stated that it did not consider itself a 
separate group and that, while it recognised that old alignments were 
still in force, it would maintain good relations will all those who held an 
internationalist position, irrespective of fractional alignment.30 This 
victory, however, proved to be short lived. The following months not 
only saw Nashe Slovo in dispute with Aksel'rod but, through polemics 
with the Organisational Committee's Izvestiya, with the whole
Menshevik fraction as well.
In a conversation with Nashe Slovo, which appeared over two issues 
of the Paris publication in May 1915, Aksel'rod outlined his latest 
thoughts on the war. He began by stating that the war had revealed that 
nationalism and internationalism were two mutually exclusive 
principles. According to Aksel'rod, the Second International had proven 
inadequate to the task of preventing the outbreak of hostilities because 
nationalism had been dominant within it. For him, it followed that only 
an internationalisation of the tactics of the workers' movement would 
guarantee that this would not reoccur. And, looking forward to this 
prospect, Aksel'rod thought that the current divisions around questions 
connected with the war would not determine who would stand where: 'I 
cannot imagine Plekhanov in the opposing conservative camp after the 
war...I agree with criticism of Nasha Zarya's current line in relation to 
the war, but I consider the attempt to harden these differences into 
fractions as, to put it mildly, premature.'31 It was from this perspective 
that Aksel’rod rejected Lenin's 'fanatical splitting', insisting instead that 
social-chauvinists should also be invited to any gathering intended to 
unify Russian social-democrats. Only in this instance, reasoned
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Aksel'rod, would it become clear if social-chauvinists and 
internationalists had already formed two hostile camps. On the war, 
Aksel'rod said that he disagreed with Lenin's call for Russia's defeat; 
the best outcome would be 'neither victory nor defeat1 for all sides.32
It was left to Trotsky to spell out Nashe Slovo's differences with 
Aksel'rod, in the form of an unsigned editorial comment upon the 
Menshevik's remarks. Trotsky noted his agreement with Aksel'rod in so 
far as the latter counterposed nationalism and internationalism, and 
rejected splitting without just cause. But, for Trotsky, Aksel'rod took his 
concern over Lenin's manoeuvres to such an extent, that he refused to 
raise the issue of the irreconcilability of internationalism and social- 
chauvinism as this would lead to the decomposition of the old 
groupings in Russian Social-Democracy. In turn, Trotsky pointed out, 
this left Aksel'rod in the contradictory position of opposing the only 
means by which his call for the internationalisation of the workers' 
movement could be realised, i.e., a clear split of internationalists from 
social-chauvinists. Furthermore, in light of Aksel'rod’s acceptance that 
nationalism and internationalism were two hostile principles, Trotsky 
puzzled over Aksel'rod's desire to maintain contact with Plekhanov. 
Whether the 'Father of Russian Marxism' returned to the fold or not 
was, Trotsky stated, irrelevant. Plekhanov's current position was 
chauvinistic and confusing the workers and it was the clear obligation of 
revolutionary internationalists to oppose him. Finally, Trotsky objected 
to Aksel'rod's view that social-chauvinists should be invited to a 
unification conference along with internationalists. According to 
Trotsky, this would only complicate the process of fractional 
realignment and hinder the struggle against social-chauvinism: 'so that 
the irreconcilable ideological-political demarcation from the social- 
patriots in all groups...is not accompanied by the preservation, and 
even the complication of party chaos, it is necessary that an ideological 
and actual unification of internationalists of all fractions takes place 
parallel with this process.'33
At the same time as the above dispute with Aksel’rod appeared, 
Nashe Slovo began to issue a series of editorial articles, penned by 
Trotsky under the title of 'Our Position’, which examined how the issues 
raised by the war affected the old groups in Russian socialism. Their
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central message that the outbreak of the war had opened a new era 
which demanded a realignment of social-democrats into new blocs, 
internationalist versus social-patriots, was a direct challenge to 
Martov's and Aksel'rod's attempts to preserve the Menshevik's 
ideological and organisational integrity.
The first instalment began by conceding some ground to Martov and 
Aksel'rod; it was admitted that not all of the issues of the pre-war era 
had since disappeared. However, Trotsky argued that such remnants 
had been radically transformed. Most notably, reformism and 
revolution now stood as two clearly opposed tactical and programmatic 
principles: the former had turned into social-imperialism, 'expecting a 
new set of social reforms from military victories', while the latter, which 
in the pre-war reformist era had been compelled to develop its 
possibilist features, had come to signify a struggle for power by the 
proletariat. It was with these changes in mind that Nashe Slovo 
considered a regrouping of forces into 'revolutionary internationalists' 
versus 'social-chauvinists' as progressive, since this 'corresponds with 
new tasks of world importance...the attempt to preserve the former 
ideological-organisational groups, ignoring the question of the relation 
to the central facts of the epoch, war and imperialism, is profoundly 
reactionary and doomed to failure.'34
In the second article of this series Trotsky rejected Aksel'rod's 
contention that one's relation to the war would not determine one's 
post-war politics. It was in this connection that Aksel'rod hoped that he 
would one day once again join hands with Plekhanov. For Trotsky, the 
contrary was true. An individual's war programme 'not only determines 
the direction of political activity at the present moment (support the war 
or struggle against it), but also to a significant degree pre-determines 
those groups which will finally take shape after the war.'35 He justified 
this remark with the claim that association with militarism during the 
present hostilities would fatally infect an individual with a social- 
chauvinist, national consciousness. In the remainder of this 
contribution Trotsky outlined three current approaches to the war 
which, given the inevitable disintegration of the centre, one could 
reduce to two: social-chauvinist and revolutionary-internationalist.
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In the third instalment of 'Our Position' Trotsky outlined how Nashe 
Slovo's policy on unity and splits was unique. The previous chapter of 
this thesis noted how Trotsky responded to Sotsial'Demokraf's critique 
that Nashe Slovo was not decisive enough in splitting from social- 
chauvinists. In this section he also tackled the Organisational 
Committee's accusation that Nashe Slovo was pursuing a splitting 
policy, both in Russian Social Democracy and in the International. 
Although it was unlikely that either side would be satisfied with his reply, 
Trotsky presented his newspaper's case thus. It was against artificial 
spits, hence the dispute with Sotsial'Demokrat\ but, at the same time, 
unlike the Organisational Committee, it was not prepared to avoid an 
open struggle against social-patriotism out of a fear that this would lead 
to a split. It was this sin that Trotsky thought the Menshevik Ionov guilty 
of when the latter argued for unity among the old groupings in Russian 
socialism in the fist issue of Izvestiya. Trotsky highlighted two harmful 
consequences of Ionov's view. First, it helped the social-patriots in their 
work of confusing the proletariat. One example of this was Aksel'rod’s 
refusal to admit that Nasha Zarya's stance on the war entailed a 
rejection of a revolutionary struggle against tsarism. Second, it 
hindered those sections of the Organisational Committee which 
genuinely held an internationalist position from conquering their 
fraction from within. If internationalists were to follow Ionov's advice in 
current circumstances, Trotsky concluded, they would be committing 
political suicide:
We cannot together with Comrade Ionov close our eyes to the 
fact that in the old socialist parties the majority is not with us but 
with the social-patriots: from this it follows that the key to unity and 
organisational discipline is also in their hands. If the 
internationalists, the persecuted minority, voluntarily limited the 
field of their activity to unity and discipline at any price, they would 
beforehand place the fate of their struggle in dependence upon 
the organisational liberalism of the social-patriots.36 
The appearance of the above warning of the dangers inherent in the 
Menshevik's stance on unity in Nashe Slovo of 5 and 6 June 1915 gave 
Ionov's colleague, Semkovskii, just enough time to pen a rejoinder for 
the second number of the Organisational Committee's Izvestiya,
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issued on 14 June. Entitled 'Demagogy and Discrimination' 
Semkovskii's note protested against Trotsky's 'polemical- 
discriminatory style [which] obviously has the aim of forming a third 
"nonfractional" fraction.'37 This response probably made little 
impression on Trotsky. After all, it only confirmed his presentation of the 
accusations of fractionalism levelled at him and Nashe Slovo by the 
Organisational Committee. However, Semkovskii's note did cause 
some upset in Menshevik ranks. In a letter to Aksel'rod of 30 June 
1915, for example, Martov argued that Semkovskii was overestimating 
Trotsky's potential to harm the Menshevik fraction. Moreover, Martov 
disagreed with the logical conclusion of his colleague's case: his 
resignation from Nashe Slovo and the closing of Menshevik ranks into 
their own fraction. He thought it more important to retain links with the 
audience among which Trotsky was conducting his 'disorganising 
tactics', and pointed out that the untimely appearance of Semkovskii's 
note had rendered Martov's plans for Nashe Slovo to publish a 
compromise resolution on the Organisational Committee impossible.38 
In their turn Aksel'rod and Semkovskii thought Martov was making too 
many concessions by remaining within Nashe Slovo, and at one point 
Aksel'rod even threatened to quit the Organisational Committee's 
secretariat because of his disagreements with Martov on this point.39
Although Martov was proved right and Nashe Slovo did not publish 
a conciliatory statement on the Organisational Committee, he did 
manage to achieve a 'civil peace' on the editorial board. It was agreed 
that the continuation of Trotsky's series 'Our Position' would, for the 
time being, be suspended. This 'civil peace' was soon broken, 
however, when Gri'gorev' sent a letter to Nashe Slovo protesting at the 
Paris publication's 'persecution' of the Organisational Committee for its 
supposed lack of energy in exposing social-patriotism in its ranks. Why 
level such charges only at the Organisational Committee, Gri'gorev' 
asked, when the Bolshevik Central Committee and the group Bor'ba, to 
which Trotsky belonged, also housed social-patriots in their ranks? He 
concluded that Nashe Slovo's selectivity on this matter aroused the 
suspicion that it was engaging in 'nonfractional fractionalism of the 
recent past.'40
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Nashe Slovo published two replies to Gri'gorev'; one from the 
editorial board and one from Trotsky. The former pointed out that it was 
aware of social-patriotism in, for example, the Bolshevik fraction. 
However, it had focussed its attention on social-patriotism in the 
Organisational Committee as it was precisely among the Mensheviks 
that social-patriotism had the most influence and was doing the most 
harm: 'Does Gri'gorev' think that the statements of individual 
Bolsheviks have the same effect as Nasha Zarya, one of the most 
influential sections of the August Bloc? Certainly not.’41 In response to 
the accusation of 'nonfractional fractionalism' the editors stated that 
Nashe Slovo's stance was independent of all fractions and it was 
precisely this that enabled it to construct a critical response to the crisis 
facing the International and Russian Social-Democracy. In his reply to 
Gri'gorev1 Trotsky repeated his view that the Foreign Section of the 
Organisational Committee had deliberately tried to mislead others by 
claiming that the Petersburg liquidationists had not repudiated a 
revolutionary struggle against tsarism. He admitted that one of the 
members of Bor'ba, An', was currently spreading social-patriotic 
propaganda. But, he pointed out, fellow members of Bor'ba both in and 
out of Russia were criticising An’. Therefore Gri'gorev' was quite wrong 
to consider An' within Bor'ba as a case analogous to the Petersburg 
liquidationists within the Organisational Committee: 'We absolutely 
refuse to comprehend in what sense An"s individual sin, which in the 
sphere of his activities immediately met with a decisive rebuff, can be 
placed on the same level as the political activity of the Petersburg 
group, which over the head of its organisation communicated with the 
Belgian patriotic minister Vandervelde...and, unfortunately, did not 
receive in the sphere of its activities that rebuff which it had won itself 
full rights for.'42
The question of Nashe Slovo's relation to the Organisational 
Committee was not exhausted by the above exchange between 
Gri'gorev' and the Paris newspaper and Trotsky. In the same issue of 
Nashe Slovo Martov attempted to dampen the flames of the polemic 
between Nashe Slovo and Izvestiya. He began by trying to clear-up 
any misunderstanding that the two publications were engaging in 
fractional warfare. He pointed out that Nashe Slovo provided a forum
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for internationalists of all fractions who occupied a similar anti-war 
position. Thus Nashe Slovo’s aim was not to replace old fractions, but 
to provide an outlet for all those who opposed nationalism during the 
war. Hence, while Nashe Slovo would criticise individual documents as 
and when it saw fit, it would not conduct a consistent campaign against 
groups as if it itself formed a fraction. For Martov, the recent polemic 
between Nashe Slovo and Izvestiya was one example of a localised 
dispute. The fact that the two publications agreed on most issues 
surrounding the war meant that current disagreements could soon be 
forgotten and friendly relations reestablished.43
However, Martov did not meet with the support of his fellow editors. 
In an editorial reply his colleagues pointed out how his statement 
diverged from the real aims of Nashe Slovo. Contrary to Martov, Nashe 
Slovo did have its own 'general-political inter-party position'. 
Moreover, Nashe Slovo thought its programme would form a focus 
around which a new unification of Russian social-democrats would 
occur, replacing the pre-war divisions. This belief, they made plain, 
issued from a conviction that the war had opened a new era in which 
the ground was being pulled from under the feet of the old fractions. 
Furthermore, Nashe Slovo saw its programme as hastening this 
process. Had Martov forgotten the editorial of issue 85 which had made 
these points clear and which he had helped to elaborate?44 It was 
Nashe Slovo’s intention to continue its work and 'if the historically 
formed fractions attempt to avoid this, this is not our guilt but their 
sorrow.’45
One might have thought that Martov would resign from Nashe Slovo 
after the latter had spelled-out its intention to replace the old fractions, 
including Martov's Mensheviks. However, in a letter to Semkovskii he 
expressed his satisfaction that his differences with some of Nashe 
Slovo's co-editors had been made public, declaring that 'our hands 
have been untied'.46 Perhaps he then took his colleagues' advice and 
re-read Nashe Slovo's editorial of issue 85, for he soon penned a letter 
in which he cited from this same text, drawing support for his 
interpretation of the Paris publication's aims.47 For Martov, the crucial 
section of issue 85 was that which read, 'Accepting that the 
fractional...groups which formed in the previous epoch are at the
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present moment the only point at which internationalists can come 
together, Nashe Slovo thinks its task of unifying internationalists 
excludes subordination to any one fraction, as it excludes the artificial 
unification of its supporters into a special fraction, politically opposing 
old groups.'48 From this paragraph Martov could justify both the 
existence of his fraction and his cooperation on Nashe Slovo. He 
warned against those who wished to use the crisis in socialism brought 
about by the war to the advantage of old fractions, including former 
'non-fractional frationalists'. Only the flexible formula which he had 
highlighted could, he argued, enable the joint activity of all 
internationalists.
If Martov intended the above letter to be the first shots in an open 
battle for control of Nashe Slovo, it soon became apparent that he had 
lost. Much to Martov's chagrin49 Trotsky's series of editorials 'Our 
Position' began to reappear, not only as a continuation of a series but 
also as an editorial response to Martov. Here Trotsky did not deny that 
pre-war divisions among Russian social-democrats had retained their 
significance. On the contrary, he admitted that ideological and 
organisational affiliations, held over the course of many years, could 
not but be carried-over into the new epoch opened by the war. 
However, he pinpointed two harmful consequences of internationalists 
failing to overcome fractional allegiances during the war. One the one 
hand, disagreements with social-patriots in one's own ranks could be 
avoided in the interests of unity and, on the other, the activities of 
internationalists of other fractions could be ignored as one claimed 
exclusive rights to 'internationalism' for one's own fraction. Trotsky 
obviously had Martov in mind when he spoke of the former danger and 
Sotsial'Demokrat' in view when he mentioned the latter. He reiterated 
Nashe Slovo's aim of overcoming old fractions by bringing 
internationalists together of all organisational origins, and threw the 
following warning at Martov:
In so far as Nashe Slovo attempts to express new ideological 
inquiries about socialism, tearing the old groups up, it becomes 
the object of accusations of 'splitting' and is suspected of 
fractional intrigue. For the dispersion of these suspicions we can 
recommend nothing other than what we have done until today,
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i.e., to further the irreconcilable struggle against social- 
nationalism and socialist eclecticism.50
Following his defeat on Nashe Slovo Martov resolved to join 
Aksel'rod in Switzerland, to where he travelled in August 1915. His 
biographer, Israel Getzler, does not connect these two events, merely 
asserting that 'by August 1915 [Martov] had been practically squeezed 
out [of Nashe Slovo ].'51 A different picture emerges from Alfred 
Rosmer's reminiscences of Paris during World War One: 'Pretty 
vehement controversies brought him [Martov] into conflict with Trotsky, 
after which he decided to settle in Switzerland.'52 Certainly relations 
deteriorated so far that the two tried to score points against each other 
in an exchange of insults which took place whenever they met,53 and, 
in a letter to Aksel'rod penned at the end of July, Martov admitted that 
the disputes in Nashe Slovo were having a far from beneficial influence 
on his health:
Eternal worries about how to earn a couple of francs has lowered 
by ability to work terribly and I am not even able to use the single 
source of making money to its fullest extent - Vorwarts; but, by the 
way, perhaps the eternal troubles with Nashe Slovo have 
hindered me to an even greater degree, ruining my nerves and 
from, time to time, making an invalid out of me.54 
Martov's defeat and retreat to Switzerland did not mean that 
disputes between Trotsky and the Mensheviks ceased to appear in 
Nashe Slovo. On the contrary, as early as mid-September 1915 Nashe 
Slovo published a three-part article by Martynov, in which the 
Menshevik criticised Trotsky's 'peace programme'. For Martynov, the 
appearance of Trotsky's 'Our Political Slogan' in Nashe Slovo of 23 
and 24 February 1915 marked a turning-point in the Paris newspaper's 
understanding of the possibilities for realising socialism as a 
consequence of the changes brought about by the war. In 'Our Political 
Slogan' Trotsky stated that the war signified a new era of historical 
development which contained two options for humanity: either it could 
continue to live under capitalism, with the inevitability of new wars, or 
the proletariat could consciously seize state power to establish 
socialism. He added that the objective prerequisites for the latter option 
were already to hand; it only remained for socialist agitators to make
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the proletariat aware of its tasks. It was with this agitational purpose in 
mind that Trotsky argued that calling for an end to the war as a return to 
the status quo ante ('Peace without annexations') was reactionary, for 
only a revolutionary socialist peace programme in the form of a United 
States of Europe, resolving the economic and nationalities problems 
which had caused the war, would be able to convince the proletariat 
that it could fulfil its duty, conquering state power and declaring its 
peace to the peoples of Europe.55 Previous to this, Martynov pointed 
out, Nashe Slovo had claimed that a resolution of the nationalities 
problem could not be expected from the war. At best the bankruptcy of 
militarism and of the bourgeois classes would be revealed to the 
proletariat who, in this way, would learn an important lesson: 'Europe 
can only pull itself out of this vicious circle by overcoming imperialism, 
i.e., by liquidating capitalism.'56 For Martynov, different perceptions of 
the meaning of 'the new epoch opened by the war' underpined two 
radically different expectations of what could be achieved through the 
war: one, modest, which predicted a positive lesson for the workers, 
instilling in them a knowledge necessary if they were to respond to 
socialist agitation; the other, high, which foresaw the proletariat seizing 
state power and resolving economic and cultural problems through its 
peace programme. In his contributions to Nashe Slovo Martynov 
showed why he did not envisage any concrete and positive political 
structures being brought about by the end of the war.
It was not the he disagreed with Trotsky's case for a United States of 
Europe, an idea which he had admired since Kautsky first formulated it 
in 1908. Nor did he object to the notion that capitalism had 'objectively' 
ripened for a transition to socialism. This, he thought, had been amply 
illustrated by the way capitalism had adapted to military conditions. His 
problem with Trotsky's analysis was that it reduced a 'historical epoch' 
to a 'historical moment'. Citing Martov as supporting evidence, 
Martynov stated that the subjective requirements for a realisation of 
socialism - a complete break with nationalism, capitalist ideology and 
traditions, i.e., the internationalisation of the workers' movement - could 
only be attained over the course of several stages of the post-war era. 
Trotsky, on the other hand, thought 'beginning with a struggle for an 
ending of the war the revolutionary mobilisation of the mass may
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conclude with the conquest of political power by the proletariat.'57 By 
telescoping a whole period of time into a single moment in this way, 
Martynov argued that Trotsky had ignored the complexities involved in 
guaranteeing the subjective aspect of his programme, and was thus 
left with unrealisable expectations. Thus, for example, the 
establishment of a United States of Europe demanded a certain level of 
consciousness and organisation from the proletariat, and 'as the 
collapse of the Second International has shown we still need to create 
them.'55 Furthermore, Martynov highlighted two ways in which Trotsky 
had misunderstood the significance of ending the war under the 
banners 'Neither victory nor defeat' and 'No forced annexations'. 
Trotsky considered these slogans a hollow return to the pre-1914 
situation which had caused the war, and as based upon a belief in the 
'weakness of militarism multiplied by our weakness.'59 But, countered 
Martynov, if the proletariat managed to call a halt to the war before the 
victory of one side or before a general exhaustion had set in, not only 
would the workers have saved thousands of lives, they would also have 
prevented a greedy peace, increasing the strength of reaction on one 
side and desires for revenge on the other. And, he added, how could 
these huge victories be taken as a sign of weakness? Next, Martynov 
attacked Trotsky's conception of the status quo ante:
Of course a peace without annexations would be a return to the 
past in the sense of state boundaries, but the correlation of class 
forces would have radically altered inside each state to the 
advantage of the proletariat. When each proletariat is convinced 
that the gold promised it by its imperialists is a lie, this is a huge 
conquest for socialism for the proletariat realises that imperialism 
is its hostile enemy.60 
This returned Martynov to the nub of his dispute with Trotsky. The 
former thought that the best one could hope for from the war was a 
positive change in the workers' consciousness. This would be but the 
first stage of a long process of preparing them for socialism. Hence, the 
negative slogans of 'Peace without annexations' and 'Neither victory 
nor defeat' were most appropriate for the current stage of the 
proletariat's development. The latter viewed the advanced workers, at 
least, ready to lead the proletariat to construct a United States of
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Europe. For Martynov, however, Trotsky had miscalculated the nature 
of the epoch and the condition of the workers. He predicted that Trotsky 
and his over-ambitious programme, out of step with reality, would be 
isolated from the workers for a long time to come.
Trotsky was brought face to face with his Menshevik adversaries at 
the Zimmerwald Conference, a gathering of international socialists 
held from 5 to 8 September 1915. In one of his reports from 
Zimmerwald Trotsky wrote that Aksel'rod, delivering a speech on 
behalf of the Organisational Committee, had delineated two 
approaches adopted by Russian social-democrats to the war: one, 
supported by a minority, called for Russia's defeat; the other, backed 
by the overwhelming majority, including Nasha Zarya and the speaker, 
demanded the convoking of a Constituent Assembly which would take 
Russia out of the war. Trotsky then dismissed the slogan of a 
Constituent Assembly as 'covering irreconcilable differences in relation 
to the war and the absolute contradictory nature of the tactics which 
flow out of this.'61
In a subsequent letter to Nashe Slovo Aksel'rod did not dispute 
Trotsky's concluding comments on the political consequences of his 
remarks since, he pointed out, the Paris correspondent had not 
accurately presented what he had actually said in Zimmerwald.62 He 
admitted that he had highlighted two basic approaches to the war 
adopted by Russian social-democrats, but these had been: (1) 
internationalists struggling for peace as a way of ending the war and 
restoring the International; and (2) nationalists such as the German 
centre. Furthermore, contrary to Trotsky's report, he had deliberately 
avoided mentioning the issue of defeatism as he did not want to stress 
issues over which internationalists disagreed at what was a unification 
conference. Devoid of any exact figures of who was holding what 
opinion in Russia, Aksel'rod claimed that he did not say, and could not 
have said, that a majority in the homeland backed the call for a 
Constituent Assembly. He had mentioned that the Foreign Section of 
the Organisational Committee had sent a proclamation to Russia which 
demanded the convocation of a Constituent Assembly, and it was in 
this context that he had expressed a hope that this document would 
meet with a warm response among the overwhelming majority. Finally,
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Aksel'rod confirmed that he had placed Nasha Zarya in the 
internationalist camp.
In 'A reply to P. B. Aksel'rod' Trotsky accepted the Menshevik's 
factual corrections to his initial report adding, however, that these 
qualifications only confirmed his original analysis of the dire 
consequences of Aksel'rod's views. Here Trotsky had in mind his 
opponent’s reiteration that Nasha Zarya was one with the 
internationalists. How could this be, asked Trotsky, when the 
Menshevik publication differed from the latter on several key issues? 
Thus, Nasha Zarya approved the French Socialist Party's pro-war 
stance whereas internationalists condemned it as deadly hostile to 
socialism; Nasha Zarya in its reply to Vandervelde had agreed not to 
hinder the Entente's 'just war', in this way rejecting the internationalist's 
revolutionary struggle against tsarism. Hence, concluded Trotsky,
I wrote that "It is clear that with such a posing of the question the 
slogan of a Constituent Assembly can in the present moment play 
only one role: covering irreconcilable differences in relation to the 
war and the absolute contradictory nature of the tactics which 
flow out of this." Aksel'rod's objections wholly support in all 
essentials the warnings that I expressed. It remains for me to be 
comforted by the fact that my real sins on secondary matters 
indirectly acted to bring out clarity in the main issue.63 
Martov's relation to Nasha Zarya’s successor, Nashe De/o, was at 
the centre of Trotsky's next confrontation with a representative of the 
Menshevik fraction. This dispute grew out of Lozovskii's request, in the 
form of an open letter in Nashe Slovo, to Volonter and Veshnev to 
repudiate Aleksinskii's assertion, made in Sovremennyi Mir', that they 
had opposed Nashe Slovo's 'Germanophilism' during editorial board 
meetings.64 Veshnev obliged, although he protested against the 
polemical tone of Lozovskii's letter.65 After receiving no reply from 
Volonter, Lozovskii addressed another open letter to him, in which he 
suggested that Volonter's differences with Nashe Slovo over 
organisational issues had now spilled over into ideological-political 
matters:
The fact that we now have ideological-political differences should 
be clear from the fact that you considered it possible, without any
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qualification, to write on the pages of the fighting organs of the 
Russian social-patriots together with Maslov, Levitskii and other 
homeland patriots whose writings are deeply hostile to Nashe 
Slovo’s internationalism. Is it possible for a...coworker of Nashe 
Slovo to remain silent when...Sovremennyi Mir' hauls the 
newspaper over the coals?... Is it possible to write in Nashe Delo, 
in this way laying a bridge between internationalism and social- 
patriotism at the same time as, as you know, Nashe Slovo 
considers the gulf between these two variants of socialism to be 
unbridgable and all types of joint literary activity inadmissible?66 
Volonter may have been unmoved by Lozovskii's open letters, but 
they certainly aroused Martov's indignation. In a letter to Nashe Slovo 
he said that he was surprised by Lozovskii's reference to Nashe Delo 67 
After all, anyone reading Lozovskii’s letters would think that Nashe 
Slovo had banned its contributors from appearing in Nashe Delo 
when, in actual fact, Martov knew that this was not the case. He once 
again reminded Nashe Slovo of its editorial of issue 85 which stated 
that the Paris newspaper was against the break-up of old fractions at 
any cost, and that comrades could remain within old organisations on 
the condition that they could propagate internationalist principles. This, 
he claimed, was the case with Volonter's contributions to numbers 3 
and 4 of Nashe Delo which had been opened-up to opponents of the 
idea of 'self-defence'. Martov also pointed out that he had warned his 
co-editors on Nashe Slovo of his intention to write an anti-social- 
patriotic article for Nashe Delo, which, because of censorship, had not 
appeared, and had not been censured at the time. Was it not the case, 
Martov asked, that Nashe Slovo itself had published contributions from 
known social-patriots (Deich, Leder, Borisov and Aleksinskii)?; and, 
was it not also true that Nashe Slovo's writers had worked alongside 
social-patriots in socialist (Sovremennyi Mir, Sovremennik', Novyi Mir) 
and non-socialist newspapers (Vestnik Evropy, Kievskaya Mysl')?
On the following day an editorial comment on Martov's letter, 
penned by Trotsky, appeared in Nashe Slovo. This conceded Martov's 
point that no formal resolution banning him, or any other person, from 
submitting articles to Nashe Delo had ever been passed. At the same 
time, however, Martov was reminded that five of the seven editors had
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expressed their individual opposition to his plans because, as in fact 
turned out to be the case, they thought that the censor would rush to 
the defence of the 'fighting organ of Russian social-nationalism.' In 
these circumstances Martov's (muted) contribution to Nashe Delo 
could only serve as a smoke-screen, both for Nashe Delo itself and for 
all 'intermediary, swaying or unprincipled elements.' This point was 
elaborated upon through a distinction between cooperation for 
bourgeois and social-patriot publications. Nashe Slovo argued that 
Martov had confused matters by placing Vestnik Evropy and 
Kievskaya Mysl1 on the same level as Nashe Delo. In actual fact the 
former publications belonged to a tradition which had long ago 
differentiated itself from Marxism. Hence it would be impossible to 
conclude from socialists working for the bourgeois press that the 
former had entered into an alliance with the latter. But, since social- 
nationalism was an outgrowth of social-democracy which had still not 
clearly separated itself from Marxism, the joint activity of 
internationalists with social-patriots in social-patriotic publications could 
only have several detrimental consequences: 'introduce confusion into 
minds, hold-up the necessary and salutary process of splitting and 
blunt the revolutionary vigilance of the advanced workers.' Then, 
Nashe Slovo objected to the way in which Martov had used its 
statement that it was against splits at any price to justify joint political 
work with social-patriots. The Paris newspaper's stance, it pointed out, 
meant that internationalists and social-patriots could coexist in one 
organisation for a certain period and under certain conditions, most 
notably if internationalists could conduct an open struggle with social- 
patriots to force the masses to chose between the two. And, in this 
battle for influence, Nashe Slovo insisted, internationalists could only 
pursue their own line in their own publications: 'one has to do battle with 
the enemy on shared territory, but one cannot to battle with it with a 
shared weapon.1 Finally, Nashe Slovo stated that one could not 
compare the appearance of an occasional social-patriotic article on its 
pages with Martov's work for Nashe Delo. To begin with most instances 
of the former had occurred in the first months of the war when rival 
tendencies were in the process of forming and, on top of this, when 
such cases had been repeated in the recent period, they had been
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accompanied by editorials to illustrate the impossibility of cooperation 
with social-patriots. In its conclusion Nashe Slovo told Martov that he 
had recently signed the Zimmerwald Manifesto, whose signatories 
were obliged to conduct an irreconcilable struggle with social- 
patriotism. For this, ’internationalists have to bring their ranks closer 
together, to create their organs and their support base for 
revolutionary activity.'68
Martov kept this dispute alight by sending an article of reply to 
Nashe Slovo69 Here he thanked Nashe Slovo for accepting that 
Lozovskii had had no grounds for condemning Volonter. On his own 
account he stated that he had ignored the objections raised by his 
coeditors to his planned cooperation on Nashe Delo, since he 
suspected that hey rejected this publication, the successor to Nasha 
Zarya, out of fractional considerations. These suspicions had then 
been confirmed by Nashe Slovo’s characterisation of Nashe Delo as 
the ’fighting organ of Russian social-nationalism’ when, in actual fact, it 
was a discussion paper. After remaking the point that he was criticising 
social-patriotism in his contributions to Nashe Delo, he reminded his 
Parisian colleagues that no resolution obliging comrades to do battle 
against defencist ideology had been taken at Zimmerwald; indeed, 
Lenin’s resolution condemning Nasha Zarya had been rejected. In 
hounding Martov and other Mensheviks for putting the case for 
internationalism from the pages of Nashe Delo, he warned Nashe 
Slovo that it was not uniting internationalists, but setting them against 
one another.
The introduction of the idea that Nashe Slovo was working against 
the fulfilment of its stated aim of bringing internationalists together 
raised the temper of the debate. In its comment on Martov's defence of 
his participation on Nashe Delo, once again penned by Trotsky, Nashe 
Slovo not only repeated its view that Nashe Delo was a social-patriotic 
publication which internationalists had to criticise to the fullest extent, it 
also accused Martov of trying to turn the Menshevik fraction into a 
social-patriotic centre. Of course, Nashe Slovo pointed out, Martov 
found it easier to write for Nashe Delo once he had discounted the 
views of his five colleagues. However, that the latter were not motivated 
by fractional concerns was evident from the fact that Martov had had to
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ignore his own revolutionary-Menshevik internationalists. Thus, for 
example, a recent resolution of a group of London revolutionary- 
Mensheviks argued for a 'merciless struggle with social-patriots 
(Plekhanov, Nashe Delo, etc)’. After defending its statement that 
Zimmerwald had obliged its signatories to conduct an irreconcilable 
struggle with social-patriots, Nashe Slovo told Martov that his ’internal- 
fractional policies' could not keep the Paris newspaper and the 
revolutionary-Mensheviks apart. In effect a battle for the Menshevik 
fraction itself was declared;
We do not doubt that..in the ranks of the worker-Mensheviks 
there are hundreds of revolutionary cadres for whom ties with 
revolutionary internationalists of all fractions are more dear than 
purely-fractional, politically-reactionary ties with the staff of 
socia l-patrio ts from Nashe Delo...These Menshevik- 
revolutionaries cannot be separated from us, just as we cannot 
be separated from them: we fulfil one and the same business. To 
their judgement, and to the judgement of the general opinion of 
all internationalists, we give the drawn-out conflict between 
Martov and our editorial board.70
In the midst of the above conflict Trotsky and Martov also clashed 
over their respective accounts of the Zimmerwald conference. This 
dispute started when Martov protested against Trotsky's ’subjective’ 
reportage of what had actually taken place in the Swiss village between 
5-8 September 1915. He claimed that a reader guided by Trotsky’s 
journalism would conclude that three groups had battled for influence 
at Zimmerwald: the left, the centre and the right. These distinctions 
would, he said, be familiar to anyone with a knowledge of the history of 
Russian Social-Democracy. However, although the Russian delegates 
at Zimmerwald had made important contributions, Martov emphasised 
that this gathering of internationalists had not repeated a set Russian 
pattern. In actual fact, the conference had divided into two groups: one 
made-up of 8 delegates, led by Lenin, who urged the participants to 
declare themselves to be the beginnings of a Third International; and 
another, the majority, who thought that they had gathered to plan a 
struggle for peace as the starting-point for the restoration of the 
Second International. The only other debate at the conference,
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whether German Social-Democracy should be condemned, also 
witnessed a minority/majority split; the former headed by Ledebour 
who said 'no' and the latter who answered 'yes'. According to Martov, 
Trotsky had created a third fraction by splitting the majority, most 
notably by portraying the Organisational Committee as a right-wing 
group, opposed by a centre majority headed by Nashe Slovo. Thus, on 
the issue of a struggle for peace, for example, Trotsky said that Nashe 
Slovo thought of this as a revolutionary-class tactic whereas Aksel'rod 
and his cohorts thought of it in non-class struggle terms. In reality, as 
was evident from the Organisational Committee's suggested 
amendment to the Zimmerwald Manifesto, not discussed at the 
conference because of a lack of time, the Mensheviks viewed a 
struggle for peace as a first step in the new era of sharpening class 
contradictions, to which the conference participants should apply all 
their efforts to turn into a second step. Hence the Mensheviks had been 
at one with the majority on this matter, and this explained why Nashe 
Slovo's 'splitting gestures...did not work: the third tendency did not 
happen.'71 Finally, Martov argued that Aksel'rod and Trotsky had 
shared the same opinion on the issue of German Social-Democracy at 
Zimmerwald, although they approached the matter from different 
starting-points. But, he regretted, Trotsky's subjectivism had turned 
Aksel'rod's passing remark that German comrades were more worthy 
of condemnation than their French and Belgian counterparts into a 
whole tendency which the conference had supposedly rejected.
In his defence, published over two issues of Nashe Slovo, Trotsky 
turned Martov's accusation on its head: if he had suffered from too 
much subjectivism, Martov had written under 'the burden of objectivity'. 
This became clear, he said, if one compared Martov's perceptions of 
what had happened at Zimmerwald with what had actually occurred. 
Trotsky began by correcting Martov's definition of the extremist group. 
They were unique not because they demanded the establishment of a 
Third International, but because they wanted to turn the war into a civil 
war. He then outlined the points which separated the revolutionary from 
the pacifist internationalists, the most important of which was that the 
former thought of a struggle for peace as a revolutionary demand, 
opposing the proletariat to the whole of bourgeois society and to social-
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patriotism, while the latter rejected revolutionary methods of struggle 
out of hand. In presenting matters in this way Trotsky argued that he 
had not simply viewed international socialism through the prism of a 
well-established divisions among Russian socialists. Indeed, he asked 
whether, 'our homeland groups in their basic political lines are not a 
national refraction of international socialist tendencies?'72 After all, the 
three groups which he had noted were evident in all European 
countries. In Germany, for example, one found the equivalent of the 
Russian passive internationalists (Martov and the Organisational 
Committee) in the fraction in the Reichstag, of the extremists (Lenin 
and the Central Committee) in the group Lichtstrahlen, and of the 
revolutionary internationalists (Nashe Slovo) in Liebknecht and his 
comrades. Hence it was no accident that three draft declarations were 
submitted for consideration at Zimmerwald, each one of which 
represented an individual tendency; just as it was no accident that it 
was Trotsky who had been asked to pen a final version as it was his 
group, which included, among others, Rakovsky, Grimm and Henrietta 
Roland Holst, which had guaranteed that anything at all was achieved 
at Zimmerwald. Furthermore, Trotsky claimed that he and his 
supporters had quarrelled with the passive internationalists, Ledebour, 
Moragi, Aksel’rod and others, on all the major points of discussion. Why 
then had Martov lumped the two groups together? This question 
returned Trotsky to the nature of Martov's 'objectivity', which reflected, 
he said, the Menshevik fraction itself, equally composed of opponents 
and supporters of Nashe Delo. Martov did not wish to upset this 
balance, and it was this desire which explained his insistence that two 
forces, internationalists and extremists, had clashed at Zimmerwald: 
Martov's position...which enables him to see the watershed 
between Marxism and extremism, at the same time forces him 
not to note the watershed between revolutionary Marxism and 
passive internationalism. But, with Martov's permission, this 
watershed does not disappear when somebody, wishing to 
preserve a spiritual equilibrium, does not note it. For however 
mighty Martov's objectivity, the objectivity of political 
development is mightier.73
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The dispute about what had happened at Zimmerwald carried over 
into the New Year when, in January 1916, Nashe Slovo published 
Martov's reply to Trotsky's reply.74 Here Martov questioned each of 
Trotsky's factual corrections, made in ’Under the burden of objectivity'. 
To begin with he asked Nashe Slovo to name the points over which 
Trotsky had clashed with Aksel'rod, for he did not know of any. He then 
threw the notion that Zimmerwald had been a victory for Trotsky into 
doubt. After all, the final manifesto made no mention of the struggle for 
peace growing over into a conquest of state power by the proletariat, 
just as there was no reference to a general battle with social-patriotism 
in the section condemning French and German Social-Democracy. 
Finally, Martov asserted that Trotsky had falsely put comrades into a 
group of 'revolutionary internationalists'. Grimm, for example, had 
recognised that there were two groups at Zimmerwald: one of eight 
headed by Lenin and another composed from the rest. In conclusion, 
Martov asked why, if he was so absorbed by fractional intrigue, had 
one of the extremists, Radek, supported his proposed amendment to 
the manifesto?
In what was to be the final word on this affair in Nashe Slovo, Trotsky 
declined the opportunity to, in turn, show the falsity of each of Martov's 
assertions. 'To take the mosaic apart stone by stone would,' he 
declared, ' be a misuse of the readers' and of the newspaper's time.' 
Instead, he would continue to critically analyse the positions of the 
three groups, extremists, revolutionary and passive internationalists, 
'rooted in the conditions of life and activities of the socialist parties in 
the epoch through which we are living',75 as they emerged on individual 
issues as time went by.
Trotsky's first opportunity to fulfil his promise came soon after the 
conclusion of his 'Zimmerwald debate' with Martov. In the second 
instalment of his 'Peace Programme', which began to appear in Nashe 
Slovo from 29 January 1916, for example, Trotsky contested 
Martynov’s belief that the only sensible slogan under which the 
proletariat should struggle to end the war was 'Peace without 
Annexations1. Here, he said that he agreed with Martynov's view that 
huge efforts on behalf of the proletariat would be required to prevent 
territorial conquests being attained from the current world conflict.
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However, it was for this very reason, he stated, that the proletariat 
should not limit itself to Martynov's 'minimal programme':
a decisive struggle of the proletariat directed against imperialist 
pretensions, whatever slogan it is conducted under, will weaken 
the ruling classes and strengthen the proletariat. But out of this it 
does not follow that in its struggle the proletariat should place 
before itself the political aim of returning to the old map of Europe 
and not advance its own programme of state and national 
relations, answering the basic tendencies of economic 
development, the revolutionary character of the epoch and the 
socialist interests of the proletariat.76 
And in later parts of this series Trotsky made it clear that a proletarian 
peace programme had to include the demand for the establishment of 
a United States of Europe.77 When he examined opposition to the 
inclusion of a United States of Europe in a proletarian peace 
programme, Trotsky focussed mainly upon the objections put forward 
by Lenin. He did, though, make the following comment upon 
Martynov's 'passive-possibilist' critique:
Comrade Martynov moves us from an 'abstract', i.e., from a 
social-revolutionary, posing of the question to 'concrete' and 
'realisable' tasks under the banner of a peace without 
annexations. We saw that an actual realisation of a peace 
without annexations would demand from the proletariat such 
revolutionary power under which it would not be able to limit itself 
to the conservative-negative programme of status quo ante 78 
In what was to be his last dispute with the Mensheviks while working 
as a journalist in Paris, it became clear to all that Trotsky and Nashe 
Slovo, on one side, and Martov and the Organisational Committee's 
Izvestiya, on the other, had irreversibly parted company. This polemic 
surrounded the election of worker representatives to the War- 
Industries Committees, bodies created to help conduct Russia's war 
effort, which took place in September 1915. In his first reports of these 
elections Trotsky recounted how candidates standing on behalf of the 
Organisational Committee and the August Bloc, despite holding 
viewpoints ranging from 'Plekhanovite to eclectic-internationalist',
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were, as a group, defencists. Hence, he concluded, the Organisational 
Committee and the August Bloc had joined the social-patriotic camp.79
In the third issue of its Izvestiya, the Organisational Committee 
argued that Trotsky had failed to stress the real differences current 
among various sections of the August Bloc. According to the 
Organisational Committee, one could identify four groups among the 
worker representatives on the War-lndustries Committees: (1) an 
insignificant number of Plekhanovite nationalists; (2) opportunists, who 
wanted to join forces with bourgeois opponents of tsarism; (3) the 
majority which aspired to oppose bourgeois organisations with the 
organised force of the proletariat; and (4) internationalists who had 
stood for election under the banner of a struggle for peace. And since, 
the Organisational Committee concluded, it and the elected Menshevik 
Dan supported the internationalist section, it was a nonsense for 
anyone to label them defencists and social-patriots.
Trotsky subjected the Organisational Committee's self-defence to 
ruthless criticism in the long-running series of articles 'Social-Patriotism 
in Russia', which appeared in Nashe Slovo between 10 February and 
15 March 1916.80 Here he stated that for Izvestiya's claims to have any 
base in reality, there should be evidence of anti-defencist statements 
being issued from meetings of the War-lndustries Committees. In 
actual fact, as was clear from the latest pronouncements of the 
Petrograd and Moscow groups, 'the political position of the workers' 
groups in the War-lndustries Committees is a completely defined 
expression of a social-patriotic character.'81 According to Trotsky, the 
leader of the August Bloc in Russia was not the fictitious Menshevik- 
internationalist Dan, but the social-patriot Gvozdev. If one examined 
the various viewpoints outlined by Izvestiya, he argued, one would 
conclude that they all collapsed into social-patriotism. About the 
Plekhanovite social-nationalists there could be no argument. The 
opportunists, thinking it possible to gain reforms on the basis of 
capitalist society, had quite naturally sought an alliance with the 
bourgeoisie. However, Trotsky noted, in the present epoch 
opportunism 'is forced to follow the bourgeoisie into nationalism and 
imperialism', i.e., like Gvozdev, be a social-patriot. The politics of the 
third tendency, to use the War-lndustries Committees as an
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organisation through which one could struggle with the bourgeoisie 
was, Trotsky stated, ruled out by the nature of the War-lndustries 
Committees themselves. In other words, the exponents of 
’organisationally exploiting' the War-lndustries Committees would be 
swallowed-up by the social-patriots and forced to serve the latter. As 
regards the final tendency discerned by the Organisational Committee, 
the internationalists, Trotsky argued that their tactic did not make 
sense. After all, he asked, how could one struggle for peace in a body 
that did not resolve questions of war and peace? The only possible way 
in which the War-lndustries Committees could have been used for 
agitational purposes, Trotsky pointed out, was if the internationalists 
had attended one meeting, only to declare their opposition to defensive 
organisations. This, he said, would have answered the revolutionary 
policy of cutting all ties with the social-patriots. However, Dan 
demanded that internationalists remain within the committees for 
national defence and this, for Trotsky, meant 'rejecting the 
revolutionary mobilisation of the mass against the war.' The 
Organisational Committee's stance was so pernicious, according to 
Trotsky, since worker opposition to the War-lndustries Committees 
depended upon internationalists remaining true to their principles: 'if 
bourgeois nationalism had met, in the form of all leading Social- 
Democratic groups and centres, a solid phalanx of internationalists...it 
would have stumbled across insurmountable class disbelief and its 
approach would have concluded in a sad fiasco.'82 In not recognising 
that its 'internationalists' had played a crucial support role to the 
outright social-patriots of the Gvozdev mould, Trotsky accused the 
Organisational Committee of penning a 'literary mockery of political 
facts.'
In a reply to Trotsky, Martov claimed that Nashe Slovo had engaged 
in its own form of subterfuge in its coverage of the events surrounding 
the War-lndustries Committees.83 In particular it had, he said, 
remained silent on the activities of the Petrograd Unification Group. At 
first sight this appeared puzzling. After all, articles on the Unification 
Group, which Nashe Slovo thought of as its own fraction, often used to 
appear on the pages of the Paris publication. Why then had this group 
not been mentioned in relation to the War-lndustries Committees?
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Because, Martov answered, the Unification Group had split over the 
issue of the worker elections, some calling for a boycott but most 
demanding participation. And, he added, the leader of the latter 
fraction, as he had learnt from SotsialVemokrat', was none other then 
Gvozdev!84 Furthermore, not only had Nashe Slovo remained silent 
on the Unification Group it had, Martov stated, out of the same 
fractional considerations, falsely equated the Organisational 
Committee and social-patriotism. In order to refute this equation he 
cited from, among other documents, a proclamation issued by the 
Initiative Group of Social-Democratic Mensheviks. This justified 
participation in the War-lndustries Committees on the grounds that 
they provided a platform from which workers' demands could be 
advanced. Moreover, the Initiative Group declared that it had fulfilled its 
election promise of entering the War-lndustries Committees 'not to join 
the cause of defence..but to struggle for peace, freedom and socialism.’ 
This corresponded, Martov said, to a distinction which Nashe Slovo 
had not discerned. Comrades in Petersburg had been elected to save 
Russia, i.e., repulse the enemy and liberate the country from tsarism. In 
Moscow, on the other hand, the workers had elected candidates on a 
purely defensive platform. According to Martov, one could characterise 
'defending Russia' as social-patriotism, but not the notion of 'saving 
Russia'. In the light of the this evidence, he concluded that only those 
who consciously wished to distort facts could present the 
Organisational Committee as social-patriots.
In his reply to Martov, Trotsky asserted that the Menshevik leader 
had not followed his own advice of saying 'what is'. To begin with, it was 
wrong to claim that Nashe Slovo had at one time often printed articles 
on the Unification Group. This would have been impossible, according 
to Trotsky, since news of its activities reached Paris only very 
occasionally. It was equally false to say that the Unification Group had 
not featured in Nashe Slovo's analysis of the elections to the War- 
lndustries Committees. On no less than two occasions its 
correspondent Boretskii had, for example, criticised the Unification 
Group for not adopting a sufficiently firm stance against social- 
patriotism.85 Similarly, Martov had misled the reader by declaring that 
Nashe Slovo had ignored the information concerning Gvozdev's
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allegiance contained in Sotsial'Demokrat. In actual fact, Trotsky 
pointed out, a full editorial had been dedicated to this matter, in which 
Nashe Slovo had correctly transmitted the news that Gvozdev was a 
former member of the Unification Group.86 He then told Martov that he 
had read the Initiative Group's proclamation and had correctly 
identified it as social-patriotic in content. After all, it recommended 
participation in the War-lndustries Committees on a defencist basis. 
This programme had, he said, most recently found expression in the 
defencist resolutions of the War-lndustries Congress. Trotsky's main 
words of advice to Martov were as follows:
before advancing new accusations against us on the basis 
of...indirect evidence it would be better to make enquiries at our 
offices by letter: it is possible that this would spare Martov from 
new...negligence and more importantly spare the pages of Nashe 
Slovo from polemics which can cause no good at all.87 
Ten days later Nashe Slovo reprinted Martov's statement, originally 
issued in the Organisational Committee's Izvestiya, in which he 
declared that he was following Ber's example and resigning from 
Nashe Slovo's editorial board. Martov explained that he had not taken 
this step while there was a 'slim chance that the majority of the editorial 
board would agree on some form of organisational control able to 
guarantee the minority from at least the worst excesses of fractional 
intrigue.'88 However, his colleagues' refusal to satisfy this request had 
removed any 'moral and political responsibility' that could be laid at 
Martov's door for the direction of Nashe Slovo.
Trotsky responded to Martov's resignation on behalf of the whole 
editorial board in the same issue of Nashe Slovo in which Martov's 
statement appeared. He began by questioning Martov's assertion that 
Ber had left Nashe Slovo at an earlier date for much the same reasons 
that had motivated Martov himself. After all, he said, although Ber had 
had disputes with the majority of his editorial colleagues, these 
differences had been accurately represented in Nashe Slovo. It was for 
this reason that Ber had not once levelled the accusation of fractional 
intrigue at his co-editors. Indeed, when Martov had demanded a 
resolution on organisational control he had been opposed by, among 
others, Ber and several leading Menshevik internationalists. For
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Trotsky, Martov's formal resignation from Nashe Slovo would have no 
influence on the policy of the latter since over the previous year the two 
had clearly parted company. Thus, for example, when Nashe Slovo 
had criticised the Organisational Committee for harbouring social- 
patriots, Martov spoke of the Paris newspaper's 'fractionalism'. 
Similarly, Martov had opposed Nashe Slovo on a whole series of other 
points, including: (1) the publication of a critique of Aksel'rod's views 
which provided a support for social-patriotism; (2) the characterisation 
of Nashe Delo as the ideological base of social-patriotism; (3) the call 
to Menshevik internationalists to join like-minded colleagues of other 
fractions in an open struggle against social-patriots serving on the War- 
lndustries Committees; and (4) the distinction between passive 
internationalism and social-revolutionary internationalism. In his 
concluding remarks Trotsky expressed no regret that Martov had 
formally broken all ties with Nashe Slovo. Rather he declared that the 
battle for influence over the Menshevik internationalists would 
continue:
If Comrade Martov at the height of a struggle with social- 
patriotism considers it necessary to remove from himself the very 
'hint' of moral (!) responsibility for the only Russian 
internationalist daily newspaper in which he enjoyed unlimited 
rights to criticise the views of the editorial majority, then we on our 
behalf declare that not for one minute will we remove from 
ourselves the obligation of moral and political responsibility which 
fails on us. as a non-fractional newspaper, for the ideological 
struggle and political work of the revolutionary Mensheviks.89 
The question of the loyalties of the Menshevik internationalists lay at 
the centre of Trotsky's next article on the War-lndustries Committees. 
In the article 'Without Substance1, published in Nashe Slovo of 4 May 
1916, Trotsky reported that opposition to the Organisational 
Committee's defence of participation in the War-lndustries Committees 
was coming from within Menshevik ranks in Russia. His evidence was 
taken from the fourth issue of the Organisational Committee's own 
Izvestiya, in which there had appeared a letter from Mensheviks in 
Petersburg. The parts of this letter cited by Trotsky made several 
points, most notably, from Trotsky's point of view, that Menshevik
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workers were not defencists and that if the Organisational Committee 
did not adopt an anti-defencist line, the Petersburg Mensheviks 
themselves would have to split from their defencist colleagues. The 
Petersburg Mensheviks also expressed their conviction that as soon as 
the Menshevik's leaders declared their opposition to defencism, social- 
patriots would suffer a total defeat. While he welcomed the demands 
made upon the Organisational Committee, Trotsky puzzled over 
Izvestiya's editorial comment on this letter from Petersburg which, it 
claimed, confirmed its earlier view that leading circles of the August 
Bloc had been forced to take-up a defencist position because of 
pressure from below. For Trotsky, 'irony itself is disarmed when faced 
with this unseen and unheard-of confusion.'90
Documents issued by Menshevik groups in Russia and published in 
Izvestiya also provided the material for Trotsky's next comment on 
'internationalism' in the War-lndustries Committees. On this occasion, 
however, the Paris correspondent could find no points of agreement 
between himself and the Russian Mensheviks.91 According to Trotsky 
the two declarations which had appeared in the fifth number of 
Izvestiya, the first signed by the Petersburg Initiative Group and the 
Moscow Social-Democratic Group and the second only by the former, 
were examples of the way in which workers were brought to serve the 
interests of the imperialist state. Ostensibly, he pointed out, both 
documents proclaimed their allegiance to Zimmerwald. They then went 
on to say, however, that a revolution in Russia could occur only if the 
proletariat joined forces with the bourgeoisie. Therefore 
internationalists, while refusing to accept responsibility for the war, 
should join the War-lndustries Committees as part of the campaign to 
link-up with the bourgeois opposition to tsarism. For Trotsky, this train 
of reasoning was faulty at several junctures. First, it misunderstood the 
nature of the bourgeois opposition which was not revolutionary, but a 
means to 'discipline the people's consciousness and subordinate it to 
the imperialist band-master.'92 By insisting on a bloc with the 
bourgeoisie one would, Trotsky said, have to follow them and stand on 
imperialist soil. This was the mechanism, identified by Trotsky, through 
which the proletariat was tied to the imperialist state. Those workers 
who were not willing to serve the bourgeoisie under the openly social-
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nationalist Plekhanovite banner, would most likely do so under the 
leadership of 'Zimmerwaldists': 'Just as the liberal opposition is needed 
by the imperialist bloc for taming...the bourgeois nation, so war- 
industrial "internationalism" is necessary for politically taming the 
workers.'93 Second, the Moscow and Petersburg Mensheviks had not 
understood what Zimmerwald stood for, for this conference had placed 
the success of the Russian revolution in dependence not upon the 
bourgeoisie, but upon the international proletariat. The only possible 
tactic which followed-on from this proposition, argued Trotsky, was an 
independent class policy constructed in a spirit of open hostility to the 
bourgeoisie. Viewed from this perspective, he concluded, one had to 
break with bourgeois organs of defence and abandon the War- 
lndustries Committees.
In what was to be his final piece on the War-lndustries Committees 
dispute, marking the end of his last clash with the Mensheviks while 
working for Nashe Slovo, Trotsky first summarised his differences with 
the Organisational Committee on this issue. Trotsky thought that 
'internationalists' who participated in the War-lndustries Committees 
were committing themselves, and the workers who followed them, to a 
social-patriotic stance. Only opposition to the War-lndustries 
Committees could, he argued, 'become an important moment in the 
development of internationalist tactics.' The Organisational Committee, 
on the other hand, as was clear from Martov's article in Nashe Slovo of 
8 April 1916 (discussed above), did not think that participants in the 
War-lndustries Committees were a priori defencists. Trotsky then 
highlighted that not all members of the Organisational Committee had 
been consistent in their statements on the elections to the War- 
lndustries Committees. In a document issued in Berne in February 
1916, for example, Martov had written that, 'More than 100,000 
workers in Petersburg voted against participation in the War-lndustries 
Committees, in this way refusing to take any responsibility for the war 
upon themselves.' Subsequently, in Nashe Slovo, this self same Martov 
had claimed that in Petersburg candidates had stood for Russia's 
saviour, and not its defence, as part of a justification for participation in 
the War-lndustries Committees! One more example of Menshevik 
duplicity was brought to the readers' attention to bring home the main
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message of this article. Here Trotsky focused upon the brochure Kriegs 
und Friedensprobleme der Arbeiterklasse, recently issued by the 
Mensheviks to enlighten foreign comrades of their approach to the 
current problems facing Social-Democracy. It was the brochure’s 
structure that most offended Trotsky. It began with a reprint of the draft 
manifesto submitted by the Organisational Committee and the Polish 
Socialist Party to the Kienthal Conference of 24-30 April 1916 which, for 
Trotsky, gave a 'sufficiently confused’ exposition of Zimmerwald’s 
response to the war.94 However, this draft manifesto had attached to it 
the declarations of the Petersburg and Moscow Mensheviks which 
called for cooperation with the bourgeoisie. If, he said, the Mensheviks 
had wanted to inform comrades of the real nature of their 
programmatic response to current issues, the appeals of the 
Petersburg and Moscow groups should have been placed at the front 
and not the back of the brochure. The fact that they had not done so, he 
concluded, suited the Organisational Committee's task of hiding its 
social-patriotic interior with an internationalist exterior:
We assert that not one foreign internationalist, acquainted with 
the first part of the document, would guess that its authors 
recommend entering organs of national defence with the 
intention of coordinating political action with the imperialist 
bourgeoisie...from the point of view of political truth there is no 
name for such a method of informing foreign comrades...this 
method inevitably follows on from the official-semi-official politics 
of the August Bloc which has two faces: one put on, international- 
Zimmerwaldist, and the other natural - Gvozdevist.95
5.1 Conclusion
There is a certain amount of irony in Trotsky's disputes with the 
Mensheviks while he was resident in Paris during World War One. His 
call for the unification of internationalists of all fractions, for example, 
was opposed on two fronts: from the Bolsheviks for not being decisive 
enough and from the Mensheviks for being too hasty and too radical; 
although both Bolsheviks and Mensheviks agreed that Trotsky was 
engaging in 'non-fractional fractionalism'. A perception shared by
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Bolsheviks and Mensheviks also underpined their disagreement with 
Trotsky on another matter, that of the United States of Europe. Both 
fractions argued that Trotsky, in calling for the establishment of this 
transnational state structure as a way of ending the war, was 
compressing a historical epoch into a historical moment. Leaving these 
ironies to one side, however, Trotsky's main bone of contention with 
the Mensheviks’ Organisational Committee was that its 
internationalism was passive, i.e., it did not recognise the need for an 
open and complete break of all ties with social-patriots. For Trotsky, 
passive internationalism was particularly harmful since it herded 
workers, who under a different leadership would have engaged in 
revolutionary activity, into the social-patriotic pen. The next chapter will 
examine Trotsky's relations with the outright, and not masked, social- 
patriots who also found themselves in Paris during the First World War.
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CHAPTER SIX
Trotsky & Russian Social-Patriotism in Paris
6.1 Introduction
If Trotsky's polemics with the Bolsheviks, on the one hand, and his 
disputes with the Mensheviks, on the other, showed that he had no 
monopoly on a Russian Social-Democratic response to the war, then 
the existence of a group of Russian social-patriots in Paris prevented 
Trotsky from laying claim to be the voice of Russian emigre opinion in 
the French capital. In a collection of articles issued in Paris in 1915 a 
selection of Russian social-patriots outlined a core set of beliefs to 
which they all adhered: Germany, by attacking Serbia and breaking 
Belgium neutrality, was responsible for the war; a German victory 
would be harmful for democracy; a German victory would hold Russian 
economic development back and would therefore be contrary to the 
best interests of the Russian proletariat; and, finally, one had to join the 
struggle to defeat Germany.1
Prominent members of this group included journalists working for 
the newspaper Novosti, Yakovlev (attached to Novoe Vremya), 
Belorussov (a correspondent for Russkia Vedomosti) and the editorial 
board of Prizyv, a weekly newspaper which began to appear from the 
autumn of 1915.2 This chapter will examine Trotsky’s critical responses 
to the outpourings of his social-patriotic compatriots .
6.2 Trotsky and the Russian Social-Patriots in Paris
Trotsky's first skirmish with a representative of the social-patriotic circle 
in Paris followed Aleksinskii's citation of a section of Trotsky's pamphlet 
War and the International in the final instalment of a series of articles 
entitled 'War and Socialism'.3 In these writings Aleksinskii criticised 
German Social-Democracy's support of the German war effort, and in 
making this point he quoted the following lines from Trotsky's just 
published work:
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In his interesting essay (in Lausanne) Comrade Trotsky told of 
the announcement made by one of the members of the Central 
Committee of the German Social-Democratic Party who, in 
conversation with Trotsky, explained the poor behaviour of 
leading circles of this party at the beginning of the war by a highly 
simple consideration: if we had spoken against the war the 
government would have confiscated our party funds! Certainly 
readers will understand that it is not even worth examining this 
pretext since a Social-Democratic Workers’ Party concludes and 
should conclude its tactics from class (klassovikh) interests and 
not from...those of the kitty (kassovikh).
I have been similarly forced to stop on these reasons with which 
several comrades 'explain' and justify the behaviour of German 
Social-Democracy.4 
Thus, in his article Aleksinskii cited Trotsky as the source of a German 
comrade's views, and then stated that he had been forced to reject 
other such attempts to whitewash German Social-democracy by 
several other (unnamed) socialists. His report of the contents of 
Trotsky's pamphlet seems just and accurate. After all, in War and the 
International Trotsky wrote,
Perhaps never before had the spirit of organisational inertia 
dominated so freely in German Social-Democracy as in the past 
few years which directly preceded the great catastrophe; and 
there can be no doubt that the question of preserving the 
organisation - the kitty, the workers' houses, the printing presses 
- played a very large role in determining the position of the 
fraction in the Reichstag in relation to the war. The first argument 
which I heard from one of the leading German comrades 
(Mol'kenbur) reads: 'if we had acted otherwise we would have 
doomed our organisation to death.'3 
However, in his 'Necessary Correction' of 25 November 1914 Trotsky 
insisted that, contrary to Aleksinskii, he had not explained German 
Social-Democracy's backing of the German government out of a 
concern for its funds and that he had not used this explanation to justify 
the German Social-Democratic Party. To begin with, Trotsky pointed 
out that in the self same pamphlet from which Aleksinskii had quoted he
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had told the German socialist that, 'You have killed the authority of 
German Social-Democracy and you have killed the International'; and, 
as Trotsky highlighted, 'this does not look like a "justification".'6 Finally, 
in an obvious dig at Aleksinskii's approval of French and Belgium 
socialists' calls for a self-defence of their countries’ frontiers, Trotsky 
said that he had also truthfully characterised those shameless semi­
patriots who used their attacks on German Social-Democracy as an 
excuse to concoct a ' patriotic mixture of France...and Petrograd under 
the internationalist flag.'7
The Swiss town of Lausanne also featured in the series of events 
which led to Trotsky's first critical response to the views of the most 
famous Russian social-patriot residing in the French capital, 
Plekhanov. Golos readers had been able to acquaint themselves with 
Plekhanov's view of the war from N.K's report of a speech Plekhanov 
delivered to a gathering of socialists of October 19 14 in Lausanne.8
Plekhanov blamed Germany for bringing Europe to war. He pointed 
out that on the eve of hostilities even German Social-Democratic 
leaders had accepted this. However, these self same German 
socialists had then failed in their duty to oppose the designs of German 
militarism. On the contrary they had justified German actions under the 
slogan 'each nation has a right to existence.' Plekhanov labelled this a 
’laughable’ position. How could German socialists seek refuge in this 
slogan while denying Belgium that very right ? He also dismissed the 
argument that German Social-Democrats had to support their 
government as it was defending itself from tsarism: 'everyone knows 
that the German crown was one of the strongest bulwarks of tsarism.'9 
For Plekhanov, one could explain the out and out opportunism of 
German Social-Democracy by its disregard for principles and by its 
concern to follow the mood of the masses:
German Social-Democracy did not find the internal strength to 
struggle with chauvinism and preferred to sacrifice principles 
than to sacrifice its influence over the masses, if only 
provisionally.10
One illustration of the German party's carelessness in the 
theoretical realm was the German radicals' explanation of their vote for 
the war credits by a desire to preserve party unity. Plekhanov claimed
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that he was against splits, but not at the expense of principles. Recent 
German events pointed to the sorry state of affairs that inattention to 
theory could lead: Arbeiterzeitung had abandoned class politics for the 
politics of race. The extent of Plekhanov's disgust for German Social- 
Democracy was evident from his demand that radical changes would 
have to be undertaken in the German SDP before one could 
reestablish ties with it.
Plekhanov's condemnation of German socialists was matched by 
his fervent support of socialists who had voted for and even joined the 
war time governments in the Entente countries. According to 
Plekhanov, Russian, French and Belgium socialists had a duty to 
uphold their respective countries' defences as they were acting under 
the principle of self-defence. Previous socialist conferences had 
stipulated that socialists could join bourgeois ministries in exceptional 
circumstances and, asked Plekhanov, were not the then current events 
'exceptional'? Furthermore, he defended socialists who were 
attempting to win over neutral countries to the side of the Entente. 
Plekhanov argued that proletarian diplomacy should urge all to fight 
against those guilty of infringing justice: 'If one is happy that the war 
passes one by then this is not an international policy but a policy of 
narrow-nationalism.'11
Five days after the appearance of N.K's report Golos published one 
of Plekhanov's letters, which had first appeared in Justice of 15 October 
1914.12 Here Plekhanov located the origins of the war in Germany's 
desire for economic supremacy. He argued that a German victory 
would undermine Russia's base for economic development and, 'since 
economic evolution is the base of social and political evolution Russia, 
in the case of her defeat, would lose all or almost all possibility of 
finishing tsarism.'13 In his conclusion, Plekhanov called upon the 
socialist world not to be fooled by the trickery of the German general 
staff. If the Entente lost, the whole progress of Western Europe would 
take a backward step.
Trotsky responded to Plekhanov's case after the 'father of Russian 
Marxism' had developed his views in the pamphlet O voine, published 
in Paris in 1914.14 For Trotsky, Plekhanov's writings were the saddest 
testimony to the recent socialist disintegration. Although he agreed
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with Plekhanov's condemnation of German Social-Democracy, he 
argued that Plekhanov had added nothing to what had already been 
said in the Russian socialist press. Moreover, Plekhanov's explanation 
of the follow the mood of the German electorate was dismissed as a 
non-explanation. According to Trotsky, one could not be surprised by 
this, for Plekhanov and German Social-Democracy shared the same 
presuppositions:
Both there and here the criterion is not the social-revolutionary 
tasks of the international proletariat but the interests of national 
capitalism from the point of view of a national workers' policy.15 
The rest of Trotsky's article was devoted to a critique of Plekhanov's 
distinction between Germany's offensive war and Russia's defensive 
war. He did this by examining Plekhanov's view of Austria-Hungary's 
and Russia's respective Balkan policies. According to Plekhanov, 
Austria-Hungary had broken the European peace by attacking Serbia, 
whereas Russia had to support Serbia so as not to lose all influence in 
the Balkan peninsular. Trotsky attempted to discredit Plekhanov's 
perception of a less rapacious tsarist diplomacy by pointing to Russia's 
appalling record of interference in the Balkans. First, Romanian, 
Bulgarian and Serbian Social-Democrats distinguished between 
Hapsburg and tsarist policy only by labelling the latter’s approach more 
'dishonourable and dangerous.'16 Second, one could easily construct a 
list of Russia’s cynical and self-interested acts in the Balkans, including: 
in 1876 Bosnia and Herzegovnia had been conceeded to Austria in 
return for Austrian neutrality in the event of a Russo-Turkish war; 
Russian endeavours to turn Bulgaria into its satrap had led to the 
formation of an anti-Russian party in Bulgaria; in 1908-09 Russia 
pushed Serbia into a war with Austria and then betrayed the Balkan 
nation and so on. Trotsky hoped that the Balkan peoples had a better 
memory than Plekhanov. Finally, Trotsky claimed that Russia had 
entered the war not out of a concern for Serbia's independence but to 
use the Serbian cause to gain Galicia. Had Plekhanov not considered a 
scenario in which, 'tsarist diplomacy would give Serbia to the 
Hapsburas as it gave gave Bosnia 38 years aao in exchange for 
Galicia, without which tsarism will not go home?'17
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In his conclusion Trotsky returned to Plekhanov's argument which 
he had considered at the outset of the article, that Austria had pushed 
Russia into war. He accepted Plekhanov's reference to Vorwarts's 
account of German aggression on the eve of the war as evidence of 
German recognition of German guilt. However, Trotsky asserted that 
one could consider Plekhanov's use of the German newspaper on the 
same level as one would evaluate German exploitation of Russian 
socialists' struggle against tsarism:
From Vorwarts's forewarning about German diplomacy 
Plekhanov sophistically pulls-out a justification of Russian 
diplomacy, representing it in a letter to Bulgarian socialists as a 
defence of Serbia and as a protection of 'simple laws of morality 
and law.1 What distinguishes Plekhanov from the current 
Vorwarts which exploits our struggle against tsarism for a 
justification of the movements of German imperialism? 
Absolutely nothing! One aim and one method!18 
During April 1915 Trotsky wrote several articles in which he 
complained of slander which was being hurled at Nashe Slovo and its 
friends by the Russian social-patriots. The first shots of this particular 
battle were fired in a report, written under the pseudonym Iks' and 
published in Novosti, of Trotsky's paper 'Pan-Germanism and the War’ 
which he delivered to the Society of Russian Engineers. Iks' cited 
Trotsky as saying that, 'Is it not absurd to assert that Pan-Germanism is 
the exclusive ideology of a small group of Prussian Junkers'; to which 
Iks' replied:
Perhaps it would be less absurd to assert that Pan-Germanism is 
the ideology of N. Trotsky and a small group of Russian Social- 
Democrats who are 'so obliged to German Social-Democracy' 
and German political science.19
Trotsky responded to lks"s report in 'The times now are such' of 1 
April 1915. He called Novosti a 'gutter newspaper' and ridiculed the 
train of logic which characterised Nashe Slovo as a Pan-Germanist 
publication thus:
in our window there really shines a suspicious light. Writing and 
collecting articles in which there is no humiliation of the German 
people and no separating off of the German culture, in which lies
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and reaction are denounced irrespective of national and state 
boundaries...The matter is clear: Pan-Germanists!20 
Trotsky also informed the reader that he had received a letter from a 
certain Mr Bek-Allaev who had accused Nashe Slovo of publishing 
itself on German money and of having a Jewish editor. Allaev's 
evidence was Nashe Slovo’s thesis that recent Russian success at the 
Austrian fortress town of Przemysl did not give her a strategic 
advantage.21 Trotsky rejected the possibility of engaging in a 
discussion over tactics with Allaev. The charge of a Jewish editor could 
easily be refuted as the author of the aforementioned war report had a 
more Russian name than Allaev himself and, in any case, the Nashe 
Slovo war correspondent was a former officer in the Russian army. 
Trotsky ended the article by reminding Allaev, or the people who were 
instructing Allaev, that 'although the times now are such, criminal 
punishments for slander have still not been repealed.'22
If Trotsky hoped that his threat of legal action would put an end to 
this matter, he was soon to be disappointed. Two days later Novosti 
carried two responses to The times now are such'.23 In a short letter to 
Novosti L. M. Glezer' revealed that he was Iks'. He stated that Trotsky's 
article of 1 April was an 'unworthy, disorderly literary denunciation' and 
that it was beneath his dignity to refute the insinuations contained 
therein. Novosti's editorial board added that as it respected language it 
would ignore N. T. 's use of the words 'gutter newspaper' and that it 
would not enter into such polemics.
In a short note in Nashe Slovo of 9 April Trotsky responded to 
Glezer' and Novosti. He denied that his 1 April contribution to the 
debate had contained any insinuations; after all, 'Iks' wrote that the 
Engineers' Society had organised a Pan-Germanist talk.' Trotsky 
ridiculed Glezer's revelation of his true identity as 'the exchange of one 
political and literary nonentity for another.' He then addressed Novosti's 
self-defence from the charge of being a 'gutter-newspaper'. How else 
could one classify a publication which had, first, in war time France 
published an ’account’ of Trotsky's Pan-Germanism and, then, 
permitted the 'informer' to write of N. T's 'disorderliness' when the latter 
had refuted charges of Pan-Germanism? Trotsky concluded, 'Nasty
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beginning Mr Social-Patriots! Worrying about the fate of European 
democracy while in the meantime covering-up dirty tricks.'24
The acrimonious tone of the exchanges between Trotsky and the 
Russian social-patriots continued into the next dispute. This arose after 
Aleksinskii, when welcoming Novosti's new editor, indirectly labelled 
Nashe Slovo a defeatist publication:
I consider that now, during such important events as war, mutual 
support and cooperation of those elements among Social- 
Democrats and Social-Revolutionaries who take-up similar 
positions on the war and who do not share the profoundly 
mistaken, in my view, ideas of Zhizn' and Nashe Slovo etc, to be 
extremely necessary. This cooperation is the more necessary 
given that in Russia the majority of conscious peasants and 
workers occupy our position which, for the sake of brevity, I call 
anti-defeatist.25
In his reply Trotsky denied that Nashe Slovo had ever 
recommended German domination to the Russian people.26 On the 
contrary, he asked Aleksinskii if defeatism was a label which would be 
better applied to his views; after all, did the Russian social-patriots not 
urge the German people to support Russia's war effort? Trotsky 
acknowledged that Aleksinskii had included Nashe Slovo in the 
defeatist camp for the sake of simplicity, but he also differentiated 
between two sorts of simplicity; one quite useful and the other worse 
than stealing. Aleksinskii's simplicity fell into the latter category since he 
had invented Nashe Slovo's stance on the war. According to Trotsky, 
the only title that Aleksinskii was earning for himself was that of a 
'distortionist.'
The final outburst of hostilities of April 1915 once again brought 
Trotsky into dispute with Aleksinskii. On this occasion the polemics 
surrounded Trotsky's evaluation of Rakovsky's visit to Italy. In the 
article 'A Sytinist "little man" on Rakovsky', published in Nashe Slovo of 
17 April, Trotsky defended the Romanian socialist from Amfiteatrov's 
claim that Rakovsky had gone to Italy to disseminate German 
propaganda.27 Trotsky pointed out that Amfiteatrov had made his claim 
despite his assertion to the contrary that Rakovsky was not of the right 
type to be entrusted with an official mission. Trotsky informed the
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reader that Rakovsky had travelled to Italy as a socialist hoping to 
convince other socialists to oppose any moves for Italian and 
Romanian intervention in the war ; a mission which, according to 
Trotsky, well-suited Rakovsky's character:
What Rakovsky's 'type' is is well-known to the International. This 
is a man who for two decades has stood under revolutionary 
banners, who has close connections with Russian, French, 
Bulgarian and Romanian socialism, who gives his exceptional 
energy and - we will allow ourselves to say this also! - his money 
to the cause of the liberation of the proletariat. 
Amfiteatrovshchina's glue does not stick to Rakovsky.28 
Aleksinskii, however, took exception to Trotsky's portrait of Rakovsky. 
In a letter to Nashe Slovo's editorial board, which appeared in the 
newspaper on 25 April together with Trotsky's reply,29 the Russian 
social-patriot said that Trotsky had committed two factual errors. First, 
one could not say that Rakovsky was closely connected to Russian 
Social-Democracy as he was not, and never had been, a member of 
either the RSDLP or the S-R Party. Second, the only material 
assistance which Rakovsky had afforded Russian socialism was in the 
publication of Trotsky's Pravda and at the then current moment in the 
production of Nashe Slovo. For Aleksinskii, this did not give Trotsky the 
right to claim a special relationship between Rakovsky and Russian 
socialism. Indeed, the latter could not be held responsible for 
Rakovsky's Italian 'mission.'
Trotsky's thoughts on Aleksinskii's letter were expressed by the title 
of his rejoinder, 'To the Slanderers!' In turn, Trotsky called Aleksinskii to 
account for his 'facts.' He denied that he had ever written that Rakovsky 
had made donations to Russian socialism. Indeed, his original 
statement (quoted above) was that Rakovsky had given material 
support to the 'cause of the liberation of the proletariat.' Several 
aspects of Rakovsky's biography which clearly illustrated the 
Romanian socialist's history of close cooperation with Russian 
socialism were then highlighted: he was a member of the Liberation of 
Labour Group which predated the RSDLP; in the 1890s he lived in St. 
Petersburg as a Marxist propagandist; outlawed from Russia as a 
foreigner he participated in the Foreign Section of the RSDLP and
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wrote for Iskra and so on. According to Trotsky, Aleksinskii was driven 
to falsification of the biography of one of the first Russian socialists out 
of 'base "patriotic'' slander.'3° Relying on the belief that some of the mud 
thrown at Rakovsky by Amfiteatrov and others was still sticking, 
Aleksinskii had avoided saying anything on the central issue of why 
Rakovsky had made his trip to Italy. At the same time Aleksinskii 
insinuated that Nashe Slovo received money from the German 
treasury via Rakovsky. For Trotsky, shamelessness and cowardice 
guided Aleksinskii's hand. In a particularly merciless conclusion he 
condemned Aleksinskii as a man who had joined Russian Social- 
Democracy on the high wave of 1905 and then deserted it, leaving him 
to the fate of all turncoats:
socialist turncoats morally disarm themselves and in the struggle 
for self-belief they are forced to snatch at the most poisonous and 
dishonourable tools of our class enemies. Aleksinskii’s 
’Announcement1 is far from being the last word on this path. And 
above all this is not Aleksinskii's last word. There is no turning- 
back from the path onto which he stepped. From slander to 
degradation and from degradation to slander he will move along 
a preordained orbit as irrefutable evidence of the fact that the 
cause which he serves is not only rotten, but also hopeless.31 
The next dispute between Trotsky and one of the Russian social- 
patriots, this time with Plekhanov, also had slander as a dominant 
issue. It followed the appearance of the collection of articles Voina. This 
prompted Trotsky to write an 'Open Letter to Comrade Plekhanov'32 
published in Nashe Slovo of 18 July 1915. The fact that Trotsky 
addressed the letter to Plekhanov seems strange as in it he 
polemicised primarily with Aleksinskii.
In his contribution to Voina Aleksinskii poured scorn upon Nashe 
Slovo's claim to represent majority opinion among Russian workers.33 
He asked how a majority of the Russian proletariat could gather around 
a newspaper whose contributors could not agree with each other or, 
indeed, even in themselves? Thus, he pointed out that on the leading 
issue of German Social-Democracy's vote for the war credits there 
existed at least three opinions among the Nashe Slovo camp: Larin 
refused to condemn the German comrades; Trotsky sought to
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condemn and justify at the same time; whereas M.K. rejected any 
attempt to condone the German Social-Democrats outright and called 
Larin a Germanofile. Moreover, Martov at first accepted the idea of 
Russia’s defeat and then rejected it. Furthermore, Voinov and Trotsky 
were conducting a struggle against patriotism in Nashe Slovo while 
their friends and soul mates Lunacharsky and Antid-Oto [Trotsky's 
pseudonym] were writing heart-rendering accounts of 'German 
atrocities' and of the heroic exploits of Entente soldiers in Kievskaya 
Mysl'. Finally, there were some examples of Russian publicists, most 
notably K. Zalewski, who wrote one thing for Nashe Slovo and another 
for patriotic newspapers:
K. Zalewski writes one thing for Nashe Slovo and something 
completely different for Vestnik Evropy. Each of these 'saviours of 
the International' are divided not only among themselves but 
even inside themselves. Voinov and Trotsky go in one direction 
and Antid-Oto , Lunacharsky and brothers run in the opposite 
direction. How can a 'majority' of the proletariat follow them?34 
In his 'Open Letter’ Trotsky limited his objections to what he found 
most offensive in Aleksinskii's article. He claimed that Aleksinskii had 
accused him of writing for Nashe Slovo 'as an internationalist and 
irreconcilable opponent of social-patriotism but in the legal press, 
under a different name, as a patriot.'35 Indeed, in a footnote to his 
contribution to Voina Aleksinskii had included Trotsky's name in a list of 
hypocrites who tailored their articles to suit the particular ideological 
leanings of different publications. He began by rejecting in advance any 
argument which would claim that the censor should be held 
responsible for any apparent duplicity. For Aleksinskii, a censor could 
remove sentences but not force a comrade to write something contrary 
to his true beliefs. He then went on to question why the editorial boards 
of the Russian radical press allowed this duplicity to continue:
One should note that I am interested not so much with the people 
here - Zalewski, Voinov and Trotsky - as with the editorial boards 
of those organs who knowing of their indecent hypocrisy open 
their pages to their literary somersaults. Previously such things 
were impermissible in the Russian left press.36
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Trotsky said that he would ignore the facts that Aleksinskii had 
disclosed the real identity of pseudonyms which put his article into the 
category of 'information' against people, and that Aleksinskii had not 
cited any evidence to support his view of Trotsky, as well as the charge 
of hypocrisy itself since the denunciation had come from Aleksinskii; a 
man who had slandered Rakovsky and Romanian Social-Democracy, 
who had made insinuations regarding Nashe Slovo's sources of 
funding and who had misquoted Martov. For Trotsky, 'One cannot even 
speak of seeking common ground in questions of political morals and 
literary honour with this professional. '37 Trotsky then turned to 
Plekhanov and challenged him to declare openly and directly whether 
he agreed with Aleksinskii. He closed the letter with the promise that if 
Plekhanov came out in support of Aleksinskii then he, Trotsky, would 
find evidence for readers to decide what they had in front of them: 
'political hypocrisy on the one side or shameless slander on the 
other.’38
Plekhanov did not reply to Trotsky's 'Open Letter' and he continued 
to publicise his view that socialists were duty bound to support the war 
effort against the Central Powers. In late September and October 1915 
Trotsky wrote several articles in which he touched upon his 
disagreements with Plekhanov.
His report of Rakovsky’s analysis of the Russian social-patriots 
afforded him another opportunity to present a critique of Plekhanov's 
views.39 Trotsky's article took the form of extracts from Rakovsky's 
introduction to a new French edition of his brochure Socialism and the 
War. Here, Rakovsky discussed Plekhanov's belief that Balkan 
socialists who urged neutrality upon their government s were in fact 
supporting the Central Powers. Plekhanov illustrated his case by a 
simple analogy: if one remains passive while one man strangles 
another then at minimum one shows no solidarity with the victim and at 
maximum one has helped the choker. Furthermore, a group of Russian 
social-patriots from the Plekhanov camp had censured the socialists of 
the neutral countries for condoning their governments' use of neutrality 
to serve class ends. In other words, neutral countries were exploiting 
their neutrality to conclude outrageous trade deals. Rakovsky 
answered this point first. He stated that one had to distinguish between
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government neutrality and socialist neutrality; the first was passive and 
provisional, the latter principled and conclusive. Government neutrality 
was based upon greed and self-interest and if this stance changed to 
interference in the war, this too would be calculated on this criteria and 
not out of a concern for Belgium's independence. Rakovsky reminded 
Plekhanov that war was a bourgeois means to serve bourgeois ends. 
He therefore rejected Plekhanov's argument that neutrality was 
tantamount to assisting the Central Powers. Did the father of Russian 
Marxism not realise that in the war to save Belgium's neutrality Galicia 
and Turkey could be brought under Russia's control? Rakovsky 
affirmed his belief in Belgium's right to independence, but insisted that 
this had to be achieved through socialist means. Any call to the working 
class to join a bourgeois army to enter a bourgeois war could only 
expose the working class to the danger of becoming tools in the hands 
of the bourgeoisie and this, in turn, could only weaken socialism. For 
Rakovsky, Plekhanov had forgotten his earlier teachings on the 
nonsense of bourgeois wars of liberation; a lesson which he, Rakovsky, 
had learnt better than the master.
Gustav Hevre's demands for a fourth assault on Bulgaria's banks on 
the Black Sea prompted Trotsky to write an amusing retort in Nashe 
Slovo of 7 October.40 According to Trotsky's report, Hevre thought that 
the attack should be led by Russian soldiers carrying icons. He 
wondered whether Hevre had been inspired by the experience of the 
Russo-Japanese War, in which the Russian army had marched into 
battle bearing icons. At that time the icons had not reached the hearts 
of the Japanese soldiers, but Trotsky was sure that it would be different 
with the Orthodox Bulgarians. In this instance a sufficient quantity of 
icons corresponding to the Bulgarian soul should make-up for any 
short-fall in ammunitions. However, he also warned that the liberating 
nature of the war should be expressed side-by-side with its religious 
counterpart. For Trotsky, the French army should be headed by the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man, the British army by Magna Carta and, 
finally, a volunteer section of Russian social-patriots should be armed 
with Plekhanov's appeals to Bulgarian Social-Democrats. He affirmed 
his belief that that this particular mixture of icons, republican 
declarations and Plekhanovised Kantanism would not only meet the
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skilful combination of arms which was the essence of the then current 
warfare, but also gain completely fascinating results!
Later in the same month Trotsky returned his attention to what 
should lead the Russian army into battle. He reported that Clemenceau 
had rejected the idea of icons and put forward the notion that Nicholas 
II should issue the 'charge' call from the front of his troops. Trotsky 
teased the Russian social-patriots with the following challenge:
The question, in our opinion, is very serious: popes with icons or 
Nicholas II? We consider Prizyv's further silence on this matter to 
be absolutely inadmissible. Its voice should be heard at this 
critical hour!41
In between his deliberations on Hevre's and Clemenceau's thoughts 
on the Russian army Trotsky appealed one more time to Plekhanov, on 
this occasion with a request to 'Leave us in Peace!'42 He pointed out 
that Plekhanov's stance on the war contradicted all of his previously 
held views. Trotsky maintained that one could explain the deluge of 
Plekhanov's recent writings by a desire to achieve two aims. First, the 
'father of Russian Marxism' wanted his articles to create as much evil 
and confusion as possible so that his spiritual downfall would be the 
less noticeable. Second, Plekhanov hoped that the ever increasing 
unruliness of his pronunciations on the war would smother the protest 
of his own weakening political conscience. For Trotsky, Plekhanov was 
prepared to use any means to gain solace by winning over others to his 
point of view. Plekhanov's recent call to the Russian Social-Democrat 
deputy Buriyanov to oppose the rest of the fraction and vote for the war 
credits as any other vote would constitute a 'betrayal' was highlighted 
as an example of Plekhanov's typical form of counter-attack: 'when 
Social-Democrats accuse you of abetting those forces which prepared 
the war you do not justify or defend but throw back in reply an 
accusation of betrayal!'43
Moreover, Trotsky claimed that the readiness of bourgeois 
proprietors to publish Plekhanov's utterances in their newspapers did 
not derive from the power of Plekhanov's thoughts in themselves. On 
the contrary, the elder statesman of Russian Marxism's platitudes were 
serving several useful functions for the bourgeoisie. To begin with, 
Plekhanov had retained some of his reputation and influence as the
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leading representative of Russian Marxism and was therefore an 
effective tool in gathering workers’ support for the war: ’what confusion 
in the minds of young workers only just affected by socialism!'44 
Furthermore, those people who had abandoned socialism several 
years previously could now celebrate the arrival of the most famous 
convert to date: 'what a victory for all of those....who even at the 
beginning of the counter-revolution had sold their swords and for those 
turncoats of the latest "patriotic" levy.'45 Finally, the liberal and 
democratic intelligentsia could compare themselves to Plekhanov and 
conclude that they were not such bad people after all, since:
they are not so spiritually meagre, not so morally base for in their 
own name they would never be brave enough to demand that 
socialists betray themselves and slander them for....betrayal 46 
According to Trotsky, the time was not right to engage in 
psychological studies, otherwise one could look upon Plekhanov's fall 
from grace as a useful moral lesson for others. Faced with the revolting 
sight of a founding father intoxicated from chauvinism and spiritually 
drained, Trotsky advised all those Russian Social-Democrats 
remaining true to the socialist cause to send the same message to 
Plekhanov:
Whether you are peaceful or not, this is all the same to us. But we 
ask you now and for always to leave us in peace!47 
The last conflict of 1915 concerned Belorussov's decisions taken 
over the distribution of a fund for Russians residing in the French 
capital. In an article of 13 November Trotsky stated that he had felt 
compelled to pen a rejoinder to Belorussov after reading that the 
Russian social-patriot had refused to give money to 'unpatriotic' 
Russian artists. He asked how Belorussov had discovered the political 
allegiances of the Russian artists. Had he conducted individual 
interviews or had he relied on hearsay? Furthermore, had the money 
been donated on the condition that only patriots would be its 
recipients? For Trotsky,
It is sufficient to put these questions to realise that Belorussov did 
not care about justifying his actions, giving them a just basis. He 
added such incredibly stupidity to moral cynicism that one has to 
say: it's unbelievable!48
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Trotsky wrote a follow-up piece on Belorussov and the fund in his 
final contribution to Nashe Slovo of 1915 49 He informed the reader that 
Belorussov had turned the management of the fund over to the 
editorial board of Russkia Vedomosti. Since then, certain monies had 
been granted to individual artists whose names had appeared on an 
earlier list of artists in need, drawn-up by the artistic community itself. 
Trotsky posed three questions. First, did those artists who were 
accepting money not feel that they were insulting the dignity of the 
whole artistic community? Second, should not all of the artists meet 
and resolve the issue? Finally, should not the Literary Society, chaired 
by V. K. Aganov, meet to discuss and condemn Belorussov for his role 
in the affair? In this way Trotsky hoped not only that the scandal would 
be ended, but also Belorussov's social and moral standing.
The issue of Russian social-patriotism was not absent from 
Trotsky's writings for long. Indeed, he devoted his New Year review of 1 
January 1916 to an analysis of several Russian social-patriots.50 The 
tone of this piece was very sarcastic, with Plekhanov and Aleksinskii 
among the main targets. During his then recent writings Plekhanov had 
adopted a particular interpretation of Marx's relation to Kant. In the 
'Inaugural Address of the International Working Men's Association' 
Marx underpined his perception of a correct proletarian foreign policy 
with 'simple laws of morals and justice.'51 According to Plekhanov, the 
right of nations to self-determination ranked as one of the most 
important of these 'simple laws'. Indeed, in applying these principles to 
the then current war Plekhanov concluded not only that socialists had 
to fight against those countries which had broken the laws, i.e., 
Germany and its allies, but also that socialist revolution would prove 
impossible if socialists did not uphold morality and law:
the proletariat....cannot liberate itself from the capitalist yoke 
without recognising the right of each nation to self-determination. 
The necessary condition for the overthrow of this yoke, the 
unification of the proletariat of all countries, becomes possible 
only to the extent that it recognises the right of each separate 
people to self-determination....German professors and lecturers 
love to read 'lectures' on the theme of 'Kant and Marx.' But not 
one of them has read a lecture about how the economics of the
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new society was united with the 'foreign policy of the proletariat' 
as recommended by Marx....international socialists should shout 
louder then anyone else against the oppressors and they should 
insist more energetically than anyone else on a 'foreign policy' 
based on simple laws of morality and law.52 
Trotsky labelled Plekhanov's use of Kant to justify tsarist diplomacy, 
'a real discovery.'53 He pointed out that Plekhanov had completed this 
feat as Russian soldiers were expected to seize the birth place of the 
German philosopher, a fact which 'could not but inspire the young 
Russian social-patriotic thought.'54 Trotsky argued that since that time 
the centre of tsarism's attention had shifted from the Balkans to Persia, 
and this had brought with it a need to seek an ideological prop for 
Russian expansion in that part of the world:
we await from the Plekhanov school the development of the 
theme that the occupation of Persia is necessary for world moral 
equilibrium to counterbalance the occupation of Belgium.55 
Trotsky suggested that Vladimir Lyakhov (1869-1919), a colonel who in 
1906 had crushed a democratic uprising in Northern Iran, could now be 
represented as the guardian of 'Rights and Justice.' For Trotsky, 
'material facts are nothing without the spiritualisation of their ideas.'56
One paragraph of Trotsky's article was given over to a 
characterisation of Aleksinskii. Aleksinskii was placed on the opposing 
pole of social-patriotism to Plekhanov's since he held the same regard 
for moral laws as the Tartars had held for the criminal code. However, 
in spite of this divergence from Plekhanov's approach Trotsky thought 
that one could not exclude Aleksinskii from the list of social-patriotic 
literature for, 'without him all our Russian social-patriotic literature 
would appear insipid, like a Petrushka without its own special smell.'57
On the first day of February 1916 Trotsky reported that the last of his 
three suggestions regarding the 'Belorussov' affair had been acted 
upon. The Literary Society had censured Belorussov. However, he also 
said that a current rumour was claiming that Aleksinskii was a member 
of the Literary Society. Trotsky dismissed the rumour as a 
misunderstanding:
At one time the Society welcomed Liebknecht. It is not possible 
that this welcome issued from an organisation which adopted
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Aleksinskii. It is not possible that in censuring Belorussov, who is 
not one of its members, the Society would not first sweep-out the 
rubbish from its own ranks. This is why we regard the rumour of 
Aleksinskii's continuing membership of the Society, which 
seriously relates to questions of political morals, to be a pure 
misunderstanding.58
Later in the same month Trotsky's commentary upon Plekhanov's 
writings touched upon Russian domestic politics. In an article in Prizyv 
of 5 February 1916 Plekhanov considered Khvostov's, the then 
Russian Minister of Internal Affairs, utterance that Russian people 
should ’produce shrapnel, prepare ammunition, but be spared from 
government orders.'59 For Plekhanov, Khvostov's words - delivered to 
a meeting of the War-lndustries Committee of 8 December 1915 - were 
a typical example of the Russian government's unacceptable 
arrogance. Khvostov clearly expected loyalty and service from the 
Russian people and was prepared to concede nothing by way of 
political reform in return. Plekhanov made his disgust for Khvostov's 
remarks clear, and looked forward to the day when Russia would 
liberate itself from its reactionary political order. However, in his article 
he expressed concern that Khvostov's indifference might lend 
credibility to defeatist agitation that was being conducted among the 
Russian workers. Plekhanov represented the defeatist argument thus: 
One has to quickly abandon those organisations, the participants 
of which resolve the work of producing shrapnel but are not 
permitted to pass judgements about the state of their country.60 
Plekhanov argued that if the workers followed the defeatists' advice, 
Russia's capacity for self-defence would be weakened and the 
likelihood of her military collapse would increase. He then posed the 
problem of who would benefit from Russia's defeat. Not, he replied, the 
forces struggling for a democratic Russia but reactionaries of 
Khvostov's persuasion. For, according to Plekhanov, any proletarian 
policy based upon a free Russia issuing from her defeat in the war was 
deeply mistaken:
From the very outset of this current war I did not cease to believe 
that our reactionaries absolutely did not desire the defeat of 
Germany because in its emperor they saw the most trusted
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support of European reaction. Events have shown that I was 
right....Victorious over Russia in the present war Germany with all 
its huge forces would place a government in our country that 
would be the most advantageous to Germany's interests. And 
what type of government could be more advantageous than a 
government of the Black Hundreds?61 
Thus, concluded Plekhanov, only the extreme right, knowing the 
consequences such an act would entail, would welcome en masse 
desertion of the War-lndustries Committees by Russia's workers. The 
duty of all those interested in the introduction of politically progressive 
measures was therefore clear: to remain firm in one's support of 
Russia's war effort.
In his rejoinder to Plekhanov's article Trotsky doubted the 
assumption that Khvostov and his cohorts would rejoice at the sight of 
workers abandoning Russia's defences. After all, argued Trotsky, it 
was Khvostov who had recommended that Plekhanov's manifesto 
calling upon the workers to elect representatives to the War-lndustries 
Committees be distributed, and it was the Russian Minister of the 
Interior who had helped Kuz'ma Gvozdev to falsify the will of the 
Petrograd workers. For Trotsky, Plekhanov's dissatisfaction at 
Khvostov's arrogance was a reflection of the founder of Russian 
Marxism's real relation to Khvostov; while Plekhanov was prepared to 
accept the appointment of right-wing candidates to ministerial posts as 
this signified the defeat of the revolutionary internationalists, he could 
not go along with the more extreme statements made by right-wing 
statesmen. Indeed, Trotsky claimed that the particular balance that 
Plekhanov was attempting to strike at that time did not demand that he 
should approve every comment issued by ministers of Khvostov's 
calibre:
'Walk apart but live together!’ - this is the strategic principle which 
Plekhanov transfers into his new period when he helps reaction 
be revolutionary.62
V. Buslaev"s enthusiastic account of a recent session of the State 
Duma, published in Prizyv of 11 March 1916, provoked a critical 
response from Trotsky. Buslaev1 highlighted the Progressive Bloc's 
demands, put forward in an elaborate programme which called, among
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other things, for a political and religious amnesty and Polish autonomy, 
as evidence of 'what a mighty lever healthy national feelings are in the 
country's political awakening.'63 He recounted how the Progressive's 
had stuck to their guns in the face of harsh criticism from Goremykin 
and soothing noises from Stumer; sufficient grounds for Buslaev' to 
claim 'how quickly the bourgeois opposition in Russia matures under 
the influence of all-national expectations.'64 The most striking feature of 
recent political events, according to Buslaev', was the support given to 
the opposition by right-wing previously pro-government thinkers: 'We 
are not used to Milyukov's criticism being given constant support...by 
Purishkevich and for the right nationalist Polovtsev to speak against the 
government.'65 He fired a shot at ’sad doctrinaires and spent 
revolutionaries [who] hurriedly declare that in the period of the 
imperialist economy the time for national revolution has irretrievably 
passed.'; pointing out that historical progress did not follow the rules of 
these newborn Marxist cosmopolitans: 'we should know and 
understand that Russia is on the eve of great events...the living 
organism of a great people...is not able to restrain itself in the chains of 
the reactionary schemas of this cosmopolitanism. Living Russia is 
liberating itself and it calls to itself all those who are alive!'66
In his reply to Buslaev’ Trotsky gave a very different evaluation of 
the Russian bourgeoisie. The Russian social-patriot's hopes upon the 
bourgeois classes as a political force were misplaced, wrote Trotsky, 
because the Russian bourgeoisie did not want to take power: 'the 
central idea of this bourgeoisie, as the recent Kadet conference once 
again confirmed, is a will to victory and not a will to powers7 In turn, its 
obsession with victory was derived from its connections with 
imperialism and the military-monarchical regime. According to Trotsky, 
the bourgeoisie wanted the Prussification of the Russian state order 
and it was this desire which lay behind its then opposition to Nicholas 
ll's government: 'Its opposition...is not affected, but the content of this 
opposition is limited, by the whole objective position of the bourgeoisie, 
to pressurising the bureaucratic monarchy into...pulling itself together, 
purifying itself, putting its affairs in order...in a word, Prussification.'68 If 
power was to be rested from the old regime then , for Trotsky, it could 
be rested only by the proletariat. He predicted that if the proletariat
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should decide to seize power ’the bourgeoisie would fatally appear on 
the side of the old order.'69 In his conclusion, Trotsky imitated 
Buslaev"s final thoughts. The social-patriot claimed that history had a 
shock for the Marxists; Trotsky foresaw history preparing a particular 
smack on the nose for Buslaev’: 'the total historical mission of our 
social-patriotic Germans is to help the Russian bourgeoisie reach - 
alas! alas! - the German state order in that moment when its radical 
destruction is being prepared in Germany itself.'70
Trotsky stressed the links between the social-patriots in Paris and 
the regime in Russia in his first of May reflections of 1916. He cited 
Khvostov's approval of Plekhanov's Autumn 1915 Manifesto to the 
Russian workers as evidence of a Khvostov-Plekhanov Bloc. For 
Trotsky, 'the combination of Khvostov and Plekhanov (and think of this 
for one minute as a fresh fact!) is one of the most fantastic aspects of 
the whole contemporary Russian fantastica.'71 Atatime when even the 
Kadets were complaining about censorship directed against their 
speeches, Trotsky reported that the Russian authorities broadcast 
Prizyv's calls for a successful defence of Russia as freely as the 
outpourings of the police department. He praised the Russian social- 
patriots in Paris for having the musical ability of turning the tune of the 
International into a hymn to Khvostov. However, if one judged Prizyv 
from the point of view of honour then one had to condemn Plekhanov et 
al outright: 'we do not think that one could create anything more 
loathsome,'72
In Two magnitudes, separately equal to a third...' Trotsky discussed 
Plekhanov's problem in building an International. The elder statesman 
of Russian Marxism could lay claim to allies in France (Hevre), Britain 
(Hyndman) and Italy (Mussolini) but what, asked Trotsky, of Germany? 
The issue could be sidestepped if Plekhanov followed Adolf Smith's 
advice that the International should be drawn from the free countries of
it'the Entente, thus excluding Hohenzgren Germany. Trotsky claimed that 
Plekhanov would not engage himself in the difficult task of constructing 
a conception of freedom which would include Tashkent but exclude 
Berlin. However, a possible solution had been offered by Hevre , a man 
who Plekhanov had promoted to the status of 'comrade' after the 
French socialist rejected his earlier unpatriotic views to support France
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in the war.73 According to Trotsky, Hevre was arguing that the future for 
socialism in western Europe lay in the promotion of national socialist 
parties. In Germany Hevre thought that Sudekum should head this 
party since, 'it should be united with the left bourgeois parties and with 
their help establish a parliamentary regime in Germany.'74 Thus, Hevre 
maintained that his ally in Germany was Sudekum. For Trotsky, 
because Plekhanov had named Hevre his comrade one could follow 
the mathematical principle that 'two magnitudes separately equal to a 
third are equal between themselves' to conclude that Plekhanov's 
German comrade would be Sudekum. He said that he had previously 
guessed at this outcome, but now his guesswork had found its 
confirmation in mathematics.
The attitude of Prizyv's editorial board to high-level diplomatic links 
between France and Russia formed the background to the appearance 
of Trotsky's article 'Why we did not mention Plekhanov’ in Nashe Slovo 
of 21 May 1916.75 In Prizyv's editorial comment on Albert Thomas's 
visit to Nicholas II, the censor had removed all but a reprint of the 
official communique of Thomas's trip to Russia.76 Five days later an 
unsigned article in Nashe Slovo ridiculed Prizyv's annoyance - 
deduced from the censor's intervention - at the French minister's 
presence at the Russian court. Nashe Slovo pointed out that the 
republicans Avksent'ev, Lyubimov, Argunov and Bunakov had 
managed to show their political allegiances by printing 'his majesty the 
emperor' in lower case letters. However, it also asked the editors if their 
advanced years had really taught them so little. After all, Prizyv 
supported the Entente's cause and urged socialists to join war time 
ministries. Did the social-patriotic publication really think that republican 
ministers would avoid meeting their autocratically-governed allies 
when common war aims had to be discussed? Moreover, Nashe Slovo 
claimed that the censor had rendered Prizyv a useful service; the 
headline and the editorial board's signature remained as testimony of 
republican disquiet at the French government's personal contact with 
the tsar, but they had been spared from making their specific 
grievances public. Finally, a popular proverb was offered to Prizyv by 
way of advice: 'one has to take the rough with the smooth. 77
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In 'Why we did not mention Plekhanov' Trotsky noted that several 
attentive readers had said that Plekhanov was not listed in Nashe 
Slovo's naming of Prizyv's republican-minded editors. In an imaginary 
dialogue conducted between two Nashe Slovo readers Trotsky 
illustrated a hidden motive which may have lain behind Nashe Slovo's 
omission. One of the readers claims that Plekhanov was not named out 
of a desire to protect a fellow Marxist:
It is true that they....named Lyubimov who is also a ’Marxist’, but 
from the aforementioned point of view he is harmless for if he 
compromises something it is only him himself. But Plekhanov 
was not named. And Aleksinskii was not named. At this point our 
perspicacious Philistine (and that is exactly what we are dealing 
with) immediately feels jubilant: one has caught Nashe Slovo 
harbouring Plekhanov!
But this is pure rubbish, exclaims, say, another reader....When 
has Nashe Slovo indulged Marxist social-patriots? When has it 
harboured Plekhanov?...
Yes....but about Plekhanov not a whisper. This is not easy....78 
Trotsky cut the conversation short at this juncture and resolved the 
point at issue. Nashe Slovo's motives for not mentioning Plekhanov 
were much simpler and a lot more subtle than the wise Philistine 
supposed. Before expounding upon this, Trotsky said that Aleksinskii 
had also been omitted as part of a general policy of avoiding his name 
as often as possible out of considerations of a 'literary-sanitory 
nature.'79 The silence surrounding Plekhanov was due to reasons of a 
more profound nature. When Nashe Slovo's editors had surmised 
Prizyv's hurt republican feelings they had decided that Plekhanov did 
not rank among the offended, for ’he is not incline d to falsify a 
conscience-stricken republicanism; his "trade” is straight-forward 
patriotism.’80 Trotsky concluded that the wise Philistine could learn an 
important lesson from this tale:
That is how the affair stands....Political criticism, like so much else 
in our complex life, demands differentiation. And if it is necessary 
to discover unity in variety then one has to be able to observe 
variety in unity. So there, Mr. wise Philistine!81
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Russian military success on the Austrian front brought a jubilant 
response from Boris Voronov. In The front has been broken which 
appeared in Prizyv of 17 June 1916,82 he argued that the heroic efforts 
of the Russian soldiers had scuppered the recent declarations of 
several groups hostile to Russia's cause. To begin with, the supposition 
underpining Zimmerwald's call for the cessation of the war, i.e., no side 
would emerge victorious from the general stalemate, had been refuted. 
The Organisational Committee's prediction that Russia would collapse 
from the pressures of war after one year of hostilities had similarly been 
disproved. Furthermore, the German general Staffs confidence that 
Russia would not be able to launch an offensive attack had evaporated; 
the Central Powers had lost the military initiative. Voronov looked 
forward to the day when the fall of the German monarch would pull the 
symbolic ground from under the tsar's feet. According to Voronov, a 
Russian victory would signal the death-knell of tsarism: 'Breaking the 
Austrian front and breaking the Zimmerwald front the Russian soldiers 
take us closer to our desired outcome to the war and to Russia's 
internal freedom.'83
Trotsky responded to Voronov's analysis of the consequences of 
recent Russian victories over the Austrians in 'Arguments from the 
hoof.'84 He did not call Voronov by name, but stated that Prizyv was 
quite wrong to claim that Zimmerwald connected its politics to the 
strategic manoeuvres of the then warring nations. Zimmerwald rooted 
its tactics in the interrelation of forces between the revolutionary 
proletariat and the capitalist imperialism, and the movements of the 
Russian soldiers could not undermine this approach. Prizyv’s damning 
conclusion about Zimmerwald was dismissed as 'clearly absurd.' 
Trotsky explained the social-patriotic newspaper's willingness to 
engage in discussions about socialism with reference to the personal 
biographies of its contributors, several of whom had at one time 
considered socialist ideas and tasks. However, the conclusions 
reached on the basis of a past interest in socialism obviously exceeded 
their authors' intelligence. For Trotsky, if the whole intellectual baggage 
of the Russian social-patriots could be placed upon a Cossack horse, 
Zimmerwald's position 'cannot be shattered by an argument from the 
hoof.'85
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If the articles surrounding Thomas's visit to Russia gave cause for 
Trotsky to express his low opinion of Aleksinskii, the ' Dmitriev affair1 
provided the best opportunity to date for a resounding dismissal of the 
Russian social-patriot. In May 1916 a campaign had been launched by 
Yakovlev and Belorussov to remove Dmitriev from his post as chairman 
of the Foreign Press Syndicate.86 The main rallying call of the 
campaign was Dmitriev's Germanophilism in view of his editorship of 
Parizhjkii Vestnik', a publication which, according to Yakovlev and his 
supporters, had conducted pro-German propaganda on the eve of the 
war. On 10 August 1916 the Foreign Journalists Society met to discuss 
the case against Dmitriev and found that it had no basis in fact. This 
judgement was then confirmed at meetings of the 11 August 1916 of 
the Society of Russian Journalists in Paris and the Foreign Press 
Syndicate. The Society of Russian Journalists in Paris highlighted 
Aleksinskii as having played the most dishonourable role of all in the 
Dmitriev affair.
Trotsky retold the events surrounding the Dmitriev affair in the 
article 'A Story with a Moral', which appeared in Nashe Slovo of 13 
August. Here Trotsky was concerned most of all in pinpointing the 
leading and supporting players in the drama. He claimed that Yakovlev 
and Jean d'Arc (Russkia Vedomosti) were the 'real organisers.' 
Bateaut, a French journalist, was recruited to broaden the ethnic base 
of the accusers, 'so that in the eyes of foreign correspondents the affair 
would not have been immediately laid bare as the intrigue of kind 
Russian colleagues.'87 Aleksinskii had been instructed to make the 
accusations as wide as possible so that Dmitriev could be kept under 
suspicion of Germanophilism for as long as possible. Meanwhile, 
Trotsky pointed out that Belorussov had written for Parizhskii Vestnik 
so when Aleksinskii said that this journal had been financed from 
German funds, 'Belorussov had to quickly inform himself: I myself 
received German money from Dmitriev.'88 For Trotsky, the 
classification of the social-patriot scandal mongers into generals and 
foot-soldiers was instructive as it showed how they were prepared to do 
a dirty work if they thought it served their cause. In his concluding 
paragraph Trotsky sprung what was perhaps the most scandalous 
aspect of the whole business upon the reader. He asked why Dmitriev
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had not raised a clamour in his employer's newspaper Rech in self- 
defence against what was, after all, groundless slander? According to 
Trotsky, Dmitriev's silence was due to his willingness to subordinate 
himself to the same patriotic cause which had motivated Aleksinskii: 
for that business which Rech serves, Milyukov and Dmitriev 
himself and Aleksinskii are in the highest degree essential. And if 
on the basis of a common affair there falls upon them some 
secondary harm which corresponds to the objective nature of the 
affair and to the subjective nature of the participants, then they all 
consider this an inevitable wound in the process of holy 
cooperation. And in the meantime this is the main moral of the 
story.89
In 'Vandervelde, Nashe Slovo and Vorwarts? Trotsky defended the 
accuracy of his newspaper's informants after D. S., writing in Prizyv, 
had questioned the veracity of an earlier Nashe Slovo scoop. The 
origin of this exchange was a short note which appeared in Nashe 
Slovo of 4 July 1916.90 This unsigned piece reported of an incident 
which had prevented Emile Vandervelde from making a speech to 
soldiers at the front. Nashe Slovo claimed that the Belgium minister 
had been thrown into so much confusion by a Belgium soldier's 
reference to the contradiction between Vandervelde's then current 
views and those which he had held previous to the war, that he 
abandoned his platform without saying one word. This story was then 
picked-up by other newspapers which repeated it on their pages. Prizyv 
commented on the story only after one of the newspapers that had 
reprinted Nashe Slovo's coup had then published a disclaimer. D.S. 
quoted the German newspaper Vorwarts of 26 July, where it was stated 
that information received from Amsterdam had shown that Nashe 
Slovo's story was 'devoid of all basis in fact. We regret that we have 
been misled by this usually well-informed list.'91 D. S. then challenged 
Nashe Slovo to declare its mistake to its readers.
Trotsky took up this challenge, but not in the manner dictated by D.
S. On the contrary, he asked why Vorwarts had taken its Amsterdam 
source at face value. In order to refute Nashe Slovo's article one would 
have to have done two things: first conduct a survey among Belgium 
soldiers and second question Vandervelde himself. The first option was
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declared to be impossible, but Trotsky stressed the good credentials of 
the Belgium soldier who had given the story to Nashe Slovo: the soldier 
shared Vandervelde's views on the war and would not want to 
embarrass his minister by making something up. Moreover, he claimed 
that it was most likely Vandervelde who was hiding behind the 
anonymous informer from Amsterdam; Vandervelde could not be seen 
to have open contact with a German newspaper. Furthermore, in his 
final paragraph Trotsky highlighted a reprint of one of Vandervelde's 
speeches in the previous day's Le Petit Parisien as further evidence for 
Nashe Slovo's version of events. In his address Vandervelde spoke of 
the high personal qualities of the French soldiers. For Trotsky, 
Vandervelde....was recommending Belgium soldiers to be like the 
French; modest and satisfied with the quantity of bread, wine and 
me at that King Albert's quartermaster supplies them. One 
wonders whether one will find among his forced listeners that 
socialist who advised the former chairman of the International to 
chose alleys for his future oratorical excursions.92 
Nashe Slovo resurrected the Dmitriev affair when, in issue 208 of 9 
September 1916, it published the resolutions of the three 
aforementioned societies.93 On the following day Trotsky submitted the 
first of two articles in which he focussed upon Aleksinskii's actions in the 
Dmitriev affair.
In the first of these commentaries, 'Prizyv and its Aleksinskii', 
Trotsky pointed out that Aleksinskii's contributions to a German journal 
before the war had not prevented him from levelling a similar 
accusation at Dmitriev.94 Indeed, Aleksinskii's articles were so powerful 
in their pro-German stance that 'the censor has not allowed us to cite 
even one passage from them.'95 Moreover, Trotsky claimed that it was 
Aleksinskii who, after being co-opted as a leading actor in the Dmitriev 
affair, had carried the accusations to such a level that the 'evil- 
blackmail character of the whole campaign became clear to all.'96 
Furthermore, one could gauge the extent of Aleksinskii's disgraceful 
behaviour as it was his fellow bourgeois-journalists who had 
condemned him and not his ideological enemies. But, Trotsky noted in 
his conclusion, Prizyv had not uttered one word about Aleksinskii's 
actions:
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The slanderous Aleksinskii continues his work as the most 
trusted brother-in-arms of Plekhanov, Avksent’ev, Bunakov, 
Voronov, Argunov and Lyubimov.97
In the very next issue of Nashe Slovo Trotsky reversed the wording 
of the headline of his first commentary in order to examine the Dmitriev 
affair from the point of view of 'Aleksinskii and his Prizyv.'9* Here 
Trotsky wondered why Aleksinskii, more than one month after the three 
press societies had censured him, had not written a self-defence on the 
pages of Prizyv. According to Trotsky, the answer to this conundrum 
was his editorial colleagues’ desire to avoid implicating themselves in 
the affair. After aii, if they permitted Aleksinskii to conduct his counter­
attack from the pages of Prizyv they would be exposing themselves to 
charges of abetting. It was their refusal to back him which, claimed 
Trotsky, prevented Aleksinskii from issuing his own appeal. What could 
Aleksinskii say in such an appeal, apart from the following?:
his closest friends Avksent'ev, Voronov, Bunakov, Lyubimov, 
Argunov and Plekhanov had refused him support and refuge on 
such a matter which in other spheres a man's political life and 
death depends.99
For Trotsky the heart of the matter was clear. Aleksinskii and the rest of 
Prizyv's editorial board were united in a common though hostile 
'agreement with an ineffaceable censure.'100
6.3 Conclusion
These were to be Trotsky's last words on the Russian social-patriots in 
Paris before Nashe Slovo was banned. His disagreements with 
Plekhanov and his supporters were clear; the former condemned the 
war as national capitalism's futile attempt to meet the demand of the 
productive forces to expand beyond the limits of the nation state 
through military conquest, whereas the latter accepted that, for some, 
the war was justified and just. The polemics which raged between the 
two sides reflected their different approaches to the war, but they also 
moved beyond them into insults. The fact that the exchanges 
sometimes approached the level of 'gutter journalism' was an indicator 
of the passion which each side invested in the debates, and of how
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much they thought was at stake. In short, Trotsky and the social- 
patriots were fighting for influence over the workers. According to 
Trotsky, the social-patriots could lead the masses only into the camp of 
the class enemy. It was for this reason that, as a revolutionary socialist, 
he thought the propaganda war against Prizyv and Novosti to be of 
supreme importance. His urgent concern to oppose social-patriotism 
will also feature in the next chapter, which deals with Trotsky's analysis 
of Russian domestic politics in his Paris writings.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Trotsky and Russian Domestic Politics
7.1 Introduction
In his recent (1992) political biography of Leon Trotsky the Russian 
historian Dmitrii Volkogonov presents Trotsky as becoming 
progressively alienated from the specific problems of his homeland 
while in exile.1 This view cannot be sustained by an examination of 
Trotsky's Paris writings during World War One. Although he 
subsequently explained his acceptance of Kievskaya Mysl"s invitation 
to work as its war correspondent in Paris as an opportunity to become 
better acquainted with French domestic politics, developments in 
Russia's internal affairs were a constant source of attention. This 
chapter will examine Trotsky's writings on his homeland thematically, 
i.e., liberalism, the government and, finally, the battle between social- 
patriotism and social-democracy among the workers. Each section 
follows Trotsky's thoughts as they developed chronologically. Although 
the material has been divided in this way for the purpose of exposition, 
the connections which Trotsky traced between these various political 
strains will be stressed; most notably, how social-patriotism, through 
liberalism, formed one link in a chain which tied the workers to the 
existing political order and marshalled them behind Russia's war 
efforts.
7.2 Liberalism
The various sections of the Russian liberal movement were presented 
with an opportunity to announce their response to Germany's 
declaration of war at a one-day session of the Duma called for 26 July 
1914. At this 'historic' sitting the respective leaders of the Octobrist, 
Progressist and Kadet fractions stepped forward and declared their 
allegiance to the Russian government at a time of national need. For 
most liberals these statements represented a sharp reversal of recent 
policy. The leader of the Kadets, Pavel Milyukov, for example, had 
continued to publicise his opposition to a European conflict as late as
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mid-July.2 However, motivated by a mixture of patriotic sentiment and 
self-interest the liberals helped turn the Duma session into what 
Milyukov described as 'a grandiose expression of national unity.'3
Trotsky went onto the offensive against Russian liberalism in only 
his fourth contribution to Golos of 12 December 1914.4 This article 
ridiculed Milyukov's view of the war, expressed in an interview with an 
Italian newspaper, as a battle for the destruction of militarism and the 
strengthening of democracy. Trotsky stated that this idea had been 
repeated many times and by people of different political persuasions. 
At the then current moment, he stated with irony, it was comforting to 
hear Milyukov's confirmation of Russia's preparedness, in spite of 
financial difficulties, to join the struggle for democracy at a time when 
parliamentary Britain and republican France were too weak to carry out 
this task. After expressing confusion over whether the perception of 
Russia's liberating role belonged originally to Milyukov or to Nicholas II, 
Trotsky asked how the programme of the end of militarism and the 
establishment of democracy would be implemented? Milyukov’s 
statement that 'victorious democracy would disarm both the belligerent 
and the neutral countries' could only be understood as an invitation to 
France and Britain to declare war on Russia. Or, teased Trotsky, was 
Milyukov including Russia on the list of victorious democratic countries 
by the same method which Sobakevich had included Elizabeth 
Vorob'ya as a member of the male sex? It was this uncomfortable 
conclusion which, Trotsky speculated, forced the Kadet leader to turn 
the conversation to the deficiencies of Russia's internal political order.
According to Milyukov, the Russian people were dissatisfied with the 
existing political structures. This dissatisfaction was expressed on the 
eve of the war through a series of mass strikes, and had most recently 
found an outlet in the war against Germany. Trotsky interpreted this as 
evidence of reaction's use of the war as a diversion behind which it 
could hide its own weaknesses, though he pointed out that the 
government had not been able to fool all of the people. Social- 
Democratic workers and deputies were attempting to expose the 
government's lies. Indeed, Golos itself had not sprung out of a vacuum, 
but represented views held by many inside Russia. However, it was 
clear that Milyukov supported the government swindlers, a reflection of
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’the modest historical role of Russian liberalism [which] consists 
precisely of this!’5
The article was not devoid of any agreement between the Russian 
revolutionary and the Russian liberal. Trotsky conceded Milyukov's 
argument that a country conducting a war in the name of democracy 
was obliged to pass democratic reforms. The problem for the Golos 
correspondent, however, was that Russia was not battling for 
democracy: 'There is no doubt that the conquest of Galicia, Persia, 
Armenia, Constantinople and the Straits spurs on the development of 
Russian capitalism. But it is not democracy but war-like imperialism 
which triumphs on this basis.’6 Milyukov's trump card - the assertion 
that victory over Germany would abolish drunkenness - was rejected 
as Russian masters were currently drinking denaturalised spirit and 
varnish.
At this point Trotsky reported that he had not exhausted Milyukov's 
interview but he already felt uneasy after holding the reader at Russian 
liberalism's political level for so long. According to Trotsky, the then 
current epoch would be represented by future historians as an age not 
only of barbarism and foolishness but also of stupidity and hypocrisy. 
And since the true nature of tsarism was so obvious, Russian liberalism 
had to expend so much energy on hypocrisy and stupidity in 
representing Russia's 'liberating mission'. In his concluding paragraph 
Trotsky expressed his disdain for Milyukov by drawing a parallel 
between the Kadet leader and Gregus, a secret police agent who had 
tortured prisoners in Riga after the 1905 revolution:
Previously he had responsibility for the torture chamber 
leadership and for burning the heels of imprisoned democrats 
with state candles. And now...with the same state candles in hand 
he is called upon to play the role of the torch bearer -of 
democracy. The people have a right to peace and freedom from 
militarism. Gregus will give them both, murdering by the 
democratic list.7
In the summer and autumn of 1915 the Russian government, faced 
with shortages of weapons and ammunition and demands for an 
increased role for society in the administration of the war effort in the 
wake of a series of Russian military set-backs which started with the
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retreat of May 1915 from Galicia, established a series of committees 
which included members outwith the bureaucratic structures. The first 
of these new organisations, the Special Commission on Defence of the 
Country, was introduced in July 1915 and had responsibility for 
mobilising the nation's industrial economy for war. Soon pressure 
mounted for the principle to be extended to other areas. Trotsky 
commented on the calls for the setting-up of military-society 
committees, for the 'mobilisation of industry' and the 'organisation of 
society's forces', in an article of 22 July 1915. He informed his Parisian 
readership that the tasks, composition and powers of these proposed 
bodies were as yet undefined. Nevertheless, the idea of encouraging 
society to play a more active role in directing the struggle against the 
enemy already formed the 'politics of "the rear'" of the bourgeois 
opposition, a strategy supported by the social-patriots:
in so far as the bourgeois opposition shows signs of life it remains 
totally on patriotic soil. While the exceptionally weak mobilisation 
of society's forces is taking place in the name of a stronger 
'national defence,' one would be able to say that Guchkov and 
Milyukov had learnt political plagiarism from Plekhanov, if only 
Plekhanov1 s whole position was not a sorry loan from Guchkov's 
and Milyukov's fund.8 
Trotsky pointed out that the idea of the Special Commission had been 
taken from Britain. However, there were good reasons why one could 
not expect huge results from its application in the Russian context. 
Britain had a mighty and modern capitalist economy combined with a 
flexible democratic state structure. But even in this favourable 
environment the results achieved so far had not matched original 
expectations. What hope then the Russian variant, which included 
plans to build a railway network, new factories and educate new 
technocrats? For Trotsky this programme, as the Russian government 
well-knew, was a 'pure Utopia'. Why then take this initiative? According 
to Trotsky, the government wanted to transfer direct economic 
responsibility for the war effort to the propertied classes who had 
earlier accepted political responsibility. In return the propertied classes 
had neither demanded nor been promised political power. In actual fact 
what was occurring was an artificial coming together between the
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propertied classes and the government, with the former talking of trust 
as though the disappointments of the post-1905 constitutional 
experiments had never happened.
Following on from this analysis Trotsky issued several warnings to 
the liberals, including one aside in which he once again linked 
liberalism and social-patriotism. First, the ministries had handed 
responsibility for their obligations to ’committees of national defence’ 
only as a ploy to better protect the concentration of power in the 
ministries' hands, i.e., the committees could be blamed for any 
mistakes in policy while policy decisions continued to be taken by the 
ministries themselves. Moreover, the liberals were cutting themselves 
off from any room for manoeuvre. On the one hand Milyukov could not 
demand a new session of the Duma since in such a sitting he could not 
call the government to account; rather, Milyukov himself would be 
questioned for his trust in the government. On the other hand, the 
Kadet leader could not insist that the military-society committees 
should take over the full tasks of the ministries, for
the Kadet Party would close for itself that last crack in which it 
currently conducts its opposition: between the policies of the state 
and its material-technical resources and methods. This is the 
very same crack into which Plekhanov and other of our social- 
patriots are attempting to bury the politics of the party of the 
proletariat.9
According to Trotsky, the tasks of ideological and material criticism of 
the then governmental regime lay more heavily upon the Russian 
proletariat than at any other time.
Highlighting the hopelessness of the liberal programme was the 
intention of Trotsky's article of 18 August 1915.10 This piece examined 
the links between the Russian liberals and the French republicans. 
According to Trotsky's report, the Russian democrats were inspired by 
Clemenceau’s and Hevre’s view that republican democracy 
guaranteed the triumph of the peoples’ will over both stagnant 
bureaucracy and selfish capitalist cliques. He argued that the Russian 
liberals were so enthused by their French counterparts that they had 
forgotten to call for ministerial responsibility, a basic principle without 
which parliamentary control can be but formal. Moreover, Trotsky
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highlighted several reasons why the Russian liberals should not be so 
enamoured with the French experience. The result of the 1792 
revolution in France had not been the victory of democracy over 
capitalist imperialism, but the use of the former to check the excesses 
of the latter; an outcome in which even tsarism could find nothing 
objectionable. However, the hopes that even the French 'democratic' 
order could be achieved in Russia through the war alliance with Britain 
and France introducing democracy into tsarism were groundless.
To begin with, Russia had had no 1792 so that there were no 
democratic institutions in existence when tsarism entered the 
imperialist age. In this sense, 'Russian imperialism came too early, or 
Russian parliamentarianism too late.'11 Whatever the case, for Trotsky, 
the Western liberal democratic option was not available for Russia. 
Milyukov and Guchkov had worked in governmental committees for 
several years and had not managed to achieve any influence over the 
course of events. Thus, for example, Milyukov had accused the War 
Ministry of tricking the Duma and threatened court action, but this 
amounted to nothing more than an 'oratorical gesture.' For Trotsky, the 
social force of the coming revolution was the Russian proletariat, and it 
did not link its fate with a successful outcome to the war. He 
characterised the Duma as a 'convent of confusion and impotence.’ If 
anything positive was to emerge from this situation, then 'the confusion 
of the rulers would have to be overcome in the decisiveness and 
strength of those who are ruled and those who are fooled.’12
The process of the increasing failure of liberal politics was analysed 
by Trotsky in the aptly-named article, ’Events are proceeding by their 
own course’.13 On the 22 August 1915 a group of liberals issued a 
statement of the newly formed Progressive Bloc which, among other 
things, called for the establishment of a government of national unity to 
lead Russia to victory.14 Right-wing groups and publications 
immediately protested against the Progressive Bloc and called upon 
the government to disperse the Duma. The tsar, urged on by his 
conservative prime minister Goremykin, duly complied, closing the 
Duma on the 3 September 1915 because of the prevailing ’state of 
emergency’. According to Trotsky, the government had organised 
right-wing opposition to the Progressive Bloc, in the form of Black
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Hundred Congresses in Petrograd and so on , so as to give itself a 
pretext for shutting the troublesome Duma. In turn, it thought that the 
call should come from ’society' since a simple government-led initiative 
would arouse too much opposition from the liberals. In actual fact, 
Trotsky pointed out, the government need not have worried itself. The 
liberal coalition had disintegrated at the first sight of the Black Hundred 
meetings:
Those attached to the 'centre' bloc in the State Duma - and 
forming this centre was the greatest victory of the Milyukov 
strategy! - immediately moved to the right and after the Black 
Hundred Congresses issued ambiguous announcements from 
which only one thing was clear: the residents of Peterhof could 
sleep peacefully.15 
For Trotsky, the uselessness of the liberals had become apparent so 
quickly that a whole series of Black Hundred meetings, organised by 
the bureaucracy, were left with nothing to do. In these circumstances 
they became arenas for sacked ministers to plot against their 
successors. In the meantime events were progressing by their own 
course: the national economy had lost millions of good workers to the 
war effort; the war itself was dislocating the economy and means of 
communication; prices were rising and the money presses were 
working flat out; the government was corrupt. Trotsky issued one more 
warning to the liberals: 'if the Progressive Bloc is pacified by the 
government today, tomorrow is preparing a rude awakening for 
them.'16
In May 1916 Trotsky was given the opportunity to take a closer look 
at the leader of the Kadet party when Milyukov visited Paris.17 A 
sarcastic and critical account of Milyukov's programme duly appeared 
in Nashe Slovo. At the outset of his report Trotsky belittled the status of 
the Russian liberal's trip. Milyukov had come to Paris to strengthen ties 
between the Allies only a few weeks after Russia had sustained the 
embarrassment of having been excluded from an Allied economic 
conference. The fact that Russia's standing continued to be low among 
her allies could be gauged from the fact that Milyukov's first interview 
appeared not in the official Temps nor even in the semi-official Matin, 
but in the 'reactionary-radical-anti-Semitic-blackmailing publication
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Oeuvre'.18 Trotsky then proceeded to discredit Milyukov's thoughts, 
partly through portraying Milyukov's performance in the interview in the 
worst possible light.
Thus, the Oeuvre reporter apparently embarrassed the Kadet 
leader when, in response to Milyukov's assertion that the Russian army 
was ready and equipped to attack and only awaiting orders, he asked 
why such orders had not been given? After all, in view of the Austrian 
attack on the Italian front was not the then current moment just right for 
a counter-attack? Trotsky pointed out that Milyukov felt no need to 
answer this question, he merely asserted that the French government 
would no doubt be delighted to hear of the Russian army's healthy 
condition; an assertion the French government would hardly deny.
Trotsky reported that Milyukov became much more animated when 
he spoke of his hopes and desires for Russia's spoils from the war: a 
victorious Russia should receive open access to the Straits. This would 
not only enable a further development of the Russian economy, it 
would also resolve the Eastern Question for Britain and France. 
Milyukov was asked how these very practical reasons related to 
notions of the war as a struggle for the principles of national self- 
determination and the rule of law? He dismissed this question as based 
upon a 'romanticism...[which] disappeared from politics long ago’; 
anybody who looked upon the war as a defensive war did so out of 
ignorance. It could have been argued that Milyukov himself had earlier 
played a significant role in encouraging people to their ’ignorance'. 
After all, in December 1914 Trotsky had criticised Milyukov for his then 
view of the war as a struggle for democracy. However, Trotsky only 
hinted at this contradiction between the Kadet leader's former and 
current position by inserting an exclamation mark in the following 
citation from the interview: 'They fooled themselves (ils s'imaginaient!) 
that the war had a purely defensive character...’19
The explicit line of attack that Trotsky adopted in this article was to 
construct an unflattering comparison of Milyukov with Bethman- 
Hollweg. He intervened his factual account of the interview to say that 
Milyukov's anti-romanticism sounded very much like Bethman- 
Hollweg's justification for Germany's march through Belgium on its way 
to the sea: 'We have forgotten about sentimentality'. However, wrote
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Trotsky, the Russian liberal need not concern himself with sharing the 
same ideological ground as his German opponent. One important 
feature differentiated Milyukov from Bethman-Hollweg; the former did 
not know when to stop talking. For example, Milyukov suggested that 
British phlegmatic determination to withstand the demands of war 
could be explained by the fortunate psychological effects of the 
German Zeppelins. For Trotsky, this stupidity was evidence enough 
that Milyukov had understood that romanticism had disappeared from 
politics, but that he had not grasped the fact that realism does not 
consist of publicly stating all political demands.
Milyukov arrived back in Russia on 17 June 1916, just in time to 
participate in the remaining few days of the latest session of the Duma, 
prorogued by Nicholas II on 20 June. Trotsky analysed the gap 
between expectations of a more powerful and active Duma and the 
supplementary role that it was to play in 'Disappointments and 
Worries', published in Nashe Slovo of 21 June 1916.20 He began by 
outlining the reasons why one might have looked forward to a more 
influential Duma. To begin with, did Milyukov's recent trips to the Allied 
countries not signify the Kadet leader's seniority in the governmental 
order? Surely only a leading state actor would have been entrusted 
with such a vital mission. Furthermore, did the fact that Milyukov 
represented the Duma not reflect the importance of the representative 
institution? Finally, the Russian army was successfully advancing on 
the Galician front. The liberal’s view was that victory would bring 
democratic reforms in its trail. Was the then current moment, when the 
War-lndustries Committees were being praised for their role in recent 
Russian victories, not the time when one could expect the liberal’s 
policy to begin to pay dividend? Perhaps, but Trotsky argued that the 
reverse was in fact happening.
The government had preceded the opening of the Duma by passing 
a series of laws relating to the running of the war economy. According 
to Trotsky, these measures were introduced to illustrate that the 
government could manage without the intervention of representatives 
from society. The right-wing had been mobilised to call for the Duma to 
be closed as an irrelevancy. The reaction of the liberal member of the 
War-lndustries Committees, Guchkov, was to complain that times were
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hard. Thus, the liberal forecast of greater democracy following victory 
was being falsified. However, for Trotsky, the liberals were not so much 
stupefied by the obvious failure of their strategy, but were in fact 
helping the government to crush a source of shared concern. Three 
hurriedly prepared pieces of social legislation (sickness payments for 
workers fulfilling ministries' orders, inspectors for women workers in 
factories, and rest periods for goods workers) were evidence of the 
liberal's and the government's desire to pacify the workers. In 
response, Trotsky called upon Social-Democrats to urge the workers to 
have no confidence in liberal social reformism and then to organise the 
workers' disbelief in revolutionary activity.
Trotsky presented one of his most damning critiques of Russian 
liberalism in 'Lessons of the last Duma session' of 12 July 1916.21 He 
characterised the parliament's proceedings as reeking of the smell of 
the politically dead bodies of the Progressive Bloc. To illustrate this 
point he focused upon the limited nature of the Progressive Bloc's 
demands on the peasant question. According to Trotsky, the peasants 
had been squeezed by the war effort to such an extent that the 
government was fearful of any signs of discontent from that quarter. In 
these circumstances winning concessions for the peasants should 
have proved a relatively easy task. However, the Progressive Bloc had 
merely suggested the removal of certain peasant inequalities before 
the law, on the basis that this was the only realistic proposal that one 
could expect the tsar's government to approve. For Trotsky, the 
Progressive Bloc's approach to the peasant question was typical of its 
approach in general: one had to tailor one's demands to suit the 
expectations of the monarchy, the bureaucracy and the nobility. 
Furthermore, this approach explained why the liberals had failed to use 
the peasants' inequality before the law to attack a whole series of other 
groups' inequalities before the law, i.e., the nationalities, people of 
various faiths and the Jews. It was this failure that made the bankruptcy 
of liberal politics all too obvious:
If history, our personal history for the past ten years has revealed 
anything beyond all doubt it is the absolute futility of placing one's 
hopes and trust on the democratic-opposition growth of Russian 
liberalism. Standing openly and demonstratively on the path of
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imperialist cooperation with the monarchy and making this 
cooperation the basis of all its policies, liberalism only completes 
the
whole of its preceding evolution as prepared by the national and 
international conditions of its development. The liberal opposition 
is just as little able to depart from its imperialist foundations as it is 
able to develop some kind of energetic opposition to it ,22 
Milyukov's trips to the Allied countries once again became the 
subject of Trotsky’s attention in an article spread over two issues of 
Nashe Slovo of August 1916.23 The Paris correspondent was replying 
to Milyukov's impressions of his experiences abroad which had 
appeared in the Russian liberal newspaper Rech. Trotsky claimed that 
Milyukov's work bore the usual hallmarks of a liberal pen, mainly 
impudence and stupidity. However, on this occasion, the Russian 
liberal's remarks were worth analysing as they contained some curious 
facts and generalisations.
The first instalment focussed upon Milyukov's account of his 
conversations with the French socialists Renaudel and Longuet. 
Trotsky illustrated how the Kadet tailored his remarks to reassure his 
co-conversationalists. For example, when Renaudel asked about 
Russian pretensions on the Straits, Poland and Persia he was not 
reminded of his 'naivety'. Rather, Milyukov used the style of the French 
Socialist Party's pacifism to stress that Russia was not an imperialist 
country. After all, had not Milyukov himself supported pacifism at 
speeches given both before and during the war? Against a background 
of pacifist pronouncements surely the issue of Russian expansion 
pales into a triviality? Evidently not so for Trotsky.
Another instance of Milyukov's duplicity was highlighted by Trotsky 
in his commentary on the Cadet's account of a discussion on whether 
the survival of tsarism was linked to Russia's winning the war. Milyukov 
had argued that a fundamental distinction separated the two issues: 
reaction could be changed in a decade whereas the outcome of the 
war would determine the fate of many future generations. Therefore, 
according to Milyukov, one's view of tsarism need not be connected in 
any way with one's hopes for Russian military success. One could 
support the war effort in the knowledge that one was fighting for the
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well-being of many future generations, and then deal with tsarism in a 
relatively short period of time after victory had been guaranteed. 
Furthermore, the failure of defeatism in 1905 had revealed the 
hopelessness of this tactic not only to the liberal, but also to the 
narodnik and Marxist intelligentsia. For Milyukov, various sections of 
the intelligentsia had learnt that problems like Poland, Persia and the 
Straits were the product of a foreign policy constructed over 
generations and then handed to the present state actors from the past. 
Hence, foreign policy could continue over decades while tsarism could 
be removed over the course of one decade. Trotsky was not impressed 
by Milyukov's use of time to support his approval of Russia's war aims. 
According to Trotsky, the Russian liberal had constructed an argument 
which allowed a combination of revolutionary action against tsarism 
with a defence of Russia in the war only to please his left-wing 
company. After all, Milyukov had expressed his real view of the relation 
between defeatism and revolution in the State Duma. There Milyukov 
had pronounced that if victory could only be achieved through 
revolution then he would renounce victory. So much for the concerns of 
future generations taking priority! For Trotsky, Milyukov understood 
that even a revolution which overthrew tsarism and guaranteed victory, 
thus strengthening the position of the bourgeoisie, would soon develop 
into a full-blown proletarian revolution. This, of course, would mean the 
death of liberalism. It was for these reasons that Milyukov would do 
anything to avoid revolution:
Twelve years ago Milyukov called for defeatism as it gave a push 
to revolution. Now he would be prepared to accept defeat if only 
to run away from revolution. But the Russian liberal said nothing 
of this historical u-tum to his French company.24 
The second instalment of 'The generalisations and impressions of 
Mr Milyukov' examined the liberal's exposition of how the Zimmerwald 
Conference had been organised. According to Trotsky's report, 
Milyukov claimed that Longuet had first to be defeated in France before 
left-wing groups there could call for an internationalist socialist 
gathering. Syndicalists had then joined-up with the official Italian 
Socialist Party and had attracted the support of minority groups in Paris 
and London. The aim of an international gathering was finally achieved
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through the auspices of German Social-Democracy. Trotsky pinpointed 
several inaccuracies in Milyukov’s version of events. To begin with, the 
left-wing in French politics began their activities while Longuet was still 
a minister. Moreover, Zimmerwald had not taken place through the 
medium of German Social-Democracy as a whole. On the contrary, the 
German party, like the French, was split. In both parties the right 
opposed the idea of Zimmerwald as an initiative of the revolutionary 
left. In using the notion of the important role played by German Social- 
Democracy Milyukov, according to Trotsky, was merely repeating a 
critique of Zimmerwald as 'Pan-German intrigue', i.e., a critique based 
upon 'ignorance and stupidity'.
Trotsky was more impressed by Milyukov's understanding of the 
fractions within French socialism: the right majority, the Longuetist 
minority and the Zimmerwaldists. Milyukov noted that the minority had 
recently abandoned its support of the majority, and called upon the 
International Socialist Bureau to investigate the possibility of renewing 
ties between the various sections of the Second International. 
However, Milyukov stated that there was no need for concern over the 
apparent fall in the right’s popularity. The minority still voted for the war 
credits and continued to serve in war cabinets. Moreover, the 
Zimmerwaldists had been forced to vote for the minority rather than 
having sufficient strength to put forward their own demands; an 
immediate recall of all sections of the International which were to be 
first of all cleansed of nationalism.
For Trotsky, Milyukov had correctly analysed the dangers of 
Longuetism. By voting with the minority the Zimmerwaldists had only 
defeated themselves. In this way Longuetism was 'a new link in a 
complex chain attaching the working masses to the existing regime';25 
the French equivalent of social-patriotism in Russia. However, Trotsky 
claimed that the credit for Milyukov's acumen could not be laid at the 
Kadet leader's own door. When in Paris Milyukov had received copies 
of Golos and Nashe Slovo and his analysis of fractions in French 
socialism was taken straight from the pages of these newspapers. But, 
there was one notable exception. Milyukov had omitted to inform his 
readership that Longuetism had to be created both as a reflection of a 
swing to the left among the working masses and as an attempt to
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contain the growing revolutionary mood. And, continued Trotsky, 
Milyukov had a very good reason for concealing the real cause of 
Longuetism; he could not expose the anti-proletarian, pro-government 
nature of Longuetism for 'he was afraid of weakening the 
pedagological force of his French impressions upon the Russian 
workers' movement...’26
In what was to be his final contribution about Russian liberalism on 
the pages of Nashe Slovo, Trotsky analysed the Kadet moderate 
Chelnokov's remarks concerning which political force was best suited 
to implement the liberal reform programme. According to Trotsky's 
report Chelnokov, the chairman of the Moscow All-Russian Union of 
Towns, thought a conservative government could pass reforms of a 
liberal nature and retain the trust of society and leading political circles, 
whereas a liberal administration attempting to pass the very same 
reforms would soon be swamped with requests that it would be unable 
to fulfil. For Trotsky, it would not be difficult to show the flaws in 
Chelnokov's logic: a conservative Cabinet would be conservative by 
nature and act accordingly. However, such an illustration would be 
pointless if one thought that by it one could convert Chelnokov to 
opposition to Russian conservatism. The Nashe Slovo correspondent 
argued that the Moscow city politician had constructed his case not out 
of ignorance of the real state of affairs, but out of an awareness of the 
common imperialist interests of the liberal bourgeoisie and the 
bureaucratic-monarchical state.
According to Trotsky, Chelnokov and his ilk knew that the monarchy 
could not adequately defend their imperialist interests and that the 
monarchy would not surrender its hold on power. This situation was not 
a problem for Russian liberalism, as it was prepared to help the 
monarchy acquire the new skills it needed without demanding political 
power. Hence, Chelnokov's insistence that the reins of government 
were best left in the hands of the traditional bureaucracy. Of course 
liberals would protest if they thought that they were being taken too 
much for granted by their conservative allies. However, those people 
who interpreted such liberal protests as a real move to overthrow the 
government were harbouring illusions which could only help to prop up 
the old regime. In this way Trotsky highlighted a chain which linked first
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liberalism and then, through its acceptance of 'liberal opposition', 
social-patriotism to the conservative ministry (Stumer):
Creating (not so much for himself as for others) 'illusions' on 
Stumer's account, Chelnokov continues to serve the basic 
interests of his class in the current epoch. Creating illusions for 
themselves on Chelnokovists' ( Chelnokovikh ) account and for 
their 'struggle for power' tomorrow, opportunists in the workers' 
movement betray the working class to the bourgeoisie.27 
The following sections of this chapter will examine the two links of the 
above chain that have not been looked at thus far, namely Trotsky's 
writings on the government and on social-patriotism.
7.3 The Government
From the outset of the war Trotsky condemned the Russian 
government as one of a group of imperialist nations pursuing interests 
opposed to those of the international proletariat.28 However, it was only 
in April 1915 that he devoted a full article to the war-time regime in 
Russia, in which he placed the suspension of the constitution in an 
international setting. He pointed out that even the countries of age-old 
parliamentarianism had taken this step. But, he argued, one could 
single out Russia since in other countries political parties had 
supported their governments by voluntarily declaring allegiance to 
'national unity', whereas in Russia the government itself had put an end 
to the unrestrained functioning of political groups. Having freed 
themselves of parliamentary criticism Trotsky claimed that all 
governments had become regulatory bodies supplying the war effort 
from the national economy; a process which involved breaking rules 
normally governing economic life. For Trotsky, the Russian 
government also stood out from other administrations in this process 
since it caused more dislocation and more disruption than that taking 
place elsewhere. In turn this did not bode well either for the condition of 
the Russian economy as time progressed, or for the likelihood of 
continuing social acquiescence with government policy:
the military-field state economy feverishly undermines its own 
basis and the longer the war lasts the more it goes into a blind
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alley...But the longer the war lasts and the more uncertain its 
outcome becomes, the more often the rulers should look into the 
state purse and the more anxiously should the propertied 
classes...ask themselves: does the bureaucracy really know 
where and why it is leading the country?29 
However, Trotsky concluded that faced with such questions and 
criticism the government would not consider relinquishing any of its 
newly discovered freedom from parliamentary and societal control.
If Trotsky was not able to be optimistic about the possibility of a new 
regime in Russia in the near future, then he was able to write a 
humorous account of a recent ministerial reshuffle, one of a series of 
the government's 'liberalisation' measures in response to Russia's 
recent military set-backs, in an article of 24 June 1915. At that time 
Nicholas II sacked the then Minister of the Interior, Nicholas Maklakov, 
and replaced him with Nicholas Shcherbatov. Among a number of other 
new appointees Katenin was given responsibility for the press. Trotsky 
assessed the likely course events would take under Shcherbatov and 
Katenin, basing his judgements upon the two men's biographies. He 
informed the reader that the new Minister of the Interior had previously 
occupied the post of Director of the State Stud, a fact which gave 
reason for optimism. After all, horses demanded regularity and order in 
the provision of food and water. One could only hope that Shcherbatov 
would preserve his skills learnt among the horses after being 
transferred to the larger human stable of Russia; although Trotsky 
declined to make a precise forecast. Katenin, on the other hand, did not 
share Shcherbatov's sound training and experience. This had become 
evident in the way that he had responded to questions concerning his 
approach to the press. Thus, Katenin freely admitted that he had no 
knowledge of the press but announced that he intended to protect the 
honourable publications and discard the rest. This left the problem of 
how to differentiate the honourable from the dishonourable, to which 
Katenin had replied: 'I will treat the press in the same way as the press 
treats me.'30 It was this answer, Trotsky claimed, in which the 
difference between the two new ministers was most clearly revealed. 
Shcherbatov knew that one treats horses not as they treat you but in 
accordance with their nature as horses. For Trotsky, the lesson was
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clear: 'one went through the serious stable school, but the other 
obviously needs to be sent to the stables for the completion of his state 
service.'31
In his next commentary upon developments in his homeland Trotsky 
once again used the form of political profile. This time the victim was 
Alexander Khvostov, who became Minister of the Interior as a 
replacement to Shcherbatov after the tsar had managed to weather the 
political storms of August 1915.32 For Trotsky, the latest reshuffle 
indicated the extent to which Nicholas II intended to dig his trenches on 
the home front after the German advance on the Eastern front had 
ground to a halt. Khvostov was a well-known reactionary, and his 
appointment made a mockery of recent liberal calls for a ministry 
enjoying popular support. After all, Khvostov had helped to crush 
worker uprisings in 1905 and it was expected that he would deal with 
similar stirrings in a similar way. Hardly a promising prospect for the 
majority of Russia's population! In turn, liberal acquiescence in the face 
of Khvostov's appointment revealed how little the government had to 
worry itself of sustained opposition from that quarter. Indeed, for 
Trotsky, Khvostov's promotion would enter the history books as 'a 
symbol of the relationship between the monarchy and the patriotic 
bourgeoisie.'33
Trotsky discovered further confirmation for his view of an increase of 
reactionary forces in Russia following military successes, most notably 
at the Turkish fortress city of Erzurum, in an article of 27 July 1916 34 
On this occasion he examined the appointment of Boris Stumer as 
Prime Minister and Makarov, the former Minister of the Interior sacked 
in the spring of 1915 during public outcry at the rapid advance of the 
German Army, as Minister of Justice. He began by placating French 
worries that Stumer, who had also taken over the post of Foreign 
Minister from Sazonov, would pursue a different line in Russian foreign 
policy. Trotsky assured the French people that, despite his German 
name, Stumer would call for battle until the Germans had been routed. 
The cause of the most recent cabinet reshuffle was the respective 
minister's approach to Russia's internal political order. Sazonov, unlike 
Stumer, thought the Duma a useful body, if only as an additional source 
of information and influence. It was true, Trotsky conceded, that
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Stumer called the Duma before dispersing it; as was the fact that the 
new Prime Minister had been accused by leading figures, in a letter to 
the tsar, of conspiring with the left to overthrow the monarchy in the 
name of national defence. Trotsky claimed that such accusations were 
clearly exaggerated; Stumer's premiership represented a swing to the 
right of the political pendulum. In turn, the pendulum had swung, or had 
been enabled to swing, because enough forces had been gathered for 
the offensive on the Austrian front, which had resulted in several 
victories for the Russian forces led by General Brusilov. For Trotsky, 
the view that Russia's 'internal Germans' would be defeated along with 
Germany had been dealt another blow.
In the very next issue of Nashe Slovo Trotsky’s appraisal of Stumer 
seemed to have undergone a rapid change. In 'Two Telegrams' 
Stumer appears not as a die-hard monarchist, but as a politician willing 
to sacrifice absolutism.35 Trotsky informed the reader that, contrary to 
expectations, Stumer had not begun his time in office by calling a press 
conference or by receiving Entente envoys. To date, Stumer had 
exchanged telegrams only with Briand, his French counterpart. In this 
correspondence Stumer had confirmed that both countries were 
engaged in a 'great task' without specifying in what this task consisted. 
In trying to fill this lacuna Trotsky brought two facts to the reader's 
attention. First, the Petrograd correspondent of the French newspaper 
Journal had been told by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Stumer 
had been appointed Prime Minister and Foreign Minister since, at a 
Peace Conference, it would be necessary to connect Russia's external 
and internal affairs; a task made easier if one person had overall 
responsibility. Second, not long ago the Russian Finance Minister, 
Bark, had visited Western Europe in the search for financial aid. In 
Britain and France he had received the reply that loans were available 
in America, but in order to receive them the Russian government would 
have to announce a more enlightened Jewish policy. The reason for 
Stumer's occupation of the two top governmental posts was now 
obvious, as was his best wishes for Briand's health from God in the 
carrying-out of their 'great task'.
When Trotsky next took up his pen to write about the Russian 
government during the First World War he was under an order, issued
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by the French authorities, to leave Paris. Nashe Slovo had been 
banned two weeks earlier, on the 15 September 1916. However, in the 
six weeks it took to find Trotsky a new home, the Nashe Slovo group 
was able to start a new newspaper, Nachalo; two of Trotsky's 
contributions to which while he was still in Paris contained attacks on 
the Russian government.
The first of these, written under his new pseudonym En\ assessed 
the amount of corruption which permeated the Russian administrative 
structure. Trotsky illustrated his point through an examination of the 
twists and turns which the careers of several leading state officials had 
taken. He began with a short synopsis of the recently deceased 
General Dumbadze (1851-1916). As governor of Yalta he had 
terrorised the local people until complaints about him reached such a 
level that he was sacked in 1910. However, a friend of Nicholas II, 
Dumbadze was reappointed and reigned until 'he was worn out by 
administration.'36 The second figure sketched by Trotsky was General 
Komissarov, who had been sacked as governor of the Rostov region 
after letters of complaint about him had been received in the Ministry of 
the Interior from local people. Trotsky advised Komissarov not to 
despair for his career; he could take comfort from the life of the 
infamous I. I. Vostorgov (1867-1918). Vostorgov was well-known as a 
priest and corrupt officer of state who , nevertheless, was tipped to 
become a bishop. Finally, Trotsky suggested a process of alienation 
from the regime to a corrupt member of it through which an individual 
could proceed. He first mentioned the case of Mansevich-Manuilov 
(Maska) who had been hired as a collegiate assessor and was 
currently in prison for embezzling 100 000 roubles.37 At the end of the 
article he then spoke of V. Burtsev. Burtsev was a former narodnik who 
had fled abroad. By the time of the First World War, however, Burtsev's 
views had undergone a profound change and he was an ardent patriot. 
With support from Entente governments he was allowed back into 
Russia where, according to Trotsky's report, he was working in 
museums. Trotsky wondered what he might be doing in that branch of 
the state service, 'perhaps he is studying the deposit there of 
Manusevich-Maska's trousers.'38
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In what was to be his last contribution on the Russian government to 
Nachalo while resident in France, Trotsky disputed Gavas's, the official 
telegraph agency of the French government, view of a rapid growth of 
liberal influence in the Russian administration.39 This article was 
partially censored, but the Russian revolutionary's message was 
preserved. In response to Gavas Trotsky asked how could a Cabinet 
which was considering hiring V. M. Purishkevich (1870-1920), a 
monarchist reactionary and member of the Black Hundreds, be 
classified as liberal? Furthermore, Stumer was attempting to crush the 
influence of the liberal Chelnokov by enfranchising the clergy for the 
upcoming elections to the Moscow City Duma. After establishing the 
'hard course' adopted by the current regime, Trotsky noted a flaw; 
namely, different ministers were proposing conflicting solutions to the 
problem of price rises and shortages on items of basic necessity. In line 
with farmers' interests the Agricultural Minister, Bobrinsky, was calling 
for no government intervention to lower prices. He was opposed by the 
War Minister, Shuvaev, who wanted the army to be supplied with cheap 
bread. When the latter course was adopted rumours circulated that 
Bobrinsky had decided to take a rest and would soon be replaced. 
Trotsky pointed out that conflict among top members of the Cabinet 
was harmful for the 'hard course'. In the meantime, calls were being 
made for the immediate convocation of the Duma. Thus, Trotsky's 
writings on the Russian government ended with an analysis of another 
looming Cabinet crisis, the mechanics of which he had outlined in his 
first article on the Russian state order of April 1915.
7.4 The Workers' Movement: Social-Patriotism versus 
Social-Democracy
In the third and fourth instalments of a series of articles published 
under the heading 'War Crisis and Political Perspectives', Trotsky 
outlined why the Russian proletariat was the crucial social force which 
would determine the future domestic political order. For Trotsky, this 
fact had already been revealed by the failed 1905 revolution, in which 
'the main moving force of the revolution had been the proletariat.'40 
The intervening years had witnessed developments which, according
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to Trotsky, had only reinforced the proletariat’s position. A period of 
economic boom had enriched the large-capital bourgeoisie while killing 
off its petty- and middle- counterparts. At the same time the proletariat 
had grown in numbers, was more concentrated in the newer and larger 
factories, and more advanced in consciousness and organisation. The 
peasantry, on the other hand, remained a culturally backward and 
dispersed mass; the workers could hope to win over only proletarian 
and semi-proletarian elements from the countryside.
According to Trotsky, the further polarisation of the Russian social 
structure between 1905-15 had also entailed consequences for the 
political positions adopted by some groups. Most notably, the 
bourgeoisie had gone from opposition to the government in 1905 to 
backing the government's campaign for victory in World War One. 
Similarly, the liberal press, whose ambiguous stance in 1905 had 
encouraged the masses' revolutionary feelings, was currently 
attempting to channel the proletariat's dissatisfaction into an alliance 
with the ruling orders. In this way the bourgeoisie, Trotsky argued, 
formed a buffer between the monarchy at one end of society and the 
proletariat at the other. Given that a revolutionary transformation of 
Russian society could only be brought about by the proletariat, the 
crucial question for Trotsky was, 'Who would exert most influence over 
the masses?' The message emanating from the bourgeoisie was clear, 
but one could also distinguish two main strains of Social- Democratic 
thought.
There were those socialists, social-patriots, who thought that the 
petty-town bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia and the peasantry could play 
a revolutionary role. Their programme approved the war and called for 
participation in 'organisations for victory', with the intention of creating a 
broad base of support which, after the war, would press for radical 
political change. In the Duma the social-patriots were represented by 
Man'kov and Kerensky. However, there were also those socialists, 
revolutionary internationalists, who were unique in agitating among the 
proletariat for peace and revolution. The revolutionary internationalist 
perceived the Russian revolution as part of a wider European 
phenomenon:
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only the international socialist revolution can form that situation 
and advance those forces under the help of which the 
revolutionary struggle of the Russian proletariat can be 
conducted to the end. And the converse: the revolutionary 
struggle of the Russian proletariat...is an important factor in the 
interrelation of European social forces and gives a mighty push to 
the revolutionary advance of the European proletariat on the 
basis of capitalist society.41
After outlining the social-patriotic and revolutionary internationalist 
approaches, Trotsky did not have to wait too long before having an 
opportunity to comment on the battle between these two sections of the 
socialist camp. Between November and December 1915 he wrote two 
articles concerning the elections which took place among the 
Petrograd workers to decide who should represent them on the 
recently formed War-lndustries Committees; organisations concerned 
with war production 42 The first of these articles, which appeared six 
weeks after the first elections of September 1915, claimed that the 
revolutionary internationalists had shown themselves to be the 
stronger force. In declaring that the 'national defencist' position had 
been 'routed', Trotsky no doubt had in mind figures which had already 
appeared in Nashe Slovo showing that workers at ninety large factories 
had voted against participation in the War-lndustries Committees, 
while eighty-one had voted fo r43 In conditions which were more 
favourable to the social-patriots - the continuing German advance was 
arousing basic instincts of self-preservation and the bourgeois press 
was raging about the 'Tuetonic danger' - he claimed that the Petrograd 
workers had emerged from a difficult political test 'with honour1. 
However, he did not overlook the fact that a significant section of 
Petrograd's workers, between one-quarter and one-third, had voted for 
participation in the War-Industrial Committees and therefore for 
national defencism. The question Trotsky posed was, 'Why?'
He pointed out that the social-patriots themselves were surprised by 
the outcome: 'without organisation, without traditions, almost without 
Duma representatives, without the authority of a party. And suddenly: 
several hundreds of thousands of votes! Where from?'44 He answered 
by pointing to several sources. To begin with, those workers who were
Trotsky and Russian Domestic Politics 220
under the spell of bourgeois ideology had united under the banner 
hoisted by Plekhanov, Prizyv and Nashe Delo. Then there was the 
bourgeois reserve army of ideologically indifferent workers who, when 
threatened by external danger, would support the cause of national 
defence. To this second group one could add a section of the qualified 
work force who were making more money than usual under the 
'mobilisation of industry'. In short, the social-patriot constituency was 
made-up from opportunistic elements most likely to take the line of 
least resistance. This trend in Russian Social-Democracy, lacking a 
history of organisation and political authority, had, in turn, been able to 
attract this constituency because the state machine and the bourgeois 
press had been at its service; or rather, claimed Trotsky, the former 
had come to the service of the latter:
Social-patriotism turned-out to be the most handy political 
instrument in the hands of the ruling classes and the state power 
for the ideological-political subordination of the backward 
workers to itself.45 
In order to illustrate the usefulness of the social-patriots to the 
government he argued that, alone, the ruling circles would have been 
able to win-over thousands of workers and not tens of thousands. 
Trotsky insisted that one could draw only one conclusion when dealing 
with the 'political tool' of the proletariat’s class enemies: 'we cannot limit 
our struggle with [the social-patriots] by any organisational bonds with 
them; a struggle which should be and will be taken to the finish!'46
After being elected, the workers1 representatives had to meet and 
decide whether to nominate individuals from their ranks to serve on the 
central organs of the War-lndustries Committees. This second round of 
voting took place toward the end of November 1915, and Trotsky 
published his commentary upon these debates roughly one month 
later. He described what had occurred as a new chapter in the history 
of social-patriotic shame. In making this charge Trotsky had in mind 
Gvozdev's behaviour at an electoral meeting of 29 November. 
Gvozdev, leader of the social-patriotic bloc, was a leading exponent of 
worker participation in the cause of national self-defence. Naturally, he 
wanted the meeting of workers' representatives to proceed with the 
nominations. In this he was opposed by the ninety revolutionary
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internationalists. It was what Gvozdev did to overcome this opposition 
that so enraged Trotsky. Gvozdev declared that one deputy was in 
attendance under false pretences. When the revolutionary 
internationalists abandoned the hall in protest at this ’informer's act', 
Gvozdev organised the election of ten workers' representatives to the 
Central War-lndustries Committee and and a further six to 
supplementary committees. For Trotsky, this amounted to a 
falsification of the will of the Petrograd proletariat; a will which Trotsky 
obviously felt amounted to a mandate not to proceed with further 
elections to War-lndustries Committees after the election of the ninety 
revolutionary internationalists. He defined the social-patriot's action as 
an 'evil form of political strikebreaking' which permitted only one of two 
responses: 'either fellow-travelling and empathy, or an implacable and 
urgent organisational rebuff.'47
An advert in the newspaper Nash Golos promoting an edition of 
social-patriotic author's essays to be published in the near future in 
Petrograd provided the pretext for Trotsky's next writing on social- 
patriotism in Russia. Nash Golos announced that the work would be 
drawn from a list of over nineteen contributors, each of whom 
supported the idea of self-defence; an idea which would also be used 
as the book's title. Trotsky reproduced this information in Nashe Slovo 
before adding several comments. First, the proposed publication 
showed how energetically the social patriots were arguing their case. 
Second, L. Sedov was on the list of intended contributors. His 
participation belied the notion that there existed a left-wing group within 
the newspaper Nashe Delo. If such a group did exist then Sedov should 
have opposed the idea of Self-Defence. Third, An"s proposed 
participation was illustrative of how new disagreements had replaced 
the old. Previously, An' had rejected the arguments of his now co­
contributors as 'opportunistic'. At this point, Trotsky introduced the 
lesson which he had drawn from his analysis of the elections to the 
War-lndustries Committees, one had to wage a propaganda war 
against social-patriotism: 'The more An' has rendered service to the 
workers' movement, and especially the Caucasian, the greater his 
authority and the more decisive the struggle with An' and the social- 
patriots should be.'48
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When Self-Defence appeared in Petrograd in 1916, copies must 
have circulated outwith Russia. Trotsky published his thoughts on this 
book in two articles in Nashe Slovo, the first of which one could 
describe as a book review.49 His intention was to discredit social- 
patriotism and its calls for an alliance with the liberals.
L. Sedov's chapter, 'Yesterday - Today - Tomorrow', did not appear 
in Self-Defence, 'due to circumstances beyond the control of the 
editorial board.'50 However, Trotsky claimed that Sedov's spirit had not 
been erased along with his writing. After all, a Foi^/ard did say that the 
authors, despite differences of opinion on specific issues, were united 
in their belief that internationalism and the defence of Russia were not 
mutually exclusive ideas.51 In actual fact, claimed Trotsky, the authors 
disagreed not only among themselves but even with themselves. 
Before embarking upon an examination of each chapter by way of a 
series of brief extracts, 'so that the reader can feel the overall "spirit" of 
the collection', Trotsky characterised the arguments put forward by all 
as, 'banal and superficial...united by capitulation before the bourgeois 
nation and the class state.'52
Self-Defence was introduced by Vera Zasulich's essay 'On the 
War'.53 In the light of her undoubted contributions to the workers' 
movement in Russia, Trotsky said that he wished he could just remain 
silent about her participation in Self-Defence. However, now she was 'a 
political enemy against whom one has to conduct an irreconcilable 
struggle.'54 He then recreated Zasulich's argument thus: she desired 
as total a defeat of Germany as possible, not only out of feelings for her 
homeland but also because of a concern for Western democracy; 
finally, in its merciless pursuit of victory Germany had aroused in her 
indignation and disgust. In the space available to him Trotsky had not 
reproduced Zasulich's arguments faithfully. Thus, for instance, her 
desire for Germany's defeat was not caused by a concern for Western 
democracy as Western democracy per se, but because the 'death or 
even weakening of Western democracy by what is a mighty country 
anyway, led by semi-absolutist Prussian Junkers, would be a huge loss 
for the present and a threat for the future, for that future to which the 
proletariat aspires.'55
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Trotsky described the next contributor, A. Potresov, as the 
’Gvozdev' of the whole collection. He said that Potresov saw the idea of 
the homeland as having caused the collapse of the Second 
International. At the same time, wrote Trotsky, Potresov was not 
counterposing the idea of the homeland to internationalism. The 
proletariat was merely protecting the riches created by it in its 
'homeland'. Russia still had to reach the stage of patriotism; when she 
had done so she would become a part of Europe. Patriotism means 
that a citizen lays down his possessions at the homeland’s alter. 
Trotsky concluded his exposition of Potresov's article by citing the 
social-patriot's final sentence: 'Through patriotism - there is no other 
path - into the kingdom of brotherhood and equality!'56 What Trotsky 
did not do, however, was to report either why Potresov considered 
patriotism a necessary stage on the path to internationalism, or the 
distinction Potresov made between bourgeois patriotism and 
proletarian patriotism. According to Potresov, capitalist development 
not only brought with it an ever-increasing class division in society, it 
also entailed the transformation of each individual into a citizen. In turn, 
it was this feeling of citizenship which formed the basis for patriotism, 
i.e., one feels part of a whole, irrespective of one's hatred of other parts 
of the whole:
we are not always inclined to turn our attention to another aspect 
of capitalist development, that the stratification of society is 
accompanied not only by an ever-increasing intensity of class 
struggle but also along side this there occurs a transformation of 
society - the transformation of the ordinary person into a 
citizen...the more active hatred to a section [of society] the more 
one feels love towards the whole, an active love which composes 
patriotism.57
Furthermore, since capitalist development is uneven and since the 
concept of 'citizenship' is concomitant upon capitalist development, 
various nations will have different degrees of citizenship and hence of 
patriotism at any given moment. Moreover, as it develops patriotism 
takes various forms; specifically, there emerges an 'aggressive 
bourgeois patriotism' which is prepared to interfere with another 
country's interests in pursuit of its own, and a 'proletarian-democratic
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patriotism’ which espouses the right of each to protect their 
achievements without harming others. The Second International had 
collapsed at the outset of the war because the development of 
patriotism into a mass proletarian-democratic consciousness had not 
gone far enough. However, Potresov was confident that one day the 
ground would be sufficiently strong for true internationalism to become 
a reality. Internationalism would grow out of patriotism, a process that 
was unfolding at the then current moment:
internationalism is the further development of patriotism, laid to a 
great extent in those same thoughts and feelings which were at 
first strengthened in the process of the crystallisation of the 
citizen within each whole....The war not only realises the force of 
citizenship accumulated by centuries of development in national- 
state boundaries, together with this it also brings about the first 
serious cracks in these boundaries of citizenship and at the same 
time lays the first stones of that fundament, on which will be built 
buildings by aware and conscious masses, not unwillingly as the 
case up until now, but by the distributed creative wills of 
internationalism.58
In his presentation of Ivan Kubikov's chapter, The Working Class 
and National Feelings',59 Trotsky focused on the emotional aspect of 
Kubikov's case. In particular, he emphasised Kubikov's citation of a line 
of poetry, 'Be kind in one's rags and the homeland will cry*, to illustrate 
the use of emotive reasoning by social-patriots. However, there was 
another side to Kubikov's analysis which went unreported in Trotsky's 
review. For Kubikov, the proletariat of each country did not, as Marx 
claimed in 1848, have nothing to loose but its chains. In the sixty-plus 
years since Marx and Engels penned the Communist Manifesto, the 
European proletariat had made significant material, cultural and 
organisational gains. Moreover, these gains had been achieved in the 
framework of the nation-state. Hence the desire of each country's 
proletariat to defend its gains from possible seizure by hostile forces 
from outwith its own lands.
For P. Maslov1, the most advanced capitalist countries exploit those 
less well advanced by pursuing a particular trade policy. Thus, for 
instance, Britain ensured that Ireland and India became markets for
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Britain's industrial goods and not competitors not by political 
oppression, but through its trade policy. This is why the United States 
had to achieve economic independence from Britain by overturning the 
letter’s trade policy as a precondition for the development of American 
industry. Maslov1 claimed that even before the war Germany was 
making a profit from its trade with Russia, even though the tsar's 
government was pursuing a protectionist policy. However, German 
capital wanted to make super-profits, which it thought it could achieve 
through the imposition of certain economic policies after victory in war: 
'At whose expense could this advantage be gained? Clearly, at the 
expense of the defeated country. It is also clear that the extraction of 
this super-profit should reflect on the economic development of the 
exploited country.'60 Maslov' cited current Germany policy in occupied 
Poland to illustrate how indigenous industry was being stripped not only 
to satisfy Germany's war needs, but for the 'demands of German 
industry.'61 Moreover, the German government was pressurising 
Polish worker s to move to Germany to supply the demand for labour- 
power there. In this way, claimed Maslov', a common interest to repulse 
German aggression had arisen among the Polish bourgeoisie, anxious 
to protect its property, and the Polish workers, concerned about their 
jobs and rights in their homeland. In light of these conditions, socialists 
who insisted that the outcome of the war was of no interest to them 
were poor defenders of the interests of the working class.
Although Trotsky did not mention why, for Maslov', control over 
trade policy was so important, he did give an accurate summary of 
Maslov’s views thus: 'the Germans threaten the Russian trade system 
and hence Russian industry and hence the Russian proletariat.'62 He 
then correctly quoted a section of Maslov's chapter in which the social- 
patriot expressed regret that the leaders of the German working class 
had supported the attempt to destroy Russian industry which could be 
saved only by giving Germany’s army an 'appropriate rebuff.1 Maslov's 
insistence that democrats were obliged to ensure that any peace 
should be conducted on the basis of 'mutual concessions in possible 
economic relations, under which one country does not exploit 
another',63 however, went unreported.
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In his contribution K. Dmitriev' examined the special demands faced 
by backward countries during wars such as the First World War.64 For 
example, whereas an advanced country can redirect resources 
normally spent on repairs and reinvestment, a backward country is 
forced to support production for war by reducing output intended for 
consumer production: 'Here is the basic reason why the rear is now 
facing the threatening phantom of goods shortages: industry and in 
part agriculture is not strong enough to serve the nor mal demands of 
the rear and the sharply growing demands of the army.'65 In the 
Russian context the effect of the war on the consumer was being 
aggravated, according to Dmitriev', by the government’s financial 
policy. By printing more money the government had devalued the 
rouble by thirty per cent, the cost of which was to be met by purchasers 
of goods, i.e., hired labour. For Dmitriev' one had to try to minimise the 
hardships of war at the rear, since at the then current moment there 
existed a close connection between the situation at home and the 
situation at the rear: 'material and spiritual hardships of the rear are 
now transmitted with lightning speed to the front where they react on 
the army's situation and mood.'66 The problem for backward Russia 
was therefore clear: how to meet the overwhelming production 
demands of the First World War without removing too many resources 
from the domestic market. Dmitriev"s solution was the rational use of 
the country's resources which could only be achieved by the 
intervention of the society's democratic forces to organise the war 
effort. Furthermore, the intervention of democratic forces was all the 
more urgent for Dmitriev', since it was only by pursuing this strategy 
that democracy could guarantee for itself an influence over the post­
war settlement. Hence his conclusion, ripped from its context and 
quoted without comment by Trotsky: 'Through the defence of the 
country to the free world, a mutual guaranteeing of the people's 
interests of the negotiating sides - such now can be the only slogan of 
Russian democracy ,'67
From An"s essay, 'Marxism and Radicalism', Trotsky cited the 
following extract which he ridiculed first by inserting an incredulous 
'(listen!)':
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All Marxist parties in Europe approached the war from the point of 
view of economic development, i.e., they remained on Marxist 
soil. But (listen!) since each of them considered their country to 
be defending itself, naturally, they all, considering the 
International's regulations, seized arms;68 
and then by using An"s nationality to throw the question of Russia 
constituting a 'country' into doubt:
And since An’ considers his country to be defending itself (To An', 
as a Caucasian, it is absolutely clear that neither in Persia nor in 
Armenia has Russia's 'defence' been carried through to the end) 
then, ‘following the International's regulations' An' gives a call to 
arms.69
In the first instance Trotsky's critique rests upon an apparent flaw in 
An"s logic. After all, why should concerns about economic development 
lead Marxists who considered their country to be defending itself to 
support the war effort? An' had answered this question thus. As 
societies develop from feudalism they experience two different stages 
of development; first a stage of general political liberation and then an 
era of social struggle. In the first stage the proletariat will unite with the 
bourgeoisie to throw off the feudal yoke, in the second the two classes 
will stand opposed to each other. At the outset of World War One 
Western Europe had already entered the second 'social' stage while 
Russia was still in the first. This explains the approach of social- 
democrats in the West for whom,
questions of victory or defeat are questions of the strengthening 
or weakening of the proletarian movement, for the destruction by 
arms of the economic fundament, on which history has formed 
and reinforced the country in question, destroys the basis of the 
class struggle and holds back the economic development of the 
whole society in general.70 
However, An' went on to say, and Trotsky omitted this from his report, 
that not all social-democrats in the West had had the right to call their 
country ’defencist': 'The mistake was committed not in the placing of 
the question but in its solution: one part of the International imagined 
their state to be defencist whereas it was aggressive, the initiator of the 
war.'71
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In the second instance, when AnMs call to arms was declared to be 
part and parcel of his belief in the link between defence and economic 
development, Trotsky simply distorted the meaning of AnMs article. In 
actual fact, An' connected the Russian proletariat's support for Russia's 
war effort to the Russian bourgeoisie's linkage of its political demands 
with the defence of Russia in the war:
In any case the advocates of 'using' propagate victory, making 
converts among previous opponents, and this leads to the usual 
result - to the political and organisational inactivity of the 
proletariat which is not able to connect its political demands with 
the demands of the moment. Political leadership goes to the 
bourgeoisie whose awakening opens a new era in the Russian 
liberation movement. Only it is able to connect a necessary 
political renewal with the necessity to defend the country from 
foreign invasion and in this way discover a deep response from 
all sections of society. Even the proletariat begins to stir under the 
sound of the bourgeois alarm-bell and responds to its 
speeches.72
If Trotsky had presented a more accurate reconstruction of An"s views, 
he would of opened the more complex can of worms of the political and 
social stages of a move away from feudalism and the implications of 
this for one's political programme for war-torn backward Russia.
Vladimir Vol'skii presented the homeland as the only possible unit in 
which both culture and the workers' movement could develop. For him 
the slogan 'the proletariat has no homeland1 meant that the proletariat 
should not, for example, organise itself for a seizure of power in the 
homeland; a proposition which 'has nothing in common with 
Marxism.'73 According to Vol'skii the Stutgardt Conference of 1907 
recognised the nation as the 'treasure house' of human progress, and 
that each nation had an inalienable right to defend itself from outside 
aggression. Trotsky chose not to review Vol'skii's thoughts on the 
homeland. Instead, he focussed upon the social-patriot's critique of a 
left-wing deputy who, in the Duma, had asked the following questions: 
'What do you, supporters of self-defence, demand of the working 
class? Does it not tire itself out working in the factories, does it not carry 
all of the hardships of war and does it not die on the field of battle?’74
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Trotsky summarised Vol'skii's response thus: one also has to give 
one's intellectual and moral forces. This set-up Trotsky's critique of 
Vol'skii, a punch-line which rests upon a disbelief in the social-patriot's 
cheek: 'In other words, for us it is not enough that the proletariat gives 
its body to militarism - we also demand its spirit.'75
However, in order to achieve this effect Trotsky had to distort 
Vol’skii's argument. The latter had not called upon the proletariat to 
apply its intellectual and moral force in the war effort because its 
physical sufferings were not enough. Vol'skii thought it was foolish to 
frame the question in this way to begin with. For him the left-wing 
deputy's questions were premised upon a view of the proletariat as 
cannon-fodder. In actual fact the proletariat is more than its body, it has 
a heart and brains which, in the then present war, were of crucial 
importance in organising the country's defence:
If there appears a force of four to five million fighters whose firm 
and long wall stretches from the Baltic to the Black Sea then the 
collective will and strength of the whole people is expressed in 
that force. If the millions of fighters quiver then this testifies to the 
weakness of the whole people.76
Trotsky dealt with the next two authors, Evgeniy Maevskii and V. 
Levitskii, in one paragraph. Of these he said they were destined to write 
of 'general-national' tasks till their dying days. For Maevskii the First 
World War had placed before Russia the tasks of guaranteeing its 
independence and of democratising its political system. These tasks, 
according to Maevskii, could be fulfilled only by an alliance of 
democratic workers and the bourgeois opposition. However, at the 
then current moment the bourgeoisie and especially its leaders, 
Milyukov and Chelnokov, thought that it could act as a mighty force on 
its own. In so thinking, Maevskii argued that they were repeating the 
mistake of judgement committed by the advanced workers in 1905. 
Then, the workers had rejected the bourgeoisie as weak and viewed 
themselves as the only effective political force. And, of course, the 1905 
Revolution had failed. The urgent task for Maevskii was the creation of 
an alliance between the workers and the bourgeois opposition. He 
described the bourgeoisie's current policy of keeping themselves cut 
off from the workers as 'the bourgeoisie in a blind alley.'77 Trotsky
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began his appraisal of Maevskii at this point in Maevskii's argument, 
labelling it as 'the freshest of his discoveries.’78 Maevskii concluded that 
the proletariat should lead the bourgeoisie out of its blind alley; a 
conclusion which Trotsky ridiculed by inserting an exclamation mark in 
the following quote from Maevskii's article: 'Workers' democracy, and 
this is in its interest for (!) this is in the interests of the country's defence, 
should save the bourgeois opposition from this situation.'79
Trotsky did not report Levitskii's view that only an alliance of the 
bourgeois opposition with the workers could save Russia in the war and 
reform its political system, nor did he retrace Levitskii’s account of how 
the proletariat and the bourgeoisie had progressively organised 
themselves in the face of political, economic and military failures, and 
how these two as yet uncoordinated organisations would inevitably 
merge into one. He did, however, quote from Levitskii's final 
paragraph; making no comment other than informing the reader that 
the emphasis was not his:
Only a movement which has tasks of an all-national character, 
which embraces different classes in society, which undergoes a 
rise in citizenship to match the extent of the tasks can take Russia 
out of those external and internal difficulties in which it now finds 
itself, (author's emphasis)80
In his contribution A. P. Bibik used the image of a Russian proletariat 
dressed in Hamlet's cloak to describe their condition as they resolved 
the question 'to be or not to be.' Bibik constructed an imaginary 
dialogue to illustrate how Hamlet's cloak was discarded as the decision 
to fight for Russia's victory in the war was reached. Trotsky exposed 
two aspects of Bibik's article to his humour and his doubts. First he 
recounted Bibik’s assertion that once it was clear that German Social- 
Democracy had backed the Prussian Junkers, French and Belgium 
workers had resolved to meet the German army 'not carrying olive- 
branches in their hands.'81 Trotsky showed his scorn for Bibik's use of 
words by adding,
(As is well known the Prussian Junkers offer all Bibiks the choice 
of picking their clothes, white or 'defensive' and arming 
themselves according to taste, with olive-branches or with 
rifles).82
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Then, in response to Bibik's claim that workers' collectives had 
eventually closed ranks and concluded that, 'Russian workers also 
have a Homeland and this Homeland is in danger',83 Trotsky asked, 
'Who are these workers' collectives which gathered around a 
Homeland with capital letters?'84 He said that Bibik had not expanded 
upon this point. However, Trotsky did inform the reader of the 
Organisational Committee’s recent remarks on Bibik: 'Comrade Bibik is 
one of the leading workers of the Menshevik wing, and his conversion 
to 'defencism' cannot remain without an influence';85 thus implying that 
it was more a case of Bibik trying to convince the workers to throw off 
Hamlet's cloak than workers discarding this piece of Shakespearian 
clothing of their own accord.
The twelfth and final essay in Self-Defence was V. L'vov- 
Rogachevskii's 'How it was then'.86 Here L'vov-Rogachevskii compared 
the then current 'Homeland War' with its predecessor of 1812. For 
L'vov-Rogachevskii 1812 started a period of national rebirth and 
renewal which unfortunately did not last for long. However, he was 
convinced that the national awakening of which he was a witness would 
be more permanent and lead to the 'total Europeanisation and 
democratisation of Russia, for this is in the interests of the whole of 
democratic Europe.'87 In his review Trotsky did not reconstruct L'vov- 
Rogachevskii's historical analogy. He simply quoted the social-patriot's 
call for each 'peaceful man' to 'Stand-up in the name of the country's 
saviour!'88
Trotsky summed-up his review of Self-Defence with several 
thoughts, some of them intended to poke fun and some serious. He 
began with the former. He claimed that after reading the wealth of 
literary sources contained in Self-Defence - 'some foolish, some 
formal' - one could not help sensing 'a wave of condescension to the 
phraseology of the French social-patriots1;89 and he quoted from a 
speech made by Hevre to illustrate that 'political acoustics...do not take 
offence.'90 On a more serious note Trotsky recalled Potresov's and 
L'vov-Rogachevskii's calls for sacrifices to be made for the defence of 
the homeland. He threw their belief of Russia's democratisation 
following a successful defence effort in the war into doubt by conjuring 
up the silhouette of a policeman informing the social-patriots: 'You are
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honourable although a bit pushy, but don’t shout in vain, we ourselves 
shall do the awakening!’91
Trotsky was to return to the themes contained in Self-Defence less 
than two weeks later, when he published an article under the heading 
'Self-Defence. Training to be a Patriot’?192 He criticised Maslov and 
others for accepting the pro-war stance adopted by the socialist parties 
of Britain, France, Australia and Belgium as the correct socialist 
response to the then current events: ’When did we, the Russian 
Marxists, consider the politics of the British and Australian bourgeoisie 
to be a form of class independence? Did not Maslov himself repeat a 
dozen times the explanation of the ideological dependence of the 
British proletariat upon the oldest and mightiest bourgeoisie?'93 
However, the main target of Trotsky's attack was Potresov's assertion 
that 'internationalism is the further development of patriotism.'94 For 
Trotsky, Potresov had in effect constructed a pattern of historical 
development from a stupid parochialism through patriotism to 
international socialism. And, wrote Trotsky, it would follow from 
Potresov's schema that Russian Social-Democracy had arrived too 
early, 'a historical abortion.' After all, Potresov himself had said that 
Russia was just entering the second 'patriotic' stage. In order to refute 
Potresov's understanding of the historical process Trotsky 
reformulated the social-patriot's stages as a production chain, 'from 
supply through manufacture to the factory.'95 He argued that, viewed 
from this perspective, the peculiarity of Russia's development became 
clear, for
European factories began to conquer Russia sooner than 
Russia's 'natural' development had reached not only 
manufacture but also European supply. Following on from this 
Russia's industrial backwardness - in current conditions of world 
economic development - is expressed...in the extremely 
concentrated character of Russian industry.96 
Furthermore, Trotsky claimed that this peculiarity of economic 
development had political and social consequences. Specifically, the 
Russian worker was dragged out of his state of 'stupid parochialism' 
not through patriotism but by exploitation in the work place. Hence, the 
worker acquires class consciousness and not patriotism, and 'this
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awakening of a sharpening of class antagonism on the very first step 
does not give him a further acquaintance with the homeland map 
painted in a patriotic colour.'97 For Trotsky, Potresov was merely 
repeating the slogans put forward at an earlier time by Peter Struve. 
However, he highlighted one important difference. Struve had 
attempted to win over the Marxist intelligentsia to the liberal opposition 
which was taking its first timid "’non-class" steps'; whereas 'Potresov 
issues his call in 1916, at a time of European war, to socialist workers to 
join the camp of the patriotic opposition which is led by imperialist 
capital.'98 He pointed out that the Marxist intelligentsia had told Struve 
to 'get lost', and he recommended the revolutionary workers to give a 
similar response to Potresov.
Indeed, in an article published nine days later in Nashe Slovo 
Trotsky praised the Social-Democratic fraction in the Duma, on this 
occasion represented by Chkheidze, for exposing a social-patriotic 
approach as 'rubbish'. In Russia at that time Trotsky viewed the Duma 
as 'the only place from which one can clearly and unambiguously put 
the masses on guard against social-patriotic seduction, broadcast in a 
whole number of legal publications.'99 The social-patriotic newspaper 
Prizyv also reported on Chkheidze's speech but in a way that did not 
please Trotsky. According to Trotsky, Prizyv had claimed that the 
Social-Democratic deputy had not supported Zimmerwald in his 
speech in the Duma.100 Trotsky disputed this evaluation, pointing out 
that Chkheidze had both welcomed the call of 'struggle for peace' 
issued by the Zimmerwald Manifesto and placed the social-patriotic 
war slogans into the category of 'lies and hypocrisy’. On the other hand, 
he did criticise Chkheidze for not unfolding the Zimmerwald banner to 
its fullest extent, but nevertheless insisted that ’one cannot identify 
Chkheidze’s moderate anti-militarism with Pnzyv’ssocial-militarism.’101 
For Trotsky, the biggest flaw in Chkheidze's speech was the Duma 
representative’s refusal to declare open hostility to the War-lndustries 
Committees out of a concern for colleagues who were participating in 
the organs of 'self-defence'. He wrote that Chkheidze's stance on this 
issue seriously weakened the rebuff to social-patriotism.
However, in a continuation of this article published in the next issue 
of Nashe Slovo Trotsky noted a recent development which could only
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help the demarcation of social-patriotism from revolutionary socialism. 
The social-patriotic deputies Bur'yakov and Man'kov, recently elected 
to the Duma and both social-patriotic 'turncoats', had attacked 
Chkheidze and had used quotations from Aleksinskii, Avksent'ev and 
other leading social-patriots in their attack. For Trotsky the Social- 
Democratic deputies should take up the challenge and make the 
appropriate response. The social-patriots were nothing but one link in a 
chain tying the proletariat to its class enemies:
Comrade deputies!...You would be able to ignore Bur'yakov but 
behind his back stands Gvozdev and behind Gvozdev's back 
stands Potresov and Plekhanov and behind their backs the 
imperialist bourgeoisie. You should openly declare to the Russian 
proletariat that social-patriotism is the deadly enemy of its 
historical mission. You should advance slogans not only flowing 
directly out of Zimmerwald but also [slogans] clearly formulated 
at the last Zimmerwald meeting: 'Abandon the War-lndustries 
Committees!' You should throw to one side all those connections 
which hamper you to openly oppose Zimmerwald to Gvozdevism. 
This is the only way to break the disbelief accumulating in the 
advanced workers to you...This is the only path in Russia to 
concentrate the proletarian struggle under the banner of the 
Third International!102
Trotsky issued the above call on 1 April 1916. His tone became even 
more urgent in an article published just nineteen days later. On a 
positive note, he claimed that the Social-Democratic fraction in the 
Duma had not fallen prey to the sins of social-patriotism, i.e., Chkheidze 
and his followers did not think that the best way to achieve a 
transformation of Russian society was to accept the war and push for a 
national revolution through criticism of the government's conduct of the 
war. However, Trotsky then distinguished two tactics which could be 
adopted by socialists after they had rejected social-patriotism: first, a 
'revolutionary mobilisation of the proletariat against the war, entailing a 
complete break of all relations with the Progressive Bloc'; and, second, 
a 'passive wait-and-see' policy, 'not moving in a social-patriotic 
direction but not finding in itself, in Liebknecht expression, "the desire 
or the courage to give revolutionary slogans to the proletariat"'.103 And,
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for Trotsky, the problem with the Duma fraction was that it moved 
’between the two alternatives with a clear tendency towards passive 
internationalism.' It was a lack of a clear conception of international- 
revolutionary perspectives, of the dependence of the Russian 
proletariat's struggle against bourgeois imperialism upon the 
correlation of class forces across the whole of Europe which, wrote 
Trotsky, explained the 'politically vague speeches of our fraction and 
the passive wait-and-see character of its internationalism.' Given the 
emphasis that Trotsky had placed upon the Duma fraction as the main 
disseminators of revolutionary socialism among the Russian 
proletariat, his concluding words of advice were quite in place: the 
Social-Democrats in the Duma had to break all ties with the social- 
patriots, otherwise they faced placing themselves into a 'totally 
hopeless situation.'
When, however, Trotsky next took up his pen to write of Chkheidze 
he was not able to say that his advice had been followed. In 'Deputy 
Chkheidze's Tour' Trotsky reported how the Social-Democratic deputy, 
on a trip to Georgia and sharing a platform with a priest and a colonel, 
had advised the local population to form self-help groups and 
cooperatives to fight rising prices in the countryside. The meeting then 
unanimously passed a resolution calling the local population to order. 
Trotsky said that there was nothing objectionable in Chkheidze's 
advice to increase self-activity and not to seek solutions to the 
economic crisis in episodic acts of violence and the raiding of shops. 
However, he also pointed out that the dreaded government minister 
Khvostov had recommended similar measures. Hence, Chkheidze had 
merely repeated official slogans and this was not the responsibility of a 
Social-Democratic orator! For Trotsky, Chkheidze should have 
explained to the people that one could not solve the disorganisation 
caused by the war by seeking refuge in cooperatives; one had to revolt 
against the basic cause of high prices and those responsible for 
creating this situation. An opportunity to put the slogans of Zimmerwald 
into the minds of the people had been lost. At this point Trotsky posed 
the question of whether Chkheidze had spoken along these lines but 
the bourgeois press, from which he had taken his information, had 
falsified the Social-Democrat's arguments. Unfortunately, claimed
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Trotsky, several facts undermined such an interpretation. To begin 
with, Chkheidze had spoken alongside a priest and a colonel; this 
would not have been possible if he had polemicised against the war. 
Second, after a revolutionary-socialist speech the crowd would hardly 
have approved a resolution calling the people to order. Finally, 
Chkheidze would not have been allowed to make further appeals in 
places suffering from high prices if had really acted as a revolutionary 
socialist. No, said Trotsky, Chkheidze had played the role of a kind- 
hearted liberal, attempting to calm a situation before the governor 
calmed it by other means. Once Chkheidze had welcomed Karl 
Liebknecht’s parliamentary opposition to the war. But, Trotsky pointed 
out, Liebknecht had not recommended cooperatives to the people but 
the slogans 'Down with the War' and 'Down with the Government', for 
which he had been sentenced to terms of imprisonment. Trotsky said 
that not everyone was obliged to equal Liebknecht's decisiveness and 
bravery. However, he concluded that 'those with Liebknecht's and 
Zimmerwald's banner are not able to compromise this banner with 
impunity.'104
Thus, in what was to be his last article on the battle between social- 
patriotism and revolutionary-socialism in the Russian workers' 
movement while in Paris Trotsky could not have been in good spirits. At 
the same time as he was writing of the disgrace of social-patriotism in 
Paris through Aleksinskii’s antics, he was forced to report of 
Chkheidze's increasing espousal of a social-patriotic platform. Social- 
patriotic practice in Russia was obviously proving to be made of sterner 
stuff than its ideological counterparts in the French capital.
7.5 Conclusion
The findings of this chapter can be summarised as follows. In his 
writings on Russia in his Paris writings during World War One, Trotsky 
noted a chain, from social-patriotism through liberalism to the 
government, which tied the proletariat to the war aims of the 
government and thus strengthening the latter. He considered the 
liberal strategy of democratic reforms following military success to be 
mistaken. Contrary to liberal expectations, advances made by Russian
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soldiers had brought a shift to the right in politics. Indeed, Trotsky's 
articles on the government attempted to show how the monarchists 
were increasing their influence in the running of the country, although 
to the detriment of efficiency and coherence of policy. Furthermore, for 
Trotsky the liberals were not serious contenders for power. In actual 
fact the liberals wanted a a more efficient authoritarian political system 
which would answer the needs of capitalist development in Russia, i.e., 
the Prussification of the state order. Faced with a revolutionary 
situation the liberals would back the old regime.
Given that he thought that the proletariat was the only class which 
could transform Russia's political system and given that he dismissed 
liberalism in the Russian context as an ideological prop of the 
monarchy, Trotsky was most concerned that the social-patriots, who 
accepted the liberals tactics and called for a worker-liberal alliance, 
should be opposed in their attempts to win support among the workers. 
This concern explains his attempts to establish the social-patriotic- 
liberal-govemment chain so that it should be clear to all, and to criticise 
the outpourings of the social-patriots to alert the workers.
However, by the time of his expulsion from Paris his urgent calls to 
Chkheidze to adopt a firmer stance against the social-patriots had not 
been heeded. On the contrary, it looked as though Chkheidze, who as 
leader of the Social-Democratic fraction in the Duma headed the most 
important medium for the dissemination of revolutionary propaganda 
among the workers, was moving towards social -patriotism.
By the autumn of 1916 the following picture of Russian domestic 
politics, constructed from Trotsky's journalism, emerges: a government 
in disarray, a bankrupt though vociferous liberalism and leading Social- 
Democrats taking up social-patriotism. It was not a scenario that 
Trotsky himself would have wished for.
In the next chapter we shall establish whether Trotsky discovered 
more promising developments in the European workers' movement.
Trotsky and Russian Domestic Politics 238
Notes
1. Dmitrii Volkogonov, Trotskii. Politicheskii portret, Vol. 1,
Moscow, 1992, p 96.
2. For an exposition and explanation of the various turns in 
Miiyukov's approach to foreign policy from 1913 to the 
immediate outbreak of war see T. Riha, A Russian European: Paul 
Miliukov in Russian Politics, Notre Dame 1969, pp 205-218.
3. For an account of why the liberals issued a patriotic response to 
the war see R. Pearson, The Russian Moderates and the Crisis o f 
Tsarism 1914-17, London, 1977, pp 16-19.
4. N. Trotskii, 'Gregus' po demokraticheskomu spisku', Golos, No. 76, 
10 December 1914, pp 1-2.
5. Ibid., p 1.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., p 2.
8. -:, ’Politika "tyla"', Nashe Slovo, No. 145, 22 Julyl915, p 1.
9. Ibid.
10. -:, 'Konvent' rasteryannosti i bessiliya1, Nashe Slovo, No. 167,18 
August 1915, p 1.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. -:, 'Sobytiya idut' svoim' cheredom", Nashe Slovo, No. 10,13 
January 1916, p 1.
14. The declaration of the Progressive Bloc was as follows: 'The 
undersigned are representatives of fractions and groups of the 
State Duma and the State Council. We believe that only a 
powerful, stable and active government can lead the homeland 
to victory. Such a government can only be one which depends 
upon the trust of the people and which is able to organise the 
active cooperation of all citizens. We have unanimously 
concluded that this important and urgent task of the formation 
of such a government cannot be realised without fulfilling the 
following conditions:
Trotsky and Russian Domestic Politics 239
1. The formation of a united government from figures who have 
the trust of the people and who agree with the lawful 
institutions to fulfil a certain programme in the coming period.
2. The decisive change of the mode of management based upon 
mistrust of society's self-activity used until today. In particular:
a. Management to be based in law.
b. The removal of dual-power military and civil governments in 
matters not having a direct relation to the conduct of military 
operations.
c. The renewal of the composition of local administration.
d. A rational and thorough policy directed towards the 
preservation of internal peace and the elimination of conflict 
between nationalities and between classes. For the realisation of 
such a policy the following measures should be taken both in 
management and in law:
1. on the path to an enlightened monarch the ending of legal 
proceedings for purely political and religious crimes which 
should not be a criminal offence; the liberation from punishment 
and the restoration of rights, including the right to participate in 
elections to the state Duma, in country and town institutions and 
so on, for people imprisoned for these crimes; the mitigation of 
the sentence of those remaining condemned for political and 
religious crimes excluding spies and traitors;
2. The return of those exiled for causes of a political and 
religious nature;
3. The complete and absolute ending of persecution on whatever 
grounds for belief. The abolition of the circulars, put in a limited 
and distorted sense in the decree of 17 April 1905;
4. The resolution of the Russo-Polish question, in particular: the 
abolition of the restriction placed upon Poles to live anywhere in 
Russia; the urgent elaboration and passing into law of autonomy 
for tsarist Poland; the reexamination of the laws on Polish 
landownership;
5. A start to be made on the abolition of limitations placed upon 
the Jews in law, in particular, the abolition of the settlements, 
the easing of entrance into educational institutions, the abolition
Trotsky and Russian Domestic Politics 240
of restrictions to election into professions, and the restoration of 
the Jewish press;
6. A conciliatory policy on the Finnish question, in particular 
personal changes in the administration and the senate and the 
ending of persecution of officials;
7. The restoration of the little Russian press, the urgent 
examination of the matter of the Galician residents held under 
guard and exiled. The liberation of those subject to persecution 
when innocent;
8. The restoration of professional unions and the ending of 
persecution of workers' representatives held under suspicion of 
membership of illegal parties; the restoration of the workers' 
press;
9. The agreement of the government with lawful institutions to 
the urgent completion of:
a: all laws having a close relation to national defence, supplying 
the army, security for the wounded, arranging participation for 
refugees and of other matters directly related to the war; 
b: the following programme of laws directed to organising the 
country for victory and supporting civil harmony: the peasants 
to have equal rights with other estates, the introduction of 
district councils, changing the town law of 1890, the introduction 
of council institutions in the outskirts, in Siberia, in Archangel, 
the Don region, the Caucuses and so on, laws on cooperatives, 
laws on holidays for trade workers, improvement of conditions 
for post-telegraph workers, guarantee of rights for land and 
town congresses and unions, a law on inspections, the 
introduction of civil courts in those districts where their 
introduction was halted for financial reasons, the passing of a 
law in which the carrying-out of the above-mentioned 
programme is guaranteed.
This programme is signed by: from the Progressive Group of 
Nationalists - Sir V. Bobrinskii, from the Centre fraction - V. 
L’vov, from Land-Octobrists - 1. Dmitryukov, from the group 
Union of 17 October - S. Shidlovskii, from the Progressive 
fraction - 1. Efremov, from the fraction People's Freedom, P.
Trotsky and Russian Domestic Politics 241
Milyukov, from the group of members of the State Council, V. 
Meller-Zakomel'skii, D. Grimm. (Translated from L. Trotskii, 
Sochineniya, Vol. 9, Moscow, 1927, pp 383-385). For an analysis 
of the events leading to the formation of the Progressive Bloc 
and of its ultimate failure see Pearson, The Russian Moderates, 
pp 39-64.
15. -:, 'Sobytiya idut1...
16. Ibid.
17. For an account of Miiyukov's activities during his visit to Russia's 
allies see Riha, A Russian European, pp 250-254 & Pearson, The 
Russian Moderates, pp 92-93.
18. -:, 'So slavyanskim' aktsentom' i ulybkoi na slavynskikh' 
gubakh", Nashe Slovo, No. 121, 24 May 1916, p 1.
19. Ibid.
20. 'Razochovaniya i bespokoistva’, Nashe Slovo, No. 143, 21 June 
1916, p 1.
21. -:, 'Uroki poslednei dumskoi sessii', Nashe Slovo, No. 161,12 July 
1916, p 1.
22. Ibid. For an account of peasant and Jewish dissatisfaction with 
the politics of the Progressive Bloc at this time see Pearson, The 
Russian Moderates, pp 94-96.
23. N. T., 'Vpechatleniya i obobshcheniya g. Milyukova. 1. Pobeda i 
svoboda', Nashe Slovo, No. 193, 23 August 1916, p 1 & N. T., 
'Vpechatleniya i obobshcheniya g. Milyukova. 2.
Tsimmerval'dtsy i longetisty', Nashe Slovo, No. 194, 24 August 
1916, p 1.
24. N. T., 'Vpechatleniya i obobshcheniya g. Milyukova. 1.
Pobeda i svoboda'. Trotsky is referring to the following 
statement made by Milyukov during a debate in the Duma on 4 
March 1916: 'I cannot be sure that the government will lead us 
to defeat. We are afraid of it and wish to prevent it. But I know 
that a revolution in Russia will, without fail, lead us to defeat, 
and no wonder our enemy so desires it. Were I told that 
organising Russia for victory meant organising it for revolution I 
would say: better leave her, for the duration of the war, as she 
was, unorganised.' (cited in Riha, A Russian European, p 248).
Trotsky and Russian Domestic Politics 242
25. N. T., 'Vpechatleniya i obobshcheniya g. Milyukova. 2. 
Tsimmerval'dtsy i longetisty'
26. Ibid.
27. -:, '"Bor'ba za vlast’". Progressivno-kadetskaya Moskva i 
ministerstvo Shtyumera1, Nashe Slovo, No. 197, 27 August 1916, 
p i.
28. See, for example, L. Trotskii, Voina i Revolyutsiya, Petrograd, 
1922, p 76.
29. 'Va-bank", Nashe Slovo, No. 77, 29 April 1915, p 1.
30. Al’fa., ’Pervyi shag' sdelan", Nashe Slovo, No. 122, 24 June 1915, 
P 2.
31. Ibid.
32. For the details of this crisis and the events leading to Khvostov's 
appointment see, R. Pipes, The Russian Revolution, 1899-1919, 
London, 1990, pp 223-228.
33. 'Khvostov'!', Nashe Slovo, No. 227, 29 October 1915, p 1. For a 
further unflattering account of Khvostov see 'Svoim' 
poryadkom", Nashe Slovo, No. 232, 5 November 1915, p 1. In 
articles of April and May 1916 Trotsky claimed that the 
fantastical nature of Russia's domestic affairs reached new 
heights under Khvostov, to the extent that only a combination of 
Shchedrin, Poe and Poprishchin could adequately describe 
Khvostov's rule. See, 'Otechestvennoe...', Nashe Slovo, No. 89,
14 April 1916, p 1 & Al'fa, 'Fantastika. Pervomaiskiy 
razmyshleniya', Nashe Slovo, No. 102,1 May 1916, pp 2-3.
34. 'Ravnenie po Makarovu', Nashe Slovo, No. 172, 27 July 1916, p 
1.
35. -:, 'Dve telegrammy1, Nashe Slovo, No. 173, 28 July 1916, p 1.
36. En', 'Rodnyya teni', Nachalo, No. 1, 30 September 1916, p 1.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. -:, 'Iz'yan' v' tverdom' kurse', Nachalo, No. 11,12 October 1916, p 
1.
40. -:, 'Voennayi krizis' i politicheskiya perspektivy. III. Sotsial'nya 
sily rossiiskoi revolyutsii', Nashe Slovo, No. 181, 3 September 
1915, p 1.
Trotsky and Russian Domestic Politics 243
41. -:, 'Voennayi krizis' i politicheskiya perspectivy. IV. Natsional'nyi 
ili internatsional'nyi kurs'?\ Nashe Slovo, No. 182, 4 September 
1915,p 1.
42. For an excellent account of the events leading to the formation of 
the War-lndustries Committees see, Robert B. McKean, St. 
Petersburg Between the Revolutions, New Haven, 1990, pp 430ff. 
For an exposition of the events surrounding the elections among 
the workers to the War-lndustries Committees see Ibid., pp 380 
ff.
43. 'Petrogradskii proletariat", Nashe Slovo, No. 229,31 October
1915, p 1.
44. 'Nuzhno sdelat' vse vyvody', Nashe Siovo, No. 237,11 
November 1915, p 1.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. 'Politicheskie shtreikbrekhery. Novye "vybory" v' 
voenno-promyshlennyi komitet", Nashe Slovo, No. 277, 29 
December 1915, p 1. Trotsky may not have received a full and 
accurate version of what happened at the meeting of electors.
His account is similar, but differs in important respects to that 
given by Robert B. McKean. He informs us that at the First 
meeting of electors, held on 27 September 1915, the Bolsheviks 
’smuggled in two of their leaders, Bogdatian-Bogdat'ev and 
Zalezhskii, using the mandates of two Putilov delegates without 
their permission.' (McKean, St. Petersburg..., p 383). When 
Gvozdev discovered the Bolshevik's foul play he petitioned the 
Central War-lndustries Committee to arrange a second electoral 
meeting, which took place on 29 November. However, the 
Bolsheviks decided to attend the meeting only to denounce it 
and then walk out. This they duly did and the 109 left behind 
'proceeded to elect ten representatives to the TsVKP (all were 
Mensheviks) and six to the Petrograd War-lndustries Committee 
(three Mensheviks and three SRs).' (McKean, Ibid., p 384).
48. N. T., 'Sbornik' "Samozashchita"', Nashe Slovo, No. 13,16 January
1916, p 2.
49. N. Trotskii,’ "Samozashchita". I. "bude nuzhno"', Nashe Slovo, No.
Trotsky and Russian Domestic Politics 244
58, 9 March, 1916, pp 1-2.
50. Samozashchita. Marksistskii sbornik', Petrograd, 1916, p 57.
51. Samozashchita..., 'Predislovie'. Cited in Trotskii, ’"Samozashchita”. 
I...’, p i .
52. Trotskii, ’"Samozashchita". I...’, p 1.
53. V. I. Zasulich', 'O voine', Samozashchita..., pp 1-4.
54. Trotskii, Op. cit.
55. Zasulich, 'O voine', p 1.
56. A. N. Potresov', '0 patriotizm' i o mezhduranodnosti', 
Samozashchita..., p 21. Cited in Trotskii, '"Samozashchita". I...', p 2.
57. Potresov, '0 patriotizm' i o mezhduranodnosti', pp 6-7.
58. Ibid, pp 11-13.
59. I. Kubikov', 'Rabochii klass' i natsional’noe chuvstvo', 
Samozashchita..., pp 22-28.
60. P. Maslov', 'Ekonomicheskoe znachenie voiny dlya Rossii', 
Samozashchita..., p 32.
61. Ibid, p 34.
62. Trotskii, '"Samozashchita". I...’, p 2.
63. Maslov', 'Ekonomicheskoe znachenie..', p 35.
64. K. Dmitriev', 'Narodnoe khozyaistvo v' nachale vtorogo goda 
voiny', Samozashchita..., pp 42-56.
65. Ibid., p 52.
66. Ibid., p 43.
67. Ibid., p 56. Cited in Trotskii, '"Samozashchita". I...', p 2.
68. Trotskii, ’"Samozashchita". I...', p 2. For the original text see An', 
'Marksizm' i radikalizm", Samozashchita..., p 77.
69. Ibid.
70. An', 'Marksizm i radikalizm", p 74.
71. Ibid., p 77.
72. Ibid.
73. V. Vol'skii, 'Zametki po povodu voiny', Samozashchita..., p 83.
74. Trotskii, '"Samozashchita". I...’, p 2. First cited in Vol'skii, 'Zametki 
po povodu...', p 88.
75. Ibid.
76. Vol'skii, 'Zametki po povodu...', p 89.
77. E. Maevskii, 'Tsenzovaya Rossiya i demokratiya', Samozashchita...,
Trotsky and Russian Domestic Politics 245
p 107.
78. T rotskii, Op. cit.
79. Ibid. For the original text see Maevskii, 'Tsenzovaya Rossiya...', p 
107.
80. Ibid. For the original text see, V. Levitskii, 'Organizatsiya 
obshchestvennykh' sil’ i zashchita strany’, Samozashchita..., p 
120.
81. A. P. Bibik', 'V' plashche Gamleta', Samozashchita..., p 121.
82. Trotskii, Op. cit.
83. Bibik', 'V' plashche Gamleta1, p 126.
84. Trotskii, Op. cit.
85. Ibid.
86. V. L'vov-Rogachevskii, 'Kak' bylo togda', Samozashchita..., pp 
128-141.
87. Ibid., p 140.
88. Trotskii, '"Samozashchita". I...', p 2. For the original text see 
L'vov-Rogachevskii, 'Kak' bylo togda', p 141.
89. Ibid.
90. Loc. cit.
91. Loc. cit.
92. N. Trotskii, "’Samozashchita". II. Na vyuchku k' patriotizmu?', 
Nashe Slovo, No. 69, 22 March 1916, p 1.
93. Ibid.
94. See fn 58.
95. Trotskii, Op. cit.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
99. 'Nasha dumskaya fraktsiya I', Nashe Slovo, No. 77, 31 March 
1916, p 1.
100. Trotsky did not give an accurate account of Prizyv's view of 
Chkheidze. Thus in his analysis N. N-ev' quoted Chkheidze as 
saying that he would support the Progressive Bloc when it 
opposed the government and expose it when it concluded 
agreements with the government. N. N-ev' urged Chkheidze to 
abandon this position and throw his total support behind the
Trotsky and Russian Domestic Politics 246
Progressive Bloc. After all, N. N-ev1 pointed out, the Progressive 
Bloc had declared that it would have no further dealings with 
the old regime. (N. N-ev’,'K poslednei cherty1, Prizyv, No. 26, 25 
March 1916, pp 1-2.) In the next issue of Prizyv A. Lyubimov' 
criticised Chkheidze’s position thus: 'It is clear that Chkheidze 
does not deny national tasks, that he does not believe in 
permanent or in social revolution for Russia and yet he does not 
recognise defence as one of the national tasks, and it is in this 
that the root of all his confusion and all his contradictions lie.' (A. 
Lyubimov', 'Burzhuaznaya oppozitsiya i tsimmervald'skie 
putaniki', Prizyv, No. 27, 1 April 1916, p 2.)
101. -:,Op. cit.
102. 'Nasha dumskaya fraktsiya II', Nashe Slovo, No. 78,1 April 
1916, p 1.
103. -:, 'Nasha dumskaya fraktsiya. I. Revolyutsionnaya i 
passivno-vyzhidatel'naya politika', Nashe Slovo, No. 94, 20 April 
1916, p 1.
104. 'Poezdka deputata Chkheidze', Nashe Slovo, No. 203, 3 
September 1916, p 2. See also, -:, 'K' poezdke deputata 
Chkheidze', Nachalo, No. 29, 3 November 1916, p 1.
CHAPTER EIGHT
Trotsky and European Social-Democracy
8.1 Trotsky and German Social-Democracy
In his writings on German Social-Democracy Trotsky discerned the 
same split between social-imperialists, passive centrists and 
revolutionary internationalists which characterised the Russian 
workers' movement. The German Social-Democratic Party’s vote for 
the war credits crushed many socialists' hopes that unity among the 
parties of the Second International would put a rapid halt to imperialist 
hostilities. Trotsky thought that the Second International lay in ruins, 
and he looked for signs of international solidarity, i.e., a Marxist analysis 
of the then current events shared by socialists of all nationalities. If such 
unity was extant this would provide not only a basis for the rebirth of the 
International on new and firmer foundations, but also hope and 
inspiration for revolutionary activists of the Trotsky mould. It is not 
surprising, therefore, to find Trotsky again and again emphasising the 
activities and growing influence of the revolutionary left in Germany.
The title of one of Trotsky's first articles on German Social- 
Democracy, 'There are still Social-Democrats in the World1, was taken 
from a lead article in the February 1915 issue of Lichtstrahlen. The fact 
that Trotsky borrowed from the radical German publication in this way 
is not accidental; it was the overriding concern of those wishing to 
overcome the recent socialist 'disgrace'. The bulk of this article was 
composed of extracts from a Lichtstrahlen editorial, in which German 
comrades praised the Russian socialists for their stance on the London 
Conference: that socialists should not group themselves according to 
the divisions among the warring nations but, on the contrary, should 
reveal the true imperialist nature of the then World War. After citing 
Lichtstrahlen's pleasure that there were still some socialists who knew 
their true duty, Trotsky returned the compliment:
Never before...have the activities of socialists in one country 
depended to such a degree upon socialist politics in other 
countries as now. The growth of feelings of international solidarity
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and the struggle for peace can develop only parallely in all 
countries sucked into this bloody whirlpool...the Russian 
revolutionary Social-Democrats give the support of their policy 
not to German imperialism....but to its deadly enemy, in the form 
of the internationalist wing of German Social-Democracy. In turn, 
the struggle of the latter is for us a vital support in our struggle 
against ’Entente' reaction.1
A review of the first issue of Rosa Luxemburg's and Franz Mehring's 
journal Internationale provided an opportunity for a further 
commentary upon the battle between social-nationalism and 
internationalism in the German workers' movement. Trotsky reported 
Luxemburg's critique of Kautsky's passive waiting for an end to the war, 
as well as her response to the idea that the International engages in 
class struggle during peace and defends the nation when it is at war, 
i.e., class struggle is the proletariat's response to economic and political 
oppression by the bourgeoisie and that this oppression increases 
during wars. After all, reasoned Luxemburg, how else was one to 
interpret the war dictatorship? Was not the socialist duty to oppose 
oppression? Furthermore, it was a mistake to think that one could 
easily switch from the tactics of class struggle to class reconciliation 
without harming the movement: 'either the International remains a 
heap of ruins also after the war or its restoration begins on the soil of 
class struggle,' and the first step in the direction of the latter, for Trotsky 
and for Luxemburg, was ’a struggle for a quick end to the war1; i.e., 
international socialist agitation during the war. In the course of 1915 the 
annexation question became central in German politics. German war 
successes increasingly placed the possibility of a 'German peace' on 
the order of the day. However, the German Social-Democratic 
fraction's support of the war effort was based upon the notion that 
Germany was conducting a defensive war, and it restated its anti­
annexationist stance in the Reichstag. For Trotsky this was not enough 
and he approvingly reported Rosa Luxemburg's critique that one had 
to abandon social-imperialism altogether. From Kfera Zetkin's 
contribution Trotsky reproduced the author's call for a struggle for 
peace with, in spite of or even against the German party's leadership. 
Finally, he recounted Franz Mehring's view that the pro-war stance
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adopted by the German SPD leadership, despite their attempts to 
under pin this policy with quotes from Marx and Engels, was the logical 
consequence of their abandonment of the tenets of scientific socialism 
in the pre-war era. The review ended by underlining the central 
message: 'Against this self-deception, against this sad, cowardly and 
fraudulent method of scientific socialism for aims which are its deadly 
enemies Franz Mehring calls for a merciless struggle under the banner 
of Marxism. One has to clearly show that we and they are of a different 
spirit !'2
In the pre-war years and beyond Karl Kautsky was one of the 
leading theoreticians in the German Social-Democratic movement. 
Although not a member of the Reichstag, he had been invited to the 
meeting of deputies of August 13 1914 at which tactics for the following 
day's vote on the war credits were discussed.3 Golos' readers had a 
chance to acquaint themselves with Kautsky's views on the war from 
the publication of his article 'Prospects of Peace', which appeared over 
two issues of the Paris newspaper in early October 1914. Here Kautsky 
asked what would constitute a good and lasting peace? He based his 
answer, independence of nation states and an increase of democracy, 
upon a particular view of the relationship between production, politics 
and the nation. From one direction, 'the more citizens are connected by 
one language, the more intensive economic, political and spiritual life 
develops1; from another, the 'participation of the lower classes in 
spiritual and political life grows as a result of contemporary production.' 
According to Kautsky, these processes led to the strengthening of each 
nationality and this was why they could develop peacefully only within 
the boundaries of a distinct nation state:
In the nation state both these tendencies unite and strengthen 
each other. In a state of nationalities they oppose each other 
hostilely, inter-ethnic conflict inside the state grows and this 
reacts unfavourably upon economic and political 
processes...Hence it would be harmful if in the present war nation 
states used victory to attach other states to themselves and in 
this way turn themselves into a state of nationalities.4 
He looked forward to Poland, the Baltic region and Finland gaining 
their independence from Russia's defeat as examples of developments
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that would correspond to the requirements of democracy and progress. 
The German Social-Democrat was also optimistic about the post-war 
world order. He envisioned a scenario in which the causes of the First 
World War would be removed. For Kautsky, the war had issued from an 
arms race which had transformed Europe into two hostile camps. 
Disarmament at the conclusion of the war could result from a staged 
process: first, the defeated countries would be disarmed by the victors, 
then the former would benefit economically from disarmament, in turn 
the latter would lose the desire to rearm as they were faced with the 
evidence of economic advantages to be derived from disarmament, 
coupled with an absence of military threat from the economically 
successful disarmed states. In this way Social-Democracy in the victor 
countries would be given a ’solid basis for a successful struggle for 
disarmament'. Kautsky foresaw opposition to disarmament coming 
from the war-industrial bourgeoisie only but he predicted that even 
they, swamped with orders for the reconstruction of a ravaged 
infrastructure, would not be so concerned. However, Kautsky was clear 
that Social-Democracy would have to wait for the war to end before it 
could discover how it could best act to secure a desirable peace. He 
was, though, still optimistic: 'Under the pressure of war we can achieve 
that which previously seemed unattainable...even the mightiest states 
have to consider public opinion. In peace discussions the ruling classes 
often disagree over the terms. This opens a space for the consideration 
of public opinion in places where previously this was thought 
impossible.'5
It was not until June 1915 that Trotsky commented upon Kautsky's 
war-time position. He wrote a lengthy review, issued over three 
numbers of Nashe Slovo, of the German socialist's thoughts, written at 
the request of Bulgarian Social-Democrats and published in the 
Bulgarian Novoe Vremya, upon Plekhanov's brochure On the War. At 
the outset Trotsky adopted a somewhat favourable tone, noting that 
Kautsky had given a healthy corrective to Plekhanov's statement that 
the German Social-Democrats had believed in the notion of proletarian 
action to prevent a war in the pre-war era. On the contrary, The 
German Marxists, and above all Bebel, at all national and international 
congresses where this issue was raised most decisively rejected the
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idea of a general strike in response to a government's call for 
mobilisation as utopian.'6 But the Russian and the German Marxists 
soon parted company. Trotsky stated that Kautsky's defence of 
Haase's reading of the declaration of 4 August in favour of war credits 
as that of the fraction and not of Haase himself had been demolished 
by Haase's recent refusal to read the latest patriotic declaration of the 
Social-Democratic Reichstag fraction. In the light of this Trotsky 
claimed that Haase's earlier behaviour was explicable only by 'a 
shortage of bravery or a shortage of acumen. Kautsky's defence is little 
able do help Haase, it only reveals through a particular issue the total 
formlesness and internal contradictions of that position which Kautsky 
himself occupies.'7 The first instalment concluded with a critique of 
Kautsky's contention that Vorwarts changed from an anti-war to a pro­
war stance because of the demands placed upon it by the censorship. 
While he did not offer his own explanation for Vorwarts's about turn, 
Trotsky said that one could not blame the censor: 'If the military 
situation can hinder the press from telling the workers the whole truth 
then, as we know from our own personal experience, it is not able to 
force lies. When the military situation demands such a 'sacrifice', a 
socialist newspaper should have the bravery to sacrifice itself.'8 Since 
the fatal days of August 1914, however, Trotsky reported that both 
Haase and Vorwarts had moved to the left. Against this background, 
Kautsky's defence of outdated 1914 behaviour could only belittle this 
shift and confuse the international proletariat.
The second part of the trilogy of articles on 'Kautsky on Plekhanov' 
focused upon the German socialist’s analysis of the war. From 
Trotsky's report the reader learned that Kautsky rejected the belief that 
social-patriots of all nationalities shared, namely that the victory of their 
homeland was in the best interests of international socialism. For 
Kautsky, all of the warring countries had equivalent economic and 
moral forces; a situation which entailed two particular consequences: 
first, one had no reason to suppose that the victory of any one country 
taken separately would be most advantageous and, second, the 
proletariat was deprived of any criteria for singling out its national 
government for defeat. Indeed, it was the strength of feeling for the 
homeland among the proletariat that had forced Social-Democratic
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parties across Europe to support their governments' war programmes. 
However, since the correlation of forces was such that no nation could 
expect to emerge victorious, Kautsky declared that a speedy peace 
should be concluded on social-democratic principles, i.e., on the basis 
of agreement and not force. Kautsky expressed the hope that 
Plekhanov would join him in his call for peace.
Trotsky began his final instalment with the claim that Kautsky's 
theoretical position was not as sad as Plekhanov's but the latter's 
political position was clearer. He then belittled Kautsky for his lack of 
critical acumen. For example, Trotsky contended that one could not 
explain the behaviour of the Social-Democratic parties at the outset of 
the war with reference to the sudden nationalist mood of the masses; 
rather one had to examine the policy of possibilism within national 
boundaries 'which characterised the whole class movement of the 
proletariat in the preceding epoch.' He admitted that, of course, one 
had to consider the mood of the masses but nevertheless insisted that 
Social-Democrats should not capitulate before the workers: 'if it does 
not have sufficient strength to prevent mutual destruction, this does not 
mean that it has the right to sanction it.' The urgency of this last point 
was becoming more and more apparent for Trotsky since, as even 
Kautsky himself had recognised, the proletariat was increasingly aware 
of the fact that the war was hopeless from a military point of view. As 
each worker realised this Trotsky predicted that he would turn his 
anger on those responsible for the war. He argued that, in turn, Social- 
Democracy would be able to use this anger only to the extent that it had 
an independent revolutionary policy. This led to what, for Trotsky, was 
surely Kautsky's greatest crime: the German socialist acknowledged 
that the ruling classes were becoming more and more isolated but he 
refused to advocate proletarian action until after the war was over. For 
the impatient Trotsky this was not good enough:
The preservation of civil peace or a decisive break with the raving 
bourgeois 'nation'?...Here is the question which as before 
Kautsky does not answer in his article on Plekhanov...we want to 
struggle during the war so as not to appear bankrupt after the 
war...in a situation unique for its drama, when the whole future of
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socialism is at stake, Kautsky does not give one piece of advice or 
one statement which we could meet with pleasure.9 
By the end of 1914 Liebknecht decided to break party unity in the 
Reichstag and vote against the second war credits bill of 3 December. 
He subsequently explained his action by a desire to provide a rallying- 
point for anti-war forces in Germany. In May 1915 the ’Left Opposition' 
issued its own manifesto, under the title The chief enemy is in one's 
own country', a copy of which was reprinted in Nashe Slovo. This 
document commented upon Italy's recent entry into the war, decrying 
the attempts of the German regime to depict Italy as a betrayer. Had 
not the German government received ample evidence of Italy's 
displeasure of Austria's ultimatum to Serbia? Was it not Austria's 
ultimatum which had brought antagonism between Austro-Germany 
and Italy over supremacy in the Balkans to a head? The manifesto 
claimed that in the war-hysteria manoeuvres of the Italian imperialists, 
the German and Austrian regimes were merely observing the mirror 
image of their own recent behaviour. For the German Left Opposition, it 
was the imperialists of each country who had responsibility for the then 
bloody war and it was against these people that the international 
proletariat should struggle. Italian socialists who were campaigning 
against their country's involvement in the war were applauded for their 
bravery and for setting the appropriate example:
An international class struggle of the proletariat against 
international imperialist destruction - such now is the socialist 
precept at this crucial hour. The chief enemy of each people is in 
their own country...Unite for international class struggle against 
the deals of secret diplomacy, against imperialism, against the 
war, for peace in a socialist spirit! The chief enemy is in one's own 
country!10
In the middle of 'The chief enemy is in one's own country' the 
following claim was made of German war aims:
In March of this year the path to peace could have been laid. 
Britain extended its hand - but a desire for gain forced the 
German imperialists to turn it down. Hopes of attempts to 
conclude peace were totally dashed by German imperialists 
interested in making colonial acquisitions on a large scale, in
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annexing Belgium and French Lorraine, by the capitalists of large 
sea-fairing companies and by the businessmen of German heavy 
industry.11
In the context of German politics of the First World War this statement 
had the makings of a political scandal. After all, on August 4 1914 
Haase, speaking on behalf of the Social-Democratic deputies in the 
Reichstag, declared: ’We need to secure the culture and the 
independence of our country...As soon as the purpose of security is 
fulfilled and the enemy inclined to peace, the war shall be brought to an 
end by a peace which will make possible the amity of neighbouring 
peoples...Guided by these principles we agree to the proposed loan.’12 
If the German radicals were correct in their accusations, then at 
minimum the party leadership would have to abandon any pretence of 
Germany's ’defensive' war; an admission that could prove decisive in 
the current battle for control of the party. In the article 'The German 
Opposition and the German Diplomacy’ Trotsky reported on the 
political fallout of this aspect of the German radicals' case. The official 
newspaper Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung denied that the German 
government had rejected peace negotiations out of a desire to make 
new conquests, claiming to the contrary that there was no wish for 
peace in Paris or in London. A letter had then been published in Berner 
Tagwacht of 17 June in which its author outlined no less than three 
separate sets of secret peace negotiations, each of which had 
foundered because of the German government's insistence that it 
make territorial gains. Trotsky cited an article from Norddeutsche 
Allgemeine Zeitung of 24 April which claimed that it would be folly for 
Germany to abandon its advantageous military position in order to 
conclude an inappropriate peace, and he also highlighted Bethmann- 
Hollweg’s assertion of May 1915 that Germany’s Eastern borders 
should be extended and that Belgium should join a German customs 
union. It was Trotsky's hope that if the governments of the warring 
nations could be shown to have aggressive war aims, if 'defencist' 
propaganda which formed the basis of 'civil peace' between socialist 
parties and their national governments could be proved false, then 
internationalist opposition to the war in socialist parties and among the 
proletariat would grow. Hence his statement that,
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Such are the revelations (razoblacheniya) which issue from the 
circles of the German S-D opposition which conducts an 
irreconcilable struggle with its government. We do not have 
sufficient information to decide whether the claims made here 
about secret diplomatic steps are in fact true. But as material for 
an orientation, the information they convey is very instructive.13 
Hot on the heels of the declaration of the left, the 'centre' of German 
Social-Democracy issued its own response to the ’annexationist1 
question in a document entitled The Demand of the Hour1. Signed by 
Bernstein, Haase and Kautsky the manifesto made clear the centre's 
dissatisfaction with the recent annexationist demands of Bethmann- 
Hollweg. It stated its continuing support for the statement of 4 August 
1914, namely that the war should secure Germany’s safety and then 
be put to an end. The three leading figures of German Social- 
Democracy called upon the SPD to conduct a campaign for a peace of 
understanding, although they avoided any mention of a need to 
engage in class struggle. For Trotsky, the politics of the centre, while 
further to the left than that of the right 'social-imperialists', acted as a 
bulwark to the latter. This was because the centre rejected class 
struggle and, in his eyes, this was the defining feature of Marxist 
strategy, in this sense the centre in Germany was playing the same role 
as that played by the 'passive internationalists' in Russian politics. He 
made these points on the pages of Nashe Slovo through a report of 
Lichtstrahlen's, the one remaining left journal in Germany, comments 
upon 'The Demands of the Hour’. For Lichtstrahlen, by preaching 
patience in the face of the 'excesses' of both right and left, the centre 
was holding back a process of ideological clarification which the left 
thought was taking place among the masses the more imperialist 
appetites were being revealed. It was for reasons of this sort that the 
Lichtstrahlen argued that one could not struggle against the right 
without at the same time engaging in a battle against the centre: 'this is 
a struggle for the application of Marxist principles to the current 
historical epoch, a struggle for the unification of all of the party's left 
elements, a section of which, under the influence of Kautsky's 
authority, swings between the left and the right, in words speaking 
against the right but in practice supporting it.'14 At the same time
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Trotsky acknowledged that the centre's critique was worrying for the 
right, especially as it was signed by such well-known figures. Indeed, 
the government was so disturbed that it suspended the Leipziger 
Volkszeitung for publishing The Demand of the Hour'. Credit for the 
centre's shift leftwards was given to the German radicals who had 
'helped Kautsky leave the state of tranquil quietism which he had 
occupied since the start of the war.’15 However, according to Trotsky, 
the consequences of the centre's stances were more destructive than 
constructive. He drew the appropriate conclusion:
the struggle of the left with the centre in Germany is still far from 
saying its final word. The working masses will more and more 
break out of the tutelage of the idealess centre, carrying with 
them many and many leaders, the more decisive and principled 
the left conducts its critical and agitational work.15 
A dispute between Nashe Slovo and a member of the Central 
Committee of the Bund, Vladimir Kosovskii (1868-1941), formed the 
background to Trotsky's next commentary on the German Social- 
Democracy. The origins of this conflict lay in the publication of two of 
Kosovskii's articles in May 1915, one in Zukunft (not available for 
check) and the other in the Bund's Informatsionnyi Listok'. In the latter 
piece, which aroused the most indignation in the Nashe Slovo camp, 
Kosovskii examined the issue of how to reestablish the Second 
International. Unlike Trotsky, Kosovskii did not think that the Second 
International had been dealt a mortal blow by the behaviour of the 
national socialist parties upon the outbreak of the war. According to 
Kosovskii the socialist parties had committed errors in August 1914, but 
he insisted that these were perfectly understandable in the context of 
the unprecedented difficulties which these parties faced. Moreover, he 
claimed that 'the further course of the workers' movement' would turn 
the socialist parties of the Second International back on to the right 
path. In this way, 'the International...[will]...be reestablished from those 
elements from which it has always been composed.'17 He highlighted 
the continuous shift leftwards among the German Social-Democrats as 
an example of a process of self-criticism correcting a party's 
programme. He also said that this process was not taking place 
simultaneously in all parties, and drew a distinction between the French
Trotsky and European Social-Democracy 257
and the German parties: the latter was quite clearly abandoning the 
'German' myth of the war as a war of liberation from Russian 
aggression, a myth that was quite hard to swallow in Germany given 
the ruling Junker class's recent history of affording material support to 
tsarism; in contrast, French socialists remained bound within the long 
established (and mistaken) view of the French Republic liberating 
Europe from tyranny and were fervently supporting the French war 
effort. Indeed, pro-war hysteria had even grown in France since August 
1914: French socialists were using growing anti-war sentiments in 
Germany as evidence of the disintegration of Germany from within to 
spur French soldiers on. Kosovskii urged French socialists to follow 
the example of their German comrades. In his view one had to 
overcome the gulf of distrust which had opened-up between socialists 
after the outbreak of hostilities not by organising events like the London 
Conference, but by uniting socialists of all countries in opposition to the 
war: 'Our task is to aspire to a quick ending of the war and the 
conclusion of a peace without annexations. All socialist parties could 
unite around this peace formula.’18 The final myth dissected by 
Kosovskii was that of the Russian Social-Democrats themselves who 
thought that they could ’save the "rotten" ("social-chauvinist1') West.' He 
argued that the slogan advanced by Russian 'real' socialists, i.e., 'on 
the one hand new splits and on the other new unifications', was simply 
the application of the old Russian policy of splits on an all-European 
scale. He thought the notion that a new International could be formed 
from 'Social-Democratic internationalists' was a nonsense because 
there was no adequate definition of what constituted a ’Social- 
Democratic internationalist'. Indeed, for Kosovskii, this deficiency was 
not accidental because it lay at the heart of the policy of splits:
Splitting along all directions, once and for all turning their backs 
on all those who do not wish to turn the International into a 
sectionalist clique, they cannot but end-up with a unification 
formula which is not worth twopence...Such is the way that the 
homeland splitters think of the 'Third' International. If this method 
achieves anything at all, then it will be only a sad clique, sect, a 
caricature of the International, devoid of all influence and 
significance.19
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In an unsigned editorial of 22 May 1915 Nashe Slovo responded to 
this direct attack upon its campaign to unite socialist internationalists in 
a new, Third International. It began by denying that the whole of 
German Social-Democracy had abandoned the August 4 policy. Was 
not Mehring and his supporters calling the party leaders and press the 
'corrupters'? By painting an over-optimistic picture of the extent of the 
anti-war mood gripping German Social-Democracy Nashe Slovo 
claimed that Kosovskii was ’drawing a veil over the disgraceful 
behaviour of the German Social-Democrats.1 It then disputed 
Kosovskii’s characterisation of the Russian socialists, pointing out that 
Nashe Slovo was not for splits. Instead, the Paris publication called for 
the winning of the old organisations from within by those who held an 
internationalist position: 'Kosovskii rejects the notion that we look for a 
criteria to restore the International in ideology (internationalism). 
Kosovskii has a type of organisational fetishism (unity at all costs) 
which is the obverse side of organisational nihilism (split at all costs). 
Organisational fetishism is not our path and without the application of a 
criteria of internationalism the International will not be restored.'20
Kosovskii was able to defend his position from the pages of Nashe 
Slovo, which published his letter to the editorial board on 14 July 1915. 
Here Kosovskii reiterated his belief that German Social-Democracy 
was being self-critical in a way that the French variant was not. In his 
turn he accused Nashe Slovo of overstating its case: it was wrong, for 
example, when in issue 47 it claimed that German Social-Democrats 
were calling the war a war of liberation for the Poles from the tsar while 
defending Junkers who burned Polish villages. According to Kosovskii, 
Nashe S/ovo's scaremongering about the Second International 
contained a potentially disastrous consequence, namely the end of any 
hopes for socialism: 'If we say without foundation that the main parties 
of the International are in disarray and that social-imperialism and 
social-chauvinism reign everywhere, then we are also saying that the 
masses have also been taken over by decay and that our cause is 
hopeless, for the official parties express the mood of the masses. We 
discredit internationalism and put off people who would otherwise 
come over to our side.' The member of the Bund's Central Committee 
also denied that he had ignored the ideological issue. On the contrary,
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his point was that the 'old socialist parties...cannot abandon Marxism. 
This is guaranteed by the further class struggles of the proletariat 
which stand behind them. What will unite these parties and what acts as 
a security for the preservation of socialist unity is precisely a general 
Marxist ideology.'21 This brought Kosovskii to the nub of his 
disagreement with Nashe Slovo: he thought that one could restore the 
International on its old foundations while the Paris publication did not.
It was at this point that Trotsky resolved that the time had come for 
him to add his polemical skills to the debate. In 'Without measure' he 
ridiculed Kosovskii's non-understanding of what constituted an 
internationalist policy: 'if voting for war credits...and renouncing class 
struggle, desolving one’s policy into the policy of the leading Junker 
national bloc, if all of this, in Kosovskii's view, is not rendering a political 
service to imperialism, then in general we speak in different 
languages.' He agreed with Kosovskii that a process of self-criticism 
was occurring within the German Social-Democratic Party, but he 
accused Kosovskii of having no analysis of the dynamics of this 
process. For Trotsky, Kosovskii had missed out the central issue of 
from where the self-criticism was coming. His answer was out of the 
internationalist left-wing struggling against the centre and the party 
hierarchy. Hence the vital issue was: 'On whose side to you stand?’ In 
response to Kosovskii's claim that Nashe Slovo's case against him was 
harmful to the cause of socialism, Trotsky countered that only an 
internationalist policy, abandoning the reactionary features of the 
ideology of the Second International, coming from the entrails of the 
old parties could guarantee a future for socialism. If the main point at 
issue was who could best restore the International, Trotsky was quite 
clear where his sympathies lay:
we foresee...that the structures of the national blocs will fatally 
come crashing down on the heads of those who first constructed 
them. The task is to arm the working masses by this time with a 
clear consciousness of its revolutionary aims. This is our task, the 
left wing in the International. If we seek unification then it is not to 
form 'sects'...but in order immediately to give an international 
scale to our struggle with nationalism in all areas of the 'old' 
parties and proletarian organisations 22
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Trotsky often liked to make his points through biographical sketches. 
In 'Haase-Ebert-David' he charted the state of German Social- 
Democracy by following the handing-on of the task of reading the 
German Social-Democratic fraction’s declaration in favour of war 
credits during successive sessions of the Reichstag. For Trotsky, the 
fact that men of less and less stature had stepped forward to fulfil this 
demeaning task was evidence of a certain 'equilibrium...established 
between people and ideas.' Moreover, David's leadership of the 
Reichstag fraction would have two beneficial consequences. First, the 
'small skinny fellow with the manners of a provincial diplomat' clearly 
illustrated the depths to which German Social-Democracy had sunk. 
Second, and more importantly, revolutionary internationalism could not 
be compromised by David's headship since the latter was a known 
reformist. Indeed, according to Trotsky, 'the political triumph of David is 
our ideological triumph, for the symbolic sequence of the leaders of 
German Social-Democracy on to the Reichstag gives a personalised, 
physical expression to the idea that the principles of an independent 
class policy of the proletariat is incompatible with the principles of 
social-nationalism.' He bemoaned the then current left's inactivity, but 
predicted that Liebknecht's lone voice of opposition would one day 
'have the last laugh.'23
One of Trotsky's reports from the Zimmerwald Conference focussed 
upon the actions of the German delegation. This article highlighted the 
important results to be gained from a consistent application of 
Internationalist principles. He stated that the German delegation at 
Zimmerwald was composed of abstainers in the war credit votes, i.e., 
those people who left Liebknecht on his own. Ledebour's justification 
for abstaining, the preservation of party unity, was recounted, but 
Trotsky labelled abstaining as a 'passive reconciliation with "civil 
peace"...[which] demoralises the proletariat.'24 After reiterating the 
tactics which should be followed in Germany as elsewhere, the take 
over of the SPD by the left through a campaign from within, Trotsky 
reported that the abstainers conceded some ground during the 
conference debates on the German Social-Democracy: Ledebour had 
abandoned his insistence that the SPD should not be censured for its 
votes on the war credits. Trotsky claimed a victory that was all but
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complete; while the German delegation would not accept a formal 
obligation to oppose the government in future budget votes in the 
Reichstag it did see that it was morally correct to do so.
A series of articles penned by Bukvoed1 under the heading 'Mehring 
on wars', published over four issues of Nashe Slovo, prompted Trotsky 
to write a rejoinder on the state of affairs among the left of German 
Social-Democracy. The last three of BukvoedMs contributions 
examined Mehring's analysis of wars dating back to the eighteenth- 
century. Trotsky had no major disagreements with the main 
conclusions reached through this exposition: war is an intrinsic element 
of class societies employed to settle issues which cannot be resolved 
peacefully and that war is a double-edged weapon upon which social- 
democrats cannot build their tactics.25 However, in the first instalment 
Bukvoed' set the scene for his subsequent pieces by outlining various 
responses which socialists had taken to the war, including the 
distinction between an offensive/defensive war and calling for the 
defeat of one's own government as the 'lesser evil1. He pointed out that 
at the outbreak of the war even Liebknecht had fallen in behind the 
fraction in the Reichstag, and he furthermore claimed that the left 
opposition which had eventually crystalised against the policy of 4 
August was disintegrating:
The opposition, which grows with every day, in German Social- 
Democracy is composed from the most multifaceted elements. It 
is wonderful to think that its extreme left-wing forms a group 
which attempted to publish its own organ in Germany, the 
Internationale, now already dead...[but] even among the 
contributors to this journal there are sufficiently well-formed 
differences. These appear with special clarity as soon as different 
elements of this opposition come into direct contact with 
representatives of the so-called extreme left in Russian Social- 
Democracy, i.e., with the Leninist group, which plays a unique, if 
involuntary, role of... litmus paper.26 
It was this last claim that Trotsky found objectionable. Writing in Nashe 
Slovo on the day following the conclusion of Bukvoed"s series of 
articles he declared that, notwithstanding philosophical-historical and 
tactical disputes which are 'possible and even inevitable', the German
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left opposition was united around a programme of ’political action', one 
example of which was the document The main enemy is in one’s own 
country'. He regretted that Liebknecht had not immediately adopted a 
revolutionary-socialist stance on the war in August 1914, but stated 
that fifteen months later Liebknecht’s name was 'synonymous with 
socialist bravery'. After distinguishing the revolutionary left (those who 
'conduct now in Germany a brave struggle against "civil peace", disrobe 
the hypocritical ideology of "national defence", break down the barriers 
of legality and call the masses against the war and the ruling classes') 
from the passive-pacifists (Kautsky, Bernstein, Haase) Trotsky issued 
the following battle cry: 'Hand in hand with those [left] elements we 
have begun and will conduct further work towards the creation of a 
Third International!'27
In December 1915 the Social-Democratic deputy Scheidemann met 
the German chancellor to discuss Germany's war aims. This meeting 
resulted in Bethmann-Hollweg's most annexationist statement to date, 
backed by Scheidemann. The left-centre in German Social-Democracy 
was appalled. It was willing to follow party policy on the war effort, but 
only as long as it was fought to secure Germany's territorial integrity. 
Faced with openly annexationist pronouncements from the leaders of 
the government and of the SPD twenty left-centre deputies felt justified 
in breaking party unity on the war credits. On 22 December 1915 they 
voted against the credits rather than abstaining as they had done in 
March and August. Rosa Luxemburg was not ecstatic by the left- 
centre's shift leftwards. For her, its opposition was grounded in a notion 
of the war as a war of defence, it was just that now Germany's borders 
were secure it should make the first move to end the war, whereas the 
left opposed the war as an imperialist war. Trotsky's analysis of the 
declaration of the twenty, which appeared in Nashe Slovo on 28 
December, followed Luxemburg's critique on this point. He announced 
that the declaration had not 'placed the issue of the "war" policy of 
Social-Democracy on a necessary principled basis',28 and he regretted 
the fact that the French social-patriots could only gain ammunition for 
their support of France's war of 'self-defence' from the declaration's 
evaluation of Germany's then strategic advantages. However, 
Trotsky's explanation of the left-centre's move to the left gave grounds
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for the expression of his revolutionary optimism. According to the 
Nashe Slovo correspondent, it was Zimmerwald, the pressure issuing 
from the masses and the logic of events which had pushed the twenty 
from abstention to open opposition. The tide had turned and was 
clearly flowing in the direction of Zimmerwald which now had new 
supporters within the Reichstag; the vote was not a single ’episode' but 
an 'important date in the rebirth of socialism.'
Two special events of very different natures gave Trotsky reason to 
pen hagiographies of Franz Mehring and Rosa Luxemburg, two of the 
leading figures on the German left. Franz Mehring was 70 on 27 
February 1916 and Trotsky paid tribute to Mehring's talents as 
historian and publicist of the German workers' movement. However 
with no doubt an eye to, among others, Plekhanov, he stated that it was 
not for past services that he was now raising his hat to Mehring. More 
importantly, the 'old man' of the German movement had passed the 
test of the outbreak of the war, he had opposed the policy of 4 August in 
the journal Internationale, and in these ways 'provided invaluable 
support for the awakening opposition on the left wing which is now the 
genuine bearer of the honour of the German proletariat.' Rosa 
Luxemburg had been arrested on 18 February 1915 for her anti-war 
pronouncements and activity. She was released on 22 January 1916, 
commenting 'I have returned to "freedom" with a tremendous appetite 
for work.'29 Trotsky welcomed her back to the 'new class struggle' and 
ended his tribute on a political point, expressed emotionally: 'In the 
persons of Franz Mehring and Rosa Luxemburg we greet the spiritual 
kernel of the revolutionary German opposition with which we are linked 
by an indissoluble brotherhood in arms.'30
At the beginning of April 1916 Trotsky commented upon the most 
recent vote on the budget, held in the Reichstag on 24 March, at which 
the centre for the second time voted against the government. In the 
months leading up to April the German left had further defined its 
position as a separate fraction. On New Years Day 1916 a group of left 
delegates meeting at Liebknecht's law office voted to adhere to the 
document, produced by Rosa Luxemburg for presentation at the 
Zimmerwald Conference, as part of a campaign, in Liebknecht's 
words, 'to recapture the party upwards through mass rebellion.'31
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Liebknecht thought that the centre would either have to go over to the 
left or join the right or face the prospect of getting crushed in the clash 
of the two extremes; a fate which Trotsky often assigned to the centre 
of Russian politics.32 In Towards the Split in the Social-Democratic 
Fraction in the Reichstag’ Trotsky retained his earlier critique of the 
centre as 'socialist pacifists’. He did, however, review the significance of 
the centre vote from a new standpoint. He began by claiming that in the 
decade preceding 1914 Europe had experienced two parallel 
processes: a massive development of the productive forces and an 
equalisation of the forms and methods of struggle of the workers' 
movement in Britain, Germany and France, i.e., a growth of 
parliamentarianism and centrally organised trade unions. The most 
notable consequence of the equalisation of the conditions and 
methods of workers' struggles was the formation of a single 
psychology, namely limited, national-reactionary responses from 
proletarian organisations. This did though take various forms in 
different countries. In Germany, for example, the workers were 
hypnotised by the notion of workers' democracy within their own 
organisations, whereas in France the proletariat was hypnotised by 
the idea of the French Republic and the traditions of 1789. 
Nevertheless the rapid appearance of social-patriotism in workers’ 
organisations in all the warring countries grew of this shared 
psychology, rooted in the nature of the previous epoch. Trotsky noted 
that Russian, Italian and Balkan socialists had remained truer to 
internationalism, but he thought that the efforts of the internationalists 
would be for nought unless German Social-Democracy threw off the 
heritage of 'organisational fetishism': 'Only a profound internal 
upheaval in German Social-Democracy can really guarantee the 
creation of a centralised revolutionary International, just as only the 
capture of power by the proletariat in Germany, the mighty citadel of 
capitalism and militarism, can secure the victory of the socialist 
revolution in Europe.' It was from this stance, an insistence of the 
importance of German Social-Democracy for the success of the 
socialist movement as a whole, that Trotsky interpreted the splits in the 
Reichstag fraction, including the pacifist centre, as an important step 
towards a real rebirth of international socialism: 'Before the German
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proletariat there henceforth stands two fractions, forcing it in the fire of 
events to make a choice and relieving it from automated discipline, a 
tool of imperialist reaction. Only through an ending of organisational 
routine will the German proletariat move to the unity and discipline of 
revolutionary activity. The split in the fraction is an important stage on 
this path.’33
Issues concerning the International were central to Trotsky's 
following contribution on the German Social-Democracy, this time 
examining 'K. Kautsky on the International.' This article translated in full 
Karl Kautsky's letter, published in Berner Tagwacht, in which the 
German socialist replied to a left-radical critique of his war time 
positions. Kautsky reasserted his belief that the International was 
weaker during wars than during peace, although he emphasised that 
this did not mean that the International had to lie low until peace was 
concluded: The International should reawaken itself for a new life and 
for new activities as soon as opportunities for action for peace are 
revealed.'34 Kautsky's letter also touched upon other issues, most 
notably his qualification to the notion that the war was exclusively an 
imperialist war, but it was his statements on the International that 
aroused Trotsky's commentary. For the Nashe Slovo correspondent 
Kautsky's position could only lead social-democrats into a 'blind alley'. 
In order to overcome the forces of militarism the International would 
have to be at the height of its powers. Why, then, ask the organisation 
of the international proletariat to struggle for peace at a time when it 
was at its weakest? Trotsky then focussed upon another 'weak' side to 
Kautsky's case, i.e., the German socialist limited his perception of a 
struggle for peace to calls by socialist parties for a peace without 
annexations. He pointed out that such agreement had already been 
reached in the resolutions of the Copenhagen, London and Vienna 
conferences, and explained their lack of effect through the absence of 
what was missing from Kautsky's analysis; linking these demands to a 
programme of action. It was at this point that Trotsky turned Kautsky on 
his head. For Trotsky, it was the Second International, precisely the 
organisation formed during peace, that had proven itself to be weak 
whereas then, during the war, a new International was taking shape 
that would show itself to be an instrument of revolution. After labelling
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Kautsky’s then opposition to outright social-patriotism a 'half-way 
house1 which alerted the workers to official falsehoods while not taking 
them to the logical conclusion of revolutionary action, Trotsky urged the 
left radicals to continue their campaign against Kautsky’s 
’procrastinating pacifism’.
Thus far Trotsky's analysis of the struggles between the social- 
patriots, the centre and the left in German Social-Democracy had 
focussed upon the balance of forces, their likely future development 
and the consequences of this for the workers' movement. In an article 
entitled 'Hoglund and Liebknecht' he reported on the response of the 
ruling classes to the ever-increasing crystallisation of the left. On 1 May 
1916 Liebknecht was arrested for shouting 'Down with the government, 
down with the war' in the middle of the Potsdamerplatz in Berlin. 
Trotsky placed this arrest in the context of a series of similar measures 
taken against revolutionary internationalists in several countries. In 
Sweden Hoglund, member of parliament, was arrested along with two 
other members of the Swedish left opposition, Heden and Oljedund, for 
calling upon workers to go out on a general strike if Sweden 
abandoned its neutrality; John MacLean received a long term of 
imprisonment in April 1916 for his anti-war activity in Scotland; and, 
finally, in Ireland the seven men who signed the declaration of Irish 
independence during the 1916 Easter rebellion were shot. For Trotsky, 
all of these measures were but a foretaste of the 'future policy of the 
whole European bourgeoisie in the approaching epoch of revolutionary 
upheavals.'35 In the meantime Hoglund and Liebknecht were the 
heroes of the then forming Third International.
Trotsky examined Liebknecht's trial from another perspective in 
'Karl Liebknecht'. He noted that the German socialist had received the 
minimum sentence possible for his 'crime', but rejected in advance any 
thought that the court had been lenient. Liebknecht had agreed with all 
the charges against him and had even attempted to antagonise the 
court. What then explained the minimum sentence? According to 
Trotsky, the state machine did not want to make a martyr out of 
Liebknecht: 'in Germany, where the awakening of the mightiest of 
social classes is at stake, one has to measure out repression in doses 
so as not to hasten the process of the accumulation of revolutionary
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passion.'36 However, pointing to the political strike which had been 
called as response to Liebknecht's sentencing on 28 June, Trotsky 
declared that Liebknecht's imprisonment could not divert events from 
taking their 'natural course of development.' The name on the banner 
of the workers' movement was now Liebknecht, who Trotsky claimed 
as his 'closest ally.'
Trotsky's final report on the German Social-Democracy in Nashe 
Slovo before he was exiled from France consisted of a reprint of an 
article which had appeared in the second issue of the Bremen 
publication Arbeiterpolitik. Entitled 'Amongst the German Opposition' 
this piece serves as a convenient concluding summary of this section 
on Trotsky's views on developments in the German workers' 
movement while he was resident in Paris.37 It outlined the different 
nature of the centre's and the left's opposition to Scheidemann's 
support of Germany's war efforts: the former 'pacifist' and 'half­
hearted1, the latter 'revolutionary' and 'principled'. Trotsky warned the 
left not to join-up with the centre which, due to its uncertainty, would 
always remain within the orbit of the right. Dismissing accusations of 
'sectionalism1 that had been levelled against the left, Trotsky 
reemphasised his basic position: strict adherence to principles was 
necessary for firm action which would win the day, and the 
organisations, from below and from within.
8.2 Trotsky and Austrian Social-Democracy
From 1907 until 1914 Trotsky, after having a request to settle in Berlin 
refused, set up home in Vienna. There he met with the leading lights of 
Austrian Social-Democracy, Victor and Fritz Adler, Rudolf Hilferding 
and Otto Bauer. At the outbreak of the war the behaviour of the 
Austrian party could have been no less disappointing to Trotsky than 
that of its German counterpart. It immediately approved the SPD's vote 
of August 4. Nevertheless, he for long remained silent on the Austrian 
SPOe, publishing his first article on this party in Nashe Slovo of 21 May 
1916. His quiescence can be put down to several possible reasons. 
Just as the internal contradictions besetting Austria could have been 
seen as secondary to Germany's mightier and faster developing
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economy and society, the SPOe could have been viewed as an adjunct 
of its 'big Brother'. Another and more prosaic possibility is that there 
was little material for journalistic accounts of Austrian developments. 
The Austrian parliament was prorogued in the spring of 1914 and was 
not summoned until May 1917. Hence there was no crisis on war 
credits, the subject matter of much of Trotsky's reportage of the 
German Social-Democracy, in the Austrian party. Furthermore, the 
party press supported the German SPD vote en bloc, Arbeiter-Zeitung 
declaring 4 August 'a day of the proudest and most powerful exaltation 
of the German spirit',38 and Trotsky loved nothing better than a clash 
of fractions before entering the fray. Indeed, it was a shift in outlook of 
Arbeiter-Zeitung that prompted him to write a report for Nashe Slovo.
In the piece 'In Austria' Trotsky gave a brief exposition of the first two 
issues of Arbeiter-Zeitung of May 1916. As background information he 
sketched the character of the newspaper before the war; it was the 
most 'German national socialist newspaper...[which]...was always ready 
to defend the "German” interests and the German character of Vienna 
from Czech "encroachment"'. Now, though, the newspaper was devoid 
of triumphant German nationalism. A lead article of 2 May spoke of a 
hopeless military situation for both of the warring camps, and reported 
a widespread desire for peace. A further contribution painted a sorry 
picture of the then current economic situation, claiming that only time 
would tell whether capitalism would survive the dislocation caused by 
the war. While reports of this kind were obviously welcome to Trotsky, 
he derided the Austrian party for not drawing the necessary political 
conclusions. Thus, the SPOe had not constructed a political 
programme of action centring on a struggle for peace to answer the 
desire for an end to the war. For Trotsky, passiveness was tantamount 
to social-patriotism which meant support for the ruling classes. The 
crime of the Austrian party was that it was the 'most passive' of all 
social-patriotic parties: 'it would be hard to think of another policy which 
was directed to such an extent on blunting the proletariat, suppressing 
all initiative in it, cooling all protest, as the policy of Austrian Social- 
Democracy.'39 Trotsky concluded this article in typical fashion with a 
call to the Austrian opposition to liberate the proletariat from the
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shackles of official party policy of ’weakness, passiveness and 
disintegration'.
The link between analysis and practice also featured in Trotsky’s 
next piece on the Austrian Social-Democrats. He praised the latter for 
their theoretical ability which 'approached Marxism'. In this instance he 
focussed upon two recent articles from Arbeiter-Zeitung in which the 
Austrian publication showed that the war was preparing the ground for 
a future socialist order. First, the ravage caused by the then world 
conflict had placed the socialist goals of peace and labour on the 
agenda; then the experience of war had knocked parochialism out of 
people, thus ushering a new internationalist spirit; and, finally, the might 
of the war technology had revealed what a centralised, mass 
organisation of production could achieve. In short, Arbeiter-Zeitung 
predicted that the post-war order would be an 'epoch of social spirit.' Of 
course Trotsky could agree with much of this analysis. He approvingly 
summarised Arbeiter-Zeitung’s view of the war as 'forming in its 
entrails a revolutionary generation and placing it face to face with the 
tasks of a socialist organisation of society.' However, he regretted the 
fact that true to the traditions of the Austrian party, the leadership 
retained an outdated and reactionary policy: 'the voice of Austrian 
Social-Democracy sounds as if from a coffin before a political dock in 
which a generation of the proletariat going through the war do not 
sit.'40
In his next writing on the Arbeiter-Zeitung Trotsky had not a hint of 
praise for the Austrian publication. On this occasion he analysed the 
Vienna newspaper's strong approval of Italian socialists who, until the 
last moment, had called for their country to remain neutral in the war. At 
first sight one would think that the Nashe Slovo correspondent would 
have nothing but praise for Arbeiter-Zeitung’s stance. But, reasoned 
Trotsky, more sinister motivations lay behind Arbeiter-Zeitung’s new 
found 'internationalism'. Arbeiter-Zeitung had done nothing less than 
use Italian socialist opposition to Italy's entry into the war as evidence 
of Italy's ruling class's aggressiveness, a crucial plank in the 'defensive' 
lie propagated by the Austro-German military machine. Furthermore, 
Trotsky pointed out that such hypocrisy was not limited to Austro- 
German social-patriotic publications. He highlighted L’Humanite as
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Arbeiter-Zeitung's French soul mate. It was using the radical German 
newspaper Leipziger Volkszeitung's denunciations of the German 
ruling class so that its French counterparts could ’shine radiantly before 
the auditorium of the French proletariat.’ This left Trotsky with the 
rather depressing question of 'which of them is better?'41
When opposition to the Austrian government did manifest itself in an 
open and dramatic way it came as something of a surprise to Trotsky. 
In October 1916 Fritz Adler, editor of Kampf and a left radical, 
demonstrated his hatred of the war and the government waging it by 
killing the Austrian Prime Minister Baron Sturgkh. The question Trotsky 
posed was: What made Adler resort to a terrorist act? After all Adler, as 
a Marxist, did not believe that a 'well directed bullet can cut the Gordian 
knot of great historical problems.' According to Trotsky the key to 
understanding Adler's act lay in the relations internal to Austrian Social- 
Democracy itself. Purchasers of Nashe Slovo had read of Trotsky's 
frustration with the SPOe, able to produce clear analysis but incapable 
of taking firm political action. How much greater must this frustration 
have been felt by a radical living in the midst of indifference and 
inactivity. The son of the 'father' of the Austrian movement knew all too 
well the bureaucrats and careerists who had risen to dominate the 
party during the parliamentary regime which had preceded the First 
World War in Austria. It was these people who had rejected his 
'Zimmerwald' resolution presented to a meeting of the SPOe's national 
council in March 1916. The pressure of demanding action to save 
socialism from bearing responsibility for the war and finding only a 
shrugging of shoulders from the leadership reached such a point that 
Adler resolved to make a dramatic gesture. For Trotsky one could have 
nothing but admiration: ’Like a heroic pointsman on a railroad who 
opens his veins and warns of danger with a handkerchief soaked in his 
own blood Fritz Adler turned himself, his life into a signal bomb before 
the face of a fooled and lifeless working class...This means that the 
heart of this unhappy humanity still beats if, among its sons, there is 
such an errant knight!’42
Trotsky and European Social-Democracy 271
8.3 Trotsky and French Social-Democracy
Opposition to their government's war effort was understandably weak 
among French socialists. It was after all German soldiers who had 
invaded France, and whatever analysis was current of 'shared' 
imperialist guilt for the war it did not hold much attraction in a country 
where most people accepted that they were fighting a 'war of defence'. 
This did not prevent Trotsky from using his journalistic powers to argue 
for a revolutionary programme of action against the war in France.
His first clash with a French social-patriotic publication was in a 
'Letter to the Editorial Board of L'Humanite'. It was in L'Humanite that 
an adversary familiar to Trotsky, Aleksinskii, had described Parvus as 
an 'agent-provocateur on a salary of the German and Turkish 
governments'.43 He had gone on to say that even Nashe Slovo had 
warned others to have nothing to do with Parvus. Trotsky felt compelled 
to pen a reply not because he was against critiques of the German 
thinker. He opposed Parvus's war time position and had described the 
inspirer of the theory of permanent revolution as 'politically dead'44 
What Trotsky objected to was the insinuation that Nashe Slovo also 
thought Parvus to be a German agent, and he declared that no 
evidence existed to support such a view. If Nashe Slovo advised a 
boycott of Parvus's institute in Copenhagen, it did so only because 
Parvus was subordinating socialism to the aims of militarism and the 
class state.
Trotsky's dispute with L'Humanite did nothing to enlighten readers 
of the condition of what worried Trotsky most in other countries, that of 
the union sacree. He seized the opportunity presented by a ministerial 
crisis to claim a future for revolutionary socialism in France. During 
1915 the French army was on the offensive, a tactic which led to great 
losses for little gain. By October 1915 a mixture of growing opposition 
within and outwith the government brought about the fall of the Viviani 
cabinet. In 'The Essence of the Crisis’ Trotsky did not deny that poor 
military performance played a large role in Viviani’s fall. There was 
though a more important and instructive aspect to this affair. For 
Trotsky the recent political events 'expressed the basic 
contradictions...of French radicalism in the current imperialist epoch'.45
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In brief, the French radicals, whose constituency was primarily made 
up of petty bourgeois elements, were powerless before the forces of 
imperialist finance capital. It was these latter, in the form of the large 
capitalists, which decided matters of policy. Indeed, socialist deputies 
were allowed to occupy ministerial posts during the war our of 
pragmatic considerations, they served as a useful control lever over 
the people at a time of great hardships. Conservative dailies continued 
to appear while the radical press had disappeared or lost its teeth. 
What further evidence did one need that the imperialists were in 
control? For Trotsky, France needed to find socialists who would not 
sacrifice themselves to the union sacree but those who would 
overcome all obstacles to achieve what they wanted.
One month later Trotsky stressed the extent to which the ruling class 
in France did not have control of events. In 'Without a programme, 
without perspectives, without control' he speculated that no 
programmatic changes would result from Briand’s appointment to head 
the government. In part Trotsky related the inertia of French politics to 
the condition of its parliamentarianism which had no new reserves of 
people or ideas. Most at blame, however, was the failings of the 
European ruling classes, of which the French was only a representative 
example, which had lost all control over events:
The powerful Prussian feudalists act now under the same 
pressure of the forming situation as the indecisive petty 
bourgeois French lawyers...The trenches, cannons, battle ships, 
thousands of armed people....these are the factors which 
automatically push historical events ahead along a path, the end 
of which more clearly signifies for everyone a dead-end. The 
ruling orders make gestures...but they long ago lost all control 
over the course of events.
Nashe Slovo readers could at least be comforted by their 
correspondent's concluding words that 'history is calling other forces to 
take control in their hands.'46
However, when voices opposed to the war began to be heard with 
increasing frequency in the French Socialist Party they were not of a 
sort that pleased Trotsky. It was none other than Karl Marx's grandson, 
Jean Longuet, who led an opposition group in the parliamentary party.
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His disaffection with the war issued from pacifist principles which he 
expounded in Le Populaire, a weekly newspaper which he also edited. 
At a meeting of the Socialist Party's national council of April 1916 
Longuet and his supporters mustered over thirty per cent of the votes 
cast. From August 1916 until the time of his expulsion from France 
Trotsky again and again advised revolutionary Marxists why and how 
they should wage a campaign against ’Longuetism’.
In his first article on this theme Trotsky looked at Longuet's plans to 
restore the International. The French pacifist had called for a meeting 
of socialists of Entente countries as a first step towards a conference of 
socialists of all nationalities. Trotsky asked why such a hopeless 
scheme had been proposed. After all, the Italian, Russian, British, 
Serbian and Portugese parties all supported Zimmerwald and would 
hardly attend an exclusively Entente affair. For Trotsky, it was clear that 
the Longuetists were playing a role common to all purely parliamentary 
oppositions: linked to the masses and to government policy they 'use 
the uninformed masses and advance consciously-fictive means with 
one aim: to win time.'47 To this Trotsky retorted that at that moment this 
was tantamount to 'wasting time' and for this no condemnation could 
be sufficiently harsh.
Following the conclusion of the Zimmerwald conference of 
September 1915, the French delegates Merrheim and Bourderon 
organised a Comite pour la Reprise des Relations Internationales in 
Paris. Trotsky had close ties with Merrheim and in August 1916 he sent 
a draft declaration to the Comite. In this document Trotsky outlined why 
Zimmerwaldists should have no truck with Longuetists. He pointed out 
that the Longuetist parliamentary group still voted for the war credits, 
thus failing a crucial litmus test for internationalism. For Trotsky, the 
Longuetists were playing such a pernicious role in French politics that 
he employed conspiracy theory to explain their existence: Longuetism 
was necessary as an outlet for the expression of opposition to 
Renaudel's uncompromising support of the war while holding this 
opposition within the boundaries of official party policy. It was for this 
reason that Trotsky perceived the Longuetists to be the most 
dangerous species of social-patriots for they attempted to 'calm the 
workers' agitated socialist conscience through secondary concessions
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and in this way divert them from an actual struggle against the war.'48 
Hence the urgent task was to disrobe the Longuetists’ lies and to speak 
real revolutionary language to the workers. Trotsky urged the Comite 
to take these tasks upon itself. Just over one week later he was able to 
report that, despite objections from some syndicalists, the Nashe Slovo 
resolution was passed by the Comite 49
Not everyone was overjoyed by the Comite’s acceptance of the 
need to struggle against Longuetism. In an interesting letter published 
along with a reply from the editors A. Lozovskii, for example, criticised 
Nashe Slovo's declaration even though he himself was a left critic of 
the centre.50 Lozovskii argued that the declaration made three basic 
errors. It incorrectly categorised the Confederation General du Travail 
as the equivalent of Longuetism in the syndicalist movement; in actual 
fact the Confederation clearly backed Renaudel’s out and out 
patriotism. Second, Nashe Slovo was wrong to say that the Longuetists 
were consciously trying to fool the workers. While he accepted that the 
centre was not sufficiently internationalist, Lozovskii viewed its 
shortcomings as an objective consequence of its politics which were 
sincerely held. By insisting upon the subjective motivation of the centre 
Nashe Slovo was complicating relations between the Zimmerwaldists 
and the centre when the latter, and especially its left wing, could 
become tomorrow's ally. Finally, Lozovskii questioned the tactic of 
sending a resolution to the Comite as a means of combating 
Longuetism. To begin with the Comite was dominated by syndicalists 
who would pass as many anti-Longuetist resolutions as were sent, but 
who were themselves even less revolutionary socialist than the centre. 
He then stated that tactical resolutions were not the best way to 
achieve agitational aims. Nashe Slovo should have invited Longuetists 
to a gathering of socialists to debate its declaration and only then urged 
the meeting to pass a resolution.
In its reply Nashe Slovo accused Lozovskii of committing the worst 
of political crimes, that of underestimating the enemy. In the case of 
Longuetism the consequences of this crime were magnified since its 
tactic depended upon goodwill towards it for success: 'for the 
Longuetists ambiguity is an important tool in their political struggles; for 
Zimmerwaldists ambiguity means death or more precisely dissolving
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into Longuetism.'51 Nashe Slovo announced that it was not against a 
public debate with Longuetists, but one had to define one's relation to 
them beforehand, and this is precisely what what its resolution had 
achieved. A clear statement of the shortcomings of Longuetism and the 
necessity to combat them was now extant. One only had to have the 
bravery not to be diverted from these tasks.
On the day that he received his expulsion order from France the 
concluding part of Trotsky's analysis of 'French and German Social- 
Patriotism' appeared in Nashe Slovo. In the first contribution Trotsky 
was concerned to establish the stable and anti-revolutionary nature of 
Longuetist politics. He argued that the Longuetists mixture of support 
for the war while calling for socialists not to accept ministerial posts 
should not be confused as a group in transition to a left position. Rather 
the Longuetists thought of their strategy as long-term which would 
accrue several advantages for socialists. They would back their 
country's war effort but avoid both responsibility for any mistakes and 
being assimilated into a national bloc. In retaining a distinct socialist 
identity in this way the ground would be prepared for future electoral 
success inside France, and lead to the quick restoration of the 
International which would be able to bring its weight to bear upon a 
peace settlement. Trotsky not only thought the Longuetists inconsistent 
- how could one vote money to a government which one considered 
unfit to join? - he also declared that the Longuetist programme shared 
the aims as Renaudel and the right:
Supporting the Socialist Party in the war as a tool to discipline the 
mass in the interests and under the control of the capitalist state 
and using this work in the interests of strengthening or, at 
minimum, holding the political-parliamentary position of the party 
itself - such are the tasks general to Renaudel and Longue.52 
The second and concluding article focused upon the assumptions 
common to the Longuetists and to German social-patriots.53 According 
to Trotsky both groups thought the war should be conducted to 
safeguard their countries' independence and were in favour of a peace 
without annexations. At the then current moment the Longuetists were 
even able to point to their German counterparts as an illustration of 
what French socialists would gain by refusing ministerial posts:
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Scheidemann had been able to attend the Hague conference because 
this in no way bound the German government. After pointing out that 
the Longuetists and Scheidemann also shared antipathy towards 
Liebknecht, Trotsky outlined two scenarios in which he illustrated why 
an internationalist perspective was worth retaining. In a pessimistic 
picture he argued that if the crisis in the workers' movement proved 
protracted, only revolutionary internationalism could present a 
principled explanation of events to workers. If. on the other hand, an 
optimistic option was to happen, if the workers were to arise in anger at 
their worsening condition, the revolutionary internationalists would be 
immediately able to occupy a vanguard role. Unfortunately for Trotsky, 
at the time of writing he was very much in the midst of the former 
variant.
8.4 Trotsky and British Socialism
Trotsky wrote very little about events in Britain, this despite the fact that 
the socialist movement there was beset by the same social-chauvinist- 
centre-left splits upon which he commented in other movements.54 
There can be no doubt that although he presented no full analysis of 
the correlation of forces in the British workers' movement Trotsky felt 
that the left wing of the British Socialist Party, John MacLean and 
associates, and its publications, Justice and The Call, his allies in 
Britain.
In a piece examined above, for instance, he noted MacLean's 
imprisonment of April 1916, and in an article on the 1916 Easter 
Uprising in Ireland he referred to the Glaswegian socialist as the leader 
of a revolutionary upsurge in Scotland: 'Scottish soldiers broke the 
Dublin barricades. But in Scotland itself the coal miners are uniting 
around the red banner raised by MacLean and his friends.’
This was Trotsky's only commentary upon the Easter Uprising and it 
contained an analysis of class forces and revolutionary perspectives in 
backward Ireland reminiscent of that produced by Trotsky for his own 
country. Thus, to the extent that an Irish trade-industrial bourgeoisie 
had formed since the turn of the century it was 'anti-proletarian' and 
subordinate to British imperialism; the peasants were backward and
Trotsky and European Social-Democracy 277
isolated, governed by 'stupid farm egoism’; finally, the proletariat, the 
only revolutionary force, had to be won over to revolutionary 
internationalism from 'national enthusiasts' and limited trade-unionism. 
Viewing the events in Dublin as evidence of a transition from the 
agrarian 'national' upheavals of previous times to the era of 
international "socialist revolutions Trotsky welcomed the Easter 
Uprising as evidence that 'the historical role of the Irish proletariat is 
only just beginning.'55
There are several possible reasons for Trotsky's reticence in 
commenting upon British developments. Nashe Slovo received reports 
from Britain from, amongst others, G. V. Chicherin, and Trotsky 
probably agreed with these analyses. Furthermore, he had not been in 
Britain for many years and felt better qualified, or more stimulated, to 
write about countries and people of which he had personal knowledge. 
He had not met, nor would he ever meet, John MacLean, whereas he 
knew Kautsky, Plekhanov, Adler and so on. Certainly the 'personal 
factor', in this case Christain Rakovsky and time spent in the Balkans 
as a reporter for Kievskaya Mysl' during the Balkan wars, was present 
in Trotsky's writings upon developments in the Balkans.
8.5 Trotsky and Balkan Social-Democracy
Trotsky had formulated his solution to the ethnic tensions rife in the 
Balkans, the creation of a Balkan federative republic, while working as 
a reporter there during the pre-1914 Balkan Wars.56 He carried this 
analysis into his First World War writings and in several theoretical 
articles attempted to show why transnational state structures would 
ensure peaceful economic, political and cultural development.
Trotsky thought the nation and the state to be two distinct entities. 
The former was a lasting source and bearer of culture, most noticeably 
through language, while the latter was a temporary phenomenon 
constructed for economic reasons. At some point in history the 
interests of economic progress brought the capitalist state into 
existence. However, by the start of the First World War economic 
forces had outgrown the limits of the national state. Hence Trotsky’s 
argument that the real source of the war was not external aggression
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from one state against another, as the social-patriots and exponents of 
the 'defence of the homeland' insisted, but demands of economic 
progress inside the state. According to Trotsky, even if the war led the 
map of Europe to be redrawn so that state structures coincided with 
ethnic groups, new conflicts would inevitably arise: 'An independent 
Hungary or Bohemia or Poland would seek a path to the sea by 
breaking the rights of other nationalities just as Italy seeks it at the 
expense of the Serbs or the Serbs at the expense of the Albanians.'57 
For Trotsky, the only possible solution to these problems was to 
guarantee the independence of the nation, vital for cultural survival and 
growth, and a wider market, essential for economic well-being, through 
the establishment of transnational democratic states. Furthermore 
these goals could only by reached through socialism:
Destroying the very basis of the economy the present imperialist 
war, which is illuminated and supplemented by spiritual 
impoverishment or by the fraudulent national idea, is the most 
convincing expression of that dead-end into which the 
development of bourgeois society has gone. Only socialism, 
which should economically neutralise the nation, uniting 
humanity in lasting cooperation; which frees the world economy 
from the grip of the nation and in this way liberating national 
culture from the grip of nations' economic competition - only 
socialism gives a way out from the contradictions which now 
open-up before us as a terrible threat to the whole of human 
culture.58
In his journalism on the Balkan Social-Democracy Trotsky focused 
upon individuals who shared his analysis as a way of propagating their 
case. During his soujourns around the Balkans Trotsky met and 
became friends with the old founder of Romanian socialism, 
Dobrodjanu Gerea. Trotsky celebrated Gerea’s fortieth birthday with an 
anniversary article in Nashe Slovo59 Here he commended the former 
leader of Romanian Social-Democracy for his theoretical acumen, 
expressed with particular clarity in the book Neo-Serfdom. Finally, 
Trotsky stressed the connection between scientific socialism and 
correct practice by noting Gerea's battle against Romanian imperialism 
and for the establishment of a Balkan democratic federation.
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In a two-part article entitled 'In the Balkans' he illustrated the 
hopeless intrigues of both the Balkan bourgeoisie, who wanted to use 
the strategic weaknesses of the great powers to aid capitalist 
development in the Balkans for their own gain, on the one hand and the 
great powers, who wanted to seize territory in the Balkans under the 
guise of fighting for the liberation of oppressed peoples, on the other. 
He cited the Bulgarian Social-Democratic publication Novoe Vremya 
which had highlighted the impossibility of the Balkan peoples deciding 
which side to back in the war: opting for the Entente would result in 
domination by Russia and Italy, deciding for the Central Powers rule 
from Berlin and Vienna. Trotsky called upon his Bulgarian, Romanian 
and Serbian comrades to continue broadcasting such beliefs, firm in 
the conviction that one day this would ease the transition to socialism: 
'Now, in these bloody fumes, let this programme preserve a 
predominantly propaganda character - in a revolutionary epoch it will 
be realised the quicker the sooner now it wears out all other 
programmes and illusions and the deeper Social-Democracy 
strengthens the authority of its political and moral bravery in the 
consciousness of the Balkan peoples.'60
As the war dragged on and on without signs that one of the warring 
fractions held or would hold a decisive strategic advantage in the near 
future, a struggle to win over neutral countries became increasingly 
intensive. In October 1915 Germany succeeded in attracting Bulgaria 
to its side in return for a promise that it would receive territory in 
Macedonia lost to Serbia during the Balkan Wars. Bulgaria duly 
attacked Serbia on 14 October. Trotsky examined the response this 
elicited among Bulgarian socialists in 'Bulgarian Social-Democracy and 
the War.' Once again he found a split between social-patriots who, 
guided by 'national' interests, supported the intervention. However, for 
the Bulgarian social-patriots this led to a particular somersault, they 
had been forced to abandon their previously held Russophile 
philosophy. The revolutionary-socialists, on the other hand, had faced 
no such dilemma. Although their publications had been suppressed 
they had preserved their belief in socialism and in a democratic 
federative Balkan republic. In what was very much an article intended 
to strengthen the spirit of the faithful Trotsky expressed his conviction
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that, 'we do not for one minute doubt their revolutionary bravery and 
belief in socialism; that together with them - over the trenches which 
currently separate us - we are convinced in a future revolutionary 
uprising in which we and they will find our true place!'61
In an earlier chapter it was noted how Trotsky cited Rakovsky's 
critique of the Russian social-patriots as further ammunition in his 
battle with this group. On several occasions he also referred to the 
exploits of his old friend on specifically Balkan affairs. Trotsky received 
Rakovsky's introduction to the Balkan socialist's brochure Socialism 
and the War in manuscript form and in Nashe Slovo of 5 October 1915 
he reproduced several extracts from it.62 These citations made several 
points, most notably that a federative Balkan republic could only be 
achieved through the class struggle of the proletariat, and that judging 
the war with 'offensive' and 'defensive' criteria meant using imperialist 
categories.
In 1916 pressure was increasingly applied upon Romania to join the 
war. This she duly did in August 1916 when, in return for a promise of 
land in Tansalvania, she sided with the Entente. Rakovsky's arrest and 
subsequent conditional release following his participation in strikes in 
Galicia in June 1916 provided Trotsky with an opportunity to comment 
upon developments in Romania.63 He praised Rakovsky's 
'revolutionary internationalism' and presented a brief analysis of 
Romanian society. Despite the weak development of Romanian 
industry Trotsky claimed that the 'young and energetic' proletariat was 
the most strategically powerful class in a country of 'dark peasant 
masses' and parasitic ruling cliques. He argued that these latter had 
allowed Romanian socialists to conduct anti-war agitation while they 
wanted Romania to remain neutral. Indeed for a while the socialists 
even served as a convenient counter pressure to pro-Entente activists. 
However, a point was reached at which socialist agitation became 
inconvenient for a government which was considering a more active 
role in the war. Hence Rakovsky's arrest. The lesson Trotsky extracted 
from these events was the closer governments moved towards 
declaring war, the clearer the distinction between revolutionary 
socialists, who would be sent to goal, and social-patriots, who would 
join war ministries, would become.
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8.6 Conclusion
Trotsky's journalism on European Social-Democracy during his time in 
Paris in World War One sought to make the following points: August 
1914 marked a significant turning-point in history, it signalled the end of 
the Second International and the epoch of reformism from which it 
grew; in order to prepare themselves and the proletariat for the coming 
epoch of revolutionary upheavals Marxist internationalists should 
propagate their ideas independent of all right social-imperialists and 
their centrist cohorts; Marxist internationalists, in arguing their own line, 
should remain within existing parties in order to win them from within; 
and, finally, a Third International would have to be established to guide 
communists in their struggle to establish transnational federative 
republics.
In his recent biography of Trotsky the Russian historian Dmitrii 
Volkogonov views Trotsky as a cosmopolitan, absorbed with non- 
Russian affairs.64 However, when one compares the volume and 
nature of Trotsky's writings on Russian domestic politics and his 
polemics with the various branches of Russian Social-Democracy with 
his articles on pan-European affairs, it becomes evident that he wrote 
more, and felt on surer ground, when commenting upon the former.
Although Trotsky himself had great faith in the power of the pen it 
would be true to say that he observed and followed events rather than 
moulded them. It would be difficult to claim any great influence for his 
journalism upon European developments, even in the socialist parties. 
His articles stressed a core set of beliefs, as is to be expected from a 
task which had a predominantly propaganda character. In the 
circumstances he could hardly do anything else. Faced with a situation 
in which most socialists supported their countries' war efforts, he was 
fighting a rearguard battle.
The next chapter examines Trotsky's activities after his expulsion 
from France to Spain.
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CHAPTER NINE
Spain
The fullest account of the several months that Trotsky spent in Spain 
appeared in Krasnaya nov' of July 1922 and January 1926. In these 
issues the Russian journal published extracts from Trotsky's 
notebooks, in which he kept a record of events from his expulsion from 
France to his arrival in New York. These extracts were then reprinted in 
volume nine of Trotsky's collected works, Europe at War (1927), and 
were subsequently used as the basis of chapter 21, 'Through Spain', of 
his autobiography My Life (1930). In these texts Trotsky recounts the 
day he spent in San Sebastian, 'where I was delighted by the sea but 
appalled by the prices'; his rapid departure to Madrid where, after 
seven days of freedom, he was arrested; his then transfer to Cadiz 
where, under police surveillance, he was permitted to wander about 
the town until his fate was sealed: he was to remain in Spain until he 
could board a boat bound for America. On 20 December he travelled to 
Barcelona from whence, reunited with his family, on 25 December, he 
set sail for New York.
Trotsky's 'Spanish interlude' was neither the most comfortable, nor 
the most exciting, of his life. He could not speak or read Spanish, and 
several times complained that a Spaniard's knowledge of foreign 
languages did not extend beyond the question 'Parlez vous francais?'1 
He found the pace of life in Madrid ’lazy’, the city 'provincial1, the people 
devoid of 'entrepreneurship, just as in their eyes there is no 
concentration.'2 His main enjoyment was derived from visits to Madrid's 
museums, ’temples of art’, but in the copy work of the young Spanish 
artists who also frequented the museums he saw no evidence of any 
current Spanish artistic talent. From Paris he received the address of a 
'French socialist-internationalist Depre', a director of an insurance 
society, with whom he made contact. Depre found Trotsky lodgings, in 
general working as his 'agent' in Spain: he informed him of the state of 
Spanish socialism, 'totally under the influence of French social- 
patriotism. Serious syndicalist opposition in Barcelona',3 took Trotsky 
food in prison and conducted a campaign on his behalf in the Spanish
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socialist press. In prison in Madrid Trotsky mused upon the cruel blow 
which fate had dealt him:
how did I end-up in prison in Madrid? I did not expect this. True, I 
was exiled from France. But I lived in Madrid as on a railway 
platform waiting my train, corresponding with Grimm and Serrati 
about going to Switzerland via Italy, walking in the museums...a 
million miles removed from the Spanish police and justice. If one 
takes into account that this is my first time in Spain...not knowing 
Spanish, not seeing anyone apart from Depre, not attending any 
meetings, my arrest is revealed in all its absurdity.4 
Trotsky's transferral to Cadiz did not bring about any great reversal 
in his fortunes. Although no longer in prison he was constantly annoyed 
by his police escort, of whom he penned a damning characterisation: ’It 
would be difficult to imagine anything more stupid and rotten than this 
subject. He reads poorly in Spanish, is inarticulate, smokes, spits, 
smirks at all approaching women, winks, waves goodbye and does not 
give me any peace.’5 He described Cadiz as even more backward than 
Spain in general, writing in a letter to Depre that 'Cadiz is a town of 
scientific and literary chastity truly touching - some centuries after 
Gutenberg!',6 and requesting that he send him some books. In the local 
library Trotsky did discover a store of one German and two dozen 
French books, all of which had been attacked by book worms! He made 
notes on Spanish history from early nineteenth-century edition French 
books, regretting that the masses were prevented from learning of the 
crimes of the forefathers of the contemporary ruling elites:
the people leam little from history because they do not know it. It 
reaches them - to the extent that it reaches them at all - through 
distorted school legends, national and religious holidays and in 
the lies of the official press. Historical facts which should 
enlighten the people become, on the contrary, a tool for its further 
duping.7
Indeed, after emerging from an empty museum and being struck by the 
noisy behaviour of the 'democratic public1 on a pier, he commented that 
'gigantic jacks will be needed to raise the culture of the mass.'8
Readers of Nachalo, the newspaper which had been formed to 
replace the now banned Nashe Slovo,9 were kept informed of Trotsky's
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whereabouts. Nachalo of 5 November 1916, for example, carried 
Trotsky's best wishes to his friends in France from Spain.10 A short note 
in Nachalo of 18 November was completely censored, but from its 
headline people would know that 'N. Trotsky is in Cadiz1.11 Eventually 
the Paris publication was able to present a fuller version of its 
correspondent's recent experiences when, on 30 November, it 
translated a piece on Trotsky which had appeared in El Socialista, the 
newspaper of the Spanish Socialist Party.12 This informed its readers of 
Trotsky's arrest by the police in Madrid, and of the efforts of Spanish 
socialists to attain his release. An editorial supplement to the translation 
said that Trotsky had spent three days in the Madrid prison before 
being sent to Cadiz. Nachalo noted that it was thanks to the 
interference of Spanish comrades that Trotsky had not immediately 
been sent to Havana upon arrival in the Spanish port, allowed instead 
to await a boat for New York, but warned that El Socialista bore all 
responsibility for writing of Trotsky as a ’pacifist'.13
Trotsky was able to maintain contact with his editorial colleagues in 
Paris, and his first report of his 'Spanish impressions' appeared in 
Nachalo at the beginning of December. Although sent from Cadiz, this 
article focussed mainly upon the events surrounding his stay in Madrid. 
After hinting that it was the intrigues of international diplomacy that lay 
behind his imprisonment,14 Trotsky recounted that when he had asked 
the Spanish police to explain that cause of his arrest he received the 
reply, 'Your ideas are too advanced for Spain'. He protested in vain that 
he had not expounded his views either at meetings or in print in Spain. 
Of the prison regime Trotsky was at first surprised that one could pay 
for a better cell and conditions, but he soon came to see the sense of 
this arrangement: 'Why establish a fictive equality before a harsh 
regime in society which is totally constructed on class inequality? 
Moreover, giving privileges to those arrested in the paying part of the 
prison, the wise administration helps the state budget which in Spain, 
as is well-known, is more in need of help than in any other place.'15 
From prison Trotsky sent a letter to the Minister of Internal Affairs 
complaining of the injustice he was suffering.16
It was on the road to Cadiz that he had earlier suspicions confirmed: 
the French authorities had telegrammed their Spanish counterparts
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warning of a dangerous 'anarcho-terrorist' who had entered Spain via 
San Sebastian.17 In Cadiz he avoided being sent to Havana, where he 
was sure he would be arrested upon arrival, through the intervention of 
the republican deputy Castrovido. There was one further aspect of his 
meetings with the Prefect in Cadiz which worried Trotsky. In a letter to 
Depre he said that the Prefect used a translator from the German 
consul to communicate with him. ’But,' he warned, 'if by any chance my 
enemies learn of this "fact" they will be able to use it after their own 
fashion.’18 In a light-hearted P.S. to his article in Nachalo he took the 
necessary preventive action: ’P. S. Because the Cadiz Prefect does not 
speak in a foreign language he invited some German as a translator. 
Then it turned out that this German is a secretary of the German 
consul. For the information of the agents and chiefs from Prizyv !’19 
Trotsky's concern that he would become the subject of scandalous 
articles back in Paris because of the ’German connection’ was not 
unfounded. Indeed, his next, and last, contribution to Nachalo was a 
response to a commentary upon his exile from France by the 
newspaper L'Action Socialiste, a translation of which appeared in 
Nachalo of 26 November. L'Action Socialiste objected to the way in 
which the closure of Nashe Slovo and Trotsky's expulsion had 
received sympathetic treatment in several French publications, and 
even among some deputies in the National Council. Were people not 
aware that the ’brave’ Nashe Slovo had afforded material assistance to 
the Germans with the aim of bringing about Russia's defeat? Did they 
not know of Trotsky's true character, most notably revealed in his 
dealings with Guesde, Sembat and Thomas?:
This person [Trotsky] at the outset of the war wrote a quick 
tempered brochure in support of the Entente. Then this person 
was seen roaming about Guesde’s and Sembat's anterior, 
supplied with a letter of recommendation from Plekhanov, in 
order to receive permission to go to the front as a correspondent 
of a Russian journal. As soon as this request was granted this 
person...poured pure insults over Guesde, Sembat and 
Thomas.20
Articles defending Nashe Slovo and Trotsky from L'Action 
Socialiste's critique subsequently appeared in Nachalo.21 Trotsky's
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own defence was printed in issue 74 of 27 December.22 He expressed 
puzzlement at the relevance of some of his adversary's statements: 
why should a professional journalist not appeal to ministers with a 
request to visit the front?; did journalists not have to visit anteriors in 
order to seek appointments? However, his main objection was that he 
had never sent a request of any sort to Guesde and Sembat. Indeed, 
he had seen the former only once, from the window of a comrade's flat, 
and the latter never. He then explained how, when in Zurich, he had 
requested a letter of introduction from Plekhanov to Guesde should he 
ever need to turn to the latter for help. But, after discovering the views 
that both men had adopted after the start of the war, he resolved not to 
use Plekhanov's letter, even ripping it up and recounting this episode 
only to Martov and Vladimirov.23 In conclusion he recommended that 
people read the extracts of his German brochure which had been 
published in Nashe Slovo to discover what 'material assistance' he had 
attempted to afford Germany.
Thus, although Trotsky described his Spanish episode as 'non- 
political' he remained at the centre of controversy both in Spain and in 
France. In February 1917 Nachalo answered readers requests for 
information about Trotsky and his family by printing short notices of 
their safe arrival in New York, and the warm welcome given to them by 
representatives of socialist groups, including the editors of Novyi Mir.2* 
Trotsky once again found a Russian socialist publication in which he 
could expound his views.
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CHAPTER TEN
America
The boat which carried Trotsky and his family out of Spain pulled into 
New York harbour in the early hours of 14 January 1917. The 
Bronsteins' arrival was not unexpected. From Cadiz Trotsky sent 
letters to the editors of the New York emigre socialist newspaper, Novyi 
Mir, informing them of the outcome of his Spanish episode. On 6th 
December 1916 Novyi Mir passed on to its readers the news which it 
had received from one of Trotsky's most recent communications: he 
was to be expelled from Spain and was intending to come to New 
York, America's port of call for many European immigrants.1 Upon safe 
arrival, Novyi Mir gave him a warm welcome, declaring that 'America 
has acquired a mainstay fighter of the revolutionary International.’2 In 
his autobiography Trotsky described his occupation in the United 
States as that of a 'revolutionary socialist'.3 Indeed, twenty-four hours 
after setting foot on American soil his first article appeared in Novyi Mir 
In 'Long live Struggle!' Trotsky outlined how the war had 
transformed Europe into an 'arresting company' in which tsarist 
methods of censorship and oppression reigned on both sides of the 
trenches. However, alongside this, he noted that, from the point of view 
of a revolutionary socialist, changes of a more optimistic character had 
also taken place. Most importantly, in response to the most bloody and 
shameful war in history, the masses were increasingly becoming 
discontented and more and more acquiring a critical analysis. The 
Europe that he had recently left was, he felt, ripe for upheaval: 'the 
combination of concentrated hatred with critical thoughts is terrible for 
today's rulers of Europe for it means revolution.'4 One might have 
thought that a professional revolutionary would be loath to leave this 
situation behind. Would not landing in America mean the loss both of an 
opportunity to lead a revolution and of the analysis appropriate to it? 
But Trotsky's move to the 'sufficiently old New World' did not lead him 
to abandon the views which he had formed in Paris. He assured his 
American readership that the United States faced the same 'problems,
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dangers and obligations’ to be found in Europe. He could thus enter the 
fray of American socialism fully equipped to do battle.
One of his first opportunities to enlighten an American audience of 
what lay in store for them was during a speech of 25 January to an 
international meeting of welcome, in which he expounded upon the 
connection between war and revolution. Trotsky delivered many talks 
in New York, the vast majority of which remained unpublished. We are 
therefore fortunate that Trotsky included the text of his 25 January 
lecture in War and Revolution. He argued that one could now trace 
several consequences of the outbreak of war which, taken together, 
were leading to revolutionary upheavals. To begin with, societies had 
become more and more split into two hostile camps, 'the rich had 
become richer and the poor poorer.' Added to this, state coffers across 
Europe were now empty, thus excluding the possibility of the ruling 
classes acquiescing the masses with further social reforms; 'people are 
becoming poorer not only materially but also in illusions.' Expanding 
upon this latter point, Trotsky discerned a new and, from his point of 
view, exciting 'mental state'. Individuals, he claimed, were no longer 
dominated by routine and were prepared to be daring; in other words, 
they had acquired the qualities of revolutionaries. Finally there was an 
international group of socialist saviours - Liebknecht in Germany, 
MacLean in Britain, Hbglund in Sweden, Rakovsky in Romania and so 
on - which, faced with the hostility of bourgeois institutions and the 
betrayal of former comrades, had for long been in the minority but 
would soon be leading the discontented majority to revolution. At the 
outset of his speech Trotsky compared an America rich in material 
goods, although sold for 'outrageous prices', with an impoverished 
Europe, and he worried whether his native continent would survive. His 
concluding remarks were more optimistic: 'The coming epoch will be an 
epoch of social revolution. I carried this conviction out of a Europe 
ravaged, burnt and drained. Here, in America, I welcome you under the 
banner of the coming social revolution!'5
Trotsky wrote a lengthy account of the last two and a half years of 
his life in Europe which appeared over several issues, spread over 
several months, of Novyi Mir.6 Published under the subheading 'From 
a Diary', these articles were a mixture of autobiographical incident,
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biographical sketches and social and political commentary. The first 
category included, for instance, a transcript of Trotsky's conversation 
of August 1914 with the head of the police in Vienna after which he 
decided to catch the first train to Zurich; being trapped in a street in 
Paris during a Zeppelin attack and so on. The figures who found 
themselves in the second category could not have been flattered by 
what Trotsky wrote of them. Briand, for example, was described as a 
'past master in the art of wire-pulling, a trafficker in the lost souls of the 
French Parliament, an instigator of bribery and corruption.' The final 
category, social and political commentary, consisted of Trotsky's 
thoughts on the effects of the war and on various socialists' responses 
to it. He mentioned meeting a Serbian revolutionary who had been 
involved in the plans to assassinate Archduke Ferdinand. He recounted 
the young man's despair at his country's then fate as a pawn in the 
diplomatic manoeuvres of the great powers, in this story highlighting 
the imperialist nature of the war. His description of Vienna after 
Ferdinand's death was full of hatred for the 'bourgeois press' which had 
'set about the task of working up the popular feelings'. At the same time 
he regretted that this 'irrefutable proof of the moral degeneration of 
bourgeois society’ had been obscured by influential socialists who had 
come out in support of the war. Unfortunately, Trotsky claimed, the 
betrayal of socialism by socialists, while a surprise for many, was not 
unexpected for him. During his stay in Vienna from 1907-14 he had had 
ample opportunity to acquaint himself with the 'purely chauvinistic 
nature' of Arbeiterzeitung's editorials on international affairs. What 
shock, then, the Austrian party's patriotic response to its government's 
war declaration? Although Trotsky said that he did not expect 
Plekhanovto go so far as an exponent of national militarism, he stated 
that in the pre-war era he already had reason to suspect Plekhanov's 
internationalism: 'in 1913, when I was at Bucharest, Rakovsky told me 
that just at the time of the Russo-Japanese war, Plekhanov had 
assured him...that in his opinion the idea that socialism should..."work 
for national defeat"...was an importation into the party that had been 
brought about by the Hebrew intellectuals.'7 In Austria, Switzerland and 
France Trotsky witnessed the same split between the social-patriotic 
right, the passive centre which acted as an appendage to the right, and
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the minority international left. He stressed the wide gulf which 
separated the latter from the others, writing that 'social-patriotism 
debases men morally and mentally,1 and left the reader in no doubt as 
to the seriousness of the battle between social-patriotism and 
internationalism. The war had brought forth hopes which it could not 
fulfil and the resulting disillusionment of the masses could only be used 
to the advantage of revolution if socialists remained true to their faith.
Trotsky drew upon his diary, on this occasion written during a train 
journey across France, for his next contribution to Novyi Mir Entitled 'In 
a French Carriage' this two-part article was similar in its portrayal of the 
realities of war to the war sketches which he had written for Kievskaya 
Mysl'. The first instalment begins with the train entering Lyon station. 
Immediately the habits of the trenches were on view for all to see: a 
group of naked soldiers stood washing themselves on the platform. 
The reader was then brought into closer acquaintance with life in the 
trenches through the experiences of a French miner-syndicalist with 
whom Trotsky conversed en route. The miner reported that most 
soldiers in the trenches were of peasant origin. Industrial workers were 
engaged in war production, while the petty bourgeoisie became 
officers or joined organisations in the rear. He then described the 
psychological difficulties trench warfare brought peasants, used to life 
above ground with a full horizon in view. The miners, at least, worked 
below ground even in peace time, and were familiar with the dangers of 
explosives and poisonous gasses. However, the one aspect of the war 
which was new to all - whether miners, peasants, soldiers, officers, 
French or Germans - was the scope and character of battle: 'The most 
awful thing is the uninterrupted firing of hundreds of different guns. 
Each sound is terrible after its own fashion and all, devoid of tempo and 
rhythm, come together in an undescribable and unbearable 
crashing...from which one cannot escape...you are led to a state verging 
on madness.'8
In the second and final section of 'In a French Carriage’ Trotsky 
focussed upon the positive psychological consequences of trench 
warfare. On the train he noticed the movement of thousands of people 
of all nationalities. He contrasted this to the pre-war era in which, on the 
one hand the industrial workers had come to occupy the most
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important strategic position in the economies of the advanced nations; 
and, on the other, old social classes, peasants and the petty 
bourgeoisie, characterised by a limited outlook and suspicion of all that 
was new, had retained a leading influence in social and political 
matters. Since August 1914, however, peasants who had not been in a 
town for decades had visited several in the course of several months. 
Trotsky expressed his conviction that this upheaval could not but 
create a psychological transformation. Specifically, he claimed that the 
war was destroying 'traditional fetishisms'.9 The post-war world would 
be inhabited by a new human type, full of criticism and daring, ready to 
introduce rationalism in production, politics and economics. This, of 
course, meant socialism.
The articles which Trotsky produced from his diary for Novyi Mir 
could not have brought much comfort either to a government 
considering declaring war or to those who would have to go forth and 
fight. However, at the time of the appearance of Trotsky's 'war notes' it 
was becoming increasingly likely that America would enter the then 
world conflict. At the end of January 1917 the German government 
announced it was going to engage in unrestricted submarine warfare 
from February 1. It took this decision in the hope that Britain would be 
starved into submission. At the same time, however, it meant breaking 
the terms of American neutrality.10 Interventionists immediately called 
upon President Wilson to declare war on Germany. In the hope that the 
Kaiser could be persuaded to change his mind, Wilson at first opted for 
severing diplomatic relations with Germany, which he announced on 3 
February. Several days following this announcement the first of a 
series articles in which Trotsky examined the growing tensions in 
America through the prism of his European experiences appeared in 
Novyi M ir.
In 'A Repetition of things past', for example, Trotsky claimed that 
America, a country without its own traditions and ideology, had many 
times provided a home for ideas which had exhausted themselves in 
Europe. Previously this had involved political and religious ideas; now it 
was the legend of a 'war of liberation'. He advised Americans to read 
the European newspapers of late July and early August 1914. From 
these sources they would gain an understanding of the aims of the
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patriotic campaign that the American press was currently waging. 
Namely, the press barons had to convince the people that its 
government was concerned about 'freedom' and ’justice' and that it 
was reacting to the aggressive acts of others. At first this 'preparatory 
work for war' would hold out the possibility of a peaceful resolution to 
the crisis, publicising the good intentions of the home government in 
humble terms. Only when the plans for mobilisation were complete 
would 'the devilish chauvinistic music' be played to its fullest extent. It 
was by proceeding in this way that Trotsky claimed the government 
and the press hoped awkward questions concerning the real reasons 
for American intervention would be avoided:
And how about the war deliveries which the German submarines 
threaten? And what of the billions of profit falling with a Europe 
bleeding to death?...Who is able to speak of this at a time of great 
national enthusiasm! If the New York stock market is prepared for 
great sacrifices (the people will bear them) then, it goes without 
saying, that this is not in the name of contemptible money, but in 
the cause of a great truth...how to call it? - morals. It is not the fault 
of the stock market if, in serving eternal justice, it receives 100% 
and more in profit!11 
The response he demanded from American socialists and advanced 
workers was to raise the 'mighty melody of the International'.
One of the main messages which Trotsky had propagated in Europe 
was that the tune of the International had not only to be 'mighty' but 
also 'pure'. In other words, socialists had to hold an internationalist 
position and have no truck with social-patriotism. Trotsky repeated this 
message to American colleagues through the pages of Novyi Mir. In 'In 
the school of war',12 for instance, he recounted how the honour of 
socialism had been saved in Europe by, among others, Liebknecht, 
MacLean and Rakovsky. He held up the Italian party as an example of 
how influence over the masses could be retained and strengthened if 
socialists occupied an anti-war position. The question facing American 
socialists was: Would they accept the lessons to be learnt from 
Europe? In a subsequent article Trotsky stated that the authority of the 
Second International could not be cited as a justification for socialists 
advocating the cause of national self-defence. At pre-war meetings
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Kautsky, described as the ’leading theoretician’ of the Second 
International, rejected national self-defence along with the notions of 
'defensive' and 'aggressive' wars in disputes with Bebel. Trotsky 
admitted that, if one studied the formal resolutions of the Second 
International, one would come across contradictory statements. 
However, the Basel Congress of 1912, called specifically to discuss a 
proper socialist response to war, was unequivocal: 'preserve between 
yourselves inseverable ties during war, fight together for its hasty 
conclusion and use the growing war crisis and dissatisfaction of the 
mass to speedily overthrow the capitalist order'.13 Finally, in 'Two 
Warring Camps', Trotsky highlighted the pitfalls of Longuetist tactics,
i.e., to be 'simultaneously for the capitalist homeland and for the 
proletariat',14 to show that social-patriotism and revolutionary 
internationalism were two mutually exclusive principles.15
Trotsky did not limit himself to pointing out the lessons which recent 
events in the European socialist movement held for American 
socialists. In New York he actively engaged in polemics with local 
organisations for the application of a revolutionary socialist 
perspective. In a commentary upon a recent anti-war meeting held in 
the Carnegie Hall, for example, he criticised the Socialist Party for 
organising this with a pacifist group ’The Friends of Peace’. From an 
'organisational-political' point of view, he argued, it was not expedient 
to share a platform with pacifists. After all, pacifists were well-known as 
people who would publicise their opposition to war until it was declared, 
after which they would announce their 'patriotism' and encourage the 
masses to conduct the war to a successful conclusion in the name of 
'peace and justice'. By standing alongside pacifists, if only temporarily, 
Trotsky stated that the masses would be brought into confusion at a 
time when 'clear class consciousness' was urgently necessary. 
Moreover, he claimed the mood of the Carnegie Hall gathering, 
overwhelmingly revolutionary socialist, had been weakened 'both 
psychologically and politically' as two resolutions, one pacifist and one 
socialist, were unanimously accepted by the same show of hands; 
anyone reconstructing the meeting's atmosphere from the resolutions 
would be led astray. Some good had, however, come out of the 
meeting. Trotsky welcomed the socialist resolution's insistence that
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American intervention in the war would 'only serve the egoistic interests 
of the capitalists of this country...to feed upon the unfortunate war in 
Europe', and that the proletariat should 'apply all the means at its 
disposal against the attempt to involve America in the war.'16 The duty 
of Socialist Party leaders to vote against war credits and to call for 
revolutionary action against the war campaign had now been made 
clear. For Trotsky, one had to ensure that they carried-out this 'great 
obligation'.
It was, however, events at the bottom of the Socialist Party's 
structure which brought forth Trotsky’s next rebuke to social-patriotism 
in the American socialist movement. In a short note in Novyi Mir he 
recounted how, while attending a Socialist Party branch meeting, Anna 
Ingerman cited Klara Zetkin, the German left revolutionary, in support 
of the view that socialists could join government-led military 
organisations.17 Trotsky stated that Ingerman had every right to draw 
upon Scheidemann, Plekhanov and Vandervelde to achieve her aims 
but it would be better if she left Zetkin, currently serving a term of 
imprisonment for anti-war activities, in peace. Ingerman then sent a 
letter protesting Trotsky's report which, along with his reply, was 
published in Novyi Mir of 16 February.
Ingerman disputed Trotsky's version of events, declaring that 'in 
aspiring to show his knightly feelings for Klara Zetkin, comrade Trotsky 
completely forgot what actually occurred at the meeting.' In actual fact, 
she claimed, nobody had opposed the proposition that it was 
inadmissible for socialists to voluntarily sign-up for the army and navy. 
What was discussed was the issue of whether comrade doctors and 
nurses who served in the Red Cross should be excluded from the party. 
It was in this context that she had repeated Zetkin's words to her that, 
'my husband and my son, doctors, will certainly join a medical 
organisation: this is our duty', not with the intention of throwing Zetkin’s 
internationalism into doubt, but to show that one could participate in the 
Red Cross and hold party membership. To Trotsky's claim that Zetkin is 
'one of us' Ingerman retorted: 'It is possible to not be with you, comrade 
Trotsky, and all the same remain a true internationalist.'18
Trotsky countered Ingerman's letter with the claim that she had 
missed the central issue of the status of the Red Cross, which she
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obviously accepted as a neutral body. However, he advised that if one 
turned to the source from which Zetkin's view of this organisation could 
be revealed, the journal of the German left, Internationale, a different 
picture would emerge. This publication clearly stated that socialists 
should afford assistance to wounded soldiers through their own and 
not state organisations, of which the Red Cross was one of many.19 
Thus, even if one accepted Ingerman's story, she still had no right to 
cite Zetkin. In his conclusion Trotsky responded to Ingerman's 
accusation that he was claiming internationalism for himself. He stated 
that before this issue could be resolved Ingerman would have to 
declare her internationalist principles. As matters stood she was an 
'intermediary element' which had 'cited a personal conversation with 
Zetkin in defence of a tendency to which Zetkin herself is irreconcilably 
hostile.'20
If Trotsky viewed the Red Cross as part of the imperialist war 
machine one can well imagine the disgust he must have felt for the 
Council of National Defence and its Advisory Commission. These 
bodies had been created by Congress in August 1916 to coordinate 
industries and resources for national security and to prepare for their 
application in the event of war. The Advisory Commission had a series 
of sub-committees, one of which, the Labour Committee headed by 
Samuel Gompers, had responsibility for, among other things, drawing 
up plans to enrol skilled labour in industrial reserves and to suggest 
adjustments to employment problems to guarantee uninterrupted war 
work.21 Trotsky analysed Gompers and his Committee in 'A Sheep's 
Constitution'. He condemned Gompers as a social-patriot who was 
attempting to put a whole generation of the proletariat at the service of 
militarism. Of course, he pointed out, Gompers claimed that the 
interests of the workers would be protected by the Council of National 
Defence - capital would bear the burdens of war and so on. But, asked 
Trotsky, what guarantee could Gompers offer that these promises 
would be honoured? Trotsky himself foresaw a very different scenario: 
'with the first practical collision with the unions the ruling classes of this 
country will say the same thing to them as the British, German and 
French ruling classes said in similar circumstances: "the defence of the 
homeland, on your own admission, is the first duty of the proletariat; in
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this case in fulfilling this duty you do not have the right to make 
demands"'. Gompersism, defined by Trotsky as the 'desire to achieve 
for the proletariat a 'beneficial' industrial constitution on the basis of the 
immunity of capitalist exploitation', was labelled the deadly enemy of 
the proletariat against which each internationalist should struggle with 
all his might. Fortunately, according to Trotsky, conditions had never 
been better for winning the workers over from Gompersism, for during 
war the bourgeoisie would not be able to afford the reforms with which 
they pacified the workers at times of peace. He predicted that the gap 
between expectations of a better life and the poverty which war would 
bring would create minds receptive to revolutionary propaganda. 
Socialists could use this to their advantage only if they repeated the 
following messages: 'No concessions to the state, to militarism and to 
patriotism. No deals with Gompersism.'22
As part of the struggle for revolutionary internationalism Trotsky 
himself engaged in polemics with the newspapers Forverts, Russkii 
Golos, and Russkoe Slovo.
Forverts was a powerful Jewish daily with a circulation of 150,000 by 
1917. It was edited by Abraham Cahan and had in its own ten storey 
high building overlooking the heart of New York's Jewish quarter.23 The 
paper gave Trotsky an enthusiastic welcome when he arrived in New 
York and he contributed four articles to it over the course of January 
and February. The publication of a fifth piece, ironically enough as it 
turned out on social-patriotism, was prevented when Trotsky broke 
with the newspaper at the beginning of March. Joseph Nedava, basing 
his account upon a conversation with David Shub in New York in July 
1969, gives the following version of the dispute:
The incident was brought about by the State Department’s 
exposure, on March 1,1917, of a German plot to embroil Mexico 
in the war against the United States, promising to Mexico the 
return of New Mexico and parts of California as a prize. The 
disclosure aroused the wrath of even the pro-German Forward 
[Forverts], which then printed on the front page an 
announcement that ’if Germany can really commit such an idiotic 
move of diplomacy, then every citizen of America will fight to the 
last drop of his blood to protect the great American republic.’ A
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few hours after the publication of this statement, Trotsky stormed 
into Cahan's office on East Broadway, and an angry exchange of 
words passed between them. Trotsky then severed his 
connection with Forward.24
If Trotsky did go to Cahan's office, he left behind his article, for when 
he opened his campaign against Forverts from the pages of Novyi Mir 
on 6 March, he demanded the return of his manuscript.25 He 
immediately sought to qualify his earlier cooperation with Forverts, 
announcing that he always knew that this publication was not fully 
internationalist. He had, he claimed, contributed articles to it as this was 
appropriate to the discussion nature of January and February and, in 
any case, colleagues who knew the paper better than he and who 
translated sections of it for him had advised him to do so. However, the 
increasing displays of hostility between Germany and the United 
States, together with Forverts statement that Americans should fight to 
the last drop of blood, had changed the situation. Trotsky thought that 
the proletariat should struggle against the imperialist homeland and he 
therefore stood on the other side of the barricade to Forverts. To avoid 
the possible confusion that he shared an analysis with the Jewish daily 
he requested that publication of his piece be stopped and the 
manuscript returned.26
In a subsequent note in Novyi Mir Trotsky reported that he had 
received numerous letters from Jewish workers approving his stand 
against Forverts. He pointed to these letters, and the anti-'national 
defence1 resolutions of a local party branch meeting, as evidence that 
Forverts had lost touch with its readers' views. Encamped within its ten 
storey headquarters he accused the Jewish newspaper of establishing 
a dictatorship over its readership, of not reporting the latest party 
decisions which were obviously uncomfortable for it, and of social- 
patriotic betrayal. For Trotsky the time had come for a ’cleansing of the 
ranks1.27 He urged Jewish workers to recapture their newspaper and 
expel Cahan from the party, assuring them that in these tasks they 
could rely on the full support of Novyi Mr.28
During his conflict with the Jewish daily Trotsky several times 
mentioned his reliance upon friends to translate from Yiddish into 
Russian. He had no such difficulties in the campaign he waged against
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the ’non-party’ newspapers produced for New York's Russian colony, 
Russkii Golos and Russkoe Slovo. His first commentary upon these 
publications highlighted their differing points of view on the likelihood of 
American intervention in the war. Ivan Okuntsov, writing in Russkii 
Golos, thought that opposition from Wall Street would keep America 
neutral, whereas Dymov, a correspondent of Russkoe Golos, thought 
that pressure from the same source, which had made super-profits 
from the 'blood of the people', would lead America into battle. Trotsky 
said that, however comforting Okuntsov's view was, he had to agree 
with Dymov. This left him with only one 'reader's difficulty'. An editorial 
of the self same issue of Russkoe Slovo in which Dymov's article 
appeared viewed America's entry into the war not as a desire to make 
more money, but as a 'guarantee of progress’. 'Why,' concluded 
Trotsky, 'had the editorial and the correspondent agreed to lead their 
public into confusion?'29
When Trotsky next took up his pen to write of his 'non-party' 
protagonists it was not to accuse them of bewildering their readership, 
but of 'indecency'. The cause of Trotsky's charge was the appearance 
of adverts, placed in Russkii Golos and Russkoe Slovo by the New 
York Council of National Defence, urging citizens to add their name to a 
petition to be sent to President Wilson recommending American 
intervention. Previously, he noted, neither of these newspapers had 
joined in the efforts to whip the population into a patriotic fury; they 
knew that the Russian colony did not want war. What had made the 
newspapers change their track, Trotsky claimed, was money: 'In such 
critical moments one gets to know the real value of people, ideas, 
parties and publications...when gold was added to the ideological 
preparation of the people Russkoe Slovo and Russkii Golos found 
their place.'30
When America eventually officially entered World War I on 6 April 
1917 Trotsky had already left America. Before his departure had had, 
however, written critical analyses both of the reasons for America's 
intervention and of its likely consequences.
In his address of war to the American people President Wilson 
declared, 'The present German submarine warfare against commerce 
is a warfare against mankind. The world must be made safe for
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democracy.’31 Seizing upon these words Trotsky, in an article in Novyi 
Mir, stated that if one took them at face value America should have long 
ago declared war on Britain for its blockade of Austria-Germany. What 
prevented this step from being taken, according to Trotsky, was that it 
would have resulted in the loss of the Entente orders for war supplies 
from which American industry was making super-profits. In turn, Wilson 
was so upset by the recent German blockade not because it violated 
any principles, but because it effectively put a halt to Entente orders 
without replacing them with their equivalent from Berlin. America was 
now deprived of all war trade and its profits. This left her in a position of 
real neutrality which, Trotsky argued, she could not sustain because 
since August 1914 her industry had been increasingly and then finally 
restructured to serve military demands. It had, in other words, become 
a war economy. He then dismissed the possibility that American 
soldiers could change the military situation in Europe, pointing out that 
if the mightiest (British) fleet in the world could not guarantee a free 
passage for goods then nothing could. For him, it was the bosses of 
finance capital and their interests which dictated American foreign 
policy and, at the then current moment, this meant war: ’a colossal new 
market will immediately be opened for American ammunition factory 
bosses in America itself...they need a "national danger" so as to be able 
to place the tower of Babel of war industry on the shoulders of the 
American people.'32
At the same time as laying bare the profit motives which demanded 
war, in other articles in Novyi Mir Trotsky argued that the real winner 
from American intervention would not be the capitalist bosses, but 
revolution. When he summarised his New York experiences in his 
autobiography Trotsky mentioned the conveniences in his flat 
(including electric lights, a bath and telephone) that Europeans were 
unused to.33 In one of his comments upon daily life in New York at that 
time, however, he wrote a moving description of the effects of the 
drudgery, out of which American capital built its achievements, suffered 
by ordinary people. He noted, during a rush hour ride on the metro, a 
humble and depressed crowd whose only solace lay in chewing gum.34 
The war, he predicted in other writings, would show the proletariat that 
only they, through social revolution, could resolve the problems that
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beset capitalism and which had led to America's entry into World War 
One.35 He advised all socialists to 'prepare the soldiers for 
revolution!'36
After Nicholas M's abdication of the Russian throne in March 1917 
anyone seeking confirmation of the link Trotsky constructed between 
war and revolution had a ready and current example to hand. Events in 
Russia continued to occupy Trotsky while he was in New York both 
before, but especially after, the collapse of the monarchy.
He submitted two articles to Novyi Mir on Russia prior to Nicholas's 
fall from power. The first was to commemorate the twelfth anniversary 
of Bloody Sunday. Calling revolutionary anniversaries days for 'great 
study' as well as for remembrance, Trotsky enumerated the lessons to 
be learnt from the events of 1905: the proletariat was the only 
revolutionary class in Russia and all calls for it to cooperate with the 
bourgeoisie were a hopeless utopia 37 In his second pre-revolution 
piece on Russia he highlighted the tsar's cynical view of the Duma, and 
the latter's willingness to fulfil its masters needs. He achieved this 
primarily through an imaginary conversation between a Russian and 
foreign diplomat, in which the former stated that the tsar would recall 
the Duma so as to receive another foreign loan, upon the receipt of 
which the Russian parliament would once again be closed. 'Thus,' 
Trotsky remarked without further comment, 'Russian politics marches 
along the path of progress.'38
Three points had for long been part of Trotsky's analysis of the 
course a revolutionary upheaval in Russia would take: first, it would be 
led by the proletariat; second, its policies would be socialist in content; 
and, third, it would call forth, either by inspiration or by force of arms, a 
spate of revolutions across the whole of Europe. During World War One 
Trotsky modified this analysis somewhat, adding that the United States 
of Europe would be the state form through which the European 
revolution would realise itself, and that revolution would occur first of all 
in Germany 39 News of the fall of tsarism obviously confounded 
Trotsky's last prediction, but for the most part he was able to retain his 
prognoses for interpreting the events taking place in his homeland.
According to Trotsky, it was street demonstrations by the workers, 
eventually backed by the army, that had brought about the tsar's
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abdication. The bourgeoisie, led by his old antagonist Professor 
Milyukov, had not wanted the monarchy to fall. On the contrary, he 
claimed, the liberals looked to the tsar as the most trustful defender of 
property against the proletariat, and to the institution of monarchy as 
the form of government best suited to conduct an imperialist foreign 
policy. For Trotsky, the liberals had been forced to form a Provisional 
Government by two pressures, one external and the other internal. 
From outside the country the British, French and American money 
markets had told the Russian bourgeoisie to assume power because 
they did not want Nicholas II to conclude a separate peace with 
Germany, and the bourgeoisie was the only group that would continue 
the war. Then, the bourgeoisie itself was afraid that its responsibility for 
the war would be revealed if a workers' government called a halt to the 
hostilities. However, Trotsky argued that the bourgeoisie could not 
retain power for long. The fall of the Provisional Government was 
guaranteed because it could not satisfy the people's demands for 
peace, bread and land. He noted that a workers' committee had 
already been formed to 'protest at the liberals attempts to 
misappropriate the revolution and betray the people to the 
monarchy',40 and he called upon it to wrest total control in its hands to 
take Russia out of the war and to resolve the agrarian question. For 
Trotsky any other outcome would mean that the revolution had failed, 
since only a 'Revolutionary Workers’ Government...will be able to 
secure the fate of the revolution and the working class.' In turn he 
looked to the establishment of a revolutionary workers' government in 
Russia as an example for the German proletariat to follow. Otherwise, 
he worried, Wilhelm II would use the Russian proletariat's backing of its 
bourgeoisie to rekindle the German workers' enthusiasm for war. He 
raised the possibility of revolution not spreading from one country to 
another only to dismiss it. Revolution would leap from Russia to 
Germany either by example or by triumphant Russian workers 
liberating their German comrades by force of arms; or it would jump 
from Germany to Russia by the same means. Trotsky was so 
convinced that the whole of Europe was simmering with discontent, 
that 'the war has turned the whole of Europe into a powder-keg of 
social revolution',41 that he was prepared for all eventualities.
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10.1 Conclusion
It was in this buoyant mood that Trotsky and his family set sail from 
New York for Russia on 27 March 1917 42 He could look back upon his 
time in America with a certain amount of satisfaction. He had argued for 
a revolutionary socialist analysis of and response to current events in 
print and at a host of meetings.43 On the other hand his campaign 
against social-patriotism had not stopped America entering the war, 
but Trotsky must have realised that his journalism could not do this. 
Besides, he now welcomed war as a harbinger of revolution, without, 
of course, recommending defeatism!
No, Trotsky's biggest disappointments lay in the future. We now 
know that his hopes for a pan-European revolutionary government in 
the form of a United States of Europe were not realised. The German 
workers did not manage to seize power, despite the fact that the 
Bolsheviks overturned the Provisional Government in November 1917, 
and despite Trotsky's efforts to reveal the imperialist nature of the war 
through his 'no peace, no war* strategy during the peace negotiations 
with the Kaiser's government. It was perhaps quite fitting that the man 
who had argued that the proletariat needed to halt the war before it 
could turn cannons against the class enemy should have negotiated 
Russia's exit from World War One. However, this thesis has focussed 
upon Trotsky's thoughts and activities while he was a revolutionary in 
exile and the story of how, why and in what context his association with 
the ’war to end all wars' came to an end lies beyond the scope of this 
present study.
America 311
Notes
1. Trotskii vyslan' iz' ispanii, sobiraetsya v' N'yu-Iorke', Novyi 
Mir, No. 851, 6 December 1916, p 1.
2. 'Tov. Trotskii v' N'yu-Iorke', Novyi Mir, No. 885,15 January 
1917, p i .
3. L. T rotskii, Moya zhizn Moscow ,1991,p262.
4. N. Trotskii, 'Da zdravstvuet' bor'ba!', Novyi Mir, No. 886,16
January 1917, p 4.
5. L. Trotskii, 'Pod znamenem sotsial'noi revolyutsii. (Rech' na 
internatsional'nom n'yu-iorkskom "mitinge vstrechi" 25 
Yanvarya 1917 g.)', Voina i Revolyutsiya, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1924, p 
368.
6. N. Trotskii, 'Za dva s' polovinoi goda voiny v' Evrope (izf 
dnevnika). I. Serbskie terroristy i frantsuzskie "osvoboditeli" - 
Venskiya nastroeniya v' pervyie dni voiny', Novyi Mir, No. 895, 
26 January 1917, p 4; N. Trotskii, 'Za dva...II. Nastroeniya v1 
avstriiskoi s-d - Viktor1 Adler' - Ot'ezde v' Tsyurikh', Novyi Mir, 
No. 903, 5 February 1917, p 2; Lev' N. Trotskii, ’Za dva...III. 
"predatel'stvo nemtsev" - Plekhanov' - Greilikh', Novyi Mir, No. 
914, 17 February 1917, p 4; Lev' N. Trotskii, 'Za dva... IV. 
Shveitsurskaya sotsialdemokratya - "Gryutli" - "Eintrakht" - 
Frits' Platten' - Nemetskaya broshyura "Voina i Internatsional"’ - 
Sotsialisticheskaya pripiska k' shtatu', Novyi Mir, No. 928,6  
March 1917, p 4; Lev' N. Trotskii, 'Za dva...V. Pereezde vo 
Frantsie - Parizh’ - Viviani - Zhofre - Brian' - Klemanso', Novyi 
Mir, No. 943, 22 March 1917, p 4. Trotsky gave his version of 
how tsarist diplomacy had had him exiled from France in Lev' N. 
Trotskii, 'Tsarizm na respublikanskoi pochve. I', Novyi Mir, No. 
908,10 February 1917, p 4 and Lev' N. Trotskii, 'Tsarizm na 
respublikanskoi pochve. II', Novyi Mir, No. 909, 12 February 
1917, p 4.
7. In a subsequent note in Novyi Mir Trotsky said that he had 
received a letter in which he was asked why he had remained
America 312
silent on Plekhanov's social-nationalism when he first learned of 
it from Rakovsky in 1913? In reply Trotsky pointed to the state 
of affairs in the pre-war era. In public Plekhanov either spoke 
the language of internationalism or said nothing at all. In such 
circumstances what basis would the public have had for 
believing Trotsky's revelations based on a personal 
conversation? It was Plekhanov's current post-war stance that 
made Trotsky's revelation possible: 'If now I considered it 
possible to cite these personal observations, it was only because 
they supplement Plekhanov's current public excesses and to a 
certain degree add to them a psychological key.' (Lev' N.
Trotskii, 'Na zaprosy chitatelei. 0  Plekhanove', Novyi Mir, No.
926, 3 March 1917, p 4).
8. N. Trotskii, Vo frantsuzkom vagone. (Razgovory i 
razmyshleniya). I', Novyi Mir, No. 900, 1 February 1917, p 3.
Two days later Trotsky presented another depressing account of 
trench warfare when he reproduced the letter of a Russian 
volunteer serving in the French army. See Al'fa, 'Dokumenty 
voiny', Novyi Mir, No. 902, 3 February 1917, p 4.
9. N. Trotskii, Vo frantsuzkom vagone. (Razgovory i 
razmyshleniya). II', Novyi Mir, No. 901, 2 February 1917, p 4.
10. For an account of America's neutrality in the war and the events 
which led it to enter the First World War see, for example, John 
Whiteclay Chambers II, The Tyranny of Change: America in the 
Progressive Era, 1900-191 7, New York, 1980, pp 199-228.
11. N. Trotskii, 'Povtorenie proidennago', Novyi Miry No. 905, 7 
February 1917, p 4.
12. N. Trotskii, 'V' shkole voiny', Novyi Mir, No. 904, 6 February 
1917, p 4.
13. Lev' N. Trotskii, 'Chto govoril International o zashchite 
otechestva?', Novyi Miry No. 922, 27 February 1917, p 4.
14. Lev' N. Trotskii, 'Dva voyuyushchikh lagerya', Novyi Mirf No. 930, 
8 March 1917, p 4.
15. Trotsky also made this point in the article 'One has to Choose the 
Path'. Here, however, he illustrated how social-patriotism leads 
to a rejection of revolutionary socialism not so much through the
America 313
example of recent European experience, as through a comparison 
of social-patriotism with other movements (Christianity, the 
Reformation, liberalism and democracy) which had began as a 
protest on behalf of the oppressed and ended as tools of the 
oppressors. See Lev1 N. Trotskii, 'Nuzhno vybirat’ put”, Novyi Mir, 
No. 919, 23 February 1917, p 4.
16. Cited in 'Bol'shoe obyazatel’stvo. (Po povodu rezolyutsii 
mitinga v' Kamegi Goll')’, Novyi Mir, No. 906, 8 February 1917, p
3. For Trotsky's response to the pacifist Hillquit's charge that 
Trotsky had no right to advise others to pursue revolutionary 
tactics since Trotsky himself had not been prepared to stay in 
Russia to do likewise see, 'Revolyutsionnyi tsenz Khilkvita.
(Pis'mo v redaktsiyu "N.-Y. Volkszeitung")', Trotskii, Voina i 
Revoiyutsiya, Vol. 2, pp 381-383.
17. Lev' N. Trotskii, 'Karlu Tsetkin1 lushche im' ostavit' v pokoe. 
(Pis'mo v* redaktsiyu)', Novyi Miry No. 910,13 February 1917, p
4.
18. Anna Ingerman', 'Iz' za chego shum' tov. Trotskii?', Novyi Mir,
No. 913, 16 February 1917, p 3.
19. In Novyi Mir of 3 March 1917 Trotsky replied to a letter that he 
had received from Mary Ragoz. Ragoz asked Trotsky what 
assistance could international socialists afford the war wounded 
when, as far as she knew, there were only two doctors among 
the group of Russian socialists in America, and none among the 
Finnish section. In light of this she wondered whether it would 
not be better to view the Red Cross as a neutral organisation, like 
a library or a tram. Trotsky stated that he was not proposing 
that internationalists should replace the Red Cross with their 
own body. He knew that the movement did not have the 
resources to achieve this, and even if it did the state would not 
permit this 'just as it does not give soldiers a free choice 
between state and private doctors.' As matters stood the Red 
Cross had as its aim healing the sick so as to ensure their speedy 
return to the front and this was why socialists could not 
participate in it. On the issue of what socialists could do to aid 
the wounded was to publicise soldiers' rights, maintain ties with
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comrade soldiers sending them books and tobacco; in this way 
preserving their socialist spirit. (See, Lev1 N. Trotskii, 'Na 
zaprosy chitatelei. 0  Krasnom' Kreste', Novyi Mir, No. 926, 3 
March 1917, p 4).
20. L Trotskii, 'A vse-taki Klaru Tsetkin' naprasno trevozhite!',
Novyi Mir, No. 913,16 February 1917, p 3.
21. For an exposition of the origins of the Council for National 
Defence, its Advisory Council and Gompers role in them see B. 
Mandel, Samuel Gompers, Ohio, 1963, pp 364ff.
22. 'Baran'ya konstitutsiya. (Konferentsiya Gompersa i Ko)1, Novyi 
Mirf No. 936, 15 March 1917, p 4.
23. For an account of the American Jewish workers' movement and 
Forverts's place in it see, for example, Arthur A. Goren, New 
York Jews and the Quest for Community, New York, 1970; Irving 
Howe, The Immigrant Jews of New York, London, 1976; and Nora 
Levin, Jewish Socialist Movements, 1871-1917, London, 1978.
24. Joseph Nedava, Trotsky and the Jews, (Philadelphia, 1971), p 26.
25. Lev' N. Trotskii, 'Obshchei pochvy s' "Forvertsom"' U Nas' Net", 
Novyi Mir, No. 928, 6 March 1917, p 4 . On the following day 
Trotsky likened Forverts's change from a pro- to an anti- 
German stance to the dilemma of a German bourgeois proprietor 
who until 3 February had published pro-German articles, but 
after this date found it expedient to argue for the American 
cause. See AT fa, 'Kto otgadaet?', Novyi Mir, No. 929, 7 March 
1917, p 4.
26. On 9 March Trotsky reported that Forverts was claiming that 
somebody had mistranslated its editorial of 1 March for Trotsky. 
Trotsky's response is illustrated by the heading of his reply to 
Forverts: 'It’s Untrue!'. See L.N.T., 'Nepravda!', Novyi Mir> No. 931, 
9 March 1917, p 3. Given Trotsky’s Jewish origins it may at First 
sight appear strange that he needed somebody to translate from 
Yiddish into Russian for him. However, from his autobiography 
we discover that Trotsky did not learn to speak Yiddish at home 
(his father spoke a mixture of Ukrainian/Russian) and he must 
of gained only the slightest knowledge of Hebrew from his brief 
period of study of the bible in Hebrew, (see Trotskii, Moyazhizn\
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pp 38, 54, 56). For an alternative view, i.e., that Trotsky knew 
Yiddish well and could easily communicate in it, see Nedava, 
Trotsky and the Jews, pp 35-37. Here Nedava claims that 
Trotsky hid his knowledge of Yiddish when he came to write his 
autobiography since he wanted to stress that he was a citizen of 
the world: 'As he never considered himself a son of the Pale of 
Settlement, but rather a true citizen of the world, he naturally 
could not admit to ever having shown interest in learning the 
language of the Pale.1
27. 'Neobkhodimo ochishchenie riadov; rol' "Forvertsa" v' 
evreiskom1 rabochem dvizhenii1, Novyi Mir, No. 935, 14 March 
1917, p4.
28. Trotsky commented on Cahan's activities one more time in 
Novyi Mir when, to mark Cahan's speech at a meeting in 
Madison Square Garden, he argued that the editor of Forverts 
had no revolutionary credentials. He labelled Cahan's comment 
in Forverts that Russia was not ripe for a republic and his 
telegram of welcome to Milyukov as an 'impudent call to the 
Russian proletariat and an insult to the Russian revolution.' See - 
:, 'G-n Kagan', kak' istolkovatel' russkoi revolyutsii pered’ 
rabochimi N'yu Iorka', Novyi Mir, No. 941, 20 March 1917, p 4. 
When Trotsky came to write of his time in New York in his 
autobiography he did not mention his initial cooperation with 
Forverts, giving only a negative characterisation of the Jewish 
daily newspaper. (Trotskii, Moyazhizn', p 268)
29. Al'fa, 'Zatrudneniya chitatelya’, Novyi Mir, No. 931, 9 March 
1917, p 4.
30. Al'fa, 'Obrabotka i pozolota', Novyi Mir, No. 937,16 March 1917,
P 4.
31. Cited in Whiteclay Chambers II,77ie Tyranny of Change, p 221. In 
'Through the Window' Trotsky described the scene, witnessed 
while staring out of Novyi M ir’s office window, of an old man 
picking his way through a litter bin and selecting some mouldy 
bread, and wondered how President Wilson would explain how 
the old man's rights and dignity were being defended by the 
war. (See Al'fa, 'U okna', Novyi Mir, No. 926, 3 March 1917, p 3).
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32. Lev’ N. Trotskii, ’Dlya chego Amerike voina?', Novyi Mir, No. 931, 
9 March 1917, p 4.
33. Trotskii, Moya zhizn', p 263.
34. Al'fa, 'Zhvachka', Novyi Mir, No. 932,10 March 1917, p 4.
35. 'Voina i revolyutsii', Novyi Mir, No. 943, 22 March 1917, p . In 
'Sober Thoughts' Trotsky noted the mayor's inadequate 
response to the problem of rising prices brought about by the 
war crisis. He warned the mayor that when hungry mothers 
protest it is not only mayors who lose their jobs. (See Al'fa, 
'Trezvyya mysli', Novyi Mir, No. 928, 6 March 1917, p 4).
36. 'Gotov'te soldat' revolyutsii', Novyi Mir, No. 930, 8 March 
1917, p 4.
37 N. Trotskii, 'Uroki velikago goda. 9 yanvarya 1905 - 9 yanvarya 
1917g', Novyi Mir, No. 890, 20 January 1917, p 4.
38. Al'fa, 'Opyat' otkryli dumu', Novyi Mir, No. 930, 8 March 1917, p
4.
39. For an exposition of Trotsky's views on these issues as they 
developed from 1905 onwards see Ian D. Thatcher, 'Uneven and 
Combined Development', Revolutionary Russia, 2,1991, pp 
235-258.
40. Lev' N. Trotskii, 'Dva litsa. (Vnutrenniya sily russkoi revolyutsii)’, 
Novyi Mir, No. 938, 17 March 1917, p 4 .
41. Lev' N. Trotskii, 'Ot' kogo i kak' zashchishchat' revolyutsiyu?', 
Novyi Mir, No. 942, 21 March 1917, p 4 . For Trotsky's analysis 
of Europe on the verge of revolution see also Lev' N. Trotskii, 
'Nespokoino v' Evrope', Novyi Mir, No. 936,15 March 1917, p 4 
and 'Pod' znamenem' kommuny', Novyi Mir, No. 938,17 March 
1917, p 4. For further articles by Trotsky on Russia after the 
March revolution which were summarised but not directly 
quoted from in the main text of this chapter see, Lev' N. Trotskii, 
'U poroga revolyutsii’, Novyi Mir, No. 934, 13 March 1917, p 4; 
'Revolyutsiya v' Rossii', Novyi Mir, No. 937,16 March 1917, p 4; 
Lev' N. Trotskii, 'Narostayushchii konflikt*. (Vnutrenniya sily 
revolyutsii)', Novyi Mir, No. 940,19 March 1917, p 4; and 
'Voina ili mir'? (Vnutrenniya sily revolyutsii)', Novyi Mir, No.
941, 20 March 1917, p 4. For an account of how Trotsky
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attempted to use his 1917 articles in Novyi Mir to argue that 
only he and Lenin had shared the same analysis of the further 
development of the Russian revolution when he wrote his 
Istoriya Russkoi Revolyutsii (1931) see James D. White, 
Trotsky's History of the Russian Revolution', Journal of Trotsky 
Studies, 1, 1993, pp 1-18.
42. Novyi Mir announced Trotsky's departure for Russia in 
'Ot'ezd tovarishchii', Novyi Mir, No. 949, 28 March 1917, p 1. For 
Trotsky's account of the difficulties he encountered at the 
Russian embassy in New York in obtaining a passport see, Al'fa, 
'V' Russkom' konsul’stve’, Novyi Mir, No. 944, 23 March 1917, p 
4.
43. Giving lectures was also a convenient way of raising money. 
Draper says that while in New York Trotsky gave 'no fewer than 
thirty-five lectures...at ten dollars a lecture' (T. Draper, The Roots 
of American Communism, New York, 1957, p 77). See 'Leon 
Trotsky: A First World War Bibliography' of this thesis for a 
listing of these lectures.
Conclusion
Trotsky's programmatic response to the outbreak of World War One 
was the logical outcome of his analysis of the causes of the then 
current hostilities. For him, the war was imperialist, by which he meant 
an attempt by the leading capitalist powers to acquire dominance on 
the world market through militarism. He argued that the imperialist 
powers were motivated by a desire to facilitate the further development 
of the productive forces which, according to Trotsky, needed to break­
out of the limits set upon them by the nation state. He thus recognised 
that, amongst others, Britain and Germany were seeking to fulfil a 
historically progressive task. However, he rejected the notion that any 
one of the belligerent capitalist powers could attain its goal. In part the 
evidence for his view was there for all to see: the war had turned into 
one of bloody attrition, resulting in thousands of deaths and a massive 
expenditure of resources, but without any sign that one power would 
emerge the clear victor.
For Trotsky, it was left to the international proletariat to establish 
transnational state structures in the form of a Balkan Federative 
Republic and a United States of Europe, as the first step towards the 
setting-up of a United World Republic. These transnational 
governmental institutions were, he thought, the only means by which 
both the productive forces could develop in a planned, harmonious 
manner on a world scale, and the needs of different cultural groups for 
free expression could be satisfied. He thought this programme realistic 
because, at the time of writing, he perceived the nation state to be an 
anachronism and capitalism as struggling with tasks which it could not 
resolve. This left the proletariat, the only class whose common interests 
spanned state boundaries, as the natural international force able to 
resolve the productive problems facing humanity.
If the proletariat did not seize power Trotsky foresaw a period a 
further capitalist crisis and acts of military aggression. But the whole 
thrust of his analysis, not to mention his Marxist optimism, led him to 
reject this possibility. In part he thought the experience of war itself was 
preparing the masses for revolution, both practically and 
psychologically. Added to this, he genuinely believed that the war had 
opened a new epoch in human history, in which the reformism which
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had polluted the workers' movement pre-1914 would be removed from 
the tactics of a new and revolutionary Third International. It was this 
latter body which, he claimed, would provide the necessary slogans 
and leadership. It was for these reasons, because he perceived a 
revolutionary situation as current, that propagating a clear and 
revolutionary policy to the workers remained his central concern. 
Hence the fervour with which he entered into battle with the social- 
patriots, i.e., socialists who backed their government's war efforts, in 
this way encouraging the masses to sacrifice themselves for the class 
enemy. Indeed, it would be true to say that the struggle with social- 
patriotism absorbed Trotsky’s attention more than any other issue 
raised by World War One.
Of course, Trotsky suffered many set-backs and encountered 
strong opposition to his programme, even within the 'internationalist' 
camp. Most notably, he did not succeed in uniting internationalist 
elements of all fractions around his analysis of the war. Although the 
Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, and Trotsky all levelled accusations of 
fractional intrigue at one another, the fact that they did not join forces is 
mainly to be explained by reasons other than established fractional 
loyalties. This is not to deny the importance of the distrust which, for 
example, Martov felt for Lenin as a result of pre-war disputes. However, 
in the last analysis Trotsky's call for unification was not realised 
because the leaders of each fraction held their own position on the war. 
Thus, for instance, Lenin thought that the imperialist war should be 
turned into a civil war and he refused to accept anyone who did not hold 
this view as a member of the internationalist camp. Hence his polemics 
with, and dismissal of, Trotsky. In turn Trotsky and Martov understood 
the significance of the slogan struggle for peace in very different ways; 
the former seeing it as a means to mobilise the masses for the 
immediate conquest of state power under the leadership of the Third 
International, the latter as the first step of many on the path to the 
renewal of class conflict under the auspices of a reunited Second 
International.
This thesis has given the first full exposition of Trotsky's writings 
penned between August 1914 and March 1917. It would be surprising 
if debates long forgotten had not been uncovered and new material
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discovered. It would also be unfair to criticise too much the works of 
previous historians who focussed upon this subject at a general level, 
or as part of wider studies, for not covering every aspect of the material 
set out in this thesis. However, it should be noted that several standard 
works have not fared too well out of the scrutiny imposed upon them by 
this thesis. Most notably, Deutscher's biography of Trotsky has been 
shown to be suspect at several points, including translation errors 
which led him, for example, to misrepresent Lozovskii's and Trotsky's 
responses to the moves to call for a session of the International Bureau 
at the Hague in the spring of 1916. Then, in his biography of Martov, 
Getzler does not mention the dilemmas faced by Martov in dealing with 
differences in the Menshevik camp, and how this complicated his 
relations with Trotsky. That said, within the limits imposed by a thesis, 
the present author found it impossible to explore every avenue of 
investigation stumbled upon during the current research. The main 
topics touched upon in this work but which, to my mind, should be 
explored further are as follows.
First, what role did Trotsky really play at the Zimmerwald 
Conference? Martov's assertion that Trotsky had not been so 
influential at this gathering of thirty-eight internationalists was noted, 
but it would be interesting to locate all accounts of this meeting, no 
doubt written in several languages by many authors, to compare their 
respective versions. Second, what was the exact balance of forces 
within Golos and Nashe Slovo and who held the upper hand and 
when? Third, how extensive was the range of opinions on the war 
within the Menshevik fraction and how seriously did these ever 
threaten a split? Fourth, who exactly composed the August Bloc and at 
what point, if any, can we talk with certainty of its final disintegration? 
Finally, what was the balance of forces on Novyi Mir's editorial board, 
and what relations really existed between Trotsky and the other 
Russian Social-Democratic Party emigres in New York between 
January and March 1917?
Leon Trotsky: A First World War Bibliography
Each Trotsky researcher owes a tremendous debt of gratitude to Louis 
Sinclair (1909-1990). Work on the present thesis began by tracking 
down the articles written by Trotsky from August 1914 to March 1917 
listed in the first volume of Louis’s Leon Trotsky: A Bibliography 
However, for several reasons Louis's listing is far from complete. To 
begin with Louis himself could not read Russian, although he could 
decipher Cyrillic script. Hence, whenever possible, he relied upon 
French translations (Louis was fluent in French) as a guide to what 
was available in Russian. This meant that the flaws in the French 
versions went straight into Louis's work. Most notably, the French 
edition of Trotsky's articles penned during the First World War is a 
translation of the 1920s Russian volume of Trotsky's collected works, 
which, as we have seen, was altered by Trotsky himself. Second, Louis 
did not have the opportunity to delve into the then closed Party archives 
in Moscow. Thus, Trotsky's letters to, among others, Radek, found in 
the former Party archives in Moscow and used in this thesis, remained 
unknown to Louis. The location of these materials also upsets the 
traditional view that Trotsky managed to take all of his writings out of 
the USSR when he was exiled at the end of the 1920s. Finally, Louis 
could not read reports published in the Russian emigre press of 
forthcoming talks, some of which were delivered by Trotsky. Hence, for 
example, he was not able to include the dates and topics of Trotsky's 
lectures which he gave while in New York, most of which were 
advertised in Novyi Mir.
The following first section of this bibliography sets out to correct 
some of the errors to be found in Louis's listing. The form of 
presentation is that established by Louis, i.e., from left to right 
beginning with date [year/month/day], followed by author's mark (if 
any), title, translation of title, place and date of publication, and then 
reprints and translations. However, there are also several significant 
differences. Contrary to Louis's style, all entries are listed in strict 
chronological order. For example, series of articles are not grouped 
together under the date of the first instalment, but listed as they 
appeared. This has several advantages. First, all subtitles are listed 
with each instalment, and this gives the reader a clue to the content of
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each contribution. Second, individual instalments were treated as such 
by Trotsky, and he included some and omitted others when he came to 
compile his collected works. Louis's style masks this process, and gives 
the impression that each part of a series was included in the collected 
works. Third, each individual instalment was treated as such by the 
censor. In the following it is stated whether each entry was subject to 
partial or complete censorship. The form in which partially or 
completely censored articles were reprinted is also noted, as is any 
significant change of title. Finally, only articles, letters and lectures 
which have a published reference between August 1914-March 1917, 
or a specific reference to an archive, are included. The issue of notes 
penned during the period of this thesis at a later date are treated as first 
publications and hence as lying outwith the remit of this bibliography. In 
this way we construct a clear picture of what information became 
available when and to whom; issues of central concern to the historian. 
Several entries appear here for the first time as 'new discoveries'. Any 
typographical mistakes in the original have been preserved, but are not 
reproduced in the translation of titles. The main list of abbreviations and 
codes used is as follows:
'KM' - Kievskaya Mysl'
’ISIS' - Nashe Slovo
'Nach' - Nachalo
•NM' (NY) - Novyi M r (New York)
RTsKhlDNI - Rossiiskogo Tsentra^KhraneniyaJzucheniya 
Dokumentov Noveishei Istorii
190000(1, 2, 3,10) - L. D. Trotskii, Gody velikago pereloma,
Moscow, 1919.
220000(3)ff - L. D. Trotskii, Voina i Revolyutsiya, Vol. 1, Petrograd, 
1922 & Id.: Vol. 2, Moscow & Petrograd, 1924.
270000(1) - L. D. Trotskii, Evropa v Voine, Moscow, 1927.
740118(1) - Leon Trotsky, La guerre et la revolution, 2 Vols., Paris, 
1974.
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The source of all other codes and abbreviations can be found in L. 
Sinclair, Leon Trotsky: A Bibliography, 2 Vols., Aldershot, 1989.
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1. Leon Trotsky
140000(1)
141015(1)
141104(1)
141120(1)
141120(2)
141121(1)
141124(1)
141125(1)
141127(1)
DER KRIEG UND DIE INTERNATIONAL 
[Trans Ger]
'Der Krieg und die Aufgabe der Internationale' 
('Volksrecht', 15.X.14)
[Pis'mo L. Trotskogo Mandelu i F. Plattenu po 
povodu intsidenta s M. Kotsiolekom pri perevode 
broshyury avtora na nemetskii yazyk (L. D. 
Trotsky's letter to Mandel and Platten concerning 
the incident with M. Kotsiolek about the 
translation of the author's brochure into German)] 
(RTsKhlDNI, F. 451, O 1, D. 89)
Politicheskii moratorium (A political moratorium) 
('KM', (328), 28.XI.14)
Repr: 190000(1); 270000(1)
N. Trotskii: Voina i Internatsional' (War and the 
International)
('Golos', (59), 20.XI.14)
N. Trotskii: Voina i Internatsional' (okonchanie) 
(War and the International (conclusion))
('Golos', (60), 21.XI.14)
N. Trotskii: Verno li? (Is it true?)
('Golos', (62), 24.XI.1914)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
N. Trotskii: Neobkhodimaya popravka (A 
necessary correction)
('Golos', (63), 25.XI.14)
N. Trotskii: Proletariat’ v' voine (The proletariat in 
the war)
('Golos', (65), 27.XI.14)
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141128(1)
141210(1)
141213(1)
141214(1)
141230(1)
150000(1)
150000(2)
150102(1)
150106(1)
150108(1)
N. Trotskii: Proletariat' v' voine (okonchanie) (The 
proletariat in the war (conclusion))
('Golos', (66), 28.XI.14)
[Part censored in 'Golos']
Dve armii (The two armies)
('KM', (334), 4.XII.14)
Repr: 190000(2); 270000(1)
N. Trotskii: Voina i Internatsional' II (War and the 
International II)
('Golos', (79), 13.XII.14)
Gregus' po demokraticheskomu spisku (Gregus 
according to the democratic list)
('Golos', (76), 10.XII.14)
Repr: 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
N. Trotskii: Pechal'nyi dokument' G. Plekhanov' o 
voine (A sad document G. Plekhanov on the war) 
('Golos', (93), 30.XII.14)
Repr:220000(3)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
[letters to Radek]
(RTsKhlDNI F.325,0.l, D.394)
Pis'mo L D. Trotskogo v pravlenie kluba 
internatsionalistov o motivakh svoego vykhoda iz 
nego (L. D. Trotsky's letter to the management of 
the Internationalist Club on the motives of his 
resignation)
(RTsKhlDNI F.325, 0. 1, D. 394)
[letter to Radek]
(RTsKhlDNI F.325, 0 . 1, D. 394)
"Yaponskii" vopros (The "Japanese" question)
('KM', (6), 6.1.15)
Repr:270000(1)
N. Trotskii: K 100-mu nom 'Golosa' (The 100th 
issue of'Golos')
150113(1)
150115(1)
150115(2)
150117(1)
150120(1)
150206(1)
150213(1)
150214(1)
150223(1)
150224(1)
150301(1)
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('Golos', (100), 8.1.15)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
French
('KM', (13), 13.1.15)
Repr: 270000(1)
N. Trotskii: Nash' politicheskii lozung' I (Our 
political slogan I)
('Golos', (106), 15.1.15)
[letter to Radek]
(RTsKhlDNI F. 325, 0. 1, D. 394)
N. Trotskii: Nash’ politicheskii lozung' II (Our 
political slogan II)
('Golos', (108), 17.1.15)
Vse dorogi vedut v Rim (All roads lead to Rome) 
('KM', (20), 20.1.15)
Repr:270000(1)
[letter to Radek]
(RTSKhlDNI F.325, O. 1, D. 394)
N. Trotskii: Zayavlenie (A statement)
CNS’, (14), 1321.15)
N. Trotskii: Parvus'
CNS', (15), 14.11.15)
R epr:190000(10)
Trans: Fr ’Verite(M), (11.67), 15.11.15)
N. Trotskii: Nash' politicheskii lozung’ (Our Political 
Slogan)
('NS\ (22), 23.11.15)
N. Trotskii: Nash' politicheskii lozung' (okonchanie) 
(Our political slogan (conclusion))
('NS\ (23), 24.11.15)
N. Trotskii: Nekriticheskii otsenka kriticheskoi 
epokhi. 1. Slabost' ili neuverennaya v' sebe sila?
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150304(1)
150306(1)
150310(1)
150317(1)
150320(1)
(An uncritical assessment of a critical epoch. 1. 
Weakness or a lack of belief in one's own 
strength?)
('NS', (28), 1.111.15)
Repr: 220000(1 )ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
"Sedmoi pekhotnyi" v belgiiskoi epopee (The "7th 
infantry" in the Belgian epich)
('KM', (63), 4.III.15)
Repr: 190000(1); 270000(1)
"Sedmoi pekhotnyi" v belgiiskoi epopee (The "7th 
infantry" in the Belgian epich)
('KM', (65), 6.III.15)
Repr: 190000(1); 270000(1)
N. Trotskii: Nekriticheskii otsenka kriticheskoi 
epokhi. II Legenda "bor'by za demokratiyu"
(An uncritical assessment of a critical epoch. II 
The legend "a struggle for democracy")
('NS', (35), 10.III.15)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr: 220000(3)ff [in uncensored form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
N. Trotskii: Nekriticheskii otsenka kriticheskoi 
epokhi. Ill Politicheskii vyvod' (An uncritical 
assessment of a critical epoch. Ill Political 
conclusions)
(’NS', (41), 17.111.15)
[Completely censored in 'NS']
[A lecture Pangermanizm' i voina (PanGermanism 
and the war)]
('NS', (38), 13.III. 15)
('NS', (39), 14.111.15)
('NS', (40), 16.III. 15)
('NS', (41), 17.111.15)
CNS’, (42), 18.111.15)
('NS', (43), 19.111.15)
('NS', (44), 20.111.15)
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150322(1)
150325(1)
150331(1)
150401(1)
150409(1)
150409(2)
150411(1)
150416(1)
150417(1)
Otkuda poshlo? (From where did it come?) 
(’KM', (81), 22.111.15)
R epr:270000(1)
Petrogradskie royalisty i frantsuzskaya 
respublika (Petrograd royalists and the French 
republic)
('NS\ (48), 25.111.15)
[Part censored in ’NS’]
Repr : 220000(3) [not all censored gaps filled in 
reprint]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Eshche est' na svete sotsial'demokraty (There 
are still Social-Democrats in the world)
(’NS’, (53), 31 .III. 15)
Repr:220000(3)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
N.T.: Vremya nynche takovskoe (The times now 
are such)
(’NS’, (54), 1.IV.15)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr: 220000(3) [in uncensored form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Guerre d'usure (A war of attrition)
('NS1, (60), 9.IV.15)
N.T.: Nekhorosho-s'! (It's not good!)
(’NS’, (60),9.IV.15)
-: Do kontsa! (To the finish!)
('NS', (62), 11.IV.15)
R epr:220000(3)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Al'fa: Porazhenchestvo i iskazhestvo (Defeatism 
and distortion)
('NS', (66), 16.IV.15)
N. Trotskii: Sytinskii "mayli" o Rakovskom' (A 
Sytinist "little man" on Rakovsky)
('NS', (67), 17.IV.15)
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150425(1)
150429(1)
150501(1)
150505(1)
150506(1)
150513(1)
150515(1)
starikh'
150516(1)
Repr: 190000(10); 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Klevetnikam'! (To the slanderers!)
('NS', (74), 25.P/.15)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Va-bank'! (Stake one's all!)
('NS', (77),29.IV.15)
Repr: 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
N.Trotskii: 1890-1915 
CNS1, (79), 1.V.15)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
N. Trotskii: Komentarii k' telegramme t. Kh. 
Rakovskago (Commentary on Comrade Rakovsky's 
telegram)
('NS', (81), 5.V.15)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Imperializm' i natsional'naya ideya 
(Imperialism and the national idea)
('NS\ (82), 5.V.15)
Repr: 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
[letter to Radek]
(RTsKhlDNI, F. 325, O. 1, D. 394)
-: Nasha Pozitsiya. I Raspad' i pererozhdenie 
gruppirovok' v' sotsializme (Our Position. I The 
disintegration and regeneration of the old 
groupings in socialism)
('NS', (89), 15.V.15)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Ot' Redaktsii (From the editors)
('NS\ (90), 16.V.15)
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150529(1)
150529(2)
150601(1)
150604(1)
150605(1)
150606(1)
Repr : 220000(3) [under title: P. B. Aksel'rod i 
sotsial-patriotizm (P. B. Axelrod and 
social-patriotism)]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Nasha Pozitsiya. II Noviya gruppirovki v' 
sotsializme (Our Position. II New groups in 
socialism)
(’NS', (100), 29.V.15)
[part censored'in ’NS’]
Repr: 220000(3)ff [in uncensored form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
N.T.: Privet' tov. Dobrodzhanu-Gerea (Greetings to 
Comrade Dobrodjanu-Gherea)
CNS’, (100), 29.V.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff; 260000(17)
Trans: Eng 720000(25)
Fr 740118(1)
Sp 810000(4)
T.:
CNS', (102), 1.V1.15)
[article completely censored]
N. Trotskii: Otkrytoe pis’mo v' redaktsiyu zhurnala 
'Kommunist" (An open letter to the editorial board 
of the journal 'Kommunist')
('NS', (105), 4.VI.15)
Trans: Am Gankin & Fisher
-: Nasha Pozitsiya. Ill Raskol' i edinstvo (Our 
Position. Ill Splits and unity)
('NS', (106), 5.VI.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Nasha Pozitsiya. Ill Raskol' i edinstvo 
(okonchanie tret'ei stat'i) (Our Position. Ill Splits 
and unity (conclusion of the third article))
('NS', (107), 6.VI. 16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
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150608(1)
150613(1)
150616(1)
150617(1)
150618(1)
150619(1)
150623(1)
150624(1)
[letter to Radek]
(RTsKhlDNI F. 325,0 .1 , D. 394)
"oni - drugogo dukha" ("They are of a different 
spirit")
(fNS\ (113), 13.VI.15)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
[letter to Radek]
(RTsKhlDNI F. 325, 0 . 1, D. 394)
-: Kautskii o Plekhanove I (Kautsky on Plekhanov
I)
('NS’, (116), 17.VI.15)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Kautskii o Plekhanove II (Kautsky on Plekhanov
II)
('NS’, (117), 18.VI.15)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Kautskii o Plekhanove III (Kautsky on 
Plekhanov III)
(?NSf, (118), 19.VI.15)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Nemetskaya oppozitsiya i nemetskaya 
diplomatiya (The German Opposition and German 
Diplomacy)
(?NS\ (121), 23.VI.15)
Repr: 270000(1)
ATfa: Pervyi shag1 sdelan' (The first step has been 
taken)
('NS’, (122), 24.VI.15)
Repr: 220000(3)ff; 260000(17)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
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150703(1)
150709(1)
150711(1)
150711(2)
150712(1)
150717(1)
150717(2)
N. Trotskii: Natsiya i khozyastvo I (The nation and 
the economy I)
(’NS', (130), 3.VIL15)
Repr:270000(1)
Trans: Eng ’In t\ (III.4), Summer '74; 'Marxist 
Review', (2), I-II, '73
Jap 'Trotsky Studies', (1), Autumn 91
N. Trotskii: Natsiya i khozyastvo II (The nation 
and the economy II)
('NS', (135), 9.VH.15)
Repr:270000(1)
Trans: Eng 'Int', (III.4), Summer '74; 'Marxist 
Review', (2), I-II, '73
Jap 'Trotsky Studies', (1), Autumn 91
-: "Levaya" i "tsentra" v nemetskoi sots-dem 
("Left" and "Centre" in German Social-Democracy) 
('NS', (137), 11.VII.15)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
N. Trotskii: Diversii (Pis'mo v’ redaktsiyu) (Acts of 
sabotage (A letter to the editors))
('NS', (137), 11.VII.15)
Na severo-zapad (In the North-West)
('KM', (191), 12.VII.15)
Repr:270000(1)
-: Bez' masshtaba (Without measure)
('NS', (141), 17.VII.15)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Zhan Zhores (Jean Jaures)
('KM', (196), 17.VII.15)
Repr: 190000(10); 260000(17)
Trans: Eng 720000(25); 'Keep Left', V, VI, '70 
Fr 670300(1 )ff 
Hoi 'NTijd', (XXI.2), 11.16 
Sp 810000(4)
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150718(1)
150718(2)
150720(1)
150722(1)
150723(1)
150724(1)
150804(1)
150815(1)
150818(1)
N. Trotskii: Otkrytoe pis'mo t. Plekhanovu (An 
open letter to Comrade Plekhanov)
('NS1, (142), 18.VII.15)
Na Balkanakh' I (In the Balkans I)
(’NS’, (142), 18.VII.15)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Na Balkanakh' II (In the Balkans II)
('NS', (143), 20.VII.15)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Politika "tyla" (Politics "of the rear")
('NS', (145), 22.VII.15)
Repr: 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Nasha Pozitsiya. 4. Nashi fraktsii i zadachi 
russkikh' internatsionalistov’ (Our Position. 4 Our 
fraction and the tasks of the Russian 
internationalists)
('NS', (146), 23.VII.15)
-: Nasha Pozitsiya. 4. Nashi fraktsii i zadachi 
russkikh' internatsionalistov' (okonchanie) (Our 
Position. 4 Our fraction and the tasks of the 
Russian internationalists (conclusion))
('NS', (147), 24.VII.15)
-: God' voiny (A year of war)
('NS', (156), 4.VIII.15)
Repr: 190000(2); 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Al'fa: Malen'kii fel'eton. Ne v' ochered (A little 
satire. Not in order)
('NS', (166), 15.V1II.15)
Repr: 270000(1)
-: Konvent' rasteryannosti i bessiliya (A 
convention of confusion and impotence)
('NS', (167), 18.VIII.15)
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150826(1)
150827(1)
150901(1)
150902(1)
150903(1)
[Part censored in ’NS’]
Repr: 220000(3)ff; 270000(1) [in uncensored 
form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Voennyi krizis’ i politicheskaya perspectivy. I 
Prichiny krizisa (The war crisis and political 
perspectives. I The resons for the crisis)
('NS'), (174), 26.V1II.15)
[Part censored in ’NS’]
Repn 220000(3)ff [under title Voennyi katastrofa 
i politicheskie perspectivy (The war catastrophe 
and political perspectives) in uncensored form] 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Gaaze - Ebert’ - David'! (Hasse, Ebert and David!) 
('NS', (175), 27.VIII.15)
Repr: 190000(10); 260000(17)
Trans: Eng 720000(25)
Sp 810000(4)
Voennyi krizis' i politicheskaya perspectivy. II 
Porazhenie i revolyutsiya (The war crisis and 
political perspectives. II Defeat and revolution) 
('NS'), (179). 1.IX.15)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repn 220000(3)ff [under title Voennyi katastrofa 
i politicheskie perspectivy (The war catastrophe 
and political perspectives) in uncensored form] 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Voennyi krizis1 i politicheskaya perspectivy. II 
Porazhenie i revolyutsiya (okonchanie) (The war 
crisis and political perspectives. II Defeat and 
revolution (conclusion))
('NS'), (180), 2.IX.15)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repn 220000(3)ff [under title Voennyi katastrofa 
i politicheskie perspectivy (The war catastrophe 
and political perspectives) in uncensored form] 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Voennyi krizis' i politicheskaya perspectivy. 
IHSotsial'naya sily Rossiskoi revolyutsii (The war
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150904(1)
150911 ( 1 )
150920(1)
150921(1)
150930(1)
151001(1)
151003(1)
crisis and political perspectives. Ill The social 
forces of the Russian Revolution)
CNS’), (181), 3.DC.15)
Repr: 220000(3)ff [under title Voennyi katastrofa 
i politicheskie perspectivy (The war catastrophe 
and political perspectives)]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Voennyi krizis' i politicheskaya perspectivy. IV 
Natsional'nyi ili internatsional'nyi kurs'? (The war 
crisis and political perspectives. IV A national or 
international course?)
('NS'), (182), 4.IX.15)
Repr: 220000(3)ff [under title Voennyi katastrofa 
i politicheskie perspectivy (The war catastrophe 
and political perspectives)]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Psikhologicheskie zagadki voiny (Psychological 
mysteries of the war)
('KM', (152), 11.IX.15)
Repr: 190000(2); 270000(1)
Transheya (The trenches)
('KM', (261),20.LX.15)
Repr: 190000(2); 270000(1)
Transheya (The trenches)
('KM', (262), 21.IX.15)
Repr: 190000(2); 270000(1)
-: Rakovskii o russkikh' sots-patriotakh' 
(Rakovsky on the Russian social-patriots)
('NS', (204), 30.IX.15)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Krepost ili transheya? (Fortress or trenches?) 
(’KM',(306),1.X.15)
Repr: 190000(2); 270000(1)
N.T.: Vpechatleniya (iz' zapisnoi knizhki) 
(Impressions (From a notebook))
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151005(1)
151006(1)
151007(1)
151007(2)
151009(1)
151012(1)
151013(1)
('NS', (207), 3.X.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff [under the title 'Vyvody' 
(Conclusions) with some textual changes]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
N. Trotskii: Pis'mo v1 redaktsiyu TFIumanite" (A 
letter to the editorial board of "l'Humanite")
(’NS', (208), 5.X.15)
N.T.: Nashi gruppirovki (iz' zapisnoi knizhki) (Our 
groupings (From a notebook))
(’NS\ (209), 6.X.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff [under the title 'Vyvody' 
(Conclusions) with some textual changes]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Al'fa: "Les Russes d'abord!" ("The Russian way!") 
('NS', (210), 7.X.15)
Repr:270000(1)
N.T.: Nemetskaya S-D oppozitsiya (iz' zapisnoi 
knizhki) (The German Social-Democratic 
Opposition (From a notebook))
('NS', (210), 7.X.15)
N.T.: Rossiskaya sektsiya internatsionalistov' (iz' 
zapisnoi knizhki) (The Russian section of the 
Internationalists (From a notebook))
('NS', (212), 9.X.15)
-: Bolgarskaya sots.-dem i voina (Bulgarian 
Social-Democracy and the war)
('NS', (214), 12.X. 15)
Repr : 220000(3 )ff 
Trans: 740118(1)
N.T.: Osnovnye tezisy (iz' zapisnoi knizhki) (Basic 
Theses (From a notebook))
('NS', (215), 13.X.15)
Repr : 220000(3 )ff [under title Raboty 
konferentsii (The work of the conference) with 
cuts]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
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151014(1)
151014(2)
151017(1)
151017(2)
151017(3)
151019(1)
N.T.: Osnovnye tezisy (iz1 zapisnoi knizhki) 
(okonchanie) (Basic Theses (From a notebook) 
(conclusion))
('NS’, (216), 14.X.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff [under title Raboty 
konferentsii (The work of the conference)]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Ostav'te nas' v' pokoe! (Leave us in peace!) 
(’NS\ (216), 14X15)
Repr: 190000(10); 260000(17)
Trans: Eng 720000(25)
Sp 810000(4)
-: Neobkhodimaya popravka (A necessary 
correction)
('NS', (217), 17.X. 15)
N.Trotskii: Osnovnye voprosy I. Bor'ba za vlast' 
(Basic problems I. The struggle for power)
(’NS’, (217), 17X15)
[Part censored in 'NS')
Repr: 190000(6); 220000(12) [in censored form] 
Trans: Eng 210000(39)
Fr 730000(7); 'InfOuv', (662), 19-
26.VI.74 
Ger 670000(6)
It 760900(2)
-: Voennyya tainy i politicheskiya misterii (War 
secrets and political mysteries)
(’NS', (217), 17.X.15)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr: 220000(3)ff [in uncensored form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Ona byla, konferentsiya v Tsimmerval'de! (It 
was, the conference in Zimmerwald!)
('NS’, (218), 19.X.15)
[Part censored in 'NS’]
Repr: 220000(3)ff [in censored form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
151022(1) N.T.: Konferentsiya v' Tsimmerval'de (The
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151023(1)
151025(1)
151026(1)
151027(1)
151029(1)
151030(1)
conference at Zimmerwald)
('NS\ (221), 22.X.15)
Repr : 220000(3 )ff [under title Glavnye 
fakticheskie dannye o konferentsii (The main 
factual information about the conference)]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Kh. Rakovskii i V. Kolarov (Ch. Rakovsky and V. 
Kolarov)
('KM', (294), 23.X.15)
Repr: 190000(10); 220000(3)ff; 260000(17) 
Trans: Eng 720000(25)
Fr 740118(1)
Sp 810000(4)
Ledebur - Goffman (Ledebour - Hoffman)
(’KM\ (296), 25.X.15)
Repr: 190000(10); 220000(3)ff; 260000(17) 
Trans: Eng 720000(25)
Fr 740118(1)
Sp 810000(4)
A.: Zametki chitatelya. Umu Nepostizhimo. Slovo za 
"Prizyvom"'! (Readers Notes. It's inconceivable. A 
Word for "Prizyv"!)
('NS\ (224), 26.X.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
N.T.: K’ konferentsii v' tsimmerval'de. 2. Otvet' P.
B. Aksel'rodu (On the conference in Zimmerwald.
2. A Reply to P. B. Axelrod)
('NS\ (225), 27.X.15)
Repr: 190000(10); 220000(3)ff;
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Khvostov!
('NS', (227), 29.X.15)
Repr: 190000(10); 260000(17)
-: Gall'eni (Gallieni)
(’NS\ (228), 30.X.15)
Repr: 220000(3)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
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151030(2)
151031(1)
151105(1)
151105(2)
151106(1)
151110(1)
151111(1)
Sushchnost' krizisa (The essence of the crisis) 
CNS', (228), 30.X.15)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
N.T.: K' Tsimmerval'dskoi konferentsii I (On the 
Zimmerwald Conference I)
('NS\ (229), 31.X.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff [under title Avstriitsy i 
Tsimmerval'd (The Austrians and Zimmerwald)] 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
N.T.: K' Tsimmervardskoi konferentsii II & III(On 
the Zimmerwald Conference II & III)
('NS’, (232), 5.XI.15)
-: Svoim' poryadkom1 (In their own order)
('NS', (232), 5.XI.15)
Repr: 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Bez' programmy, bez' perspektiv, bez1 kontrolya 
(Without a programme, without perspectives and 
without control)
('NS', (233), 6.XI.15)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: O sovmestnykh' vystupleniyakh' s' sots- 
patriotami. (Po povodu "Pis'ma t. Martova") (On 
joint activity with the social-patriots (On "Comrade 
Martov's Letter"))
(’NS',(236), 10.XI.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Nuzhno sdelat’ vse vyvody (K' vyboram' 
rabochikh' v' voenno-promyshlennyi komitet')
(All conclusions must be drawn (On the election of 
workers to the War-Industries Committee)
('NS', (237), 11.XI.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
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151113(1)
151117(1)
151119(1)
151119(2)
151124(1)
151125(1)
151127(1)
Postoronnii: Neveroyatno! (Pis'mo vf redaktsiyu) 
(It's unbelievable! (A letter to the editors))
('NS', (239), 13.XI.15)
Gruppirovki v' nemetskoi sots-dem (Po povodu 
stat'i t. Bukvoeda) (Groupings in the German 
Social-Democracy (On Comrade Bukvoed's article)) 
('NS', (242), 17.XI.15)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
N.T.: K' tsimmerval'dskoi konferentsii IV (On the 
Zimmerwald Conference IV)
('NS', (244), 19.XI.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff [under title Gollandskie 
ekstremisty (The Dutch extremists) with cuts] 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Postoronnii: Akh', vot' ono chto! (Pis'mo v' 
redaktsiyu) (Alas, but there it is! (A letter to the 
editors))
('NS', (244), 19.XI.15)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
N. Trotskii: Pod' bremenem' ob'ektivizma. I (Under 
the burden of objectivity. I)
('NS', (248), 24.XI.15)
N. Trotskii: Pod' bremenem' ob'ektivizma. II 
(Under the burden of objectivity. II)
('NS', (249), 25.XI.15)
AT fa: Zametki chitatelya. Sbivaemyi s' tolku 
chestnyi evropeets'. Rasshirenie vlasti Al'berta 
Toma, "budem' dumat'!... (Readers notes. 
Bewildering honourable Europeans. An extension 
of Albert Thomas's power. "We will think on it"!...) 
('NS', (251), 27.XI.15)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
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151128(1)
151130(1)
151203(1)
151205(1)
151212(1)
151218(1)
151219(1)
N.T.: "Vpered"' ("Forward”)
(’NS’, (252), 28.XI.15)
N.T.: Chto eto za informator’? (What type of 
informer is this?)
('NS', (253), 30.XI.15)
Byli i ostaemsya krasnymi (We were and 
remain Reds)
('NS', (256), 3.XII.15)
Repr : 220000(3 )ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Postoronnii: 79, rue de Grenelle (79 Grenelle 
Street)
('NS’, (258), 5.XII. 15)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr : 220000(3)ff [with changes]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Sotrudnichestvo s sotsial’-patriotami. (Otvet't. 
Martovu) (Cooperation with social-patriots. (A 
reply to Comrade Martov))
('NS', (264), 12.XII.15)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Chudesa, kotoryya ne snilis' mudretsam'. 
Podkhod' protiv "Nashego Slovo" (Wonders, which 
the wise did not dream of. An approach against 
"Nashe Slovo")
('NS', (269), 18.XII.15)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr: 220000(3)ff [in uncensored form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Fakti i vyvody (eshche o petrogradskikh' 
vyborakh') (Facts and Conclusions. (Once more on 
the Petrograd elections))
('NS', (270), 19.XII.15)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
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151221(1)
151225(1)
151228(1)
151228(2)
151229(1)
151229(2)
160000(1)
160000(2)
160000(3)
Voina i tekhnika (War and technology)
(’KM’, (353), 21.XII.15)
Repr: 190000(2); 270000(1)
N. Trotskii: Ni su'ektivizma, ni fatalizma! (Neither 
subjectivism, nor fatalism!)
('NS1, (275), 25.XII.15)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Deklaratsiya dvadtsati (The decalration of the 
twenty)
(fNS\ (276), 28.XII.15)
Repr : 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
AT fa: Na nachalakh’ vzyamnosti (On the beginings 
of reciprocity)
('NS’, (276)/28.XII.15)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr: 270001 (1) [in censored form]
-: Politicheskie shtreikbrekhery. Novye "vvborv" 
v' voenno-promyshlennyi Komitet' (Political 
strikebreaking. New "elections" to the War- 
Industries Committee)
('NS', (277), 29.XII.15)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Postoronnii: Itak1? (So?)
('NS’, (277), 29.XII.15)
[Part censored in ’NS’]
[letters to D. B. Ryazanov]
RTsKhlDNI, F. 325, O. 1, D. 399
[postcards to D. B. Ryazanov]
RTsKhlDNI, F. 325,0. 1, D. 399
[letters to D. B. Ryazanov]
RTsKhlDNI, F. 325, 0 . 1, D. 396
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160101(1)
160101(2)
160101(3)
160101(4)
160106(1)
160107(1)
160111(1)
160112(1)
Otkhodit epokha (An epoch is passing)
(’KM1, (1), 1.1.16)
Repr : 190000(1); 220000(3) ff; 260000(17) 
Trans: Eng 720000(25)
Fr 670306(l)ff; 740118(1); ’BulCom’, 
(IV.52)
Sp 810000(4)
K' novomu godu (Towards the New Year) 
(?NS\(1), 1.L16)
[Part censored in ’NS’]
Repr: 270000(1) [in censored form]
Vtoroi novyi god'
('NS’,(1), 1.1.16)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr: 220000(3 )ff; [in uncensored form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Al'fa: Ikh' literature (Vmesto novogodnyago 
obzora) (Their literature (Instead of a New Year's 
review))
(’NS’,(1), 1.1.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
N. Trotskii: Sotsializma i sotsial-natsionalizm 
(Socialism and social-nationalism)
('NM’(NY), (564), 6.1.16)
N. Trotskii: Sotsializma i sotsial-natsionalizm 
(Socialism and social-nationalism)
(’NM'(NY), (565), 7.1.16)
N. Trotskii: Sotsializma i sotsial-natsionalizm 
(Socialism and social-nationalism)
('NM'(NY), (568), 11.1.16)
N. Trotskii: Sotsializma i sotsial-natsionalizm 
(Socialism and social-nationalism)
('NM'(NY), (569), 12.1.16)
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160113(1)
160113(2)
160114(1)
160116(1)
160125(1)
160129(1)
160130(1)
160200(1)
160201(1)
Sobytiya idut' svoim' cheredom' (Events proceed 
by their own course)
('NS', (10), 13.1.16)
Repr:270000(1)
N.T.: Vokrug' Tsimmerval'da (po povodu stat'i t. 
Martova) (Around Zimmerwald (On Comrade 
Martov's article))
('NS', (10), 13.1.16)
-: Tsimmerval'd' ili gvozdevshchina? (Zimmerwald 
or Gvozdevism?)
('NS', (11), 14.1.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
N.T.: Sbornik' "Samozashchita" (The collection 
"Self-Defence")
('NS', (13), 16.1.16)
-: Ikh' perspektivy (Their prospects)
('NS', (20), 25.1.16)
Repr:270000(1)
N. Trotskii: Programma mira. I. Nuzhna-li 
programma mira? (A Programme of Peace. I. Do 
we need a programme of peace?)
('NS', (24), 29.1.16)
N. Trotskii: Programma mira. II. "Mir' bez' 
anneksii" i status quo ante (A Programme of 
Peace. II. "A peace without annexations" and the 
status quo ante)
('NS', (25), 30.116)
[letter to H. Roland-Holst]
(Van Rossum)
Trans: Eng 'Spokesman', (4), VI.70
Postoronnii: Eto nedorazumenie! (This is a 
misunderstanding!)
('NS', (26), 1.11.16)
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160203(1)
160204(1)
160208(1)
160210(1)
160211(1)
160211(2)
160215(1)
160216(1)
160217(1)
N. Trotskii: Programma mira. III. Pravo natsii na 
samoopredelenie (A Programme of Peace. III. The 
right of nations to self-determination)
('NS', (28), 3.II.16)
N. Trotskii: Programma mira. IV. Soedinennye 
Shtaty Evropy (A Programme of Peace. IV. United 
States of Europe)
(’NS\ (29), 4.II.16)
Al’fa: "Narodnaya Mysl'" ("People's Thought")
('NS\ (32), 8.II.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Sotsial'-patriotiznT v' Rossii. I. Ikh' "pobeda" 
(Social-patriotism in Russia. I. Their "victory") 
('NS', (34), 10.11.16)
Repr : 220000(3 )ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Sotsial'-patriotizm' v1 Rossii. I. Ikh' "pobeda" 
(okonchanie) (Social-patriotism in Russia. I. Their 
"victory" (conclusion))
(TNS\ (35), 11.11.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Al'fa: Plekhanov' o Khvostove (Plekhanov on 
Khvostov)
(’NS1, (35), 11.11.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff: 270000(1)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
[letter to D. B. Ryazanov]
(RTsKhlDNI, F. 325, O. 1, D. 399)
N. Trotskii: Informator' nashelsya! (The informer 
has been found!)
('NS', (39), 16.11.16)
Al'fa: Zhuskobu (To the finish!)
('NS', (40), 17.11.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)
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160220(1)
160224(1)
160303(1)
160303(2)
160304(1)
160305(1)
160307(1)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
AT fa: "Est' eshche tsenzura v' Parizhe" (There's 
still a censor in Paris")
('NS', (43), 20.11.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: 740118(1)
Al'fa:
('NS', (46), 24.11.16)
[Completely censored in 'NS']
-: Sotsial'-patriotizm' v' Rossii. II. "Timy gor'kikh' 
istin' nam' dorozhe nas vozvyshayushchii obman'" 
(Social-patriotism in Russia. II. "The bitter truth is 
more precious to us than [y]our domineering 
fraud")
('NS', (53), 3.III. 16)
Repr : 2 20000(3 )ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Redaktsiya: Pirvet1 F. Meringu i R. Lyuksemberg1 
(Editorial: Greetings to F. Mehring and R. 
Luxemburg)
('NS\ (53), 3.111.16)
Repr: 190000(10); 260000(17)
Trans: Eng 720000(25)
Sp 810000(4)
-: Sotsial'-patriotizm' v' Rossii. III. "Voenno- 
promyshlennye" sots-dem-ty i ikh' gruppirovki 
(Social-patriotism in Russia. III. "War-Industril" 
Social-Democracyand their groupings)
('NS', (54),4.111.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: O t'"istoshcheniya" - k' "dvizheniyu" (From 
"attrition" - to "movement")
('NS', (55), 5.III.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Amnistiya - da ne s' toi storony (Amnesty, yes
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160309(1)
160314(1)
160315(1)
160322(1)
160324(1)
160325(1)
not from that side)
('NS’, (56), 7.III.16)
Repr:270000(1)
N. Trotskii: "Samozashchita" I. "bude nuzhno" 
("Self-Defence" I. "It will be necessary")
('NS', (58), 9.III.16)
Repr: 190000(10); 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Sotsial’-patriotizm’ v' Rossii. IV. Klass' i partiya, 
massy i vozhdi (Social-patriotism in Russia. IV. 
Class and party, masses and leaders)
('NS’, (62), 14.111.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Sotsial'-patriotizm' v' Rossii. V. Neobkhodimo 
izolirovat' sotsialpatrioticheskii shtab 
(Social-patriotism in Russia. V. It is necessary to 
isolate the social-patriotic staff)
('NS', (63), 15.111.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
N. Trotskii: "Samozashchita" 2. Na vyuchku k' 
patriotizma? ("Self-Defence" 2. Training to be a 
patriot?)
(’NS’, (69), 22.111.16)
Repr: 190000(10); 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Ne polnaya, no simmetriya (Not completeness 
but symmetry)
('NS', (71), 24.111.16)
Repr: 190000(10); 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Po to storonu Vogez' (On that side of the Vosges) 
('NS', (72), 25.111.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
160326(1) -: Ironicheskii shchelchok' istorii (An ironical fillip
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160331(1)
160401(1)
160402(1)
160409(1)
160411(1)
160412(1)
160413(1)
of history)
(’NS’, (73), 26.111.16)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr: 220000(3)ff; 270000(1) [in uncensored 
form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Nasha dumskaya fraktsiya I (Our Duma fraction 
I)
(’NS', (77), 31.111.16)
-: Nasha dumskaya fraktsiya II (Our Duma 
fraction II)
('NS', (78), 1.IV.16)
[Part censored in 'NS']
-: Novaya glava' (K raskolu s-d fraktsii reikhstaga) 
(A new chapter. Towards the split of the 
Social-Democratic fraction in the Reichstag)
('NS', (79), 2.IV.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff [under subheading only]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Logika plokhogo polozheniya (Otvet't. Martovu) 
(The logic of a bad situation. (A reply to Comrade 
Martov))
('NS', (85), 9.IV.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
N. Trotskii: Programma mira. V Pozitsiya 
"Sotsialdemokrata" (A programme of peace. V. The 
position of "Socialdemokrat")
('NS', (86), 11.IV.16)
N. Trotskii: Programma mira. V Pozitsiya 
"Sotsialdemokrata" (okonchanie) (A programme of 
peace. V. The position of "Socialdemokrat" 
(conclusion))
('NS', (87), 12.IV.16)
N. Trotskii: Programma mira. VI. Patsifistskoe i 
revolyutsionne otnosheniye k' programma mira (A 
programme of peace. VI. Pacifist and
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160414(1)
160419(1)
160420(1)
160421(1)
160423(1)
160426(1)
160501(1)
160501(2)
revolutionary relations to the programme of 
peace)
(’NS’, (88), 13.IV.16)
[Part censored in ’NS’]
Otechestvennoe... (Homelanders...)
(’NS’, (89), 14.IV.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff; 260000(17)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Po povodu "zayavlenie" tov. Martova (On 
Comrade Martov's "Declaration")
('NS', (93), 19.IV.16)
-: Nasha Dumskaya fraktsiya. 1. revolyutsionnaya 
i pasivno-vyzhidatel'naya politika (Our Duma 
fraction. 1. Revolutionary and passive-wait-and- 
see policies)
(,NS',(94),20.IV.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Nasha Dumskaya fraktsiya. 2. "druzh'ya" i 
"vragi" dumskoi fraktsii (Our Duma fraction. 2. 
"Friends" and "enemies" of the Duma fraction) 
('NS', (95), 21.IV.16)
-: Dva printsipa. Po povodu stat'i t. A. Lozovskago 
(Two principles. On Lozovskii's article)
('NS', (97), 23.IV.16)
-: K. Kautskii ob' Internatsionale (K. Kautsky on 
the International)
('NS\ (98), 26.IV.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Al'fa: Fantastika Pervoimaiskiya razmyshleniya 
(Fantastika May Day reflections)
('NS', (102), 1.V.16)
Repr: 190000(10); 220000(3)ff; 260000(17) 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Pervoe maya (1st of May)
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160504(1)
160506(1)
160506(2)
160510(1)
160511(1)
160512(1)
160516(1)
('NS\ (102), 1.V.16)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr: 220000(3)ff [in uncensored form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Bez' sterzhnya (Without substance)
('NS', (104), 4.V.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Kheglund' i Libknekht' (Hoeglund and 
Liebknecht)
('NS', (106), 6.V.16)
R epr:190000(10)
N. Trotskii: Nuzhdatsya v' proverke (It is in need 
of verification)
('NS', (106), 6.V.16)
-: V' bor'be za tretii Internatsional' (In the 
struggle for a Third International)
('NS', (109), 10.V.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Clemence! (Clemency!)
('NS', (110), 11.V.16) '
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr: 220000(3)ff [under title "Miloserdiya!" 
("Clemency!") in uncensored form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Vtoraya tsimmerval'dskaya konferentsiya (The 
second Zimmerwald Conference)
('NS', (111), 11.V.16)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Al'fa: Zametki chitateli. "Zakon Mekhaniki" 
(Readers notes. "A law of mechanics")
('NS', (114), 16.V.16)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr: 220000(3 )ff [in censored form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
160516(2)
160516(3)
160521(1)
160521(2)
160524(1)
160527(1)
160604(1)
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Al’fa: Zametki chitateli. Servantes' i Svift’. Dve 
velichiny, porozn' ravnyya tret’ei... (Readers 
notes. Cervantes and Swift. Two magnitudes 
separately equal to a third...)
('NS’, (114), 16.V.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Parizh', 16 Maya (Paris, 16 May)
(’NST, (114), 16.V.16)
[Part censored in ’NS’]
Repr: 220000(3)ff [under title Yubilei "Nashego 
Slova" ("Nashe Slovo's" jubilee) in uncensored 
form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Pochemu ne nazvali Plekhanova (Why we did 
not mention Plekhanov)
(‘NS’, (119), 21.V.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: V’ Austrii (In Austria)
(’NS1, (119), 21.V.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: So slavyanskim' aktsentom’ i ulybkoi na 
slavyanskikh’ gubakh’ (With a Slavonic accent and 
a smile on Slavonic lips)
('NS', (121), 24.V.16)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr: 190000( 10); 270000( l) f f  [not all censored 
gaps filled in reprint]
-: Nedomoganie (Lethargy)
('NS', (124), 27.V.16)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr: 220000(3)ff [not all censored gaps filled in 
reprint]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Voennyya zametki: "Voina v voine" (War notes: 
"War on war")
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160604(2)
160615(1)
160621(1)
160624(1)
160629(1)
160701(1)
160704(1)
(’NS’, (130), 4.VI.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Iz' ideinoi zhizni Austriiskoi sots-dem (From the 
ideological life of Austrian Social-Democracy)
('NS’, (130), 4.VI.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff [under title Epokha 
"obshchestvennogo dukha" (An epoch of "public 
spirit")]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Klyuch' k' pozitsii (The key to the situation)
('NS’, (138), 15.VI.16)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr: 220000(3)ff; 270000(1) [in uncensored 
form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Razocharovaniya i bespokoistva 
(Disappointments and worries)
('NS', (143), 21.VI.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Kto iz' nikh' luchshe? (Which of them is better?) 
('NS', (146), 24.VI.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Argument ot' kopyta (An argument from the 
hoof)
('NS', (150), 29.V1.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Karl' Libknecht' (Karl Liebknecht)
('NS’, (152), 1 .VII. 16)
Repr: 190000(10)
-: K' dublinskim' itogam’ (Towards the Dublin 
results)
('NS', (154), 4.VII.16)
[Part censored in 'NS’]
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160704(2)
160706(1)
160712(1)
160713(1)
160719(1)
160720(1)
Repr: 220000(3)ff [in uncensored form]
Trans: Eng 740000(22); 'Lace Curtain’, [1970]; 
’Workers Press', 16.VI.70; "RCL", (3), [1973]
Fr 740118(1)
Khristyu Rakovskii (To Christain Rakovsky) 
('NS', (154), 4.VII.16)
Repr: 190000(10); 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Etapy (Stages)
('NS', (156), 6.V1I.16)
[Part censored in 'NS']
-: Uroki poslednei dumskoi sessii (Lessons of the 
last Duma session)
('NS', (161), 12.VII.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Vokrug' natsional'nago printsipa (Around the 
national principle)
('NS', (162), 13.VII.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Korennoe raskhozhdenie. I. Politicheskiya 
osnovy voenno-promyshlennago 
"internatsionalizma" (Radical differences. I The 
political underpinnings of War-Industrial 
" internationalism")
('NS', (165), 19.V1I.16)
Repr : 220000(3 )ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Korennoe raskhozhdenie. II. Dve 
isklyuchayushchiya drug druga takticheskiya linii 
(Radical differences. II Two mutually exclusive 
tactical lines)
('NS', (166), 20.VII.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
160727(1) N.T: Pamyati D. M. Gertsensteina (In memory of D.
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160727(2)
160728(1)
160729(1)
160802(1)
160803(1)
160803(2)
160803(1)
160804(1)
M. Herzenstein)
('NS1, (172), 27.VII.16)
Repr:260000(17)
Ravnenie po Makarovu (Lining up with 
Makarov)
('NS', (172), 27.VII.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Dve telegrammy (Two telegrams)
('NS', (173), 28.V1I.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Dva litsa (Two faces)
('NS', (174), 29.V1L16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Sredi germanskoi oppozitsii. Sektanstvo ili 
neobkhodimoe vyyasnenie (In the midst of the 
German opposition. Sectionalism or a necessary 
clarification)
('NS', (177), 2.VIII.16)
-: Sredi germanskoi sots-dem oppozitsii. (In the 
midst of the German Social-Democratic opposition) 
('NS', (178), 3.VIII.16)
Al'fa: Nash' konkurs' (Our Competition)
('NS', (178), 3.VIIL16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
N. T.: Gustav' Ekhshtein' (Gustave Eckstein)
('NS', (178), 3.VIII.16)
Repr:260000(17)
Trans: Eng 720000(25)
Sp 810000(4)
-: Dva goda (Two years)
('NS', (179), 4.VIII.16)
[Part censored in 'NS']
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160804(2)
160806(1)
160808(1)
160813(1)
160813(2)
160817(1)
Repr: 220000(3)ff; 270000(1) [not all censored 
gaps filled in reprint]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Sredi germanskoi sots-dem oppozitsii 
(okonchanie) (In the midst of the German Social- 
Democratic opposition (conclusion))
('NS', (179), 4.VIII.16)
-: "Sud'ba idei" ("The fate of an idea")
('NS', (181), 6.VIII.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Proekt' deklaratsii (Draft declaration)
('NS', (182), 8.VIII.16)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr : 220000(3)ff [in uncensored form under title 
Deklaratsiya, vnesennaya v Komitet dlya 
vosstanovleniya internatsional'nykh svyazei 
(Declaration sent to the Comite pour la reprise des 
relations internatsionales)]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Po adresu Longetistov' (For the attention of the 
Longuetists)
(’NS’, (187), 13.VIII.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff [under title Manevrv 
longetistov (Longuetist'a manoeuvres)]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
N. T.: Istoriya s moraliyu. "Delo" g. E. Dmitreva (A 
Story with a moral. The "Affair" of Mr. E. Dmitrev) 
('NS', (187), 13.VIII.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: V' komitete dlya vosstanovleniya internats 
svyazei (At the Comite pour la reprise des 
relations internationales)
('NS', (188), 17.VIII.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
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160818(1)
160818(2)
160820(1)
160822(1)
160822(2)
160823(1)
160824(1)
0 chem molchit frantsuzskaya press. K' sud’be 
Pol’shii (What the French press is silent about. 
Towards Poland’s fate)
(’NS', (189), 18.VIII.16)
Ot' Redaktsii (From the editors)
(’NS1, (189), 18.VIII.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff [under title Kak borot'sya s 
longetizmom? (How to struggle against 
Longuetism?)]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Konferentsiya neitralnykh' tenei (A conference 
of neutral shadows)
('NS’, (191), 20.VIIL16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Vandelvel'de1, "Nashe Slovo", i "Vorwarts" 
(Vandervelde, "Nashe Slovo", and "Vorwarts") 
(’NS1, (192), 22.VIII.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
N. Trotskii: Strategiya i sotsialisticheskaya politika 
(Strategy and socialist policy)
(TNS\ (192), 22.V1II.16)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr: 220000(3)ff [in uncensored form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
N. T.: Vpechatleniya i obobshcheniya g. Milyukova.
1 Pobeda i svoboda (The impressions and 
generalisations of Mr. Milyukov. 1 Victory and 
freedom)
(’NS1, (193), 23.VIIL16)
[Part censored in ’NS’]
Repr: 220000(3)ff [in uncensored form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
N. T.: Vpechatleniya i obobshcheniya g. Milyukova.
2 Tsimmerval'dtsy i longetisty (The impressions 
and generalisations of Mr. Milyukov. 2 
Zimmerwaldists and Longuetists)
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160826(1)
160827(1)
160901(1)
160902(1)
160903(1)
160905(1)
160907(1)
('NS\ (194), 24.V1II.16)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr: 220000(3 )ff [in uncensored form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
[letter to the Editor]
Trans: Fr 'Ce qu'il faut dire, 26.V1II.16
"Bor'ba za valst'". Progressivno-kadetskaya 
Moskva i ministerstvo Shtyumera ("Struggle for 
power. Progressive-Kadet Moscow and Stumer's 
minstry)
('NS', 197), 27.VIII.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
"Guarantii mira" (K' kharakteristike patsifizma)
I ("A guarantee of peace" (Towards a 
characterisation of pacifism) I)
('NS\ (201), 1.IX.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: "Guarantii mira" (K kharakteristike patsifizma)
II ("A guarantee of peace" (Towards a 
characterisation of pacifism) II)
('NS', (202), 2.IX.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Poezdka deputata Chkheidze (Deputy 
Chkheidze's tour)
('NS', (203), 3.IX. 16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Stavka na siln'ykh' (Betting on the strong)
('NS', (204), 5.IX.16)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr: 270000(1) [in censored form]
-: "Solidnye argumenty" ("Solid arguments")
('NS', (206), 7.IX.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)
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160908(1)
160910(1)
160912(1)
160914(1)
160914(2)
160915(1)
160930(1)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: V' atmosphere neustoichivnosti i rastleniya (In 
an atmosphere of instability and depravity)
('NS', (207), 8.IX.16)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr: 220000(3)ff [in uncensored form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
'Prizyv" i ego Aleksinskii ('Prizyv' and its 
Aleksinskii)
('NS', (209), 10.1X.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Ale ksinskii go'Prizyv" (Aleksinskii and his 
'Prizyv')
('NS\ (210), 12.IX.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Novyi tsenzurnyi rezhim' (A new censor regime) 
('NS\ (212), 14.IX.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Frantsuzskii i nemetskii sotsial-patriotizm' 
chem' sushchnost' ppozitsii" longetistov'? (French 
and German social-patriotism. I In what does the 
opposition of the Longuetists consist of?)
('NS', (212), 14.IX.16)
[Part censored in 'NS']
Repr: 220000(3)ff [in uncensored form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Frantsuzskii i nemetskii sotsial-patriotizm' II. 
Longetizm' i nemetskoe "bol’shinstvo" (French and 
German social-patriotism II Longuetism and the 
German "majority")
('NS', (213), 15.IX.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
En': Rodnyya teni (Homeland shadows)
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161001(1)
161006(1)
161012(1)
161017(1)
161018(1)
161022(1)
('Nach’, (1), 30.IX.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
En': Prestupleniya i nakazanie (Crime and 
Punishment)
('Nach', (2), 1.X.16)
[Part censored in 'Nach']
-: Imperializm' i sotsializm' (Imperialism and 
socialism)
('Nach', (6), 6.X. 16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff [with changes]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Izyan' v' tverdom' kurse (The flaw in the hard 
way)
('Nach', (11), 12.X.16)
[Part censored in 'Nach']
Repr: 220000(3 )ff [in censored form]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Imperializm' i sotsializm' I (Po povodu 
germanskoi s-d konferentsii) (Imperialism and 
socialism I (On the German Social-Democratic 
Conference))
('Nach', (15), 17.X.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff [under title Soyuznik - ne 
edinomyshlennik (Allies - not like-minded 
thinkers)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Imperializm' i sotsializm' I (Po povodu 
germanskoi s-d konferentsii) (Imperialism and 
socialism II (On the German Social-Democratic 
Conference))
('Nach', (16), 18X16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff [under title Budushchee za 
spartakovtsami (The future belongs to the 
Spartacists)]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
En': Negodyai (A scoundrel)
('Nach', (20), 22X16)
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161024(1)
161025(1)
161102(1)
161103(1)
161105(1)
161118(1)
161202(1)
Repr: 220000(3)ff; 260000(17)
Trans: Eng 720000(25)
Fr 740118(1)
Sp 810000(4)
Imperializm' i sotsializm'. bor'ba za respubliku 
v' Germanii (Imperialism and socialism. The 
struggle for a republic in Germany)
('Nach', (21), 24.X. 16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff [under title Za respubliku ili za 
sotsializm? (For a republic or for socialism?)] 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Frits' Adler' (Fritz Adler)
('Nach', (22), 25.X.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff; 260000(17)
Trans: Eng 720000(25)
Fr 740118(1)
Sp 810000(4)
[letter to the Editor of 'Avanti' in Italian] 
(RTsKhlDNI, F.325, O. 1, D. 401)
K' poezdke deputata Chkheidze (Towards deputy 
Chkheidze's tour)
('Nach', (29), 3.XI.16)
Repr : 220000(3)ff [under title Eshche o poezdke 
deputata Chkheidze (More on deputy Chkheidze's 
tour)]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Privet' druz'yam' (Greetings to friends)
('Nach', (31), 5.XI.16)
N.Trotskii v' kadikse (N. Trotsky is in Cadix) 
('Nach', (42), 18.XI.16)
[Completely censored in 'Nach']
En': Ispanskaya "vpechatelniya". Pochti-arabskaya 
skazka (Spanish "impressions". Almost an Arabian 
tale)
('Nach', (54), 2.XII.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)
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161206
161227(1)
170115(1)
170115(2)
170116(1)
170116(2)
170116(3)
170120(1)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Tov. Trotskii vyslan1 iz' ispanii, sobiraetsya v' 
N'yu-Iorke (Comrade Trotsky has been exiled 
from Spain and is intending to come to New York) 
(’NM’ (NY), (851), 6.XII.16)
N. Trotskii: Vnusheniya "khefov"', otkroveniya 
"akhentov"' (The "chiefs" suggestions, the "agent's" 
revelations)
('Nach', (74), 27.XII.16)
Repr: 220000(3)ff; 270000(1); ’Krasnayanov', (7), 
1922
Trans: Am 'Living Age', 23.XI & 9.XII.22 
Fr 740118(1); 'Revue Mondiale' 
(150,151), 15.X & 1.XI.22
-: Tov. Trotskii v' N’yu-Iorke (Comrade Trotsky is 
in New York)
('NM' (NY), (885), 15.1.17)
[Interview]
('The Call’)
[Interview]
('Jewish Daily Forward', 16.1.17)
[Interview]
('The Call')
N. Trotskii: Da zdravstvuet' bor'ba! (Long live 
struggle!)
('NM'(NY), (886), 16.1.17)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
N. Trotskii: Uroki velikago goda. 9 yanvarya 1905- 
9 yanvarya 1917g (Lessons of a great year. 9 
January 1905- 9 January 1917)
(’NM1 (NY), (890), 20.1.17)
Repr : 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Eng 'Journal of Trotsky Studies', (I), VII.93.
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170125(1)
170126(1)
170130(1)
170201(1)
170201(1)
170202(1)
170202(2)
[Speech at a meeting in New York]
('NM'(NY), (890), 20.1.17)
(’NM1 (NY), (892), 23.1.17)
('NM'(NY), (893), 24.1.17)
('NM'(NY), (894), 25.1.17)
Repr : 220000(3)ff [under title Pod znamenem 
sotsial'noi revolyutsii (Under the banner of the 
social revolution)]
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
N. Trotskii: Za dva s' polovinoi goda voiny v'
Evrope (iz1 dnevnika) I. Serbskie terroristy i 
frantsuzskie "osvoboditeli" - Venskiya nastroeniya 
v1 pervyie dni voiny (For two and a half years of 
war in Europe (From a diary) I Serbian terrorists 
and the French "liberators" - The mood in Vienna 
in the first days of war)
('NM’ (NY), (895), 26.1.17)
Repr: 190000(10); 220000(3); 270000(1)
Trans: Am 180000(3)
Cz [190000(62)]
Fr 740118(1)
[How [Tsar] Nicholas operates in free France] 
(’Jewish Daily Forward', 30.1.17)
[The Russian government commits provocations in 
France]
('Jewish Daily Forward’, 1.II.17)
N. Trotskii: 'Vo frantsuzkom vagone. (Razgovory i 
razmyshleniya). I' (In a French railway carriage. 
(Conversations and Ruminations) I)
('NM' (NY), (900), 1.11.17)
[lecture in New York 'Rossiya i voina' (Russia and 
the war)]
('NM'(NY), (899), 31.1.17)
('NM' (NY), (900), 1.11.17)
('NM' (NY), (901), 2.11.17)
N. Trotskii: 'Vo frantsuzkom vagone. (Razgovory i 
razmyshleniya). IP (In a French railway carriage. 
(Conversations and Ruminations) II)
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170203(1)
170205(1)
170206(1)
170206(2)
170207(1)
170208(1)
170208(2)
('NM' (NY), (901), 2.11.17)
Al'fa: Dokumenty voiny (War documents)
('NM' (NY), (902), 3.11.17)
N. Trotskii: Za dva s' polovinoi goda voiny v' 
Evrope (iz1 dnevnika) II. Nastroeniya v' avstriiskoi 
s-d - Viktor' Adler' - Ot'ezde v' Tsurikh' (For two 
and a half years of war in Europe (From a diary)
II. The mood in Austrian Social-Democracy - 
Victor Adler - Departure for Zurich)
('NM' (NY), (903), 5.11.17)
Repr: 190000(10); 220000(3); 270000(1)
Trans: Am 180000(3)
Cz [190000(62)]
Eng 720000(25)
Fr 740118(1)
Sp 810000(4)
N. Trotskii: V’ shkole voiny (In the school of war) 
('NM' (NY), (904), 6.11.17)
Repr : 220000(3 )ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Tov. Trotskii v' N'yu-Iorke (Comrade Trotsky in 
New York)
('Nach', (108), 6.II.17)
N. Trotskii: Povtorenie proidennago (A repetition 
of things past)
('NM' (NY), (905), 7.11.17)
Repr: 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Bol'shoe obyazatel'stvo (Po povodu rezolyutsii 
mitinga v' Karnegi Goll) (A great obligation 
(Concerning the resolution of the meeting in 
Carnegie Hall))
('NM' (NY), (906), 8.11.17)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
[Speech at an anti-war meeting in New York]
('NM' (NY), (904), 6.11.17)
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170210(1)
170212(1)
170213(1)
170215(1)
170215(2)
170216(1)
170216(2)
170217(1)
(’NM' (NY), (905), 7.11.17)
('NM' (NY), (906), 8.II.17)
Lev' N. Trotskii: Tsarizm na respublikanskoi 
pochve. I(Tsarism on republican soil. I)
('NM' (NY), (908), 10.11.17)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118( 1)
Lev' N. Trotskii: Tsarizm na respublikanskoi 
pochve. II (Tsarism on republican soil. II)
('NM' (NY), (909), 12.11.17)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Lev' N. Trotskii: Karlu Tsetkin' lushche im' ostavit' 
v pokoe (Pis'mo v' redaktsiyu) (It would be better 
if they left Klara Zetkin in peace (Letter to the 
Editors))
(TNMf (NY), (910), 13.11.17)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
[What will American workers get from the war?] 
('Jewish Daily Forward’, 15.11.17)
[Speech at an anti-war meeting in New York]
('NM' (NY), (912), 15.11.17)
L. Trotskii: A vse-taki Karlu Tsetkin' naprasno 
trevozhite! (And all the same you have disturbed 
Klara Zetkin for nothing!)
(’NM1 (NY), (913), 16.11.17)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Tov. Trotskii v' N'yu-Iorke (Comrade Trotsky in 
New York)
('Nach', (116), 16.11.17)
[Part censord in 'Nach']
N. Trotskii: Za dva s' polovinoi goda voiny v' 
Evrope (iz’ dnevnika) III. "predatel'stvo nemtsev"
- Plekhanov' - Greilikh (For two and a half years
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170220(1)
170223(1)
170225(1)
170225(2)
170227(1)
170300(1)
of war in Europe (From a diary) III. "The betrayal 
of the Germans" - Plekhanov - Greulich)
(’NM' (NY), (914), 17.11.17)
Repr: 190000(10); 220000(3); 270000(1)
Trans: Am 180000(3)
Cz [190000(62)]
Fr 740118(1)
[Lecture in New York in German 'Priblizit' li 
vmeshatel'stvo Soed. Shtatov' konets voiny?' (Will 
American intervention bring the end of the war 
any closer?)]
('NM' (NY), 20.11.17)
Lev’ N. Trotskii: Nuzhno vybirat' put' (One has to 
choose the path)
('NM' (NY), (919), 23.11.17)
('Jewish Daily Forward', 23.11.17)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
[Speech at a meeting in New York to celebrate 
women’s day]
('NM'(NY), (918), 22.11.17)
('NM' (NY), (919), 23.11.17)
('NM' (NY), (920), 24.11.17)
[Speech at a meeting in Philadelphia]
('NM' (NY), (912), 15.11.17)
('NM' (NY), (917), 21.11.17)
('NM'(NY), (918), 22.11.17)
('NM'(NY), (919), 23.11.17)
('NM'(NY), (920), 24.11.17)
Lev' N. Trotskii: Chto govoril Internatsional o 
zashchite otechestva? (What did the International 
say about the defence of the homeland?)
('NM' (NY), (922), 27.11.17)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Zeier pazifism un user pazifism Wi azoy der 
burgeoiser pazifism fihrt zu militarizm 
('Zunkunft', 111.17)
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170302(1)
170303(1)
170303(2)
170304(1)
170306(1)
170306(2)
170306(3)
170306(4)
170306(5)
[Lecture in New York 'Tsimmerval'd i kintal" 
(Zimmerwald and Kienthal)
('NM' (NY), (924), 1.III.17)
('NM', (NY), (925), 2.III.17)
Lev' N. Trotskii: Na zap rosy chitateli. 0  Krasnom' 
Kreste. O Plehkanove (On readers' requests. About 
the Red Cross. About Plekhanov)
('NM' (NY), (926), 3.III.17)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Al'fa: U okna (At the window)
('NM' (NY), (926), 3.III.17)
Repr:270000(1)
[Speech at a meeting in Newark in German]
('NM' (NY), 28.11.17)
[Lecture to Jewish section of the American 
Socialist Party in New York 'Rabochoe dvizhene 
Evropy vo vremya voiny' (The European workers' 
movement during the war)]
('NM' (NY), (927), 5.III.17)
('NM' (NY), (928), 6.III.17)
[Lecture to Jewish section of the American 
Socialist Party in the Bronx, New York 'Voina i 
Internatsional'(War and the International)
('NM' (NY), (928), 6.III.17)
Lev' N. Trotskii: Obshchei pochvy s' "Forvertsom"
U Nas' Net' (There is no common soil between us 
and 'Forverts')
('NM' (NY), (928), 6.III.17)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Al'fa: Trezvyya mysli (Sobering thoughts)
('NM' (NY), (928)^6.111.17)
N. Trotskii: Za dva s' polovinoi goda voiny v' 
Evrope (iz' dnevnika) IV. Shveitsurskaya
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170307(1)
170308(1)
170308(2)
170308(3)
170309(1)
sotsialdemokratya - "Gryutli" - "Eintrakht" - Frits’ 
Platten' - Nemetskaya broshyura "Voina i 
Internatsional"’ - Sotsialisticheskaya pripiska k’ 
shtatu (For two and a half years of war in Europe 
(From a diary) IV. Swiss Social-Democracy - 
"Greutli" - "Eintracht" - Fritz Platten - German 
brochure "War and the International" - Socialist 
appendages to the General Staff)
(’NM1 (NY), (928), 6.III.17)
Repr: 190000(10); 220000(3); 270000(1)
Trans : Am 180000(3)
Cz [190000(62)]
Fr 740118(1)
Al’fa: Kto otgadaet? (Who can guess?)
(’NM’ (NY), (929), 7.III.17)
Repr: 270000(1)
-: Gotov’ye soldat’ revolyutsii (Prepare the soldiers 
for revolution)
('NM' (NY), (930), 8.III.17)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Lev' N. Trotskii: Dva voyuyushchikh lagerya (Two 
warring camps)
('NM’ (NY), (930), 8.III.17)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Al'fa: Opyat' otkryli dumu (They have opened the 
Duma once again)
('NM' (NY), (930), 8.III.17)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Eng 'Journal of Trotsky Studies', (1), VII.93
Lev' N. Trotskii: Dlya chego Amerike voina? (What 
is the war to America?)
('NM' (NY), (931), 9.111.17)
Repr: 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
170309(2) Al'fa: Zatrudneniya chitatelya (Readers'
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170309(3)
170310(1)
170311(1)
170313(1)
170313(2)
170314(1)
170314(2)
difficulties)
('NM' (NY), (931), 9.III.17)
Repr: 270000(1)
L.N.T.: Nepravda! (Untrue!)
(’NM’ (NY), (931), 9.III.17)
Repr : 220000(3 )ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Al'fa: Zhvachka (Chewing gum)
('NM' (NY), (932), 10.IIL17)
[Speech at a branch meeting of the Russian section 
of the American Socialist Party in Newark]
('NM' (NY), (923), 28.11.17)
('NM' (NY), (931), 9.III.17)
('NM' (NY), (932), 10.111.17)
Lev' N. Trotskii: U poroga revolyutsii (On the 
threshold of revolution)
('NM' (NY), (934), 13.111.17)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Jap 'Trotsky Studies', (5), Autumn 92 
Eng 'Journal of Trotsky Studies', (1), VII.93
Al'fa: Pravosudie na kryshe (Justice on the roof) 
('NM' (NY), (934), 13.111.17)
[Lecture to a meeting in aid of victims of the 
Russian revolution 'Revolyutsionnyya traditsii i 
perspektivy' (Revolutionary traditions and 
perspectives)]
('NM' (NY), (933), 12.111.17)
('NM' (NY), (934), 13.111.17)
('NM' (NY), (935), 14.111.17)
-: Neobkhodimo ochishchenie riadov; rol' 
"Forvertsa" v' evreiskom rabochem dvizhenii (A 
necessary cleansing of the ranks; the role of 
"Forverts" in the Jewish workers' movement)
('NM' (NY), (935), 14.111.17)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
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170315(1)
170315(2)
170316(1)
170316(2)
170317(1)
170317(2)
170318(1)
Baran'ya konstitutsiya. (Konferentsiya Gompersa 
i Ko) (A sheep's constiution. Gompers & Co.'s 
conference))
('NM' (NY), (936), 15.111.17)
Repr : 220000(3 )ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Lev' N. Trotskii: Nespokoino v' Evrope (Unrest in 
Europe)
('NM' (NY), (936), 15.111.17)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
-: Revoiyutsiya v' Rossii (Revolution in Russia) 
('NM' (NY), (937), 16.111.17)
Repr : 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Eng 'Journal of Trotsky Studies’, (1), VII.93
Al'fa: Obrabotka i pozolota (Processing and 
guilding)
('NM' (NY), (937), 16.111.17)
Repr: 270000(1)
Pod' znamenem' kommuny (Under the banner of 
the Commune)
('NM' (NY), (938), 17.111.17)
Repr: 220000(3)ff
Trans: Am 'NMil', 21.111.36; 701200(l)ff 
Eng 'WIN', II-III.46; 550900(1)
Sin 510000(1)
Fr 580000(7); 740118(1)
Lev' N. Trotskii: Dva litsa. (Vnutrenniya sily 
russkoi revolyutsii) (Two faces. The internal forces 
of the Russian revolution)
('NM' (NY), (938), 17.111.17)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Jap 'Trotsky Studies', (5), Autumn 92 
Eng 'Journal of Trotsky Studies', (1), VII.93
[Speech to a meeting of the Jewish section of the
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170319(1)
170320(1)
170320(2)
170320(3)
170321(1)
American Socialist Party in the Bronx, New York in 
memory of the Paris Commune]
('NM' (NY), (938), 17.111.17)
Lev' N. Trotskii: Narostayushchii konflikt 
(Vnutrenniya sily revolyutsii) (The growing 
conflict (The internal forces of the revolution)) 
('NM' (NY), (940), 19.111.17)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Jap Trotsky Studies’, (5), Autumn 92 
Eng 'Journal of Trotsky Studies', (1), VII.93
[Speech to a meeting on the Russian revolution in 
New York]
('NM' (NY), (938), 17.111.17)
('NM' (NY), (940), 19.111.17)
('NM' (NY), (941), 20.111.17)
('NM' (NY), (943), 22.111.17)
Voina ili mir'? (Vnutrenniya sily revolyutsii) 
(War or Peace? (The internal forces of the 
revolution))
('NM' (NY), (941), 20.111.17)
Repr : 220000(3 )ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Jap Trotsky Studies', (5), Autumn 92 
Eng 'Journal of Trotsky Studies', (1), VII.93
-: G-n Kagan', kak istolkovatel' russkoi revolyutsii 
pered' rabochimi N’yu Iorka (Mr Cahan as a 
commentator on the Russian revolution to the 
workers of New York)
('NM' (NY), (941), 20.111.17)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Lev' N. Trotskii: Ot' kogo i kak' zashchishchat' 
revolyutsii? (From whom and how to defend the 
revolution?)
('NM' (NY), (942), 21.111.17)
Repr: 220000(3)ff 
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Jap Trotsky Studies', (5), Autumn 92
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170322(1)
170322(2)
170322(3)
170323(1)
170324(1)
170325(1)
170325(2)
170326(1)
Eng ’Journal of Trotsky Studies', (1), VII.93
Voina i revolyutsii (War and revolution)
('NM' (NY), (943), 22.111.17)
Repr: 220000(3)ff; 270000(1)
Trans: Fr 740118(1)
Kto izmenniki? (Who are the traitors?)
('NM' (NY), (943), 22.111.17)
N. Trotskii: Za dva s' polovinoi goda voiny v' 
Evrope (izf dnevnika) V. Pereezde vo Frantsie - 
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